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Abstract
The action programming language Golog has proven to be a useful means for the high-level
control of autonomous agents such as mobile robots. It is based on the Situation Calculus,
a dialect of classical first-order logic, that is used to encode dynamic domains through logical
axioms. Perhaps the greatest advantage of Golog is that a user can write programs which
constrain the search for an executable plan in a flexible manner.
However, when general planning is needed, Golog supports this only in principle, but does
not measure up with state-of-the-art planners, most of which are based on the plan language
PDDL. On the other hand, planning formalisms and systems lack the expressiveness of Golog
that make it suited for realistic scenarios of agents with partial world knowledge acting in
dynamic environments. We therefore propose an integration of Golog and planning where
planning subtasks encountered during the execution of a Golog program are referred to a
PDDL planner, thus combining Golog’s expressiveness with the efficiency of modern planners.
The theoretical justification for such an embedding is provided in the form of relating state
updates in PDDL to the progression of a certain form of theories of the modal Situation
Calculus variant ES. We complement these results with an empirical evaluation that shows that
equipping Golog with a PDDL planner indeed pays off in terms of the runtime performance.
Moreover, before deploying a Golog program onto a robot, it is often desirable to verify
that certain requirements are met, typical examples including safety, liveness and fairness condi-
tions. Since autonomous robots typically perform open-ended tasks, the corresponding control
programs are often non-terminating. Analyzing such programs so far requires manual, meta-
theoretic arguments involving complex fixpoint constructions, which is tedious and error-prone.
In this thesis, we propose an extension to ES that includes new modal operators to express
temporal properties of Golog programs. We then provide algorithms for the automated ver-
ification of such properties, relying on a newly introduced graph representation for Golog
programs which enables a systematic exploration of the state space. Similar to other forms
of reasoning in the Situation Calculus, our verification methods ultimately reduce to classical
first-order theorem proving.

Zusammenfassung
Die Aktionsprogrammiersprache Golog hat sich als nu¨tzliches Mittel zur High-Level-Steuerung
autonomer Agenten wie z.B. mobiler Roboter erwiesen. Sie basiert auf dem Situationskalku¨l,
einem Dialekt klassischer Logik der ersten Stufe, welcher zur Darstellung dynamischer Anwen-
dungsdoma¨nen mittels logischer Axiome verwendet wird. Der wahrscheinlich gro¨ßte Vorteil von
Golog ist, daß es die Formulierung von Programmen erlaubt, die den Suchraum mo¨glicher
Ausfu¨hrungspla¨ne auf flexible Weise einschra¨nken.
Wenn jedoch generelles Planen beno¨tigt wird, so unterstu¨tzt Golog dies zwar prinzip-
iell, kann sich aber nicht mit Planern auf dem aktuellen Stand der Technik messen, die auf
der Plansprache PDDL basieren. Andererseits fehlt Planformalismen und -systemen die Aus-
drucksma¨chtigkeit von Golog, durch die es sich fu¨r realistische Szenarien von Agenten mit nur
partiellem Weltwissen in dynamischen Umgebungen eignet. In dieser Arbeit schlagen wir daher
eine Integration von Golog und Planen vor, bei der wa¨hrend der Ausfu¨hrung eines Golog-
Programms angetroffene Planungssubprobleme an einen PDDL-Planer delegiert werden, und so
die Ausdrucksma¨chtigkeit vonGologmit der Effizienz eines modernen Planers kombiniert wird.
Die theoretische Grundlage einer solchen Einbettung wird in Form einer Abbildung zwischen
Zustandsaktualisierungen in PDDL und der Progression einer bestimmten Form von Theorien
der modalen Situationskalku¨lvariante ES erbracht. Wir komplementieren diese Ergebnisse mit
einer empirischen Evaluierung, die zeigt, daß die Ausstattung eines Golog-Systems mit einem
PDDL-Planer tatsa¨chlich eine deutliche Verbesserung der Laufzeitperformanz mit sich bringt.
U¨berdies ist es ha¨ufig wu¨nschenswert, vor dem Deployment eines Golog-Programms auf
einen Roboter zu verifizieren, daß es bestimmte Voraussetzungen erfu¨llt, etwa bezu¨glich Sicher-
heit, Liveness und Fairness. Da autonome Roboter meist fortwa¨hrende Aufgaben erfu¨llen,
sind die entsprechenden Steuerungsprogramme u¨blicherweise nicht-terminierend. Bislang wur-
den solche Programme mittels manueller, meta-theoretischer Beweisfu¨hrungen und komplexer
Fixpunkt-Konstruktionen analysiert, was mu¨hsam und fehleranfa¨llig ist. In dieser Arbeit schla-
gen wir eine Erweiterung der Logik ES vor, die neue Modaloperatoren zur Formulierung tempo-
raler Eigenschaften von Golog-Programmen einfu¨hrt. Wir pra¨sentieren daru¨berhinaus Algo-
rithmen zur automatischen Verifikation solcher Eigenschaften, die auf einer systematischen Er-
forschung des Zustandsraums mithilfe einer neuen Graph-Darstellung von Golog-Programmen
basieren. A¨hnlich wie andere Formen des Reasonings im Situationskalku¨l ko¨nnen unsere Veri-
fikationsverfahren schlußendlich auf klassisches Theorem-Beweisen in Logik erster Stufe zuru¨ck-
gefu¨hrt werden.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Artificial Intelligence (AI) can roughly be defined as the study of intelligent agents, where an
agent is an entity that perceives its surroundings through sensors (for example cameras and
laser range finders) and acts upon its environment by means of actuators (e.g. robotic arms and
wheels). While this broad definition includes a huge range of applications such as computer game
characters, automated lawn-mowers and self-driving cars, one of AI’s most appealing visions
is to build intelligent, autonomous robots that cooperate and interact with human beings in a
natural way, that are capable of dynamically adapting to new situations, and that can learn to
fulfill all kinds of desired tasks which they have not explicitly been programmed for.
Although reality is still somewhat behind the promises made in popular culture science
fiction [Asi82], substantial progress has been made since the pioneering work on the robot
“Shakey” at the Stanford Research Institute in the 1960s and early 1970s [Nil84] and landmark
projects such as the museum tour guide robot “Rhino” [BCF+99]. Symptomatic for the growing
interest in robotics are the advent of robotics competitions like the ones offered by the Robocup
initiative [KAK+97]. Whereas it started as a series of tournaments for Soccer-playing robots,
the scope of Robocup has since expanded to include application domains that get closer to the
above-mentioned vision of robot companions interacting with humans in domestic and workplace
environments. This holds in particular for the “Robocup@Home” league [vdZW07], where
the objective is to develop service robotic systems that assist people in their everyday lives
within home environments. The robot Caesar [SFL12a, NFBL10] developed by the team of the
Aachen Knowledge-Based Systems Group is one example for a robotic system that successfully
participated at Robocup@Home competitions.
While nowadays there exist robust approaches for many low-level tasks such as navigation,
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collision avoidance and localization, the question of how the high-level control of an autonomous
robot in a dynamic, incompletely known environment can be designed to let it behave intelli-
gently is still an issue that is subject of active research. The field of Cognitive Robotics [LL08]
is concerned with developing “an understanding of the relationship between the knowledge, the
perception, and the action of such a robot” [LR98].
To choose its actions, an intelligent agent has to maintain an internal representation of its
own state and that of its environment. Typically, especially in the case of a mobile robot, the
agent will only have incomplete knowledge about its surroundings. For example, it may be
fully aware of objects and people in the same room, but ignorant of who is currently present in
the room next door, unless it takes action and uses its sensors in order to gather the missing
information. Furthermore, there may be facts that are not explicitly known to the agent, but
that can be deduced from what it knows by means of reasoning. For instance, if fragile objects
are known to break when being dropped, and when the agent believes1 that the vase it is holding
is a fragile object, then it can infer that it better not drop the vase. The subarea of AI that
studies formalisms for the symbolic representation of knowledge and corresponding inference
methods is called Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR) [BL04]. Its goal is to encode
human knowledge in a way that it can be put to use in an automated system, which is best
summarized by the Knowledge Representation Hypothesis [Smi82]:
“Any mechanically embodied intelligent process will be comprised of structural in-
gredients that a) we as external observers naturally take to represent a propositional
account of the knowledge that the overall process exhibits, and b) independent of
such external semantical attribution, play a formal but causal and essential role in
engendering the behavior that manifests that knowledge.”
That is to say we speak of a knowledge-based system whenever two criteria are met: First, there
is something within the system (in the following called its knowledge base) that can easily be
understood as propositions, i.e. declarative statements that can be either true or false. Second,
it is required that these propositions indeed determine how the system behaves.
The knowledge-based approach is thus especially appealing when the set of tasks the system
is supposed to perform is not fixed in advance, in which case there are often more efficient task-
specific solutions, but rather open-ended. Clearly this is the case in the intelligent domestic
robot scenario. For instance, the robot may at some point learn that books are typically in the
library. While there may be no current use for that information, it may become important later
on with new tasks imposed on the robot. Moreover, a knowledge-based system can be designed
1In this thesis, we use the terms “knowledge” and “belief” as synonyms.
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to justify and explain its behaviour. If the robot is told to get a certain book, and we want
to know why it starts moving towards the library, then it may answer that this is because it
believes the book to be in the library.
Much speaks in favour of taking a logical approach to KR, where the knowledge base is
a collection of formulas in some logical language such as propositional logic or first-order logic
(FOL). It is certainly possible to represent an agent’s knowledge through natural languages such
as English or German, but due to their sheer endless expressiveness, it is very difficult to process
statements of this kind by a computer program. Logics however provide a good compromise
between human-comprehensibility on the one hand and the availability of powerful reasoning
tools on the other hand. With the logical approach, reasoning reduces to logical entailment, and
thus to just another form of mechanical symbol manipulation that computers are particularly
well suited for.
As opposed to other approaches where knowledge is represented subsymbollically, for ex-
ample through neural nets [MP43], or in a symbolic, yet non-logical manner, e.g. graphically
or procedurally [Min75], one of the main advantages of the logic-based approach lies in the
fact that the corresponding formally well-founded, declarative semantics makes the represented
knowledge and the behaviour it induces much easier to comprehend. Thus, a logical repre-
sentation of knowledge not only constitutes the basis for high-level, abstract problem solving,
arguably a paramount ingredient for complex intelligent behaviour, but also allows for a formal
analysis and verification of the system and its properties.
Regarding the question of what logic is the most appropriate for the purpose of representing
an agent’s knowledge, a well accepted opinion is that at least the expressive power of FOL is
required. According to Moore [Moo82], the two main reasons for this are that FOL describes
the world in terms of objects, their properties and relations, together with the fact that it is
capable to express incomplete information so well. Obviously, a domestic robot has to deal with
objects, properties and relations and, as argued above, its knowledge is usually incomplete.
Classical FOL by itself is however not enough due to its inherently static nature. Since
agents live in dynamic worlds, it is rather necessary to account for changes to the objects’
properties and relations, be they caused by the agent’s actions or exogenously. The Situation
Calculus [MH69, Rei01a] is a dialect of first-order logic (with some second-order features) for
reasoning about such dynamic domains, and it is probably the best known and most widely
studied action logic. It constitutes the basis for the expressive high-level agent programming
language Golog [LRL+97] in the sense that axioms in the Situation Calculus are used to define
the preconditions and effects of actions, and Golog allows to compose complex behaviours out
of those actions. The latter may contain on the one hand deterministic constructs as known
4 1 INTRODUCTION
from imperative programming languages, and on the other hand nondeterministic operators
that leave a choice to the system and have to be resolved through search. In addition to the
high expressiveness that arises from its Situation Calculus basis, one of the greatest advantages
of Golog is that it is thus possible to freely combine programming with planning. Variants of
Golog have already been successfully applied to the control of autonomous robots such as the
above mentioned Rhino and Caesar.
Despite its popularity, the original Situation Calculus is problematic in certain respects. This
becomes particularly apparent in extensions that include epistemic modalities [Rei01b, SL03].
The latter allow formulas to not only express statements about the state of the world, but
also the agent’s knowledge and lack thereof, thus allowing for introspective agents that can
reason about what they know and what they do not know, and how their knowledge is affected
by sensing. However, the corresponding Situation Calculus axiomatization of a possible-world
semantics [Hin62, Kri63] is quite involved and to some extends leads to counter-intuitive results.
Model-theoretic proofs of meta-theoretical properties moreover tend to be lengthy and tedious.
For that reason, Lakemeyer and Levesque introduced the logic ES [LL10, Lak10] which can be
viewed as a modal variant of the epistemic Situation Calculus, where belief and action is encoded
through modalities whose meaning is defined within the (non-classical) semantics of the logic,
rather than axiomatically. This allows for a better readable syntax and much easier proofs,
while all the benefits of the Situation Calculus are retained, including its reasoning methods,
its first-order expressiveness, and Golog.
Unfortunately, a common theme in KR is that more expressiveness almost always comes at
the price of less tractability: In more expressive formalisms, reasoning is computationally much
harder, and in the case of FOL even undecidable. For this reason, practical implementations of
Golog-based agents typically apply harsh restrictions in order to ensure tractability, thus losing
a great deal of expressiveness. Closely related to this issue is the problem of Logical Omniscience
[Hin79]: Formally, an agent knows all logical consequences of the beliefs in its knowledge base
as well as all tautologies. In practice, the resources of an agent are however bounded, and with
limited memory and time, not all inferences can be derived explicitly. Clearly, humans are not
logically omniscient as we are not always instantly aware of all implications of the information
that we possess. On the contrary, at times it can rather be quite cumbersome if not impossible
to come to certain conclusions.
1.1.1 Planning
It was recognized quite early that controlling an agent solely based on logical entailment is
infeasible, which gave rise to the AI subarea of Planning, starting with the introduction of the
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STRIPS planner [FN71] for the robot Shakey in the early 1970s. Whereas work on action
logics such as the Situation Calculus was concerned with formalisms of high expressiveness,
planning research focused primarily on efficiency to obtain formalisms and methods that exhibit
good computational performance. Despite their common origin, the two fields developed rather
independently from each other for over two decades.
One could observe a sudden thrust of progress made in the area of planning in the last
one and a half decades. Again, this was in large part due to the upcoming of an international
competition by means of which systems by different researchers could be benchmarked and
evaluated on a common basis. In particular, the Planning Domain Definition Language PDDL
[GHK+98] that is used as the input language for the planners participating at the biennially
held International Planning Competition (IPC) has become a de-facto standard for the formu-
lation of planning domains and problems since its introduction in 1998. It extends the very
simple STRIPS formalism by various features such as conditional effects, durative actions and
concurrency. Today, there is a multitude of planning systems that proved their efficiency at
the IPC, and that use a variety of different techniques and approaches such as propositional
satisfiability, forward search or partial-order planning, to name but a few.
In many agent scenarios, and especially in the case of an autonomous domestic robot, one
often encounters subproblems that are rather combinatorial in nature, such as scheduling cur-
rently pending requests, planning a route, or a combination of these two. For example, the
robot may have to decide in which order to serve coffee to people, when to get the mail and
deliver it to its recipients, and come up with an appropriate path through the building to do
so. When it comes to such pure, classical planning tasks, state-of-the-art planning systems
usually outperform any current implementation of Golog. One may then be tempted to ask
why Golog is needed at all, for which there are at least two good reasons.
First, the restricted expressiveness of planning languages allow their application only for
certain subproblems. In particular, at least in what constitutes the main area of classical,
sequential planning, complete information about the problem at hand is required. Therefore,
planning is appropriate for tasks like scheduling and routing a robot, but a more expressive logic
is still needed to represent and reason about incomplete knowledge, e.g. regarding the current
location of people and objects.
Second, in an agent system whose design follows the classical sense-plan-act scheme, planning
only constitutes one building block, and there has to be some meta-level control to update the
knowledge base according to exogenous events and sensing results, to monitor the execution of
the actions in a chosen plan, and to trigger replanning in case a currently executed plan fails.
Often, the integration of a planner into such a system is only ad-hoc and meta-theoretic. To
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a large degree, this is because it has somewhat been neglected to study the formal semantics
of the involved planning languages. In fact, there was not any research on a formal account of
STRIPS until the mid-1980s [Lif87]. Moreover, the semantic definitions that were proposed
heavily rely on meta-theoretic operations on logical theories. It was not until the 1990s that
the first purely declarative semantics for STRIPS was presented by Lin and Reiter [LR97] who
show the correspondence of STRIPS operators to a certain form of Situation Calculus axioms.
This does not only provide a deeper understanding of STRIPS that for instance allows it
to be generalized to knowledge bases with only incomplete information. It also allows for a
semantically well-founded embedding of STRIPS planning into a Golog system, where the
latter is responsible for the overall control, including sensing updates and plan monitoring. It
seems desirable to be able to extend this approach to more expressive sublanguages of PDDL
in order to exploit the most recent progress in state-of-the-art planning systems.
1.1.2 Verification
Before deploying a Golog program to the actual robot and executing it in the physical world,
it is often desirable if not crucial to verify that it indeed fulfills its intended purpose and meets
certain requirements such as safety, liveness and fairness conditions. For example, we may
want to ensure that every request for coffee is eventually served by the robot, and that it
never runs out of energy, but always returns to its charging station in time. In this respect,
the design and implementation of a Golog agent is no different from industrial hardware and
software development in general, where verification is an important and critical step in the
overall development process.
In many scenarios, in particular that of an autonomous robot performing an open-ended task,
the corresponding control program is a non-terminating one. Surprisingly, the verification of
non-terminating Golog programs has so far received very little attention within the Situation
Calculus research community, with a few notable exceptions. De Giacomo, Ternovska and
Reiter [GTR97] show how the semantics of non-terminating processes can be defined by means
of (second-order) Situation Calculus axioms, how properties can be expressed using second-
order fixpoint formulas, and that it is then possible to prove the satisfaction of these properties
given the aforementioned axioms.
Apart from the fact that second-order formulas, inductive fixpoint definitions and the un-
derlying µ-calculus are typically difficult to grasp even for the mathematically inclined, and all
the more so for a Golog programmer who may not be an expert in logic, problematic about
this approach is that properties are proven manually, which is not only tedious, but also prone
to errors. It would rather be desirable if verification could be done automatically by means of
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appropriate algorithms.
The formal verification of non-terminating processes has been the subject of research on
model checking [CGP99, BK08] since its introduction in the mid-1980s. Typically, the system
is represented through some kind of graph structure (its model) and the property in question
is expressed in some temporal logic. In addition to the fact that this kind of representation is
very human-comprehensible, it allows to basically reduce the satisfaction of the property to a
graph-theoretical problem, and thus solve it efficiently.
In the face of the abundance of formalisms and methods the field has come up with, it is
conceivable to use existing model checking tools for the verification of non-terminating Golog
programs. However, the underlying formalisms are usually chosen very carefully to ensure
decidability or even tractability of the method. Consequently, they are of very restricted ex-
pressiveness, in particular regarding first-order quantification, which is either supported only
in a very limited fashion, or not at all. On the other hand, as argued above, the first-order
expressiveness of the Situation Calculus is considered a desirable feature that one would rather
not give up, but the reason why we chose the language in the first place. It seems preferable
to be able to do the verification in the very same expressive formalism and with the very same
reasoning methods that we use for the actual control and specification of our agent.
1.2 Objectives and Contributions
For the above stated reasons, the goal of this thesis is to study both planning and verification
in the agent language Golog. In both cases, this is to be done in a semantically well-founded,
preferably declarative manner, as opposed to a meta-theoretic ad-hoc integration. In particular,
the contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• Foundations for knowledge-based agents using ES
A formal account of knowledge-based agents on the basis of the logic ES is provided. This
includes the integration of various reasoning procedures to handle actions, sensing and
knowledge, an ES-based transition semantics for a rich variant of Golog, as well as a
formal interface definition for the meta-level control that implements the sense-plan-act
cycle of the agent.
• Declarative semantics of PDDL in ES
The semantics that has been provided for the planning language PDDL so far [FL03] is
only meta-theoretic and at times hard to grasp. Similar to Lin and Reiter’s treatment
of STRIPS, in this thesis, a declarative semantics for an expressive subset of PDDL
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is presented that not only helps to further our understanding of the language, but that
is also the basis for the embedding of efficient state-of-the-art planners into Golog. An
empirical evaluation shows that such an embedding is indeed highly advantageous in terms
of the increase of the overall runtime performance of the system.
• The logic ESG
An extension of the logic ES is given that includes new modal operators in order to
express properties of both terminating and non-terminating Golog programs. With a
syntax resembling classical dynamic logic [HKT00], the new modalities contain Golog
programs as arguments whose execution traces they quantify over. To describe or constrain
these traces, formulas may moreover contain modal operators known from temporal logics
[Eme90] such as “always”, “eventually”, and “until”. Similar in spirit to the original
ES, the meaning of these operators is defined within the logic’s semantics, rather than
axiomatically.
• Verification algorithms for ESG
Finally, algorithms are provided for the automated verification of terminating and non-
terminating Golog programs. The presented procedures constitute reasoning methods for
different subsets of ESG formulas. They rely on a newly introduced graph representation for
Golog programs called characteristic graphs in order to systematically explore the state
space by means of an iterative fixpoint approximation. Similar to other forms of reasoning
in the Situation Calculus, the verification of ESG formulas thus ultimately reduces to
classical first-order theorem proving. Because of the semi-decidability of FOL, only the
soundness of the methods can be guaranteed.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents related work for the areas of action logics, planning and verification. Its
purpose is to provide a rough overview of the fields, without making any claim to be
exhaustive. Work more specifically related to the contents of this thesis will be discussed
within the individual chapters.
Chapter 3 gives the logical foundations for the remainder of this thesis. After motivating its
use, the syntax and the semantics of the logic ES is introduced, followed by the ES variants
of established Situation Calculus concepts such as basic action theories, regression and
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progression. Furthermore, reasoning with belief modalities and sensing is discussed, after
which the language Golog is presented, alongside with an ES-based transition semantics.
Finally, it is shown how all these ingredients can be put together to build a knowledge-
based agent. Parts of this chapter are based on [CL06a].
Chapter 4 is dedicated to planning in Golog. It starts with a formal definition of a declara-
tive semantics in terms of a mapping to ES basic action theories for an important fragment
of the planning language PDDL that extends basic STRIPS by arbitrary preconditions
and conditional effects, among other things. Afterwards, the thus theoretically justified
embedding of state-of-the-art PDDL planners in Golog is discussed and evaluated em-
pirically. This chapter is based on material that was previously published in [CL06b],
[ENLC06], [CELN07], [CELR08], and [CRLN12].
Chapter 5 deals with the verification of Golog programs, beginning with the language
definition of the logic ESG, followed by the introduction of the concept of characteristic
graphs as a means for representing Golog programs. The main results are then provided
in the form of verification algorithms for different subsets of ESG. First, properties of
non-terminating Golog programs are considered that are expressed in a fragment that
resembles a first-order variant of the classical temporal logic CTL. Next, a more expressive
class of properties is addressed that is similar to CTL∗. Finally, we discuss the verification
of postconditions of terminating Golog programs and sketch an implementation based
on binary decision diagrams. This chapter is an extended version of what was presented
in [CL08] and [CL10].
Chapter 6 concludes with a summary and an outlook on future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
The purpose of this chapter is to put this thesis and its contribution into the context of past
and current research on action formalisms (Section 2.1), planning (Section 2.2), and agent
verification (Section 2.3).
2.1 Action Formalisms
The idea of using a logical formalism for building intelligent agents is almost as old as the
field of Artificial Intelligence itself. McCarthy [McC59] envisioned a system called advice taker
that represents information about the state of the world, the system’s capabilities as well as its
goals declaratively, i.e. by means of propositions expressed as formulas in some logical language.
As opposed to classical imperatively programmed systems in which all eventualities need to be
foreseen by the programmer, advice taker would be able to deduce the right course of action by
inferring it from the formulas in its memory.
The advice taker however was not much more than an idea, and McCarthy’s description
of its underlying language and deduction method was rather sketchy. Subsequent work on
defining an appropriate formalism eventually led to the introduction of the Situation Calculus
in [McC63, MH69], where McCarthy and Hayes discuss how a dialect of first- (and higher-)
order predicate logic can be used to express facts about the state of the world, the abilities of
an agent, and the effects of its actions.
Although their presentation was again still at an informal level, they already recognized a
major challenge in the logical formalization of an agent, which they called the frame problem:
To be able to reason about whether a certain course of action will bring about some goal, it is
not sufficient to only encode what changes result as effects of an action, but also what remains
unchanged by it. While an encoding of the direct, intended effects of an action is typically
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straightforward as there are usually only few of them, manually identifying and formalizing all
invariants is a somewhat hopeless endeavour because of their sheer number. As an example, the
action open(window) will cause the window to be opened, but it will leave unaffected what the
colour of the window is, whether the door is open or closed, where the furniture is positioned,
what the weather is like, who the chancellor of Germany is and so on.
The frame problem was not the only hurdle the Situation Calculus had to overcome before
achieving its today’s prominence. In his seminal paper, Green [Gre69] proposes to represent a
mobile robot’s actions and environment by Situation Calculus axioms and then generate plans
using constructive resolution-based theorem proving. The pioneering robotic project Shakey
at SRI (Stanford Research Institute) was first based on Green’s account of planning. Due
to the approach’s computational inefficiency it was however quite soon abandoned in favor of
the STRIPS (“Stanford Research Institute Problem Solver”) system [FN71], which allowed
for a more efficient search-based planning method at the cost of limited expressiveness: action
effects were simply represented by lists of literals that have to be added to or deleted from the
description of the current world state. When people nowadays speak of STRIPS, it is usually
this representation language that they are referring to, rather than the underlying algorithmic
approach, as the former has been far more influential than the latter. Nonetheless it is justified
to say that the work on STRIPS gave rise to what has become today one of the most important
subareas of AI, namely that of planning, which we will discuss in more detail in Section 2.2.
Since then research on action formalisms developed rather independently from that on plan-
ning, despite the two fields’ common origin. Whereas work on planning was more focused
on developing efficient and practicable systems, action logic researchers concentrated more on
expressive formalisms and the fundamental theoretical issues underlying them. In particular,
the Situation Calculus gained new momentum with a solution to the above mentioned frame
problem that is due to Reiter [Rei91], who combined ideas from earlier proposals by Pednault
[Ped89], Davis [Dav90], Haas [Haa87], and Schubert [Sch90]. Alongside with the so-called suc-
cessor state axioms that constitute the core of Reiter’s solution, he presents a corresponding
regression method that allows to transform a formula about what will be true after doing certain
actions into an equivalent formula only describing the current situation. Since regression is a
purely syntactic manipulation, reasoning about actions and change thus becomes easier as all
dynamic aspects can be eliminated before the actual theorem proving is applied.
Regression is thus a solution to the projection problem, which means to decide whether some
formula will hold after executing a sequence of actions, given a background axiomatization of
the current situation as well as preconditions and effects of actions. While regression solves
this problem quite elegantly, it also has its drawbacks. First, the size of the regression result
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usually grows exponentially with the number of actions involved. Regression thus soon becomes
infeasible as a robot that has been operating for some time has typically accumulated a rather
long history of actions. Furthermore, such a history likely contains many redundancies, for
example an open(window) action that is later on undone by means of close(window). An
alternative to transforming a query property backwards is to instead update the knowledge
base forwards through the actions that have been performed so far, which is commonly referred
to as progression. The latter lets an agent keep only information that is relevant for the present
and future and “forget” everything else. Ideally, a robot performs progression during phases of
“mental idle time” where it is busy performing physical actions (like moving from one room to
the next), but is not occupied cognitively. Based on Reiter’s formalization of successor state
axioms, Lin and Reiter [LR97] present a model-theoretic account of progression and study its
properties. Unfortunately, their analysis comes with a strong negative result: In general, a
first-order knowledge base may not possess a progression that is in turn expressable through
first-order logic. However, they discuss a variety of restricted classes of theories for which a first-
order progression is guaranteed to exist, including one that corresponds to the above mentioned
STRIPS formalism.
Today, the formalization of the Situation Calculus developed by Reiter and his colleagues
at the Toronto Cognitive Robotics Group [LPR98, PR99, Rei01a] is the most widely used and
deeply studied one. Among other things, it has since been extended to include a variety of
features such as indirect effects [Lin95, Lin96], continuous processes [Pin94, Rei96, Pin98], and
a probabilistic notion of uncertainty [BHL95]. To account for the fact that real-word agents only
possess incomplete information and have to be able to reason about their knowledge and how it
is affected by their actions, Moore [Moo79, Moo85] adapted the standard possible-world model
of knowledge from epistemic modal logic [Hin62, Kri63] for the Situation Calculus. Scherl and
Levesque [SL93, SL03] presented a solution to the frame problem for knowledge, alongside with a
corresponding regression method. Lakemeyer and Levesque propose the logic ES [LL04, LL05a]
as an alternative that overcomes some shortcomings of earlier formalizations of knowledge and
action in the Situation Calculus by using modal operators for action and knowledge similar to
dynamic logic [HKT00] and epistemic logic [Kri63], respectively, and by fixing their meaning
semantically rather than axiomatically.
Reiter’s concise solution to the frame problem also lead to the development of the high-level
agent programming language Golog (for alGOL in LOGic) [LRL+97]. It allows to construct
complex behaviours out of high-level actions by combining them on the one hand through control
structures known from imperative programming languages such as conditionals, loops, and
recursive procedures. On the other hand, Golog programs can also contain nondeterministic
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constructs that leave choices to the system and have to be resolved through some form of
lookahead. Hence, the programmer can freely combine programming and planning within a
Golog program such that the system concentrates its computational effort where it is actually
needed. Semantically, Golog is defined by a meta-theoretic operation that macro-expands
a program to a Situation Calculus formula. In principle, all it thus takes to build a Golog
interpreter is an implementation of Reiter’s regression mechanism together with a theorem
prover.
Since its first introduction, numerous variants of Golog have been proposed. ConGolog
[GLL00] extends the original language by concurrency, interrupts, and exogenous actions. It
also comes with an alternative semantics where second-order Situation Calculus axioms define
single-step transitions of programs and the conditions under which they can terminate. Lake-
meyer’s sGolog [Lak99] is the first approach to include sensing into Golog, where instead
of producing a linear sequence of actions, the interpreter yields a tree of actions that branches
over possible outcomes of sensing actions. Reiter’s sequential temporal Golog [Rei98] incorpo-
rates an explicit notion of time. Finzi and Pirri [FP04] study a concurrent variant which uses
constraint-based interval planning. IndiGolog [GL99, GLS01, GLLS04] is especially suited
for realistic scenarios as it overcomes some of the drawbacks of earlier variants. First, the
original Golog executes programs offline, meaning that before actions are executed physically,
the interpreter searches for a sequential solution for the entire input program. As this may be
prohibitively time consuming, in particular for larger, non-trivial programs, IndiGolog resorts
to an online approach that interleaves lookahead with action execution. Moreover, the language
allows the agent to use sensing actions to gather new information at runtime. A variant for
knowledge-based programs [Rei01b] uses Scherl and Levesque’s solution to the frame problem
for knowledge. ccGolog [Gro02, GL03] introduces continuous change based on the temporal
Situation Calculus. DTGolog [BRST00, Sou01] is a decision-theoretic variant where actions
can have probabilistic outcomes and the system searches for an optimal policy that maximizes
the expected reward for the agent. The game-theoretic GTGolog [FL04] generalizes DT-
Golog to adversarial multi-agent scenarios. Readylog [Fer07, FL08] aims at highly dynamic
real-time domains such as robotic soccer.
There are many other action formalisms aside from the Situation Calculus. Thielscher’s
Fluent Calculus [Thi99, ST00] is derived from the Situation Calculus, but solves the frame
problem in a different manner. As opposed to using one successor state axiom per predicate
that is affected by actions, his solution relies on having one state update axiom per action that
describes how a state is changed by that action. FLUX [Thi05] is a run-time system for the
Fluent Calculus that plays a similar role as Golog does for the Situation Calculus. Schiffel and
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Thielscher [ST05, ST06] explore the formal connections between Situation Calculus and Golog
on the one hand and Fluent Calculus and FLUX on the other hand. One successful application
of FLUX is in General Game Playing [ST07], where the task is to develop computer programs
that are able to play any previously unknown game without any human intervention, simply by
providing them with a formal description of its rules.
Furthermore, the Event Calculus [KS86, Sha95, Mue06a] is a narrative-based action for-
malism utilizing an explicit notion of time, where planning is done in the form of an abduc-
tive reasoning task that relies on Circumscription [McC80]. Temporal Action Logic (TAL)
[DGKK98, DK01b] is derived from Sandewall’s Features and Fluents [San94] framework and
represents time in a similar quantitative manner, but uses a non-classical surface language
to represent narratives and translates them to a classical base language in order to perform
Circumscription-based reasoning. The similarities and differences between the Event Calculus
and TAL are explored in [Mue06b]. 3APL [HdBvdHM99] is an agent programming language
based on the beliefs-desire-intention (BDI) model [Bra87] which combines features from imper-
ative and logic programming, using a transition-style semantics. The action logic A [GL93]
and its successors B and C [GL98] as well as C+ [GLL+04] use causal laws to describe dynamic
domains, where plans are generated by means of Answer Set Programming (ASP) [Gel08].
Dynamic Logic [HKT00] was originally intended for reasoning about computer programs, but
has also become a popular means for describing agents, in particular its propositional variant
[FL79]. Epistemic Dynamic Logic shares many similarities with the Situation Calculus and ES
[vDHL11].
2.2 Planning
In AI, planning (in its classical sense) refers to the deliberation process of finding a sequence of
actions that achieve a desired goal, given a description of the current state of the world and the
action operators at the agent’s disposal. Planning has been a central research topic ever since
the earliest years of AI. The above mentioned STRIPS [FN71] is widely viewed as the first
major planning system. Its underlying algorithm is based on the General Problem Solver GPS
[NS63], a state-space search system using means-end analysis. However, the STRIPS language
has been far more influential than its algorithm, even up to the present day, as the majority of
planners that were since developed were based on some variant, extension or derivative of it.
The success of STRIPS was in large part due to its simplicity. Action operators are de-
scribed in terms of three components: preconditions, positive effects, and negative effects, each
of which is given in the form of a list of logical atoms. Thus, it is straightforward to determine
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the result of an action to a state given in the form of a set of atoms, namely by adding all atoms
that are positive effects (hence they are also called the “add list”) and deleting all those that
are negative effects (“delete list”). While this made planning possible in the first place, expres-
siveness was very restricted, and early systems such as the first linear planners of the 1970s
[Sus75] could only handle rather short plans [Byl94]. The following two decades were mainly
dominated by partial-order planners [PW92], until a major breakthrough was made in the mid
1990s with the development of the GraphPlan method [BF97], which yielded a performance
increase of several orders of magnitude.
An early proposal for a formalism that goes beyond the limited expressiveness of STRIPS
was the Action Description Language ADL [Ped89, Ped94] which extends basic STRIPS by
features such as conditional effects, functions and quantification, among others. One could
argue that most planners that were developed at the time supported either an extension of
STRIPS or a subset of ADL as input language. UCPOP [PW92] for example could handle
problems that contain universal quantification and conditional effects (hence the letters ’U’ and
’C’ in the acronym), but neither existential quantification nor disjunction. Since each planner
used its own syntax, only few were directly evaluated against each other, and it was therefore
difficult to judge the overall progress in the field.
This changed with the introduction of the biennial International Planning Competition
(IPC) [McD00], first held at the 1998 AI Planning Systems conference (AIPS), which aims
at creating a repository of planning domains and problems, to provide a benchmark for plan-
ners that allow researchers to compare their system to the state of the art, and to focus and
drive research towards more realistic applications. The Planning Domain Definition Language
PDDL [GHK+98] that is used as the common input language at the competitions has by now
become the de-facto standard for the formulation of planning domains and problems. It ex-
tends basic STRIPS by features of ADL. Moreover, later extension include numerics, durative
actions and concurrency [FL03], derived predicates and timed initial literals [EH04], as well
as quantitative preferences and trajectory constraints [GL05b]. Since most of these features
are tackled in special competition tracks, planning systems do not have to support all of them
but can specialize on certain fragments. Furthermore, apart from the most prominent case of
classical planning under complete information, there are now also tracks for learning systems
and planners that can deal with probabilistic uncertainty.
Since the introduction of the IPC and PDDL, one could observe a sudden thrust of progress
in the area. In the case of classical planning, today’s state-of-the-art planners apply a multi-
tude of different paradigms. One popular approach is to convert the planning instance into a
propositional satisfiability problem and apply solving techniques that have been developed in
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this area [KS92, KS96]. A related idea is to use methods for constraint satisfaction problems
[DK01a]. Many systems however apply a forward search algorithm in the state space in com-
bination with a sophisticated heuristics [BG01b, BG01a] that is in most cases based on the
groundbreaking GraphPlan algorithm [BF97]. Two of the fastest such planners are FF [HN01]
and Fast Downward [Hel06a] which form the basis of many current successful planning systems.
Instead of searching in the state space, some systems do a search in the space of partial plans
[PW92, GS02].
The practical progress that has been made in developing efficient planners has been comple-
mented by theoretical studies on planning in terms of the expressiveness of planning formalisms
and the computational complexity of the planning problem. In the worst case, determining
whether a planning problem has a solution is very hard. Bylander [Byl94] showed that proposi-
tional STRIPS planning is PSPACE-complete. Erol, Nau and Subrahmanian [ENS92, ENS95]
furthermore study how decidability and computational complexity of regular STRIPS is af-
fected by restrictions on the language such as disallowing function symbols, delete lists, or
negated preconditions. In practice, worst case complexity however often does not apply due to
the fact that many instances of planning problems are in fact easier. Studies on the complexity
of various planning domains were done by Gupta and Nau [GN91] and Helmert [Hel03, Hel06b].
Moreover, the computational complexity of deciding plan existence may be too coarse a mea-
sure when it comes to comparing the expressiveness of different formalisms, as the length of
plans may also play a role. Ba¨ckstro¨m [Ba¨c95] proposes to use structure-preserving many-one
reductions for this purpose, however his assumptions that plan lengths remain unchanged and
that reductions are computable in polynomial time are sometimes too strict. Nebel’s [Neb00]
compilation schemes circumvent this problem by allowing plans to also grow linearly or poly-
nomially, and by only requiring the the compiled instances to be of representable in polynomial
size. He demonstrates the usefulness of these compilation schemes by presenting an exhaustive
study of the expressiveness and compilability of different subsets of propositional ADL.
When some or all of the restricting assumptions of classical planning are dropped, one
enters the area of planning under uncertainty. When actions have nondeterministic outcomes,
but states are fully observable, conditional planning [PS92] has to be applied, where the aim
is to find a policy (a mapping from states to actions) that achieves the goal, and, in case that
outcomes are assigned probabilities, that also minimizes plan costs. In the case of conformant
planning, the task is to find a sequence of actions that achieves the goal from any initial state
and under any outcome of a nondeterministic action, given that states are not observable at all
[STGM05]. Moreover, domains where action outcomes are stochastic are typically formalized
and solved in terms of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) [Bel57, Put94, BDG00] or Partially
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Observable MDPs (POMDPs) [Mon82, BP96]. Furthermore, quantitative or qualitative user
preferences may have to be considered [BM08]. Recently, there has also been growing interest
in generalized planning which aims at solving entire problem classes by synthesizing controllers
that may even contain loops [Lev05, HG11].
All systems and approaches mentioned so far (which by no means constitute an exhaustive
list1) can be subsumed under the term of domain-independent planning, which means that the
corresponding planners are not specialized or fine-tuned to any particular planning domain.
In many application scenarios it is however often the case that the human user or designer
possesses special knowledge that might be helpful to the planner in restricting the search space,
thus yielding an increase in efficiency. Domain-dependent planners therefore allow to provide
such domain knowledge in addition to the actual planning instance that is to be solved. TLPlan
[BK00] is able to make use of control information that is given in the form of formulas of
linear temporal logic (LTL), whereas TALplanner [DK01b] is based on the above mentioned
TAL. Planners using Hierarchical Task Networks (HTN) [EHN94] such as SHOP2 [NAI+03]
also fall into the domain-dependent category as well; the underlying idea is to provide the
system with knowledge of how to decompose tasks into subtasks, which might consist of further
subtasks or atomic actions. Furthermore, behaviours and strategies that are formulated in agent
programming languages such as Golog constrain the search space and thus also constitute a
form of domain-dependent control knowledge.
However, sometimes such information may not be available. Although Golog supports
pure, domain-independent planning in principle, existing Golog systems can typically not
compete performance-wise with current PDDL planners. The reason lies in the fact that the
former usually resolves non-determinism by blind search, whereas the latter resort to a variety
of sophisticated techniques and heuristics, as indicated above. In face of the abundance of
efficient PDDL-based planning systems, it suggests itself to try to exploit these achievements
and apply them in the context of Golog, with the aim of thus acquiring a system which is
both expressive and able to efficiently solve planning problems.
As a prerequisite to this endeavour, we have to be able to relate the two formalisms in terms
of their semantics. As opposed to the field of action logics, semantics played only a minor role in
the area of planning. For a long time, there has not been any formal semantics for STRIPS at
all, until the first meta-theoretic formalizations were presented [Lif87, ENS92, BY94] that are
based on the transformation of logical theories. Later, embeddings into the Situation Calculus
were proposed [Ped89, SS98], which are much more appealing as these represent declarative
1Past and current IPC results as well as information on the participating planning systems can be found at
http://www.icaps-conference.org.
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definitions in terms of a well-defined logic whose properties are well understood. In particular,
Lin and Reiter [LR97] relate the state updates of STRIPS to the progression of certain Situation
Calculus theories, thus combining the benefits of a declarative definition with the efficiency of
STRIPS operators. Moreover, their approach also works in the more general case of incomplete
theories.
It seems natural to try to generalize these results to more expressive languages such as
PDDL, which was originally not accompanied by a formal semantics, but rather intended as
a standard syntax for a commonly accepted semantics for STRIPS, as described by Lifschitz
[Lif87]. The first formal semantics was provided for version 2.1 by Fox and Long [FL03], who
extended Lifschitz’ state-transitional definition to also cope with the newly added numeric
and temporal features of PDDL. In any case, the meaning of action operators is defined only
meta-theoretically through the addition and deletion of literals, which already Lin and Reiter
identified as problematic in the case of STRIPS, in particular for logically incomplete theories.
Moreover, the formalization is rather complicated and therefore quite difficult to grasp for a
human reader. On the other hand, a declarative semantics for PDDL based on the Situation
Calculus or ES would not only further our understanding of the language, but also provide the
basis for the combination and integration of PDDL planners with Golog. Chapter 4 of this
thesis will address this issue.
2.3 Verification
In computer science, formal verification refers to the act of proving or disproving the correctness
of a system with respect to a formal specification. Verification is a critical and major part of the
overall process of industrial hardware and software development. Before deploying a product,
it has to be ensured that it indeed fulfills its intended purpose and meets certain requirements.
Not only does it become more costly to fix an error the later in the development process it
is detected, but hardware and software reliability is also often directly related to the safety of
human beings. The design and implementation of a knowledge-based robot is no different in all
of the above respects.
First ideas on verifying the correctness of (terminating) programs were already presented
by Turing [Tur49, MJ84], foreshadowing what would later be called the axiomatic approach on
program verification as formalized by Floyd [Flo67] and Hoare [Hoa69]. The approach requires
the programmer to annotate the program by assertions (pre- and postconditions, loop invariants)
in the form of logical formulas, and a given proof system consisting of axioms and inference
rules then allows to prove program properties formally, typically by means of an interactive,
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higher-order logic theorem prover. Examples where this approach has been put into practice
include the correctness proof of a large fragment of the programming language C [Ler09] using
the theorem prover Coq [BC04], as well as a correctness proof of the seL4 micro kernel [KEH+10]
by means of the Isabelle/HOL prover [PW02]. Other theorem provers such as KeY [BHS07]
and KIV [BRS+00] formalize Dynamic Logic [HKT00], which can be viewed as a generalization
of classical Hoare Logic.
When it comes to the formal verification of non-terminating processes, the most prominent
current approach is probably model checking [CGP99, BK08], which was introduced in the early
1980s [CE81, CES86, QS82]. In the classical case, the system is represented by a model that
is given in the form of a finite graph structure, and the properties to be verified are expressed
in some temporal logic such as CTL, LTL, or CTL∗ [Eme90]. It is then possible to check the
formula in question by a systematic, graph-theoretic analysis of the model. A major perfor-
mance boost to model checking methods was achieved in the mid-1990s with symbolic model
checking [BCM+92, McM93]. By resorting to compact, implicit representations such as ordered
binary decision diagrams (OBDD) [Bry86], it is possible to handle very large state spaces. With
appropriate finite representations, even infinite-state systems can be handled, for instance us-
ing pushdown automata [BEM97], petri nets [Esp94], or variants of Minsky’s counter machines
[Dem06]. Moreover, while originally model checking typically used propositional formalisms to
ensure decidability, approaches have been proposed for the verification of first-order specifica-
tions, for example by sufficiently restricting expressiveness to ensure decidability [WTM04] or
by combining symbolic model checking with theorem proving and taking into account that the
method is not guaranteed to terminate [BDG+98]. Furthermore, infinite state spaces can be re-
duced to finite ones by means of predicate abstraction [CDG01, BP06], and can then be verified
using any common finite model checking tool such as NuSMV [CCG+02] or SPIN [Hol03].
Formal verification lends itself particularly well to knowledge-based agents because the sys-
tem is already defined in a formal, logical manner. Ideally, it is hence unnecessary to come up
with a system description manually, which is prone to errors. It is rather possible to do the
verification within the very same logical representation and with the same reasoning tools that
are used for the actual control of the agent, as was already pointed out by Green [Gre69].
Regarding the formal verification of Golog programs, one observation is that if the agent
performs an open-ended task as in our envisioned domestic robot scenario, it will (at least
ideally) operate indefinitely. Its corresponding control program therefore has to be a non-
terminating one. Surprisingly, the verification non-terminating Golog programs has so far
received very little attention within the Situation Calculus research community. A notable
exception is a paper by De Giacomo, Ternovska and Reiter [GTR97], who define programs and
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properties in terms of second-order formulas and then do a manual, meta-theoretic proof to show
that a program indeed satisfies a given property. This is problematic for at least two reasons. On
the one hand, their formulation in terms of second-order fixpoint formulas is quite involved and
difficult to grasp even for the mathematically inclined. On the other hand, manual proofs are
of course tedious and prone to errors, and it would be much more desirable to be able to do an
automated verification, using an appropriate algorithm. In the face of the abundance of results
on model checking and available tools, it is conceivable to utilize them for the verification of
Golog programs. However, the formalisms they use are often of very restricted expressiveness
and typically tailored to low-level computer programs rather than high-level agent programs.
Instead of a cumbersome translation from Golog to the model checker’s input language, which
may result in a loss of expressiveness, it seems preferable to be able to follow the above mentioned
idea of verifying Golog directly within its underlying logic. Chapter 5 of this thesis will be
concerned with this subject.
Although there has not been much work on the verification of non-terminating Golog pro-
grams so far, related forms of reasoning in the Situation Calculus have been studied. Liu [Liu02]
presents a proof system in the style of Hoare logic for proving properties of terminating Golog
programs. Shapiro, Lespe´rance and Levesque [SLL02] describe CASLve, a framework for verify-
ing properties of multi-agent systems that are specified in ConGolog, where an axiomatization
is fed into a theorem prover in order to do interactive, computer-aided proofs. Gu and Kiringa
[GK06] represent classical propositional model checking within the Situation Calculus. Reiter
[Rei93] proves properties that hold throughout all world states by means of induction. Bertossi
et al. [BPS+96] propose an automatic constraint verification system using an induction theo-
rem prover. Kelly and Pearce [KP07, KP10] provide an algorithm for checking the persistence
of formulas. An alternative approach to checking and proving state constraints is to ensure
them by compiling them into the agent’s axiomatization [LR94b, McI00]. If a system shows
unexpected behaviour, diagnosis [McI98, Iwa02, SBM10] can further be used to generate possi-
ble explanations that help to identify possible sources of failure. Finally, verification has been
studied in other agent languages as well. To mention but a few, de Boer et al. [dBHvdHM07]
provide a verification framework for the propositional agent programming language GOAL.
Van der Hoek, Lomuscio and Wooldridge [vdHLW06] study the complexity of model checking
properties formulated in the Alternating-Time Temporal Logic ATL [AHK02] for models ex-
pressed in the Simple Reactive Modules Language SRML. Alechina et al. [ADLM07, ADLM08]
discuss the verification of agents formalized in SimpleAPL, a fragment of 3APL that allows the
implementation of agents with beliefs, goals, actions, plans, and planning rules.
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Chapter 3
Logical Foundations
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the formal foundations for this thesis. Section 3.1 first gives
an informal introduction as to why we resort to the logic ES, a modal variant of the classical
Situation Calculus. The formal definition of ES is then given in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents
how the logic can be used to axiomatize dynamic domains by means of so-called basic action
theories. Regression and progression, which are two different forms of reasoning with dynamic
properties, are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents how epistemic operators are used
in ES in order to express facts about the agent’s knowledge, its lack thereof, and how it is
affected by sensing. The agent programming language Golog, which is defined on top of ES,
is introduced in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 finally shows how all of the above can be integrated to
build a knowledge-based agent system.
3.1 A Modal First-Order Logic for Dynamic Domains
In the previous chapters we argued that a logical representation of an agent has many benefits.
Once we have decided to follow the knowledge-based approach, the first question that arises is
the choice of an appropriate representation formalism.
3.1.1 First-Order Representation and Reasoning
Recall that an autonomous agent’s knowledge about the state of its environment is typically
incomplete. While it may know some facts to be true, at the same time there might be other
things about which the agent is ignorant. As a running example let us consider a mobile robot
acting in an office environment. Said robot may be unaware whether the person named Bob is
currently in his office or in the kitchen. Using standard logical1 notation, this can be expressed
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by the following formula:
(3.1) In(bob, office(bob)) ∨ In(bob, kitchen)
While this example statement is still expressible by means of a Boolean combination of ground
propositions, this is in general not sufficient. An autonomous agent whose task is open-ended
is in most cases not aware of every single individual and object that it potentially may have
to deal with in the future. On the contrary, a suitable representation language for the agent’s
knowledge base should account for possibly unknown individuals. For example the office robot
may know that there is some person other than Bob currently in Bob’s office (and the robot
may in fact not know who that person is):
(3.2) ∃x.In(x, office(bob)) ∧ Person(x) ∧ (x 6= bob)
We therefore settle for a logic that includes first-order quantification and equality, as this gives us
sufficient expressive power to represent knowledge that is potentially incomplete, both regarding
the truth of facts as well as the identity of individuals and objects.
One may now be tempted to move from first- to second-order logic, as the latter further
increases expressiveness by not only allowing to quantify over single individuals, but also over
sets and relations on them. The problem however is the well-known consequence of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem [Go¨d31] that second-order logic (SOL), as opposed to first-order logic
(FOL), does not admit a complete proof theory. This is to say that the validity of every FOL
formula (and similarly the logical consequence of a formula from a finite set of premises) is
provable, where a proof consists of a finite sequence of statements each of which is either an
axiom or follows from some previous statements by means of an inference rule. For SOL this
is not the case, i.e. for certain true sentences in the logic there is no, and cannot be any finite
proof.
While FOL’s completeness guarantees that a proof of a theorem (a valid statement) can
always be found in finite time, such a guarantee cannot be given in the opposite case of an
invalid formula. Validity of FOL formulas is hence a semi-decidable2 problem: Any sound
decision algorithm for the validity of FOL formulas will eventually return the answer “yes”, if
the input formula is indeed valid, but may not even terminate, if the input is not.
1Although this thesis is written with the aspiration to be self-contained in that it gives all relevant formal
definitions, we assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of classical predicate logics. A good introduction
to mathematical logics can be found in [End72].
2Since semi-decidability also subsumes decidability, we should say more precisely that FOL validity is an
undecidable, yet semi-decidable problem.
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Semi-decidability implies that no upper bound on the response time of the decision algorithm
can be given. Depending on the application domain, this does not necessarily pose a big problem.
The purpose of efficient state-of-the-art automated theorem provers such as Vampire [RV02] or
E [Sch02] is typically seen in assisting mathematicians in proving mathematical theorems, in
which case it is often worthwhile to wait a longer time for the result. However when it comes to
the control of a logic-based agent, the possibility that the agent may “get stuck” while deciding
on its next action is obviously undesirable. Nevertheless, for the purpose of expressiveness as
argued above, we will in the following assume that our agent is one that possesses full first-order
reasoning capabilities. However, think of this more as an idealized perspective that we take in
order to be able to investigate the involved theoretical issues. In an actual implementation
of such an agent one would then need to restrict oneself to some alternative (sub-) logic that
is known to be decidable, and thus ensure that the agent will always reach some decision
within finite time. One possibility to obtain decidability and even tractability while retaining
a significant part of first-order expressiveness is discussed in [CL09].
Despite this assumption of an agent that is a first-order reasoner, below we will equip our
logic also with second-order quantification. We will use the latter however only from our “meta-
perspective”, i.e. to talk about the agent (e.g. to define concepts, to prove theoretical properties
etc.), but do not expect the agent itself to reason with second-order formulas.
3.1.2 Standard Names
Now that we opted for a first-order language with equality, there would be good reasons to simply
use the “classical” predicate calculus as described in textbooks, most importantly the fact that
it has been thoroughly studied for many decades and is therefore well understood. Indeed this
approach is taken in Reiter’s Situation Calculus as described in [Rei01a]. Nevertheless there
are some drawbacks, one of which arises when reasoning about the identity of individuals.
Consider again statement (3.2) which expresses that there is some unknown person in Bob’s
office. The robot now may be told that that person is Bob’s best friend and hence
(3.3) In(bestfriend(bob), office(bob))
holds. But still it is not really justified to say that the agent now knows who the person in Bob’s
office is. Indeed the term bestfriend(bob) is not sufficient to identify that person, but only gives
some further description of it. Assertions involving equalities such as
(3.4) bestfriend(bob) = father(ann)
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do not help either when the agent does not know who the father of Ann is. A similar problem
arises even in the case where we use an atomic term such as mr smith, as the identity of
mr smith may be still unknown to the robot.
In fact it is a notion of identity which regular predicate logics lack. When it comes to “wh-
questions” (knowing who, what, when, or where) it is difficult to say whether the agent has an
answer since there is nothing that formally distinguishes a “non-identifying” term like mr smith
from others such as bob. Any further “identification power” we ascribe to the latter is purely
informal and meta-theoretical.
For this reason, Levesque and Lakemeyer propose the usage of standard names for their
logic of only-knowing OL [LL01]. The idea is to assume that there is a countably infinite set of
names
#1,#2,#3,#4, . . .
which are syntactically treated like ordinary constants, but which play the role of unique iden-
tifiers, very much like in database formalisms. If we partition the set of terms into equivalence
classes, each standard name corresponds to one such class of all terms equal to it. When the
agent then for instance knows that
(3.5) mr smith = #17
we will admit that the agent knows the identity of the individual mr smith, i.e. it indeed knows
who Mr. Smith is.
Semantically, a standard name such as #17 does not carry any information whatsoever,
except for the fact that it is distinct from any other name such as #16. Together with epistemic
modalities, standard names then allow us to have a formal distinction between de dicto and de
re knowledge, where the former refers to knowing that some fact (a formula) is true, whereas
the latter means knowing who or what satisfies a certain property. We will discuss these things
formally in Section 3.5. Furthermore, we assume that in every semantical model, the universe
of discourse is isomorphic (or indeed identical) to the countably infinite set of standard names.
While this yields a non-standard semantics where some of the known properties of standard
first-order predicate logic will not hold anymore, it allows us, among other things, to interpret
first-order quantification substitutionally. As we will see, the latter not only comes in handy in
inductive proofs over the structure of formulas, but also yields a useful property called universal
generalization.
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3.1.3 Fluents, Actions and Situations
Predicate logics, be it classical FOL or a non-standard one such as described above, are an
appropriate means when it comes to expressing facts and reasoning about objects, their prop-
erties, and relations among them. However they take a rather static perspective as there is no
explicit notion of possible changes included. Our application domain of an autonomous agent
is on the other hand a highly dynamic setting that requires the possibility to encode and model
how and when the agent’s actions affect its environment.
For this purpose, our language contains predicates and functions that are assumed to be
able to vary as the result of actions. Such “varying” symbols are called fluents, as opposed to
non-varying ones, which we call rigid. An example of a fluent predicate (also called relational
fluent) is Holding(x), which we may use to denote that the robot is currently holding object
x. Obviously this predicate is potentially subject to changes, namely when the robot grabs an
object or drops it again. Similarly, an example for a fluent function (also called a functional
fluent) is loc(x), whose value intuitively corresponds to the current location of object x, which
again is affected when the robot performs moving actions. On the other hand, a predicate such
as NextTo(x, y), denoting that room x is accessible from room y, can be considered as rigid
since none of the robot’s actions will be capable of altering this property3.
It is further assumed that indeed all changes to the environment and thus to the fluents’
values are due to the execution of actions, which are represented as terms. Here, function
symbols are used as operators, and their arguments correspond to the action’s parameters. For
instance pickup(x) could refer to the action of the robot picking up object x with its robotic
arm. We will distinguish actions from other terms by resorting to a sorted logic where each
term is assumed to be of one of the sorts action, number , or object , where the latter captures
everything that is neither an action nor a number.
Different action formalisms differ in the way in which we may relate actions and fluents within
formulas. Reiter’s Situation Calculus makes use of situations, which are basically histories
(sequences) of actions. Fluents then have an additional situation argument to distinguish their
values in different situations. For example the fact that the robot is not holding the cup initially,
but after going to it and picking it up, is expressed as follows:
¬Holding(cup,S0 ) ∧Holding(cup, do(pickup(cup), do(goto(loc(cup,S0 )),S0 )))(3.6)
S0 is a constant that denotes the initial situation (before any actions have occurred), whereas
3Of course this distinction depends on the frame of reference that we assume. While the adjacency of rooms
may be rigid within our office robot running example, it ought to be considered a fluent e.g. in the (far-fetched)
case of a construction or demolition robot.
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the term
do(pickup(cup), do(goto(loc(cup,S0 )),S0 ))
means the situation resulting from first executing action goto(loc(cup,S0 )) in S0 , and then
action pickup(cup) afterwards. Note that the nested construction of a situation term using the
do construct requires us to read the resulting sequence of actions in reverse order.
Apart from expressing facts about specific situations as above, it is also often necessary to
describe general laws that hold throughout all situations. For instance we may wish to formalize
that whenever the robot performs action putdown(x) in situation s, afterwards it will not be
holding x anymore, which can be done by universally quantifying over situations:
(3.7) ∀s.¬Holding(x, do(putdown(x), s))
Using situations in this form serves its purpose, but also suffers from some disadvantages,
one of which is related to the fact that the Situation Calculus is based on predicate logic
with the standard Tarskian semantics, which means that the structure of situations has to be
axiomatized. In Reiter’s formalization, so-called foundational axioms are used to ensure that in
every model, the situations form an infinite tree of which S0 is the root, and where each sequence
of actions corresponds to a path to a particular node in that tree, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Apart from the somewhat cumbersome notation, the problem with this term representation of
situations is that model theoretic proofs tend to be quite tedious and involved.
To overcome this problem, Lakemeyer and Levesque proposed in [LL04] to build the tree-like
structure of situations directly into the language’s semantics, thus overcoming the need to have
explicit axioms defining it. They called the resulting language (for Epistemic Situation Calcu-
lus), as it amalgamates the above mentioned epistemic logic OL with the Situation Calculus.
Unlike an earlier proposal for such a language called AOL [LL98a], ES does not contain situation
terms at all, but situations remain a purely semantical concept. Instead, two forms of modal
operators are used to formulate facts about future situations. On the one hand, [a]α expresses
that formula α will be true after doing the single action a. For instance formula (3.6) would
read as follows in ES:
(3.8) ¬Holding(cup) ∧ [goto(loc(cup))][pickup(cup)]Holding(cup)
On the other hand, α is used to denote that α will hold after any sequence of actions. The
ES analogue of (3.7) thus is:
(3.9) [putdown(x)]¬Holding(x)
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S0
· · ·
do(αn,S0 )
· · · · · ·
do(αm, do(αn,S0 ))
· · · · · · · · ·
αm
· · ·
αn · · ·
do(αm,S0 )
· · · · · · · · ·
αm
· · ·
Figure 3.1: The tree of situations as used in the Situation Calculus. Nodes correspond to
situations, and edges to atomic actions αi. Since there are infinitely many actions, the tree has
an infinite branching factor, as indicated by the dots.
Formally, the restriction to these two modal operators constitutes a loss in expressiveness when
compared to the original Situation Calculus. However, as we will see later, the resulting formal-
ism not only yields a simplification for semantic proofs, but it is also still sufficiently expressive
to retain the main benefits of the Situation Calculus such as basic action theories, regression-
based reasoning and expressing complex actions by means of Golog programs.
3.2 The Logic ES
For the above reasons, we decide to employ ES as the underlying formalism throughout this
thesis. It should be noted that since its first proposal in [LL04], different variants and extensions
of the language have been introduced. The logic we present below does not exactly coincide
with either one in the existing literature, but is a combination of ideas and aspects presented
in [LL04], [LL05a], [CL06a], [CHL07], [CL08], [LL09a], and [LL10], with additional adaptations
to suit this thesis’ specific needs. We will discuss the details of this at the end of the chapter.
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3.2.1 Formal Syntax
Let us start with our logic’s syntax. First of all, the language consists of formulas over symbols
from the following vocabulary:
• object variables: x1, x2, . . . , y1, y2, . . . ;
• action variables: a1, a2, . . . ;
• number variables: m1,m2, . . . ;
• object standard names: o1, o2, . . . ;
• action standard names: p1, p2, . . . ;
• number standard names (constants): 0, 1, 2, . . . ,√2, 12 , . . . ;
• fluent object functions of arity k: fk1 , fk2 , . . . ;
• rigid action functions of arity k: gk1 , gk2 , . . . ;
• fluent number functions of arity k: hk1, hk2, . . . ;
• fluent predicates of arity k: F k1 , F k2 , . . . ;
• rigid predicates of arity k: Gk1, Gk2, . . . ;
• connectives and other symbols: =, ∧, ¬, ∀, round and square parentheses, period, comma.
That is, we have a countably infinite sets of variables, standard names and function symbols
for each of the three sorts. We denote the countable infinite set of object standard names by
NO, the action standard names by NA, and the number standard names by NN . The set of all
standard names is
N = NO ∪NA ∪NN .
For simplicity we assume that the functions of sort object and number are always fluent, whereas
the ones of the action sort are all rigid. Note that fluent actions are only rarely necessary:
Generally we would expect that an action term such as pickup(cup) refers to the very same
action, no matter which actions have been performed so far (i.e. which situation we are currently
in). In the rare cases where a situation-dependent action is actually needed, for instance when
we want to have something like bestaction, we can simulate a fluent action by using a unary
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rigid action symbol g(x), and then let the argument x vary accordingly. Similarly, a rigid object
or number function can be simulated by using a fluent symbol f and asserting4 that
[a](f(~x) = y) ≡ (f(~x) = y).
There are both fluent and rigid predicate symbols, and both function and predicate symbols
can be of any arity k ∈ N (including zero).
We further assume that the list of number functions above contains the special symbols “+”
and “ · ” that we will use to denote the arithmetical operations of addition and multiplication,
respectively. Similarly, the list of rigid predicates is assumed to contain the less-than symbol
“<”.
Terms are built as usual, except for the fact that we not only have variables and constants
(zero-ary functions) as atomic terms, but also standard names:
Definition 3.1 (Sorts and Terms). There are three sort: object , action, and number . The set
of term, each of which is of one of the three sorts, is the least set such that
• every variable is a term of the corresponding sort;
• every standard name is a term of the corresponding sort;
• if t1, . . . , tk are terms (of any sorts) and f is a k-ary function symbol, then f(t1, . . . , tk) is
a term of the same sort as f .
A term without variables is called a ground term. A primitive term is of the form f(n1, . . . , nk),
where each ni is a standard name (of some sort). We denote the sets of primitive terms of sort
object, action and number as PO, PA and PN , respectively. Furthermore Z refers to set of all
finite sequences of action standard names, including the empty sequence 〈〉.
For the arithmetical operations + and · we use the normal infix notation, i.e. we will write
x+y instead of +(x, y) and x ·y instead of · (x, y). The notion of primitive terms is used further
below in the semantics to define the denotation of terms, where every term will be mapped to
some standard name. We are now ready to define the set of objective ES formulas:
Definition 3.2 (Objective Formulas). The objective formulas are the least set such that
1. If t1, . . . , tk are terms (of any sorts) and P is a (fluent or rigid) k-ary predicate symbol,
then P (t1, . . . , tk) is an objective formula;
4This axiom is a special case of a successor state axiom for functional fluents and would have to be included
in the basic action theory, see Section 3.3.
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2. if t1 and t2 are terms, then (t1 = t2) is an objective formula;
3. if α and β are objective formulas, x is a variable, and t is a term of sort action, then α∧β,
¬α, ∀xα, [t]α, and α, are also objective formulas.
A variable x is bound when it occurs within the scope of a corresponding ∀x quantifier and free
when it occurs without being quantified. We call a formula without free variables a sentence.
If x is a free variable in α, then αxt denotes the result of simultaneously replacing all free
occurrences of x by the term t. A primitive formula is of the form F (n1, . . . , nk), where each
ni is a standard name. We denote the set of all primitive formulas by PF . We use > to denote
truth, i.e. ∀x.(x = x), and ⊥ to denote falsity, i.e. ¬>.
The adjective “objective” here refers to the fact that any formula according to the above defi-
nition can only express truths about the physical environment, but not the agent’s knowledge
about it. The epistemic case is discussed later in Section 3.5. For expressions involving the
arithmetical less-than relation, we will again resort to the usual infix notation, i.e. we write
x < y instead of < (x, y). The greater-than relation > is to be understood as an abbreviation
in terms of less-than:
(x > y)
def
= (y < x)(3.10)
The reader may also have noticed that our syntax definition did not include all of the logical con-
nectives. As usual, we can define disjunction, implication, equivalence, existential quantification
and inequality as abbreviations in terms of other connectives:
(α ∨ β) def= ¬(¬α ∧ ¬β)(3.11)
(α ⊃ β) def= ¬α ∨ β(3.12)
(α ≡ β) def= (α ⊃ β) ∧ (β ⊃ α)(3.13)
(∃xα) def= ¬∀x¬α(3.14)
(t1 6= t2) def= ¬(t1 = t2)(3.15)
Thus we view these operators as “syntactic sugar” and do not have to deal with them explicitly
in proofs or other definitions.
Furthermore, to reduce the number of parentheses used, we follow the usual conventions of
preferences among the logical connectives. Additionally, the  modality has lower syntactic
precedence than the connectives, and [ · ] has the highest priority. In summary, the preference
order among the logical operators is as given in Table 3.1. If not stated otherwise, free vari-
3.2 The Logic ES 33
Priority 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Operator [ · ] ¬ ∧ ∨ ∀ ∃ ⊃ ≡ 
Table 3.1: Syntactical preference among logical operators
ables are understood as being universally quantified from the outside. With all of the above
conventions, the formula
[a]Holding(x) ≡ a = pickup(x) ∨Holding(x) ∧ a 6= putdown(x)
for example is to be read as
∀a∀x.{[[a]Holding(x)] ≡ [a = pickup(x) ∨ (Holding(x) ∧ a 6= putdown(x))]}.
The dot notation of quantifiers indicates maximum scope, that is ∃x.α ⊃ β is read as ∃x(α ⊃ β),
whereas ∃xα ⊃ β stands for (∃xα) ⊃ β.
Two important subtypes of formulas are those that do not contain any actions at all, and
those that only contain a limited number of them:
Definition 3.3 (Static Formulas). A formula φ is called static when it contains no [ · ] and no
 operators.
Definition 3.4 (Bounded Formulas). A formula φ is called bounded when it does not contain
any  operators.
Example 3.5. Consider the following formulas from previous examples:
¬Holding(cup)(3.16)
¬Holding(cup) ∧ [goto(loc(cup))][pickup(cup)]Holding(cup)(3.17)
[pickup(x)]Holding(x)(3.18)
Formula (3.16) is static, and therefore also bounded. (3.17) is a bounded, but not a static
formula. (3.18) is neither bounded nor static.
3.2.2 Formal Semantics
Now that we established what formulas are, we have to define how to interpret them. That is,
we have to devise how to determine the truth value of a formula, given an interpretation. In
the case of ES, an interpretation is given by a world:
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Definition 3.6 (Worlds). A world w is a mapping
• w : PO ×Z → NO and
• w : PA ×Z → NA and
• w : PN ×Z → NN and
• w : PF ×Z → {0, 1}
satisfying the following constraints:
Rigidity: If R is a rigid function or predicate symbol, then
w[R(n1, . . . , nk), z] = w[R(n1, . . . , nk), z
′] for all z, z′ ∈ Z.
Unique names for actions: If g(n1, . . . , nk) and g
′(n′1, . . . , n′l) are two distinct primitive ac-
tion terms, then
w[g(n1, . . . , nk), z] 6= w[g′(n′1, . . . , n′l), z] for all z ∈ Z.
Arithmetical correctness: If n1 and n2 are number standard names, then:
w[n1 + n2, z] = n1 + n2 and w[n1 · n2, z] = n1 · n2 for all z ∈ Z
w[n1 < n2, z] = 1 iff n1 < n2, for all z ∈ Z
Let W denote the set of all worlds.
A world thus maps primitive terms to co-referring standard names of the corresponding sort,
and primitive formulas to truth values. The rigidity constraint ensures that rigid symbols do
not take different values in different situations, as expected. We further incorporate the unique
names assumption for actions into our logic’s semantics, as opposed to the Situation Calculus
where this is typically asserted axiomatically. The arithmetical correctness constraint finally
means that arithmetical expressions such as 3 + 7 are mapped to their corresponding value, in
this case 10, and that inequalities such as 5 < 3 are assigned the expected truth value. Note that
the assumption here is that the number standard names coincide with the numerical constants
that we may use within arithmetical expressions. We discuss this issue further below in Section
3.2.4.
Definition 3.7 (Denotation of Terms). Given a ground term t, a world w, and an action
sequence z ∈ Z, we define |t|zw (read: “the co-referring standard name for t given w and z”) by:
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1. If t ∈ N , then |t|zw = t;
2. if t = f(t1, . . . , tk), then |t|zw = w[f(n1, . . . , nk), z], where ni = |ti|zw.
The above definition extends the idea of co-referring standard names from primitive terms to
arbitrary ground terms. We now have everything we need to define truth:
Definition 3.8 (Objective Truth). Given w ∈ W and an objective sentence α, we define w |= α
(read: “w satisfies α” or “α is true in w”) as w, 〈〉 |= α, where for any z ∈ Z:
1. w, z |= F (t1, . . . , tk) iff w[F (n1, . . . , nk), z] = 1, where ni = |ti|zw;
2. w, z |= (t1 = t2) iff n1 and n2 are identical, where ni = |ti|zw;
3. w, z |= α ∧ β iff w, z |= α and w, z |= β;
4. w, z |= ¬α iff w, z 6|= α;
5. w, z |= ∀x.α iff w, z |= αxn for all n ∈ Nx;
6. w, z |= [t]α iff w, z · p |= α, where p = |t|zw;
7. w, z |= α iff w, z · z′ |= α for all z′ ∈ Z.
The notation Nx above refers to the set of all standard names of the same sort as x. Moreover,
αxn means replacing all free occurrences of x by n. Reducing the quantificational case to a
countably infinite set of instances in this manner is what we call substitutional quantification.
As we will see later, this is one of the major reasons why inductive proofs in ES are comparatively
simple.
An objective sentence α is called satisfiable if some w exists such that w |= α. When Σ is
a set of objective sentences and α is an objective sentence, we write Σ |= α (read: “Σ logically
entails α”) to mean that for every w, if w |= α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ, then also w |= α. Finally, we
write |= α (read: “α is valid”) to mean {} |= α.
3.2.3 Properties
Let us now take a look at some of this language’s properties.
Unique Action Names
The first interesting property is the uniqueness of action names, as follows:
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Proposition 3.9 (Unique Names for Actions). Let g and g′ be distinct action function symbols.
Then
|= g(x1, . . . , xk) 6= g′(y1, . . . , yl)
|= g(x1, . . . , xk) = g(y1, . . . , yk) ⊃ x1 = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk = yk
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the unique names for actions constraint in Definition
3.6.
Note that that the above are identical to the unique names axioms for actions as they are used
in the classical Situation Calculus. The difference however is that here they are theorems of our
language rather than axioms that we have to assert explicitly.
Comparison with FOL
For better comparing our logic with classical first-order predicate calculus with its standard
Tarskian semantics, we restrict ourselves here to a sublanguage without the dynamic aspects
of ES. When we disallow the [ · ] and  operators as well as any mentioning of actions and
numbers (be it as variables, standard names or functions), and when we identify the set of our
object standard names {o1, o2, o3, . . . } with the set {#1,#2,#3, . . . }, we get a sublogic that
Levesque and Lakemeyer [LL01] call L. The first observation is that in terms of semantics, ES
restricted to L formulas coincides with L:
Lemma 3.10. Let α be a sentence of L and |=L mean validity for L formulas as defined in
[LL01]. Then
|= α iff |=L α.
Proof. (Sketch) Let PF |O denote the set of all primitive formulas F (n1, . . . , nk) and PO|O the
set of all primitive object terms f(n1, . . . , nk), where in both cases all the ni are of sort object .
A world w′ for L according to [LL01] corresponds then to a mapping w′ : PF |O → {0, 1} and
w′ : PO|O → NO. Such a world can be identified with an entire equivalence class of ES worlds w
that share the same values for PF |O and PO|O in the initial situation, but may differ on values
for other primitive formulas and terms and in other situations, i.e.
[w′] = { w | w[F (~n), 〈〉] = w′[F (~n)] for all F (~n) ∈ PF |O,
w[f(~n), 〈〉] = w′[f(~n)] for all f(~n) ∈ PO|O }
It is then easy to show that w′ |=L α iff w |= α for all w ∈ [w′], the reason being that for the
truth of α, only PF |O and PO|O matter.
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The above result tells us that L can indeed be viewed as a subset of ES, and we can therefore
use any related results, yet stick to our semantics as presented in Section 3.2.2.
One difference between FOL and ES is in terms of compactness. A logic is compact when
a set of formulas is satisfiable if and only if all finite subsets are. It is well known that FOL is
compact [Go¨d29]. However:
Theorem 3.11 (Levesque and Lakemeyer, [LL01]). L is not compact.
Proof. The infinite set
{∃xP (x), ¬P (#1), ¬P (#2), ¬P (#3), . . . }(3.19)
is not satisfiable, yet any finite subset is.
Corollary 3.12. ES is not compact.
Proof. This is a consequence of Theorem 3.11 and Lemma 3.10.
This difference is however mostly of theoretical, academic interest, since compactness is a prop-
erty that is only non-trivial in the context of infinite sets of formulas. In our intended applica-
tion of devising a logical agent, infinite sets will not play any role as the knowledge base of any
implemented agent will always be a finite collection of formulas.
The following theorem shows that L coincides with FOL when we omit equality and standard
names:
Theorem 3.13 (Levesque and Lakemeyer, [LL01]). Suppose α ∈ L does not contain standard
names or equality. Then |= α iff α is a valid sentence of ordinary first-order logic.
Proof. (Sketch) First note that the proposition of the theorem is equivalent to saying that α
is falsifiable in L iff α is falsifiable in FOL, and that falsifying α is the same as satisfying
¬α. The proof of the if-direction now makes use of the fact that for any world w of L such
that w |= ¬α, one can construct a corresponding Tarskian model M with a countably infinite
universe such that M |=FOL ¬α. In the converse direction, when M |=FOL ¬α, then according
to the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem [Sko20], there is a countable M ′ with M ′ |=FOL ¬α, for
which then a corresponding world w can be constructed with w |= ¬α.
In both directions, a countable model M = 〈D,Φ〉 corresponding to a world w means that
we devise a bijection ∗ between NO and M ’s domain D such that for all predicate symbols P ,
w[P (n1, . . . , nk)] = 1 iff 〈n∗1, . . . , n∗k〉 ∈ Φ(P ),
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and for all functions symbols f ,
w[f(n1, . . . , nk)] = n iff Φ(f)(n
∗
1, . . . , n
∗
k) = n
∗.
Things get a little bit more complicated once we add equality into the picture. Consider the
infinite sequence of sentences starting with:
1. ¬∃x1∀y. (y = x1)
2. ¬∃x1∃x2∀y. (y = x1) ∨ (y = x2)
3. ¬∃x1∃x2∃x3∀y. (y = x1) ∨ (y = x2) ∨ (y = x3)
The i-th sentence in this sequence says that there are more than i individuals. Let ∆ denote
the set of all such sentences for i ∈ N. While FOL indeed allows for models with finite domains,
in ES and L we fixed a countably infinite universe of discourse. While this is a somewhat
major difference, it does not represent a restriction in terms of applications that are repre-
sentable. Whenever we want to talk about a finite domain in ES, it suffices to resort to typed
quantification, where some unary predicate P serves as the type:
∀x(P (x) ⊃ α)
One then only has to ensure that P ’s extension remains finite. We will make heavy use of this
technique in Chapter 4.
Typically, equality is treated in FOL as a normal predicate for which one has to assert
that it is an equivalence relation and which allows the substitution of equals in predicates and
functions. More precisely, let Γ be the set of the following sentences:
• reflexivity: ∀x(x = x);
• symmetry: ∀x∀y(x = y) ⊃ (y = x);
• transitivity: ∀x∀y∀z((x = y) ∧ (y = z)) ⊃ (x = z);
• substitution of equals for functions: for any function symbol f ,
∀x1 . . . ∀xk∀y1 . . . ∀yk((x1 = y1) ∧ · · · ∧ (xk = yk)) ⊃ f(x1, . . . , xk) = f(y1, . . . , yk);
• substitution of equals for predicates: for any predicate symbol P ,
∀x1 . . . ∀xk∀y1 . . . ∀yk((x1 = y1) ∧ · · · ∧ (xk = yk)) ⊃ P (x1, . . . , xk) ≡ P (y1, . . . , yk).
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Then we have the following:
Theorem 3.14 (Levesque and Lakemeyer, [LL01]). Let α be a sentence of L without standard
names. Then α is valid iff in classical FOL, ∆ ∪ Γ implies α.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is analogous to the one of Theorem 3.13, but where additionally ∆∪Γ
ensures that the correspondence between a Tarskian model M and an L world w also includes
equality. Note that as opposed to FOL, the sentences in ∆ ∪ Γ are valid theorems in L.
Universal Generalization
Another consequence of our usage of standard names, in addition to the substitutional inter-
pretation of quantification, is the fact that the validity of a quantified formula can be reduced
to the validity of finitely many instances. We will provide a detailed proof for this because
it exemplifies a proof technique that we will make use of more often during the course of this
thesis, namely proving a property of a term or formula by an induction over its structure.
Theorem 3.15 (Universal Generalization). Let α be a formula with a single free variable x not
of sort number, and let n be a standard name of the same sort as x that does not appear in α.
Let n1, . . . , nk be all the standard names of the same sort as x appearing in α. If α
x
n is valid
and all the αxni are valid, then so is ∀xα.
Proof. Intuitively, the property holds because all names not appearing in α can be treated in
the same manner, and hence we only need to check one such name that serves as representative
for all the others. Following the proof in [LL01] for the language L, we prove this theorem by
considering a bijection ∗ from object and action standard names to object and action standard
names, preserving sorts. For a term t, a formula β, and a sequence of action names z, the result
of simultaneously replacing every standard name by its mapping under ∗ is denoted by t∗, β∗,
and z∗, respectively. Further if w is a world, then let w∗ be the world that is exactly like w,
with the exception that for all primitive terms t, and action name sequences z,
(3.20) w∗[t, z] = (w[t∗, z∗])∗
−1
,
where ∗−1 refers to the bijection that is the inverse of ∗. Note that w∗ always exists and is
unique. As a consequence, we have
(3.21) (w∗[t, z])∗ = w[t∗, z∗].
Further let for all primitive formulas β and action name sequences z,
(3.22) w∗[β, z] = w[β∗, z∗].
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First we show that
(3.23) (|t|zw∗)∗ = |t∗|z
∗
w
for all ground terms t by an induction over their structure:
• If t ∈ N , then (|t|zw∗)∗ = t∗ = |t∗|z
∗
w by Definition 3.7.
• If t = f(t1, . . . , tk), then
(|t|zw∗)∗
= (w∗[f(|t1|zw∗ , . . . , |tk|zw∗), z])∗
= w[(f(|t1|zw∗ , . . . , |tk|zw∗))∗, z∗] (by assumption (3.21))
= w[f((|t1|zw∗)∗, . . . , (|tk|zw∗)∗), z∗] (by definition of ∗)
= w[f(|t1∗|z∗w , . . . , |tk∗|z
∗
w ), z
∗] (by induction)
= |f(t1∗, . . . , tk∗)|z∗w (by Definition 3.7)
= |(f(t1, . . . , tk))∗|z∗w (by definition of ∗)
= |t∗|z∗w
Now we prove that for any sentence β and action name sequence z,
(3.24) w∗, z |= β iff w, z∗ |= β∗
again by induction on its structure:
• If β is an atom F (t1, . . . , tk):
w∗, z |= F (t1, . . . , tk)
iff w∗[F (|t1|zw∗ , . . . , |tk|zw∗), z] = 1 (by Definition 3.8)
iff w[(F (|t1|zw∗ , . . . , |tk|zw∗))∗, z∗] = 1 (by assumption (3.22)
iff w[F ((|t1|zw∗)∗, . . . , (|tk|zw∗)∗), z∗] = 1 (by definition of ∗)
iff w[F (|t1∗|z∗w , . . . , |tk∗|z
∗
w ), z
∗] = 1 (by (3.23))
iff w, z∗ |= F (t1∗, . . . , tk∗) (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ |= (F (t1, . . . , tk))∗ (by definition of ∗)
• If β is an atom (t1 = t2):
w∗, z |= (t1 = t2)
iff |t1|zw∗ = |t2|zw∗ (by Definition 3.8)
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iff (|t1|zw∗)∗ = (|t2|zw∗)∗ (since ∗ is a bijection, see below)
iff |t1∗|z∗w = |t2∗|z
∗
w (by (3.23))
iff w, z∗ |= (t1∗ = t2∗) (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ |= (t1 = t2)∗ (by definition of ∗)
Above we made use of the fact that because ∗ is a bijection, the mapping is unique in
both directions, i.e. not only does n1 = n2 imply that n1
∗ = n2∗, but also vice versa.
• β has the form β1 ∧ β2:
w∗, z |= β1 ∧ β2
iff w∗, z |= β1 and w∗, z |= β2 (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ |= β1∗ and w, z∗ |= β2∗ (by induction)
iff w, z∗ |= β1∗ ∧ β2∗ (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ |= (β1 ∧ β2)∗ (by definition of ∗)
• β has the form ¬β1:
w∗, z |= ¬β1
iff w∗, z 6|= β1 (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ 6|= β1∗ (by induction)
iff w, z∗ |= ¬β1∗ (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ |= (¬β1)∗ (by definition of ∗)
• β has the form ∀xβ1:
w∗, z |= ∀xβ1
iff w∗, z |= β1xn for all n ∈ Nx (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ |= (β1xn)∗ for all n ∈ Nx (by induction)
iff w, z∗ |= β1∗xn∗ for all n ∈ Nx (by definition of ∗)
iff w, z∗ |= β1∗xn′ for all n′ ∈ Nx (since ∗ is a bijection, see below)
iff w, z∗ |= ∀xβ1∗ (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ |= (∀xβ1)∗ (by definition of ∗)
Above we exploited the fact that because ∗ is a sort-preserving bijection from standard
names to standard names (a permutation), its image from all standard names of one sort
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is again the set of all standard names of that sort, i.e.
{n | n ∈ Nx} = {n∗ | n ∈ Nx} = Nx.
• β has the form [t]β1:
w∗, z |= [t]β1
iff w∗, z · |t|zw∗ |= β1 (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, (z · |t|zw∗)∗ |= β1∗ (by induction)
iff w, z∗ · (|t|zw∗)∗ |= β1∗ (by definition of ∗)
iff w, z∗ · |t∗|z∗w |= β1∗ (by (3.23))
iff w, z∗ |= [t∗]β1∗ (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ |= ([t]β1)∗ (by definition of ∗)
• β has the form β1:
w∗, z |= β1
iff w∗, z · z′ |= β1 for all z′ ∈ Z (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, (z · z′)∗ |= β1∗ for all z′ ∈ Z (by induction)
iff w, z∗ · z′∗ |= β1∗ for all z′ ∈ Z (by definition of ∗)
iff w, z∗ · z′′ |= β1∗ for all z′′ ∈ Z (since ∗ is a bijection, see below)
iff w, z∗ |= β1∗ (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z∗ |= (β1)∗ (by definition of ∗)
Above we use a similar argument as in the ∀ case: Since ∗ is a bijection from action
standard names to action standard names, ∗ applied to the set of all sequences of action
names yields again the set of all action sequences:
{z | z ∈ Z} = {z∗ | z ∈ Z} = Z.
Now that we proved property (3.24), if for some w we have that w 6|= β∗, then for w∗ we have
that w∗ 6|= β. Conversely, if for some w we have w 6|= β, then since w can be expressed as
(w∗−1)∗, by (3.24) we get w∗−1 6|= β∗. Therefore a sentence β is valid iff β∗ is.
Now let α have one free variable x, n1, . . . , nk be all standard names of the same sort as x
appearing in α, and n be one standard name of that sort that does not appear in α. To show
that ∀xα is valid, it suffices to show that all substitution instances of α are valid. In case of
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n1, . . . , nk, n, the validity is already assumed. If n
′ is a standard name distinct from n1, . . . , nk, n,
then let ∗ be the bijection that swaps n and n′ and leaves everything else unchanged. By the
above, αxn′ is valid iff α
x
n is, where the latter again is assumed.
Corollary 3.16. Theorem 3.15 does not hold when the free variable is of sort number.
Proof. A counterexample is the case where α is the formula m < 3 + 3. Then αm3 is the formula
3 < 3 + 3, which is obviously valid. One number standard name not occurring in α is 4, and
αm4 = (4 < 3 + 3) is valid as well, but ∀m.(m < 3 + 3) obviously is not.
For the sorts object and action we make use of the fact that standard names bear no special
information and are in no specific relation among each other except for each name being distinct
to any other name. The trick (first used in [Lev84]) then is that any single name not appearing
in α can be used as a representative for all other names that do no appear, as they all behave
equally in relation to the names mentioned in α. In case of the number sort, this does obviously
not work since there we actually do have special relations among the names, namely through
the arithmetical operators +, · , and <, whose meaning we fixed in our language’s semantics.
This implies that we will not be able to reason about unknown numbers in the same way we can
reason about unknown objects or actions. In particular the Representation Theorem, presented
below in Section 3.5, will not be applicable either. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this thesis
where only limited use of numbers and arithmetics is made, this is perfectly sufficient. In the
robot scenario for instance we expect that the robot may possibly not know who is the person in
the kitchen, or which food is in the refrigerator, or what action is necessary to fix the dishwasher,
but it is always aware about the duration of its own actions, the distances between locations,
its current energy level and the like. That is to say that the more complex reasoning tasks are
to be expected within the domains of objects and actions, whereas numbers are only necessary
to do simple calculations that involve numerical parameters.
3.2.4 A Remark on Numbers
Speaking of numbers, note that in our semantics we assume a fixed, countable set of numbers to
serve as the standard names of sort number . At first glance this precludes the usage of the set
of real numbers since this set is known to be uncountable [Can91]. On the other hand, even for
the limited use of arithmetic that we want to employ in this thesis, it seems that real numbers
are essential. As an example, consider that we have a robot which represents physical locations
through two-dimensional coordinates. When the robot is currently at location 〈0, 0〉 and an
object that it wants to grab is located at 〈1, 1〉, the distance between the two (which might for
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instance be needed to decide whether the robot can reach the object with its robotic arm) is√
2. Similarly, we may want to reason about the fuel or energy consumption of our robot, for
instance to ensure that some recharging station is reachable:
(3.25) ∃x.ChargingStation(x) ∧ [goto(loc(x))]energy > 0
When we suppose that the energy use of a goto(x) action depends linearly on the travelled
distance, and even in the case of simple straightline distances, this again potentially involves
having to deal with irrational numbers.
One might argue that it is often not necessary to be that precise about numerical values
because there is always a margin of error and because a physical computer’s internal arithmetics
will approximate values such as
√
2 by floating point (i.e. rational) numbers anyway. However,
at the logical level there is a strong reason why the agent should in some sense be “aware” that
something like the square root of two exists. Consider the formula
x · x = 2.
If we simply used an approximation of
√
2 such as 1.41 to substitute it for the x here, we would
get that (1.41)2 = 1.9881 = 2, and therefore that 0.0119 = 0, and hence also 1 = 0 could be
deduced. In other words our logic can never be consistent when we resort to such approximate
values!
As discussed in [Hu06], there is however one solution that allows us to have numbers and
(simple) arithmetics in our language, treat quantification over numbers substitutionally, yet
include irrational numbers such as
√
2 and pi. To understand this, we first have to take a closer
look at how the real numbers are defined within mathematics.
Actually, there are several possible known constructions of the reals. While explicit ap-
proaches start from a smaller set such as the rational numbers or the integers, and build on top
of that, the synthetic approach defines the real number system axiomatically [Hil00]. That is,
one provides a set of axioms in the form of formulas of (classical) predicate logic such that their
(any) model can be identified with the set of the reals.
More precisely, a model of the real numbers is given by a set R, two constants 0 and 1, two
operations + : R× R→ R and · : R× R→ R, as well as a relation < ⊆ R× R, satisfying:
1. (R,+, · ) forms a field, i.e.
∀x, y, z ∈ R. (x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z)(3.26)
∀x ∈ R. x+ 0 = x(3.27)
∀x ∈ R ∃y ∈ R. x+ y = 0(3.28)
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∀x, y ∈ R. x+ y = y + x(3.29)
∀x, y, z ∈ R. (x · y) · z = x · (y · z)(3.30)
∀x ∈ R. x · 1 = x(3.31)
∀x ∈ R \ {0} ∃y ∈ R. x · y = 1(3.32)
∀x, y ∈ R. x · y = y · x(3.33)
∀x, y, z ∈ R. (x+ y) · z = x · z + y · z(3.34)
0 6= 1(3.35)
(3.26) to (3.29) are the rules of associativity, the neutral element, the inverse, and commu-
tativity for addition, while (3.30) to (3.33) are the corresponding rules for multiplication.
(3.34) is the distributivity law, and (3.35) expresses that the two neutral elements have
to be distinct.
2. (R, <) is a strict total order that is compatible with + and · , i.e.
∀x, y, z ∈ R. exactly one of x < y or x = y or y < x holds.(3.36)
∀x, y, z ∈ R. if x < y and y < z then x < z.(3.37)
∀x, y, z ∈ R. if x < y then x+ z < y + z.(3.38)
∀x, y, z ∈ R. if x < y and 0 < z then x · z < y · z.(3.39)
(3.36) is the trichotomy law, and (3.37) is the law of transitivity. (3.38) ensures the
compatibility between < and +, while (3.39) does so for < and · .
3. R is Dedekind-complete, i.e.
(3.40) Every bounded nonempty set S ⊆ R has a least upper bound.
This axiom finally ensures that the real number line is indeed continuous and does not
contain any “gaps”.
In other words, axioms (3.26)–(3.40) define the real number system to be a Dedekind-complete
ordered field, which is sufficient to capture all intrinsic properties of the reals. Other properties
can then be derived from these axioms. Furthermore it can be shown that there is a unique
model R in the sense that every other model R′ has to be isomorphic, i.e. identical up to
renaming and relabelling.
As indicated above, the fact that there are uncountably many reals is problematic in the
context of our substitutional semantics for quantification, which requires the underlying domain
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to be countable. The uncountability of the reals is due to axiom (3.40). The axiom, which is
obviously second-order as it quantifies over sets of numbers, is an important property when it
comes to analysis and proving theorems about the reals. However, for our purposes of doing
simple arithmetical calculations, it is actually unnecessary.
Once we drop (3.40) and only keep (3.26)–(3.39), we end up with the theory of ordered fields,
which may be or not be Dedekind-complete. While the real numbers are still one possible model,
we now get several additional ones such as the rational numbers Q, the algebraic numbers A,
and the computable numbers C. Here, an algebraic number means a number that is the root of
a non-zero polynomial in one variable with integer coefficients. It includes all rational numbers
such as 12 and irrational numbers like
√
2 and 3
√
4, but not the circle constant pi and the Euler
constant e. The computable numbers [Tur37] are those real numbers which can be computed
to any desired precision by a finite, terminating algorithm. They include all algebraic numbers
and additionally important transcendent numbers such as pi and e. In fact we have that these
sets constitute increasingly general concepts, i.e.
Q ⊂ A ⊂ C ⊂ R,
where except for R, each of them is countable. Note that the natural numbers N as well as the
integers Z do not constitute ordered fields since they lack the inverse elements for multiplication.
Therefore, any of Q, A, or C (or any other structure that is an ordered field) is a possible
candidate for our definition of the set of number standard names NN . For our semantics to
be well defined, we just have to fix one of these sets. The arithmetical correctness constraint
of Definition 3.6 is then to be understood as a mapping of the symbols +, · and < to the
corresponding operations within the chosen ordered field structure.
Here, we will in the following assume that NN = C, not only because it is the largest of
the above mentioned sets that is still countable, but also because it is somewhat analogous
to our view of an agent that is a logically omniscient first-order reasoner. The latter means
that we assume that the agent is always aware of all logical consequences of the formulas
in its knowledge base, despite the fact that any physical implementation will suffer certain
computability limitations due to the semi-decidability of first-order logic. Similarly, in our
idealized perspective the exact result of any arithmetical calculation is always instantly available
to the agent, although in practice one would have to resort to approximations whose accuracy
depends on the computation time invested. Consequently, we will in the following make free
use of the elementary operations +, · , and < within formulas and view number constants such
as 42, 12 ,
√
2 and pi as number standard names. Furthermore, expressions involving the inverse
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operations − (subtraction) or / (division) will be viewed as abbreviations in terms of + and · :
(x− y = z) def= (y + z = x)(3.41)
(x/y = z)
def
= (y · z = x)(3.42)
3.2.5 Second-Order Quantification
Sometimes it may be necessary for us to be able to quantify not only over single individuals,
but also over sets, relations and functions. As mentioned earlier, we assume that the agent
itself only possesses first-order reasoning capabilities. Second-order quantification may however
be necessary on the one hand to express facts about the agent and its environment from a
meta-perspective, and on the other hand to point out the limits of what is representable by the
sole usage of first-order formulas. The macro-definition of the Golog semantics presented in
Section 3.6 is an example for the former, the second-order LR-Progression discussed in Section
3.4.2 for the latter.
To include second-order quantification, we extend our language’s syntax as follows:
Definition 3.17. The set of objective SO formulas is constructed analogously to Definition
3.2, with the additional rule:
4. If α is an objective SO formula, P a (fluent or rigid) predicate symbol, and f a (fluent or
rigid) function symbol, then ∀P.α and ∀f.α are objective SO formulas.
For interpreting second-order quantification semantically, we define a compatibility relation
among worlds wrt some predicate or function symbol:
Definition 3.18. Let w and w′ be worlds, P a (fluent or rigid) predicate symbol, f a (fluent
or rigid) function symbol, and z ∈ Z. Then w z∼P w′ iff for all primitive sentences P ′(~n) with
P ′ 6= P and all z′ ∈ Z,
w[P ′(~n), z · z′] = w′[P (~n), z · z′].
Similarly, w
z∼f w′ iff for all primitive terms f ′(~n) with f ′ 6= f and all z′ ∈ Z,
w[f ′(~n), z · z′] = w′[f ′(~n), z · z′].
Intuitively, the definition says that w
z∼P w′ iff w and w′ are identical from z onwards, except
perhaps on their interpretation of primitive formulas involving P . Similarly, w
z∼f w′ iff w
and w′ are identical from z onwards, except perhaps on their interpretation of primitive terms
involving f . If z is the empty sequence, we also write ∼P and ∼f instead of 〈〉∼P and 〈〉∼f ,
respectively.
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Proposition 3.19. For any P , f and z,
z∼P and z∼f are equivalence relations.
Proposition 3.20. If w′ z∼P w, then w′ z·z
′∼ P w.
We will further employ an extended notation that allows
z∼ to be used with multiple predicates
and/or functions. w
z∼P1,P2,f1 w′ then for instance means that from z onwards, w and w′ agree
on every primitive formula that mentions neither P1 nor P2 and on every primitive term without
f1.
Proposition 3.21. If w′ z∼P1 w, then w′ z∼P1,P2 w.
The semantics of formulas with second-order quantifiers is now given by the definition below:
Definition 3.22. For objective SO formulas, we extend Definition 3.8 by the following addi-
tional rules:
8. w, z |= ∀P.α iff w′, z |= α for all w′ z∼P w;
9. w, z |= ∀f.α iff w′, z |= α for all w′ z∼f w.
Note that the above definition of second-order ES slightly differs from the one in the existing
literature such as [LL05a]. Whereas Lakemeyer and Levesque assume that the logic’s alphabet
contains a separate pool of uncountably many second-order variable symbols, we simply allow
to quantify any of the already available function and predicate symbols. That is to say that
the role of any such symbol differs between being a second-order variable or a normal non-
logical symbol, depending on whether it is within the scope of a corresponding second-order
quantifier or not. In consequence, we do not need to include special second-order variable maps
in our semantics as in [LL05a], but it suffices to let worlds interpret functions and predicates
as before. Semantically, a second-order quantifier ∀P here then does not range over all possible
second-order variable maps, but over all worlds with different extensions of P .
A typical application of second-order quantification is the definition of the transitive closure
of a given relation. Consider the In predicate that we used in our robot example. When we
have facts telling us that Bob is in his office and Bob’s office is in the building of the Computer
Science Department, i.e.
In(bob, office(bob)) ∧ In(office(bob), csbuilding),(3.43)
we would like to be able to deduce that this also means that Bob is currently inside the Computer
Science building, without explicitly including this fact in our theory. The fact that the binary
relation In is transitive can easily be expressed as follows:
∀x∀y∀z. In(x, y) ∧ In(y, z) ⊃ In(x, z)(3.44)
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Unfortunately, this sentence is not sufficient to capture the notion of a transitive closure. The
reason is that it is nowhere said that In has to be interpreted by the smallest set that satisfies the
transitivity rule. In fact, the full Cartesian product of all pairs of object standard names would
be a model, i.e. any w such that w[In(n1, n2), z] = 1 for all n1 ∈ NO, all n2 ∈ NO, and all z ∈ Z
satisfies (3.44). As a consequence, In(csbuilding , office(bob)) and In(csbuilding , interior(moon))
cannot be excluded, contrary to our intuition.
It is possible though to define the transitive closure of In by means of second-order quan-
tification. Let α denote (3.43) and β mean (3.44). Then take the sentence
InTrans(x′, y′) ≡ ∀In(α ∧ β ⊃ In(x′, y′))(3.45)
saying that the true instances of InTrans(x′, y′) are exactly those pairs 〈x′, y′〉 such that In(x′, y′)
is true in all possible interpretations of In satisfying (3.43) and (3.44). The idea is then what
holds for all interpretations must also be true for the smallest one, which then corresponds to the
actual transitive closure. Note that (3.45) now correctly entails both InTrans(bob, csbuilding)
and ¬InTrans(csbuilding , office(bob)).
3.3 Basic Action Theories
Now that we have defined the fundamental part of the language ES (later we will discuss a
number of extensions), we are ready to use it in order to represent the dynamics of specific
application domains. Typically, for any such domain this involves at least a description of
1. what the world is currently like,
2. the preconditions of the actions at the agent’s disposal and
3. how the agent’s actions affect the state of the world.
The first item does not pose a big problem. In order to describe what is currently true, no actions
or modal operators are required, but standard first-order syntax is sufficient. For example, in
the case of our office robot, a simple first-order sentence like ¬∃x.Holding(x) can be used to
express that the robot is currently not holding anything in its robotic arm.
Each of the other two items however comes with a problem that has been recognized early
and studied thoroughly in the KR literature. When describing the action’s preconditions, we
are confronted with the so-called qualification problem, and in the case of their postconditions
(effects), we have to deal with the frame problem. We will present these problems together with
possible (simple) solutions in the following.
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3.3.1 The Qualification Problem
Preconditions of an action are requirements that have to be met in order for the agent to be
able to execute that action in the current situation. To formalize such requirements through
logical formulas we use the fluent predicate Poss(a) whose intended meaning is that it is true
whenever the argument a is an action that is possible to execute.
As shown in [Rei01a], it is normally straightforward to write down a collection of necessary
conditions for a given action. For instance, consider the action pickup(y): In order for the robot
to be able to pick up an object y, it should not be holding anything else currently, it should be
at the same location as the object, and the object should not be too heavy (we imagine a robot
that has only one robotic arm and therefore can only hold one object at a time):
Poss(pickup(y)) ⊃ ¬∃xHolding(x)(3.46)
Poss(pickup(y)) ⊃ loc(y) = loc(robot)(3.47)
Poss(pickup(y)) ⊃ ¬Heavy(y)(3.48)
All conditions of this form can be easily combined into a single sentence by means of conjunction:
Poss(pickup(y)) ⊃ ¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ loc(y) = loc(robot) ∧ ¬Heavy(y)(3.49)
The problem now is that while this formula certainly expresses true facts about the executability
of a pickup(y) action, by itself it is actually useless. The reason is that from (3.49) alone we can
at most infer when pickup(y) is not possible, but not when it is. What is missing in addition
to the necessary conditions given in the axiom is that we also explicitly state all sufficient
conditions. The qualification problem now refers to the difficulty of foreseeing every possible
such condition. As an example, it is not sufficient to simply reverse the implication of (3.49):
¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ loc(y) = loc(robot) ∧ ¬Heavy(y) ⊃ Poss(a)(3.50)
We would rather have to include also something along the lines of the following:
¬GluedToFloor(y) ∧ ¬ArmsTied ∧ ¬HitByTenTonTruck ∧ . . .(3.51)
Even in the improbable case that we are able to come up with a complete list of all these
“minor” qualifications, this is problematic. When all the agents knows is that
¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ loc(y) = loc(robot) ∧ ¬Heavy(y)(3.52)
holds and it is not known to it whether any of the “minor” conditions is true, then it still cannot
be inferred whether pickup(y) is possible, at least by means of ordinary monotonic logics. What
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would be needed here is a form of nonmonotonic reasoning such as Reiter’s Default Logic [Rei80],
which uses rules of the form
α : β1, . . . , βk
γ
The intuition is that when the prerequisite α is known to hold and none of the justifications
β1, . . . , βk is known to be false, then by default, infer the conclusion γ. In our case, the pre-
requisite would be the “major” qualifications (3.52), the justifications are given by the “minor”
qualifications (3.51), and the conclusion is Poss(pickup(y)).
For the purpose of this thesis, we simply decide to basically ignore the “minor” qualifications
and only deal with the “major” ones. We should though keep in mind that this is again
an idealization, and that practical implementations require some mechanism that enables the
system to cope with unforeseen events or unexpected situations.
In general, we assume that for each action operator gj(~yj), we have one axiom stating the
necessary (“major”) preconditions:
Poss(g1(~y1)) ⊃ pi1
. . .
Poss(gl(~yl)) ⊃ pil
Each pij is a formula without any modal operators and whose free variables are the corresponding
~yj . Furthermore, there may be one general axiom that does not depend on a particular operator:
Poss(a) ⊃ pia
Again pia does not contain modal operators, and its only free variable is a. An example for a
qualification axiom of this type in the robot scenario could be the precondition that no matter
what action is to be performed, the robot must have some energy left:
Poss(a) ⊃ energy > 0(3.53)
We then make an idealized completeness assumption that these axioms in fact encode all the
necessary and sufficient conditions for an action a to be possible. A single precondition axiom
can then be constructed as follows:
Poss(a) ≡ (
l∨
j=1
∃~yj(a = gj(~yj) ∧ pij)) ∧ pia(3.54)
In the example, we might have the following axioms for the operators goto(y), pickup(y),
putdown(y), and recharge, respectively:
Poss(goto(y)) ⊃ Location(y) ∧NextTo(loc(robot), y)(3.55)
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Poss(pickup(y)) ⊃ ¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ loc(y) = loc(robot) ∧ ¬Heavy(y)(3.56)
Poss(putdown(y)) ⊃ Holding(y)(3.57)
Poss(recharge) ⊃ ∃x(ChargingStation(x) ∧ loc(x) = loc(robot))(3.58)
That is, going to y requires y to be at a location that is next to the robot’s one. Picking up
an object is possible only if the robot is not holding anything else, it is at the object’s position,
and the object is not too heavy. An object can be put down only if it is currently being held,
and recharging is possible only when the robot is at a location where there is some recharging
station. Let (3.53) be the operator independent qualification axiom. The precondition axiom
then is:
Poss(a) ≡
{ ∃y(a = goto(y) ∧ Location(y) ∧NextTo(loc(robot), y)) ∨
∃y(a = pickup(y) ∧ loc(y) = loc(robot) ∧ ¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ ¬Heavy(y)) ∨
∃y(a = putdown(y) ∧Holding(y)) ∨
(a = recharge ∧ ∃x(ChargingStation(x) ∧ loc(x) = loc(robot))) }
∧ energy > 0
(3.59)
3.3.2 The Frame Problem
It is also comparatively easy to come up with formulas that describe what direct effects actions
have on the state of a fluent. For instance, picking up an object will cause it to be held by the
robot, while putting it down has the effect that the object is not held anymore:
[pickup(x)]Holding(x)(3.60)
[putdown(x)]¬Holding(x)(3.61)
We call formulas of this form effect axioms. These axioms by themselves are however not
sufficient to fully describe the new state that results from doing some action. The reason is
that effect axioms only encode the changes that are caused by the actions, but they do not
encode what is left unchanged. For example, the above effect axiom (3.60) does not exclude the
possibility that the colour of the object changes while picking it up:
{colour(x) = y, [pickup(x)]Holding(x)} 6|= [pickup(x)]colour(x) = y(3.62)
This is of course counter-intuitive as one would expect the colour of an object to remain unaf-
fected by a pickup action. To correctly account for such invariants, one would have to resort to
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so-called frame axioms. In the above example, the corresponding frame axiom would be
colour(x) = y ⊃ [pickup(x)]colour(x) = y.(3.63)
The problem now is the sheer number of such axioms that one would have to include in the
theory. Picking up an object for instance not only leaves the colour of that object unchanged,
but also the colour of every other object, the positions of other objects, the positions of people
in the building, whether doors are open or closed, and so on. In general, if NA is the number
of actions to be considered, and NF the number of fluents, then the total number of effect and
frame axioms would be around 2 ·NA ·NF .
Listing all effects and non-effects for all possible combinations of actions and fluents in this
way is not only tedious and error-prone, but it is also somewhat redundant. Once one has come
up with a complete list of all actions’ effects, that list already contains all necessary information.
What it however is missing is a logical representation of the fact that the listed effects comprise
all possible effects and that in any other case, by default, no change happens. Furthermore,
because actions usually only affect a few fluents, there is only a small number of effect axioms,
but a huge number of frame axioms would be needed.
Reiter’s popular solution [Rei91], which is based on earlier proposals by Pednault [Ped89],
Davis [Dav90], Haas [Haa87], and Schubert [Sch90], is as follows. Given a set of relevant fluents
F , we assume that for each relational F ∈ F , we have exactly one positive effect axiom of the
form
 γ+F ⊃ [a]F (~x)(3.64)
and one negative effect axiom of the form
 γ−F ⊃ [a]¬F (~x).(3.65)
γ+F and γ
−
F have to be formulas that do not contain any modal operators and whose only free
variables are ~x and a. Here, γ+F describes all conditions under which F (~x) is caused to become
true by executing action a, while γ−F gives the conditions under which a makes F (~x) false. The
above represents a normal form to which our example effect axioms (3.60) and (3.61) above do
not yet conform. However, they can easily brought into this form by means of equalities:
(a = pickup(x)) ⊃ [a]Holding(x)(3.66)
(a = putdown(x)) ⊃ [a]¬Holding(x)(3.67)
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Furthermore, in general one may have more than one effect axiom of a sort, for example when
there are multiple actions which can possibly affect a fluent F . A collection of k axioms
ψ(1)F ⊃ [a]F (~x)
. . .
ψ(k)F ⊃ [a]F (~x)
can be combined into a single one by using a disjunction:
(ψ(1)F ∨ · · · ∨ ψ(k)F ) ⊃ [a]F (~x)
This construction moreover captures the case where we do not have any positive effect axiom
for F , e.g. when there is no action whatsoever that can potentially cause F to become true.
Following the usual convention, a disjunction over an empty set is interpreted as “false”, and
thus we get in this case the effect axiom
⊥ ⊃ F (~x).
All of the above of course can be similarly applied to negative effect axioms. Now, given a
single positive effect axiom and a single negative one for each relational fluent F , one makes
the causal completeness assumption: Axioms (3.64) and (3.65), respectively, characterize all the
conditions under which action a causes F to become true (respectively, false) in the successor
situation. In other words, when F ’s truth value changes from true to false by action a, then γ−F
must hold, and similarly, if F changes from false to true, this is due to γ+F being true. Formally,
this is expressed by the explanation closure axioms:
F (~x) ∧ [a]¬F (~x) ⊃ γ−F(3.68)
¬F (~x) ∧ [a]F (~x) ⊃ γ+F(3.69)
Theorem 3.23 (Reiter, [Rei91]). Suppose Γ is a background theory that entails
¬(γ+F ∧ γ−F ).(3.70)
Then Γ entails that the effect axioms (3.64) and (3.65), together with the explanation closure
axioms (3.68) and (3.69), are logically equivalent to:
[a]F (~x) ≡ γ+F ∨ F (~x) ∧ ¬γ−F(3.71)
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We call (3.71) a successor state axiom (SSA). The intuition is that F (~x) is true after doing
action a iff it was caused to become true, or it was already true and not caused to turn false.
In the example of the Holding fluent, the corresponding successor state axiom thus is
[a]Holding(x) ≡ (a = pickup(x)) ∨Holding(x) ∧ (a 6= putdown(x)).(3.72)
Reiter’s is an extremely elegant solution to the frame problem as instead of the 2 ·NA ·NF many
effect and frame axioms, now only NF successor state axioms are needed. One may object to
this by pointing out that SSAs are larger in size than effect axioms because the former are
constructed out of several of the latter. However, as each effect axiom is only used within a
single SSA, the total size of the SSAs corresponds roughly to the total size of all effect axioms.
This together with the fact that in a typical application, each action only affects a small,
limited number of fluents, while a much larger number of fluents remains unaffected, implies
that SSAs comprise a much more compact representation. Moreover, SSAs are also the basis
for regression-based reasoning, which we will discuss in Section 3.4.1.
The consistency condition (3.70) is necessary to ensure that a fluent is not caused to be true
and false at the same time, which obviously leads to a contradiction. For the fluent Holding ,
the condition is satisfied because of unique names for actions. Reiter’s solution for the original
Situation Calculus indeed included the unique names assumption for actions as an explicit
requirement. In the case of ES however, this is unnecessary as we get it “for free” by the
language’s semantics, cf. Proposition 3.9.
For functional fluents, successor state axioms can be constructed in a similar manner. The
assumption here is that for any functional f ∈ F , we have one effect axiom of the form
γ+f ⊃ [a](f(~x) = y),(3.73)
where γ+f is a subformula without any modal operators and whose free variables are among ~x,
y, and a. Note that we do not have a negative effect axiom since functions cannot “lose” their
value as the logic’s semantics defines them to be total.
Similar to the relational case, we now have to make a causal completeness assumption,
meaning that we assume that (3.73) characterizes all the conditions under which action a can
cause f to take value y in the successor situation. Formally, this is expressed again by means
of an explanation closure axiom:
∃y′∃y′′((f(~x) = y′) ∧ [a](f(~x) = y′′) ∧ (y′ 6= y′′)) ⊃ ∃yγ+f(3.74)
This axiom says that when f has a different value before and after executing action a, then this
is due to action a causing it, under the conditions expressed in γ+f . Just as in the relational
56 3 LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
case, assuming the consistency condition
¬∃y∃y′.γ+f ∧ γ+f
y
y′
∧ (y 6= y′)(3.75)
it can then be shown that (3.73) together with (3.74) is equivalent to
[a](f(~x) = y) ≡ γ+f ∨ (f(~x) = y) ∧ ¬∃y′γ+f
y
y′
(3.76)
which we call the successor state axiom for functional fluent f .
As an example, consider the fluent loc(x), denoting the location of an individual x, where
x can refer to a physical object, but also to the robot or a person. The location of an object x
changes to y by doing a goto(y) action in case x is the robot itself or if it is an object held by
the robot:
(a = goto(y) ∧ x = robot) ⊃ [a](loc(x) = y)(3.77)
(a = goto(y) ∧Holding(x)) ⊃ [a](loc(x) = y)(3.78)
Using disjunction and simplification, the two effect axiom can be combined into a single one:
(a = goto(y) ∧ (x = robot ∨Holding(x))) ⊃ [a](loc(x) = y)(3.79)
The successor state axiom then is
[a](loc(x) = y) ≡(3.80)
a = goto(y) ∧ (x = robot ∨Holding(x)) ∨
loc(x) = y ∧ ¬∃y′(a = goto(y′) ∧ (x = robot ∨Holding(x))).
Note that again the consistency condition (3.75) is satisfied because unique names for actions
ensure that a = goto(y) can only hold for one standard name at a time.
3.3.3 Formal Definition
In later parts of this thesis we will introduce further special fluents for which we use axioms
similar to the precondition axiom that defines Poss. In the following, we therefore distinguish
two types of fluents: On the one hand, there is a set of normal fluents F for which we have
successor state axioms, and on the other hand there is a set of definitional fluents D whose
truth values are defined in terms of the values of normal fluents in the same situation.
Definition 3.24 (Fluent Formulas and Terms). Let D and F be two sets of (functional and
relational) fluents such that D ∩ F = ∅. An objective formula φ is fluent wrt 〈D,F〉 if
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• φ is static,
• φ does not mention any fluents from D and
• all fluents mentioned in φ are from F .
Similarly, we say that a term is fluent when it does not contain any function symbols d ∈ D
and all functional fluents that it does contain are from F .
We often omit the phrase “wrt 〈D,F〉” when the two sets of fluents are understood.
Definition 3.25. Let 〈D,F〉 be sets of (functional and relational) fluents such that D∩F = ∅.
A basic action theory over 〈D,F〉 (BAT) is a set of sentences of the form
Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost,
where
• Σ0 is a set of fluent sentences wrt 〈D,F〉 called the initial database.
• Σdef is the definitional part and consists of one sentence of the form
(3.81) D(~x) ≡ ϕD
for each relational D ∈ D, where ϕD is a fluent formula wrt 〈D,F〉 whose free variables
are ~x, and one sentence
(3.82) (d(~x) = y) ≡ ϕd
for each functional d ∈ D, where ϕd is a fluent formula wrt 〈D,F〉 whose free variables
are ~x and y.
• Σpost is a set of successor state axioms
(3.83) [a]F (~x) ≡ γF
for each relational F ∈ F , where γF is a fluent formula wrt 〈D,F〉 with free variables ~x
and a, and
(3.84) [a](f(~x) = y) ≡ γf
for each functional f ∈ F , where γf is a fluent formula wrt 〈D,F〉 with free variables ~x,
y, and a.
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Typically, we have at least one definitional fluent in the form of the Poss(a) predicate. The
axiom
Poss(a) ≡ ϕPoss
then is the so-called precondition axiom that defines the sufficient and necessary conditions
under which actions a are executable. Later, we will introduce additional definitional fluents
when needed, e.g. for sensing results or exogenous actions.
Example 3.26. Let us take a look at what a basic action theory might look like in our robot
example. An initial database could consist of the following sentences:
¬∃x.Holding(x)(3.85)
energy = 50(3.86)
loc(robot) = hallway(3.87)
loc(cup) = kitchen(3.88)
¬Heavy(cup)(3.89)
NextTo(office(ann), hallway) ∧NextTo(office(bob), hallway)(3.90)
∧ NextTo(kitchen, hallway)
∀x∀y. NextTo(x, y) ⊃ NextTo(y, x)(3.91)
distance(office(ann), hallway) = 5 ∧ distance(office(bob), hallway) = 3(3.92)
∧ distance(kitchen, hallway) = 4
∀x∀y. distance(x, y) = distance(y, x)(3.93)
∃x. ChargingStation(x) ∧ loc(x) = office(bob)(3.94)
Person(ann) ∧ Person(bob)(3.95)
Room(office(ann)) ∧ Room(office(bob)) ∧ Room(hallway)(3.96)
∀x.Room(x) ⊃ Location(x)(3.97)
That is initially, the robot is not holding anything (3.85), its energy level is at 50 percent (3.86),
and it is located in the hallway (3.87). The cup of coffee is initially in the kitchen (3.88), and it
is not heavy (3.89). Furthermore, each of Ann’s office, Bob’s office and the kitchen is connected
to the hallway (3.90), where the distances are as specified in (3.92). Both NextTo and distance
are symmetric (3.91), (3.93). There is a charging station in Bob’s office (3.94).
The only definitional fluent here is the Poss predicate, i.e. D = {Poss}. The definitional
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part Σdef therefore solely consists of the precondition axiom (3.59), repeated below:
Poss(a) ≡
{ ∃y(a = goto(y) ∧ Location(y) ∧NextTo(loc(robot), y)) ∨
∃y(a = pickup(y) ∧ loc(y) = loc(robot) ∧ ¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ ¬Heavy(y)) ∨
∃y(a = putdown(y) ∧Holding(y)) ∨
(a = recharge ∧ ∃x(ChargingStation(x) ∧ loc(x) = loc(robot))) }
∧ energy > 0
(3.98)
The axiom says that a goto action is possible iff the destination is adjacent to the robot’s current
location. Picking up an object is possible when the object is at the robot’s location and it is
currently not holding anything else. An object can be put down if it is currently held, and the
robot can recharge if there is a recharging station at its location. In any case the robot has to
have some energy left to do an action.
The normal fluents in this example are F = {loc,Holding , energy , distance}. We have one
successor state axiom for each of them:
[a](loc(x) = y) ≡(3.99)
a = goto(y) ∧ (x = robot ∨Holding(x)) ∨
loc(x) = y ∧ ¬∃y′(a = goto(y′) ∧ (x = robot ∨Holding(x)))
[a]Holding(x) ≡(3.100)
a = pickup(x) ∨ ¬Holding(x) ∧ a 6= putdown(x)
[a](energy = y) ≡(3.101)
∃x(a = goto(x) ∧ y = energy − 3 · distance(x, loc(robot))) ∨
∃x(a = pickup(x) ∧ y = energy − 10) ∨
∃x(a = putdown(x) ∧ y = energy − 10) ∨
(a = recharge ∧ y = 100)
[a](distance(x1, x2) = y) ≡(3.102)
distance(x1, x2) = y
The location of an object x changes to y iff x is the robot and it moves to y, or if is an object
held by the robot while moving to y, or if it is already at y and is not moved elsewhere (3.99).
The robot will hold an object x after picking it up or when it is already holding it and does not
put it down (3.100). The energy costs of moving from one location to the other are three times
the travelled distance in percentage points, and those of grabbing an object or putting it down
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amount to ten units. The recharge operation sets the energy level back to one hundred (3.101).
Finally, since we defined all numeric functions to be fluent, we have one SSA to assert that
distances do not change by the robot’s actions (3.102). Note that we do not have any successor
state axioms for Heavy , Location, NextTo and ChargingStation as these are rigid predicate
symbols. If Σ is the above basic action theory, a few simple consequences are as follows:
Σ |= ¬Holding(cup)(3.103)
Σ 6|= Poss(pickup(cup))(3.104)
Σ |= Poss(goto(loc(cup)))(3.105)
Σ |= [goto(loc(cup))]loc(robot) = kitchen(3.106)
Σ |= [goto(loc(cup))]energy = 38(3.107)
Σ |= [goto(loc(cup))]Poss(pickup(cup))(3.108)
Σ |= [goto(loc(cup))][pickup(cup)]Holding(cup)(3.109)
3.4 Projection
Entailments such as the ones given in the above example are instances of what is called the
projection problem. This term refers to probably the most important reasoning task for an
autonomous, knowledge-based agent, which is to decide whether some formula φ will hold after
executing a sequence of ground actions 〈g1(~t1), . . . , gk(~tk)〉, given some background theory Σ:
Σ |= [g1(~t1)] · · · [gk(~tk)]φ(3.110)
Obviously, projection is needed in the context of planning. If 〈g1(~t1), . . . , gk(~tk)〉 is one candidate
plan, then it needs to be checked whether it achieves the goal formula φ. Furthermore, it needs
to be ensured that in each situation along such a plan, the next action to be executed is indeed
executable according to Poss. These executability checks again have the form (3.110), where
〈g1(~t1), . . . , gk(~tk)〉 in this case is a partial plan leading to the current situation and φ refers to
the precondition of the subsequent action gk+1(~tk+1).
Projection can be solved in two possible directions. On the one hand one can transform the
query φ backwards through actions 〈g1(~t1), . . . , gk(~tk)〉 into an equivalent formula φ′ about the
initial situation. The problem can then be solved by deciding whether Σ0 |= φ′, which does not
involve actions anymore and can therefore be done by standard first-order theorem proving.
On the other hand, it is also possible to leave the query φ unchanged, but transform the
initial database Σ0 forwards into an equivalent theory Σ
′
0 that is updated by the changes in-
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duced through actions 〈g1(~t1), . . . , gk(~tk)〉. The projection problem thus reduces to the question
whether Σ′0 |= φ, which can again be decided by standard first-order reasoning alone.
The former approach is called regression, while the latter is referred to as progression. Both
have their advantages and disadvantages, and we will discuss those along with formal definitions
in the following.
3.4.1 Regression
The successor state axioms that result from Reiter’s solution to the frame problem allow for a
particular elegant solution to the projection problem called regression. The underlying idea is
explained quickly: Consider a non-static formula like
[pickup(cup)]Holding(cup),(3.111)
expressing that the robot will be holding the cup after doing action pickup(cup). Now the
successor state axiom for the Holding fluent is
[a]Holding(x) ≡ a = pickup(x) ∨ ¬Holding(x) ∧ a 6= putdown(x),
which tells us that for all x, in any situation and after any action a, Holding(x) is true iff the
right-hand side of the axiom holds before doing a. When we instantiate (i.e. substitute) a by
pickup(cup) and x by cup, this implies that according to the successor state axiom, (3.111) is
equivalent to
pickup(cup) = pickup(cup) ∨ ¬Holding(cup) ∧ pickup(cup) 6= putdown(cup).(3.112)
We may therefore replace the original formula by this one, preserving equivalence wrt the basic
action theory. The nice thing about this is that this new formula now does not contain any [t]
operators. In general, each regression step removes one such operator, and after a finite number
of substitutions, we end up with a static formula. The result can then simply be checked against
the initial database Σ0, and since no modal operators are involved anymore, standard first-order
reasoning suffices. In the above example, formula (3.112) is trivially entailed by any Σ0 since it
is obviously valid.
Similarly, whenever a formula contains an atom Poss(t), we can simply replace it by the
right-hand side of our precondition axiom, where the variable a needs to be substituted by the
term t mentioned by the atom. Accordingly we can proceed for any definitional fluent.
In order to formalize regression, we first have to define which formulas we can handle:
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Definition 3.27 (Regressable Formulas). Let Σ be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉. An
objective formula α is regressable iff it is bounded and the only fluents mentioned are from
〈D,F〉.
The restriction to bounded formulas is because while we can easily treat [t] operators as ex-
plained above,  operators are much more difficult and are therefore not handled by standard
regression; we will discuss this issues later in this thesis in Chapter 5. Furthermore we of course
need as a requirement that the formula to be regressed only mentions fluents for which we
actually have the corresponding axioms in our basic action theory.
In order to be able to deal with functional fluents in a similar manner as we handle relational
ones, we have the following definition:
Definition 3.28 (Regressable Form). A regressable formula α is in regressable form if every
quantifier uses a distinct variable and every occurrence of a functional fluent f in α is of the
form f(~t) = t′, where ~t and t′ do not contain any further functional fluents.
Restricting ourselves to formulas of this form does not constitute a loss of generality:
Lemma 3.29. Every regressable formula α can be expressed in regressable form.
Proof. Quantified variables can be made distinct by simply renaming them appropriately.
The requirement on functional fluents can be achieved by introducing additional existential
quantifiers. For example, if f is a unary and g a zero-ary functional fluent, then F (f(g)) in
regressable form is
∃x∃y. g = x ∧ f(x) = y ∧ F (y).
Note that the regressable form of a formula is at most linear in the size of the original one.
Using the above, we will in the following simply identify regressable formulas with formulas in
regressable form. We are now ready to define the regression operator:
Definition 3.30 (The Regression Operator). We define R[α], the regression of α wrt a basic
action theory Σ, to be R[〈〉, α], where for any sequence of action terms σ, R[σ, α] is defined
inductively on α by:
1. R[σ, (t1 = t2)] = (t1 = t2);
2. R[σ, α ∧ β] = R[σ, α] ∧R[σ, β];
3. R[σ,¬α] = ¬R[σ, α];
4. R[σ, ∀x.α] = ∀x.R[σ, α] (for all sorts);
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5. R[σ, [t]α] = R[σ · t, α];
6. R[σ,G(~t)] = G(~t), where G is a rigid predicate;
7. R[σ, F (~t)] for relational normal fluents F is defined inductively by:
(a) R[〈〉, F (~t)] = F (~t);
(b) R[σ · t, F (~t)] = R[σ, γF ~x~t ];
8. R[σ, (f(~t) = t′)] for functional normal fluents f is defined inductively by:
(a) R[〈〉, (f(~t) = t′)] = (f(~t) = t′);
(b) R[σ · t, (f(~t) = t′)] = R[σ, γf ~x y~t t′ ];
9. for relational definitional fluents D: R[σ,D(~t)] = R[σ, ϕD~x~t ]
10. for functional definitional fluents d: R[σ, (d(~t) = t′)] = R[σ, ϕd~x y~t t′ ]
To prove the regression operator’s correctness, and also for the definition of progression in the
next subsection, we need the following definition:
Definition 3.31. Let w be a world and Σ a basic action theory over fluents 〈D,F〉. Then wΣ
is a world satisfying the following conditions:
1. For any functional g 6∈ D ∪ F and relational G 6∈ D ∪ F :
wΣ[g(n1, . . . , nk), z] = w[g(n1, . . . , nk), z];
wΣ[G(n1, . . . , nk), z] = w[G(n1, . . . , nk), z];
2. for any functional f ∈ F :
wΣ[f(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = w[f(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉];
wΣ[f(n1, . . . , nk), z · p] = n iff wΣ, z |= γf x1 ··· xk y an1 ··· nk n p;
3. for any relational F ∈ F :
wΣ[F (n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = w[F (n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉];
wΣ[F (n1, . . . , nk), z · p] = 1 iff wΣ, z |= γF x1 ··· xk an1 ··· nk p;
4. for any functional d ∈ D and relational D ∈ D:
wΣ[d(n1, . . . , nk), z] = n iff wΣ, z |= ϕdx1 ··· xk yn1 ··· nk n;
wΣ[D(n1, . . . , nk), z] = 1 iff wΣ, z |= ϕDx1 ··· xkn1 ··· nk .
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The above definition as well as the following lemma and theorem are similar to the ones in
[LL04] and [LL10], but tailored to our specific variant of ES.
Lemma 3.32. Let w be a world, Σ = Σ0∪Σdef∪Σpost a basic action theory, and α a regressable
formula. Then
1. wΣ exists and is uniquely defined.
2. If w |= Σ0, then wΣ |= Σ.
3. If w |= Σ then w = wΣ.
4. wΣ |= α iff w |= R[α].
5. If α is a fluent sentence, then R[α] = α.
6. If α is a fluent sentence, then wΣ |= α iff w |= α.
Proof. (Sketch)
1. wΣ clearly exists. The uniqueness follows from the fact that the ϕD and ϕd are fluent
formulas wrt 〈D,F〉 and that for all fluents in F , once their initial values are fixed, then
the values after any number of actions are uniquely determined by Σpost.
2. Directly from the definition of wΣ we get that wΣ |= D(~x) ≡ ϕD, wΣ |= (d(~x) = y) ≡
ϕd, wΣ |= [a]F (~x) ≡ γF , and wΣ |= [a](f(~x) = y) ≡ γf .
3. If wΣ |= D(~x) ≡ ϕD, wΣ |= (d(~x) = y) ≡ ϕd, wΣ |= [a]F (~x) ≡ γF , and wΣ |=
[a](f(~x) = y) ≡ γf , then w satisfies the definition of wΣ.
4. For this property we prove a more general property. Assuming that σ = 〈t1, . . . , tk〉,
wΣ |= [t1] · · · [tk]α iff w |= R[σ, α].(3.113)
The proof is simple, but tedious and we will skip the details here. The most interesting
aspect about it is probably its structure, which is as follows. First, property (3.113)
is proven for static formulas only by means of an induction over the length of σ and a
sub-induction over the length of α, where we count the number of logical operators and
occurrences of D(~t) and (d(~t) = t′) are counted as the length of ϕD~x~t + 1 and ϕd
~x y
~t t′ + 1,
respectively. The induction is well-behaved because the formulas ϕD, ϕd, γF and γf are
themselves fluent formulas wrt 〈D,F〉, that is they are static and do not mention any
D ∈ D or d ∈ D.
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After proving the property for static α, the case for bounded formulas is treated by another
simple induction on the number of [t] operators in α.
5. This property can be proven by a simple induction on the structure of α. Since α is static,
regression rules 5, 7b, and 8b never apply. Because α is fluent, it does also not contain
any definitionals, hence rules 9 and 10 do not apply either. The remaining rules leave the
input formula unchanged.
6. This property follows directly from properties (4) and (5).
Theorem 3.33 (Regression Theorem). Let Σ be a basic action theory and α a regressable
sentence. Then R[α] is a fluent sentence and satisfies
Σ |= α iff Σ0 |= R[α].
Proof. “⇒”: Suppose Σ |= α. Let w be a world such that w |= Σ0. From Lemma 3.32 (2) it
follows that wΣ |= Σ, and hence wΣ |= α. By Lemma 3.32 (4) we obtain that w |= R[α].
“⇐”: Conversely, suppose Σ0 |= R[α] and let w be a world with w |= Σ. Then in particular
w |= Σ0, and so w |= R[α]. By Lemma 3.32 (4), wΣ |= α. By Lemma 3.32 (3), wΣ = w, and
hence w |= α.
Example 3.34. To illustrate how regression works we will apply it to verify the entailments
(3.103) to (3.109) of our office robot’s basic action theory as presented in Example 3.26.
• Σ |= ¬Holding(cup):
We have R[〈〉,¬Holding(cup)] = ¬R[〈〉,Holding(cup)] = ¬Holding(cup). Since the initial
database contains ¬∃x. Holding(x) (3.85), obviously Σ0 |= R[¬Holding(cup)].
• Σ 6|= Poss(pickup(cup)):
Using the precondition axiom (3.98), we obtain that R[〈〉,Poss(pickup(cup))] is
{ ∃y(pickup(cup) = goto(y) ∧ Location(y) ∧NextTo(loc(robot), y)) ∨
∃y(pickup(cup) = pickup(y) ∧ loc(y) = loc(robot) ∧ ¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ ¬Heavy(y)) ∨
∃y(pickup(cup) = putdown(y) ∧Holding(y)) ∨
(pickup(cup) = recharge ∧ ∃x(ChargingStation(x) ∧ loc(x) = loc(robot))) }
∧ energy > 0.
Due to unique names for actions, we can replace (pickup(cup) = pickup(y)) by (cup = y)
as well as all of (pickup(cup) = goto(y)), (pickup(cup) = putdown(y)) and (pickup(cup) =
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recharge) by ⊥. Since three of the above disjuncts are thus unsatisfiable, we can simplify
the regression result to
loc(cup) = loc(robot) ∧ ¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ ¬Heavy(cup) ∧ energy > 0
which is not entailed by Σ0 due to it containing the sentences loc(robot) = hallway (3.87)
and loc(cup) = kitchen (3.88), and due to the fact that the distinct standard names
hallway and kitchen are unequal.
• Σ |= Poss(goto(loc(cup))):
Again using the precondition axiom and similar simplification as in the last item, we get
that R[〈〉,Poss(goto(loc(cup)))] is equivalent to
Location(loc(cup)) ∧NextTo(loc(robot), loc(cup))
which is entailed by Σ0 due to loc(robot) = hallway (3.87), loc(cup) = kitchen (3.88), as
well as NextTo(hallway , kitchen) (3.90),(3.91), and Location(kitchen) (3.96),(3.97).
• Σ |= [goto(loc(cup))]loc(robot) = kitchen:
If t = goto(loc(cup)), we have R[〈〉, [t]loc(robot) = kitchen] = R[〈t〉, loc(robot) = kitchen],
which yields with the successor state axiom (3.99) and unique action names
loc(cup) = kitchen ∧ (robot = robot ∨Holding(robot)),
what can be further reduced to loc(cup) = kitchen. Hence, in order for the robot to be
in the kitchen after moving to the location of the cup, it is necessary and sufficient that
the cup is located in the kitchen. This is indeed the case according to the robot’s initial
database (3.88).
• Σ |= [goto(loc(cup))]energy = 38:
In order to determine R[〈goto(loc(cup))〉, energy = 38] we use the successor state axiom
for energy (3.101):
38 = energy − 3 · distance(loc(cup), loc(robot))
The equation is entailed by Σ0 due to energy = 50 (3.86) and since
distance(loc(cup), loc(robot)) = distance(kitchen, hallway) = 4
by (3.92) and (3.93).
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• Σ |= [goto(loc(cup))]Poss(pickup(cup)):
Let t = pickup(cup). Similar to above, we obtain that R[〈t〉,Poss(pickup(cup))] is
R[〈t〉, loc(cup) = loc(robot) ∧ ¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ ¬Heavy(cup) ∧ energy > 0]
which according to our convention regressing functional fluents we can rewrite as
R[〈t〉,∃y. loc(cup) = y ∧ loc(robot) = y ∧ ¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ ¬Heavy(cup)
∧ ∃y′. energy = y′ ∧ y′ > 0].
Regressing loc(cup) = y through t has no effect: the resulting formula can be reduced to
loc(cup) = y again. The regression of loc(robot) = y through t moreover is loc(cup) = y as
well: The robot’s location after moving to the location of the cup is of course the previous
location of the cup. Holding and Heavy are again unaffected by regression through t since
the goto action does not change the value of the former, and the latter is a rigid predicate.
Finally, energy = y′ is regressed similarly to as we did in the last item, only using y′ as
the value instead of 38. Putting it all together, we have:
∃y. loc(cup) = y ∧ ¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ ¬Heavy(cup)
∧ ∃y′. y′ = energy − 3 · distance(loc(cup), loc(robot)) ∧ y′ > 0.
The existence of a location of the cup is a tautology, the robot is initially not holding
anything (3.85), the cup is not heavy (3.89), the energy level is 50 (3.86), and the distance
between the cup’s location (the kitchen) and the robot’s (the hallway) is 4, as before.
Therefore, the inequation holds and the regression result is entailed by the initial theory.
• Σ |= [goto(loc(cup))][pickup(cup)]Holding(cup):
We need to determine R[〈goto(loc(cup)), pickup(cup)〉,Holding(cup)]. Note that regress-
ing Holding(cup) through pickup(cup) immediately simplifies to >, whose regression
through goto(loc(cup)) is of course again >. Therefore obviously, the result is entailed.
3.4.2 Progression
While regression is an elegant solution to the projection problem, it also has its drawbacks. For
one thing, note that regressing a formula tends to blow up its size exponentially. Intuitively,
this is because every fluent atom F (~t) or f(~t) = t′ within the scope of a [ · ] operator is replaced
by a formula that consists of at least one, but in general multiple such atoms, say K on average.
When the formula contains N nested [ · ] operators (i.e. talks about action sequences up to
length N), then the regression result will contain around KN fluent atoms. In consequence, the
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regressed formulas soon become unmanageable in size. This gets worse with every new action
the robot performs, and a robot that has been in operation for some time will have acquired a
very long history of already executed actions.
Apart from the problem of the sheer size of regression results, another point is that typically,
the entire history will contain a lot of redundancies, and only the most recent history is really
relevant for a certain task. In order for the robot to bring the cup of coffee to Bob, it is not so
important where the cup has been put and moved around during the last two years, but when
it is known that the cup was stored in the kitchen yesterday and has not been touched since
then, this is actually all that matters.
Finally, regression also needs to be done anew for every single query formula. While it is
conceivable to come up with a caching mechanism to cope with the redundancies resulting from
a repeated evaluation of formulas and subformulas, the idea behind progression is instead to
update the knowledge base Σ0 such that it does not describe the initial situation any longer, but
reflects the state of the world at the present situation. Thus, the agent “forgets” its history of
already performed actions and only keeps that information which is of relevance for the present
and future. As opposed to regression, the progression of the knowledge base only needs to be
computed once for the action sequence in question, and every corresponding query can then be
directly checked against this new knowledge base.
Furthermore, in particular a physical agent like a robot often has phases of “mental idle time”
during which it is busy performing physical actions (like moving from one room to the next),
but where it does not have to perform any reasoning tasks (like deciding on the next action).
Such time periods can ideally be used to progress the knowledge base through the history of
the latest actions that have been done, and thus bring the robot’s internal representation of the
state of the outside world up to date.
Before we can apply progression on knowledge bases, we first have to provide a semantic
definition of what constitutes a progression. We start with defining progression for single worlds:
Definition 3.35 (Progression of a World). Let w be a world and z a sequence of action standard
names. The progression of w through z, denoted as wz, is a world such that
• wz[β, z′] = w[β, z · z′] for all primitive formulas β and all z′ ∈ Z and
• wz[t, z′] = w[t, z · z′] for all primitive terms t and all z′ ∈ Z.
In other words, wz is the world that we obtain when we “cut off” the subtree starting at z in
w. The following lemma shows how the definition generalizes to arbitrary ground terms and
formulas:
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Lemma 3.36. Let w be a world, z, z′, sequences of action standard names, α an objective SO
formula, and t a ground term. Then
1. |t|z′wz = |t|z·z
′
w
2. wz, z
′ |= α iff w, z · z′ |= α
Proof.
1. The proof is by induction on the structure of t.
• If t ∈ N , then |t|z′wz = t = |t|z·z
′
w .
• If t = f(t1, . . . , tk):
|f(t1, . . . , tk)|z′wz
= wz[f(n1, . . . , nk), z
′], where ni = |ti|z′wz (by the semantics)
= wz[f(n1, . . . , nk), z
′], where ni = |ti|z·z′w (by induction)
= w[f(n1, . . . , nk), z · z′], where ni = |ti|z·z′w (by Definition 3.35)
= |f(t1, . . . , tk)|z·z′w (by the semantics)
2. The proof is by induction on the structure of α.
• α = F (~t):
wz, z
′ |= F (t1, . . . , tk)
iff wz[F (n1, . . . , tk), z
′] = 1, where ni = |ti|z′wz (by the semantics)
iff wz[F (n1, . . . , nk), z
′] = 1, where ni = |ti|z·z′w (by item 1 of this lemma)
iff w[F (n1, . . . , nk), z · z′] = 1, where ni = |ti|z·z′w (by Definition 3.35)
iff w, z · z′ |= F (t1, . . . , tk) (by the semantics)
• α = (t1 = t2):
wz, z
′ |= (t1 = t2)
iff |t1|z′wz = |t2|z
′
wz (by the semantics)
iff |t1|z·z′w = |t2|z·z
′
w (by item 1 of this lemma)
iff w, z · z′ |= (t1 = t2) (by the semantics)
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• α = α1 ∧ α2:
wz, z
′ |= α1 ∧ α2
iff wz, z
′ |= α1 and wz, z′ |= α2 (by the semantics)
iff w, z · z′ |= α1 and w, z · z′ |= α2 (by induction)
iff w, z · z′ |= α1 ∧ α2 (by the semantics)
• α = ¬α1:
wz, z
′ |= ¬α1
iff wz, z
′ 6|= α1 (by the semantics)
iff w, z · z′ 6|= α1 (by induction)
iff w, z · z′ |= ¬α1 (by the semantics)
• α = ∀xα1:
wz, z
′ |= ∀xα1
iff wz, z
′ |= α1xn for all n ∈ Nx (by the semantics)
iff w, z · z′ |= α1xn for all n ∈ Nx (by induction)
iff w, z · z′ |= ∀xα1 (by the semantics)
• α = [t]α1:
wz, z
′ |= [t]α1
iff wz, z
′ · p |= α1, where p = |t|z′wz (by the semantics)
iff wz, z
′ · p |= α1, where p = |t|z·z′w (by item 1 of this lemma)
iff w, z · z′ · p |= α1, where p = |t|z·z′w (by induction)
iff w, z · z′ |= [t]α1 (by the semantics)
• α = α1:
wz, z
′ |= α1
iff wz, z
′ · z′′ |= α1 for all z′′ ∈ Z (by the semantics)
iff w, z · z′ · z′′ |= α1 for all z′′ ∈ Z (by induction)
iff w, z · z′ |= α1 (by the semantics)
• α = ∀Pα1:
wz, z
′ |= ∀Pα1
iff w′, z′ |= α1 for all w′ z
′∼P wz (by the semantics)
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iff w′′z , z′ |= α1 for all w′′z z
′∼P wz (see below)
iff w′′, z · z′ |= α1 for all w′′z z
′∼P wz (by induction)
iff w′′, z · z′ |= α1 for all w′′ z·z
′∼ P w (see below)
iff w, z · z′ |= ∀Pα1 (by the semantics)
In the second rewriting step above, we exploited the fact that every world w′ is
expressible as w′′z for some w′′. The fourth step makes use of the fact that w′z
z′∼P wz
iff w′ z·z
′∼ P w, which is a direct consequence of Definitions 3.18 and 3.35.
• α = ∀fα1:
The proof of this case is exactly like the one for ∀Pα1 above.
We can now define progression for knowledge bases:
Definition 3.37 (Progression). Let Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory. A set of
static, objective SO sentences Σ′0 is a progression of Σ0 through a fluent action term t wrt
Σdef ∪ Σpost iff for any world w′, w′ |= Σ′0 iff there is a world w such that w |= Σ and w′Σ = wp,
where p = |t|〈〉w .
Intuitively, the definition means that a set of formulas Σ′0 is a progression when for all and
only its models w′, a model w of the original theory can be reconstructed. An observer who is
only looking “forward” in time would thus be unable to distinguish a model w′ of Σ′0 ∪ Σdef ∪
Σpost viewed from the initial situation from a model w of the original theory Σ viewed from
the situation after performing action t. The following theorem shows that this definition of
progression is correct in the sense that Σ′0 is the strongest post-condition of Σ0 (cf. e.g. [Ped86]):
Theorem 3.38. Let Σ′0 be a progression of Σ0 through t wrt Σdef ∪ Σpost. Then for any static,
objective SO sentence φ,
Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost |= [t]φ iff Σ′0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost |= φ.
Proof. “⇒”: Let Σ0 ∪Σdef ∪Σpost |= [t]φ and w′ be a world such that w′ |= Σ′0 ∪Σdef ∪Σpost. We
have to show that w′ |= φ. First note that by Lemma 3.32 (3) we have w′ = w′Σ. By Definition
3.37, there exists a world w such w |= Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost, where wp = w′ and p = |t|〈〉w . By
assumption, w |= [t]φ, i.e. w, p |= φ. Then by Lemma 3.36 (2), we get wp, 〈〉 |= φ, i.e. w′ |= φ.
“⇐”: Let Σ′0 ∪Σdef ∪Σpost |= φ, let w be a world with w |= Σ0 ∪Σdef ∪Σpost, let w′ = wp and
p = |t|〈〉w . By Lemma 3.32 (3), w = wΣ, and hence also w′ = w′Σ. By Definition 3.37, w′ |= Σ′0,
and therefore w′ |= Σ′0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost by Lemma 3.32 (2). Then by assumption, w′ |= φ, and by
Lemma 3.36 (2) we get w, p |= φ, i.e. w |= [t]φ.
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Now that we defined what constitutes a progression, the next question is how we determine
the progression of a given knowledge base. In [LR97], Lin and Reiter show that as long as we
can resort to second-order quantification, a progression is guaranteed to exist and can easily be
constructed:
Theorem 3.39 (LR-Progression). Let Σ = Σ0∪Σdef∪Σpost be a basic action theory over fluents
〈D,F〉. For every relational Fi ∈ F , we introduce a new predicate symbol Pi with the same
arity. Similarly, for every functional fi ∈ F , let hi be a new function symbol of the same arity
and sort. For any formula φ, let φ
~F ~f
~P ~h
denote the result of replacing every occurrence of Fi by
Pi and every occurrence of fi by hi. Then the following is a progression of Σ0 trough t wrt Σpost:
(3.114) ∃P1 . . . ∃Pl ∃h1 . . . ∃hm. Ψ,
where Ψ refers to the conjunction of the following:
(Σ0)
~F ~f
~P ~h
(3.115)
l∧
i=1
∀~xi(Fi(~xi) ≡ (γFiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
)(3.116)
m∧
i=1
∀~xi∀yi((fi(~xi) = yi) ≡ (γfiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
)(3.117)
Proof. Here we only provide the structure of the proof. The complete proof can be found in
Appendix A.1. Let w′ be a world and let Σ′0 denote (3.114).
“⇒”: Let w′ |= Σ′0. We have to show that there is some world w such that w |= Σ and
w′Σ = wp, where p = |t|〈〉w . By Definition 3.22, there is a world w′′ such that w′′ ∼~P ,~h w′ and
w′′ |= Ψ. We define w′′′ to be a world such that for all the Fi, all the fi and all standard names
~n,
w′′′[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = w′′[Pi(~n), 〈〉]
w′′′[fi(~n), 〈〉] = w′′[hi(~n), 〈〉]
and for all G, g 6∈ D ∪ F ∪ {P1, . . . , Pl} ∪ {h1, . . . , hm}, all ~n, and all z ∈ Z,
w′′′[G(~n), p · z′] = w′′[G(~n), z′]
w′′′[g(~n), p · z′] = w′′[g(~n), z′]
and further that for all Pi, all hi, all ~n, and all z
′ ∈ Z,
w′′′[Pi(~n), p · z′] = w′[Pi(~n), z′]
w′′′[hi(~n), p · z′] = w′[hi(~n), z′]
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Now let w = w′′′Σ . We will need the property that for any fluent sentence φ,
w′′ |= φ~F ~f~P ~h iff w
′′′ |= φ,(3.118)
which can be shown by an induction on the structure of φ. Since w′′ |= (Σ0)~F ~f~P ~h by assumption,
it now follows from (3.118) that w′′′ |= Σ0. By Lemma 3.32 (2) we get w′′′Σ |= Σ.
As for showing that w′Σ = wp, according to Definition 3.35, this means that for all z
′ ∈ Z,
all primitive formulas β and all primitive terms t′:
w′Σ[t
′, z′] = w[t′, p · z′](3.119)
w′Σ[β, z
′] = w[β, p · z′](3.120)
To prove this, we show a more general property, namely that for all ground terms t′′ and all
static, objective sentences φ:
|t′′|z′w′Σ = |t
′′|p·z′w(3.121)
w′Σ, z
′ |= φ iff w′′′Σ , p · z′ |= φ(3.122)
Properties (3.119) and (3.120) follow then as special cases from (3.121) and (3.122), respectively,
since any primitive term is also a ground term, and any primitive formula is also a static,
objective sentence. The proof is on both theses properties together, with an outer induction
on the length of the action sequence z′ and a sub-induction on the size of t′′ and φ, where any
occurrence of d(~t) is counted as the size of the corresponding ϕd
~x
~t
+ 1 and any occurrence of
D(~t) as the size of ϕD
~x
~t
+ 1. The induction is well-behaved since the formulas ϕd, ϕD, γfi and
γFi are fluent formulas wrt 〈F ,D〉 and therefore do not mention any further d ∈ D or D ∈ D.
“⇐”: Let w be a world such that w |= Σ and wp = w′Σ, where p = |t|〈〉w . We have to show
that w′ |= Σ′0, or equivalently that there exists some w′′ with w′′ ∼~P ,~h w′ such that w′′ |= Ψ.
Let w′′ be a world that is like w′, except that for every Pi, every fi, and all names ~n,
w′′[Pi(~n), 〈〉] = w[Fi(~n), 〈〉],
w′′[hi(~n), 〈〉] = w[fi(~n), 〈〉].
Obviously w′′ ∼~P ,~h w′. In order to show that w′′ |= Ψ, we first need the property that for every
fluent formula φ,
w |= φ iff w′′ |= φ~F ~f~P ~h,(3.123)
which is again provable by means of an induction on φ’s structure. We can then show that
w |= Ψ as follows:
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• w′′ |= (Σ0)~F ~f~P ~h:
This follows directly from the fact that w |= Σ0 and (3.123).
• w′′ |= ∀~xi(Fi(~x) ≡ (γFiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
):
Let ~n be arbitrary standard name instances for the ~xi. We have that
w′′ |= Fi(~n)
iff w′′[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = 1 (by the semantics)
iff w′[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = 1 (by assumption)
iff w′Σ[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = 1 (by Definition 3.31)
iff wp[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = 1 (since wp = w′Σ by assumption)
iff w[Fi(~n), p] = 1 (by Definition 3.35)
iff w, p |= Fi(~n) (by the semantics)
iff w |= γFi~xi a~n p (since w |= Σpost by assumption)
iff w |= γFi~xi a~n t (since p = |t|〈〉w by assumption)
iff w′′ |= (γFi~xi a~n t)
~F ~f
~P ~h
(by (3.123))
iff w′′ |= ((γFiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
)~xi~n (see below)
In the last rewriting step we made use of the fact that the ~xi~n and
~F ~f
~P ~h
substitutions do not
interfere with each other since the former is only concerned with variables and the latter
only with predicate and function symbols, which is why their order can be reversed.
• w′′ |= ∀~xj∀yi(fi(~xj) = yi ≡ (γfiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
):
The proof in this case is very similar to the one above.
Example 3.40. Consider our office robot again. Suppose its initial database is
Σ0 = {¬∃xHolding(x) ∧ loc(robot) = kitchen ∧ loc(cup) = kitchen}
and that, for simplicity, Holding and loc are the only normal fluents. Assume that we want to
progress through the action t = pickup(cup). First, let P be a new unary predicate symbol and
h a new unary function symbol. Then
(Σ0)
Holding loc
P h = {¬∃xP (x) ∧ h(robot) = kitchen ∧ loc(cup) = kitchen}.
3.4 Projection 75
Instantiating the successor state axioms for Holding (3.100) and loc (3.99) and substituting P
and h on their right-hand side yields
∀x. Holding(x) ≡ pickup(cup) = pickup(x) ∨ ¬P (x) ∧ pickup(cup) 6= putdown(x)
∀x∀y. (loc(x) = y) ≡ pickup(cup) = goto(y) ∧ (x = robot ∨ P (x))
∨ h(x) = y ∧ ¬∃y′. pickup(cup) = goto(y′) ∧ (x = robot ∨ P (x))
which we can simplify by unique action names to
∀x. Holding(x) ≡ x = cup ∨ ¬P (x)
∀x∀y. loc(x) = y ≡ h(x) = y.
The progression is then given by
∃P∃h. ¬∃x(P (x) ∧ loc(robot) = kitchen ∧ loc(cup) = kitchen)
∧ ∀x(H(x) ≡ x = cup ∨ ¬P (x)) ∧ ∀x∀y(loc(x) = y ≡ h(x) = y).
Obviously, a function h that is equivalent to loc exists. Moreover, we can pull subformulas out
of the scope of quantifiers that do not mention any of the quantified symbols. Therefore, the
above can be simplified to
loc(robot) = kitchen ∧ loc(cup) = kitchen ∧ ∃P. ¬∃xP (x) ∧ ∀x(H(x) ≡ x = cup ∨ ¬P (x)).
Similarly, the above expresses that P is false for all individuals x, hence ¬P (x) always holds.
We can therefore simplify once more to obtain
loc(robot) = kitchen ∧ loc(cup) = kitchen ∧ ∀x(H(x) ≡ x = cup)
which is precisely what to expect when progressing through pickup(cup): the locations of the
robot and the cup remain the same, but the set of instances of Holding(x) changes from the
empty set to the singleton {cup}.
Unfortunately, this form of second-order progression is problematic for several reasons. First,
we argued above that it is sensible to assume that our agent is a first-, but not a second-
order reasoner. Of course, such an agent would be unable to deal with a knowledge base
that contains second-order quantifiers. Second, note that this form of progression amounts to
“cheating”. Recall that the idea behind progression was to forget about the previous situation
and only keep the information that is relevant to the current one. While syntactically, the
LR-progression certainly has the right form in the sense that it treats the situation resulting
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from doing action t as the new initial one, actually no information about the original situation
is dropped! Instead, by means of renaming through second-order quantification, the contents
of the original knowledge base are kept in their entirety, and their connection to the current
situation is encoded in an equally “hidden” instantiation of the successor state axioms. It
cannot be expected that reasoning with this knowledge base is any easier than reasoning with
the original one, e.g. using regression.
Sadly, Lin and Reiter’s landmark article on progression [LR97] further comes with a strong
negative result: In general, it is not possible to represent the progression of a knowledge base
solely through a finite collection of first-order formulas. Furthermore, Vassos and Levesque
[VL08] showed that even the infinite set of all first-order entailments of a basic action theory
about the situation resulting from executing the action t is weaker than a progression through
t. It is very likely that these results hold similarly for ES, but non-trivial to adapt their
corresponding proofs. The reason is that in both cases, the existence of so-called unnamed
individuals is essential, where in a semantic model, an individual is unnamed whenever no
ground term exists that refers to it. While it is straightforward to construct such structures in
classical Tarskian semantics, no individual in any ES world is unnamed due to the existence of
standard names. Since both proofs are quite involved, reproving Lin and Reiter’s and Vassos
and Levesque’s results within ES is beyond the scope of this thesis. Because we do not expect
to gain any new insights from them, we leave it at that.
Far more important for our purposes is the fact that it is possible to identify subclasses of
basic action theories for which first-order progressions indeed can be guaranteed to exist. The
idea is to syntactically restrict the types of formulas allowed within the initial database and the
successor state axioms in a way such that the progression is first-order representable. Ideally,
such a class of theories is furthermore closed under progression, i.e. the result of progression
falls again into the same class such that progression can be iterated. Already in [LR97], Lin
and Reiter provide a number of classes of such first-order progressable theories, which are the
so-called relatively complete databases, the class of context-free action theories, as well as the
class of BATs that correspond to STRIPS descriptions. All of them can be adapted to ES in a
straightforward manner, and we will not go into the details here about the former two, but refer
the interested reader to [Cla05]. The STRIPS case is the most interesting one for the topic of
this thesis. In fact, it constitutes the basis for our results on the integration of planning into
the Golog programming language to be presented in Chapter 4, so it is also there where we
further elaborate on this.
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3.5 Knowledge and Sensing
So far we have only been concerned with objective formulas, that is formulas that express facts
about the state of the world and how the agent’s actions affect it. However, it is often useful if
not necessary to be able to talk about the agent’s knowledge about its environment, and also
in particular its lack thereof.
As an example, consider again example formula (3.2) from this chapter’s introduction, re-
peated below:
∃x.In(x, office(bob)) ∧ Person(x) ∧ (x 6= bob)(3.2)
It expresses that there is some person other than Bob in Bob’s office, and we might say that
this is a case where the robot does not know who the person in Bob’s office is. Of course this
is only true as long as the robot does not have any further knowledge. If on the other hand the
agent’s knowledge base also contains the formula
∀x.In(x, office(bob)) ⊃ x = ann(3.124)
saying that Ann is the only person in Bob’s office, then obviously the agent again does know all
the persons in Bob’s office. The problem now is that what the agent knows or does not know is
not expressible within the logical formalism itself, at least in the form as we have used it so far.
While in some simple contexts it is perfectly sufficient to only have a meta-theoretic notion
of the agent’s state of knowledge, it is in general much more convenient to extend the language
by an epistemic modal operator Know . This means that, in addition to the current rules for the
construction of formulas, we also say that Know(α) is well-formed formula whenever α is. For
instance, the fact that the robot knows that Bob is in his office or in the kitchen is expressed
as follows:
Know(In(bob, office(bob)) ∨ In(bob, kitchen))(3.125)
To express an agent’s lack of knowledge we simply put a negation in front of the Know operator:
¬Know(In(bob, office(bob)))(3.126)
The above expresses that In(bob, office(bob)) is not known to be true, which is different from
knowing the expression to be false. The agent does not know whether Bob is in his office when
both In(bob, office(bob)) and its negation are not believed:
¬Know(In(bob, office(bob))) ∧ ¬Know(¬In(bob, office(bob)))(3.127)
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The new modal operator now allows us to explicitly express both de dicto and de re knowledge
within the logic. The former refers to the situation where we know that a certain individual
exists, for example a person in Bob’s office:
Know(∃x.In(x, office(bob)) ∧ Person(x) ∧ (x 6= bob))(3.128)
The latter expresses that is is even known who that individual is:
∃x.Know(In(x, office(bob)) ∧ Person(x) ∧ (x 6= bob))(3.129)
Note that knowing a person in Bob’s office de re implies knowing de dicto, but not vice versa.
In addition to Know , we will require one further modal operator. The reason is that it
is otherwise not possible to express all that is known to the agent. Consider the sentence
Know(In(bob, office(bob))): It says that the agent knows that Bob is in his office, but it does
not entail whether the agent does or does not know the current location of Ann. Know(α) thus
really only expresses that “at least α is known”, but maybe even more. For this reason, we
will use OKnow(α) to denote only-knowing [Lev90] a formula α, which means knowing α, but
nothing more and nothing less than it. Typically, an agent has some finite, objective knowledge
base Σ, and we will be interested in determining whether OKnow(Σ) |= α, where α talks about
the agent’s knowledge in the current situation or after the execution of actions.
3.5.1 Formal Definition
Formally, we extend the set of objective formulas as follows:
Definition 3.41 (Formulas). Formulas are formed according to the set of rules obtained by
extending the Definitions 3.2 and 3.17 by:
5. If α is a formula, then so are Know(α) and OKnow(α).
Formulas where no predicate or function symbol and no  and [t] operators occur outside the
scope of a Know or OKnow are called subjective, and formulas without OKnow basic.
Semantically, knowledge will be interpreted with a variant of the classical possible-world se-
mantics [Hin62, Kri63]. The idea is that a semantic model will now consist of two parts: On
the one hand, a single world w ∈ W, as before, representing the “real world”. Additionally,
we have a set of worlds e ⊆ W, called an epistemic state. Intuitively, the agent considers each
world w′ ∈ e possible. Some formula α then is known when every world in the epistemic state
satisfies it, and α is only known in e if e consists exactly of those worlds where α is true. The
more worlds are in e, the less is known to the agent, and vice versa. In the extreme case, e
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consists of all worlds, then the agent knows nothing, or only of a single world, then has perfect
knowledge. We even allow that e = ∅, which can happen when the agent has an inconsistent
knowledge base. Also note that it is not a requirement that the actual world w is part of the
epistemic state, i.e. the agent’s beliefs about what the real world is like may be wrong.
We also want the agent to be able to gather new information at runtime through sensing. As
opposed to Lakemeyer and Levesque’s [LL09a] formalization, on which the following is based, we
here let the agent not only sense truth values, but allow for the more general case that a sensing
result is given by an object standard name. Sensing truth values can then still be emulated by
having a corresponding action return one of the two distinguished standard names n> and n⊥.
For simplicity, we moreover do not distinguish between physical and sensing actions. Instead
we assume that any action returns some kind of sensing result, and be it only a default value
such as “ok”. A special definitional fluent sf (p) is used to encode possible sensing results by
including a corresponding axiom
sf (a) = y ≡ ϕsf
into the basic action theory, where ϕsf is a fluent formula whose free variables are a and y. We
then need:
Definition 3.42 (Sensing Compatibility). Let w and w′ be two worlds. We define w′ 'z w
(read: w′ and w agree on sensing results throughout z) inductively as follows:
1. w′ '〈〉 w iff w′ and w agree on all primitive terms of sort action;
2. w′ 'z·p w iff w′ 'z w and w′[sf (p), z] = w[sf (p)].
Above, the additional condition that the worlds agree on the primitive terms of sort action is
necessary in order to be sure that an action term such as goto(kitchen) is mapped to the same
standard name p by w and w′.
Similar to worlds, we now have to progress epistemic states as well. This amounts to
progressing all worlds in e and retaining only those that agree sensing-wise with the real world
w.
Definition 3.43 (Progression of an Epistemic State). Let e be an epistemic state, w a world,
and z a sequence of action standard names. The progression of e through z wrt w, denoted as
ewz , is given by
ewz = {w′z | w′ ∈ e and w′ 'z w}(3.130)
The progression of the single worlds w′z above is according to Definition 3.35.
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We are now ready to define the semantics of formulas:
Definition 3.44. Given an epistemic state e ⊆ W, a world w ∈ W, and a sentence α, we define
e, w |= α (read: “e, w satisfies α” or “α is true in e, w”) as e, w, 〈〉 |= α, where for any z ∈ Z:
1. e, w, z |= F (t1, . . . , tk) iff w[F (n1, . . . , nk), z] = 1, where ni = |ti|zw;
2. e, w, z |= (t1 = t2) iff n1 and n2 are identical, where ni = |t1|zw;
3. e, w, z |= α ∧ β iff e, w, z |= α and e, w, z |= β;
4. e, w, z |= ¬α iff e, w, z 6|= α;
5. e, w, z |= ∀x.α iff e, w, z |= αxn for all n ∈ Nx;
6. e, w, z |= [t]α iff e, w, z · p |= α, where p = |t|zw;
7. e, w, z |= α iff e, w, z · z′ |= α for all z′ ∈ Z;
8. e, w, z |= ∀P.α iff e, w′, z |= α for all w′ z∼P w;
9. e, w, z |= ∀f.α iff e, w′, z |= α for all w′ z∼f w;
10. e, w, z |= Know(α) iff for all w′ ∈ ewz , ewz , w′, 〈〉 |= α;
11. e, w, z |= OKnow(α) iff for all w′, w′ ∈ ewz iff ewz , w′, 〈〉 |= α.
A sentence α is called satisfiable if some e and w exist such that e, w |= α. When Σ is a set of
sentences and α is a sentence, we write Σ |= α (read: “Σ logically entails α”) to mean that for
every pair e, w, if e, w |= α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ, then also e, w |= α. Finally, we write |= α (read:
“α is valid”) to mean {} |= α.
Rules 1 to 7 are as in Definition 3.8. Rules 8 and 9 are furthermore exactly as in Definition 3.22.5.
The last two rules finally are the one that define the meaning of Know and OKnow according
to possible world semantics, and including sensing compatibility with the actual world.
Just like the original ES introduced by Lakemeyer and Levesque [LL04], the logic that we
defined here is a special case of possible-world semantics where knowledge is simply modelled
as a set of worlds. Unsurprisingly, we thus obtain the properties of weak S5 [FHMV95], and
5It was pointed to the author by Hector Levesque that this definition does not work in case we quantify a
predicate from the outside into an epistemic operator, such as in the formula ∀PKnow(∀xP (x)). Since this case
is of no relevance for this thesis, we simply stick to this definition. Otherwise, one possible solution is to resort to
second-order variable maps that take a world as one of their arguments as is done in Lakemeyer and Levesque’s
original formalization [LL09a].
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since we use a fixed universe of discourse, the Barcan formula for knowledge and its existential
version hold as well:
Theorem 3.45.
1. |= Know(α) ∧Know(α ⊃ β) ⊃ Know(β);
2. |= Know(α) ⊃ Know(Know(α));
3. |= ¬Know(α) ⊃ Know(¬Know(α));
4. |= ∀xKnow(α) ⊃ Know(∀xα);
5. |= ∃xKnow(α) ⊃ Know(∃xα).
3.5.2 Regression
To extend regression to cope with subjective subformulas, we use the theorem below. It can
be viewed as a successor state axiom for the Know operator, however it is a theorem of the
logic rather than an axiom that we have to provide explicitly. Since this thesis uses a variant
where actions sense standard names instead of truth values, a corresponding adapted version
of Lakemeyer and Levesque’s original proof is provided as well.
Theorem 3.46. Let x be a variable that does not appear freely in α. Then
|= [a]Know(α) ≡ ∃x.sf (a) = x ∧Know(sf (a) = x ⊃ [a]α)(3.131)
Proof. “⇒”: Let e, w, z |= [p]Know(αap) for any action name p and any z ∈ Z. Let further
w[sf (p), z] = n. We have to show that e, w, z |= Know(sf (p) = n ⊃ [p]αap). Suppose w′z ∈ ewz ,
i.e. w′ ∈ e and w′ 'z w, and that w′z |= sf (p) = n. By Definition 3.35, w′[sf (p), z] = n. But then
w′ 'z·p w by Definition 3.42, hence ewz·p, w′z·p |= αap by assumption, and therefore ewz , w′z |= [p]αap.
“⇐”: Conversely, let e, w, z |= ∃x.sf (p) = x ∧Know(sf (p) = x ⊃ [p]α) for any action name
p and any z ∈ Z. Therefore there is some name n such that w[sf (p), z] = n and e, w, z |=
Know(sf (p) = n ⊃ [p]α). We need to show that e, w, z |= [p]Know(α), that is e, w, z · p |=
Know(α). Let w′z·p ∈ ewz·p, then w′ ∈ e and w′ 'z·p w. By Definition 3.42, this means that
w′ 'z w and w′[sf (p), z] = w[sf (p), z] = n. Hence w′z |= (sf (p) = n), therefore by assumption
ewz , w
′
z, 〈〉 |= [p]α, from which ewz·p, w′z·p, 〈〉 |= α follows.
We regress non-objective formulas with respect to a pair of basic action theories Σ′ and Σ.
Intuitively, Σ′ represents the beliefs of the agent, whereas Σ contains the laws by which the real
world abides.
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Definition 3.47. We define R[α] as R[Σ′,Σ, 〈〉, α], where for any sequence σ of terms of sort
action, R[Σ′,Σ, σ, α] is given as follows. Rules 1 – 10 are exactly as in Definition 3.30, but
with the extra two arguments Σ′ and Σ, and where in the cases for the different types of fluent
atoms, the axioms of Σ are used. We further have the following additional rule for Know , where
κ denotes the right-hand side of the equivalence in Theorem 3.46 (with a fresh variable x):
11. R[Σ′,Σ, σ,Know(α)] is defined inductively by:
(a) R[Σ′,Σ, 〈〉,Know(α)] = Know(R[Σ′,Σ′, 〈〉, α]);
(b) R[Σ′,Σ, σ · t,Know(α)] = R[Σ′,Σ, σ, κat ].
The soundness of the new regression operator is given by:
Theorem 3.48 (Lakemeyer and Levesque [LL04]). Let Σ and Σ′ be basic action theories and
α be a bounded, basic sentence. Then R[α] is static and satisfies
Σ ∧OKnow(Σ′) |= α iff Σ0 ∧OKnow(Σ′0) |= R[α].
If we are only concerned about the agent’s internal view, we only need to regress wrt the BAT
believed by the agent:
Corollary 3.49. Let Σ be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉 and α a basic, bounded sentence
that mentions only the fluents in D ∪ F . Then
|= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(α) iff |= OKnow(Σ0) ⊃ Know(R[Σ,Σ, 〈〉, α]).
Example 3.50. Suppose we have a robot that has an action lookFor(x) at its disposal. The
action is at the same time a sensing action, where its sensing result will be the location of object
x, as well as a physical action with the effect that in the process of searching object x, the robot
ends up at the location of x. Let Σdef ∪ Σpost hence consist of the following two axioms:
(sf (a) = y) ≡(3.132)
∃x. a = lookFor(x) ∧ y = loc(x) ∨ ¬∃x(a = lookFor(x) ∧ y = ok)
[a](loc(x) = y) ≡(3.133)
x = robot ∧ ∃x′(a = lookFor(x′) ∧ y = loc(x′))
∨ loc(x) = y ∧ (x 6= robot ∨ ¬∃x′a = lookFor(x′))
For simplicity, we do not include any precondition axiom. Now let Σ be the BAT consisting of
Σ0 = {loc(book) = room6213 , loc(cup) = kitchen}(3.134)
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together with (3.132) and (3.133), whereas Σ′ is the union of
Σ′0 = {loc(cup) = kitchen}(3.135)
and (3.132) and (3.133). If Σ′ is the BAT believed by the robot, and Σ the one the actual world
satisfies, this means that the robot has accurate knowledge about sensing and action effects as
well as the location of the cup, but it is initially not aware of the location of the book.
Let now α be the formula that expresses that the location of the book will be known after
looking for it, that is
α = [lookFor(book)]∃xKnow(x = loc(book)).
Let l be shorthand for lookFor(book). Then
R[α] = R[Σ,Σ′, 〈〉, α] = R[Σ,Σ′, 〈l〉,∃xKnow(x = loc(book))].
Applying Theorem 3.46 yields
∃x. R[Σ,Σ′, 〈〉, ∃x′. sf (l) = x′ ∧Know(sf (l) = x′ ⊃ [l](x = loc(book)))].
Furthermore, sf (l) = x′ regresses to x′ = loc(book) both inside and outside of Know , as Σ and
Σ′ agree on sf . [l](x = loc(book)) regresses to x = loc(book) since looking for the book does not
change its location. We end up with the (simplified) regression result of
∃x∃x′. x′ = loc(book) ∧Know(x′ = loc(book) ⊃ x = loc(book)).
The above is obviously entailed by Σ0 ∧ OKnow(Σ′0) if we let x′ = room6213 = x. Therefore,
Σ ∧OKnow(Σ′) |= α.
As opposed to regression, we do not need a special form of progression in the epistemic case.
The reason is that while regression transforms the query properties, progression operates on the
agent’s knowledge base. Whereas queries now may contain knowledge operators that need to
be handled by the regression operator, the agent’s initial knowledge usually is still a collection
of objective sentences, and therefore can be progressed by the already available methods.
3.5.3 The Representation Theorem
While regression solves the projection problem for non-objective formulas by eliminating modal
action operators, its end result may still contain modal epistemic operators. The idea behind
Levesque and Lakemeyer’s Representation Theorem for OL [Lev84, LL01] is to recursively re-
place subjective subformulas of the form Know(α) either by their truth value (wrt the agent’s
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knowledge base), in case α is closed, or by an objective formula that represents the known
instances of α, in case it has free variables. For the latter, we can resort to the same “trick”
that we already used for Universal Generalization in Section 3.2.3: When a formula contains a
free variable, it suffices to check the entailment for a finite number of standard names, namely
all those that are contained in the query and the knowledge base, plus one that does not appear
and serves as representative for all non-mentioned names. Formally:
Definition 3.51. Let φ be an objective formula and Σ0 be a finite set of objective sentences.
Suppose that n1, . . . , nk are all the standard names in φ or in Σ0, and that n
′ is some name
that does not appear in φ or in Σ0. Then RES[[φ,Σ0]] is defined by:
1. If φ has no free variables, then RES[[φ,Σ0]] is
>, if Σ0 |= φ, and ⊥, otherwise.
2. If x is a free variable in φ, then RES[[φ,Σ0]] is
((x = n1) ∧ RES[[φxn1 ,Σ0]]) ∨ · · ·
((x = nk) ∧ RES[[φxnk ,Σ0]]) ∨
((x 6= n1) ∧ · · · ∧ (x 6= nk) ∧ RES[[φxn′ ,Σ0]]n
′
x ).
Note that in the last case, we first substitute the new n′ for x, then recursively evaluate RES,
after which we replace n′ again by x. Thus, the n′ is only a temporary placeholder for all
unmentioned individuals and will not appear in the overall result. As we have discussed before,
the trick does not work in the case of number variables. Therefore, throughout this section we
assume that formulas do not mention any number terms.
Using the above, it is possible to define a recursive evaluation operator for arbitrary basic
and static formulas as follows:
Definition 3.52. Given a finite set of static, objective sentences Σ0 and a static, basic formula
α, ||α||Σ0 is defined by
1. ||α||Σ0 = α, when α is a static objective formula;
2. ||¬α||Σ0 = ¬||α||Σ0 ;
3. ||α ∧ β||Σ0 = ||α||Σ0 ∧ ||β||Σ0 ;
4. ||∃xα||Σ0 = ∃x||α||Σ0 ;
5. ||Know(α)||Σ0 = RES[[||α||Σ0 ,Σ0]].
Then we have:
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Theorem 3.53 (Lakemeyer and Levesque [LL04]). Let Σ0 be a set of static, objective sentences
and α a static, basic sentence. Then
|= OKnow(Σ0) ⊃ Know(α) iff |= Σ0 ⊃ ||α||Σ0 .
Example 3.54. Suppose that the robot believes the initial theory
Σ0 = {loc(cup) = kitchen, ∃x (loc(x) = kitchen)}
and we want to check whether only-knowing Σ0 entails knowing some object in the kitchen:
α = ∃xKnow(loc(x) = kitchen)
We have that
||α||Σ0 = ∃x RES[[||loc(x) = kitchen||Σ0 ,Σ0]] = ∃x RES[[loc(x) = kitchen,Σ0]].
The standard names in Σ0 and α are cup and kitchen. Let n
′ be a new standard name.
RES[[loc(x) = kitchen,Σ0]] therefore is the formula
((x = cup) ∧ RES[[loc(cup) = kitchen,Σ0]]) ∨
((x = kitchen) ∧ RES[[loc(kitchen) = kitchen,Σ0]]) ∨
((x 6= cup) ∧ (x 6= kitchen) ∧ RES[[loc(n′) = kitchen,Σ0]]n
′
x ).
Because neither loc(kitchen) = kitchen nor loc(n′) = kitchen is entailed by Σ0, the corresponding
RES subformulas evaluate to ⊥. loc(cup) = kitchen however holds according to Σ0, so we get
RES[[loc(x) = kitchen,Σ0]] = (x = cup).
Intuitively, this accurately describes the known instances of loc(x) = kitchen. As the formula
∃x(loc(x) = kitchen) is trivially satisfied, we obtain |= OKnow(Σ0) ⊃ Know(α).
As a final remark, note that if we drop loc(cup) = kitchen from Σ0, the entailment no longer
holds. Even though we would still have ∃x (loc(x) = kitchen), the agent would only know that
there is some object in the kitchen (de dicto), but it would not know its identity (de re).
It is moreover possible to combine the Representation Theorem with regression. For that
matter, we first regress the query sentence, and afterwards apply || · ||. Thus, reasoning about
the knowledge and action of an agent can be reduced to a finite number of instances of classical
first-order theorem proving.
Theorem 3.55 (Lakemeyer and Levesque [LL04]). Given a pair of basic action theories Σ and
Σ′, and a bounded, basic sentence α,
Σ ∧OKnow(Σ′) |= α iff Σ0 |= ||R[α]||Σ′0 .
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3.6 Golog
The theory we have developed so far allows us to represent and reason about an agent’s actions
and knowledge. What we have ignored until now is the question of how the agent should choose
its course of action in order to achieve a certain goal, based on what it knows about the state
and the dynamics of its environment. A simple approach is to use planning: Assuming that the
agent’s goal is given in form of a formula α, we search for a ground action sequence leading to a
situation where α is known to hold. This could be done, for instance, using iterative deepening
search, where candidate sequences 〈t1, . . . , tk〉 of increasing length k are tested by means of
projection:
Σ |= [t1] · · · [tk]α(3.136)
For solving such projection tasks, we can then use one of the methods presented in Section
3.4. This approach however soon reaches its limits. On the one hand, we ignored the fact that
the agent typically also has to employ its sensors in order to gather necessary information at
runtime (i.e. while executing a previously planned course of action), which would require that
instead of sequential plans we have to search for conditional plans [Lak99] that have the form
of trees, which is even more costly. On the other hand, in our envisioned application scenario,
the robot will typically perform a multitude of different tasks over an indefinite time period,
and hence the search space, both in terms of branching factor and search depth, is usually way
too large.
On the other hand, the human domain designer often has already some understanding of how
a certain task is to be solved. The orthogonal approach to planning is therefore programming,
which means in our case that we equip the agent not only with a basic action theory, but also
some program that controls its behaviour:
while ¬∀x. Room(x) ⊃ Clean(x) do
if ¬Clean(livingroom)
goto(livingroom); clean(livingroom)
endIf ;
if ¬Clean(kitchen)
goto(kitchen); clean(kitchen)
endIf
. . .
endWhile
(3.137)
On the one hand, such an agent program resembles the ones that we can write with common
programming languages such as C++ or Java in the sense that it contains control structures like
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conditionals (if) and loops (while). The difference on the other hand is its high-level nature: A
Java program’s atomic instructions typically are variable assignments of the form x := y ∗2, the
execution of which amounts to the CPU doing some calculation and then writing the updated
value back into a register or memory cell. Our robot program’s basic building blocks though are
the actions as defined in the basic action theory. In the highly abstracted perspective that we
assume in this context, an action such as goto(livingroom) is considered atomic. The physical
execution of it however is in itself a complex task that requires to solve a multitude of lower-level
problems such as path planning, real-time collision avoidance, and sensor fusion.
Predefining the agent’s behaviour by means of programming has the drawback that the pro-
grammer must be able to foresee every eventuality that the agent may encounter in its lifetime.
In particular in the case that the robot performs an open-ended, indefinite task this is of course
unrealistic. The agent programming language Golog (for alGOL in LOGic) was introduced
[LRL+97] to allow for a middle ground between the two extremes of pure planning and pure
programming: In Golog, the programmer can freely combine deterministic, imperative con-
structs such as while and if with nondeterministic aspects, such as nondeterministic choice of
branches, of arguments, or of number of iterations. Thus, it is possible to manually adjust the
mixture between planning and programming, and concentrate the search effort to where it is
actually needed. For example, instead of solving the problem of cleaning all rooms by a blind
search over all action sequences, we may define the following program:
(pix. (Room(x) ∧ ¬Clean(x))?; goto(x); clean(x))∗; (∀y. Room(y) ⊃ Clean(y))?(3.138)
Intuitively, it means to nondeterministically pick (pi) some instantiation for the variable x such
that Room(x) ∧ ¬Clean(x) holds, then perform the action goto(x), followed by clean(x). This
is to be iterated a nondeterministically chosen number of times greater than or equal to zero (∗)
such that afterwards ∀y. Room(y) ⊃ Clean(y) comes to hold. Such a program can be viewed
as a plan sketch whose gaps then have to be filled by the system through search. In the above
example, the search space is constrained by forcing a successful execution to be a sequence of
the form
goto(n1); clean(n1); goto(n2); clean(n2); . . .
In particular, this disallows any execution where two clean actions are performed consecutively,
or two goto actions etc., leaving only the order of the rooms in the solution to be determined
by the agent.
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3.6.1 Simple Golog
The original Golog language, as introduced by Levesque et al. [LRL+97] defines the semantics
of programs meta-theoretically through macro expansion. Lakemeyer and Levesque later showed
that a similar definition can be given within ES, and that the two are (in a certain formal sense)
equivalent [LL05a]. They define a macro Do(δ, α) that takes a program δ and a formula α
as arguments, and expands to a formula that expresses under which circumstances there is a
possible successful execution of δ after which α comes to hold:
Definition 3.56 (The Do macro). Do is defined inductively as follows:
• Atomic action:
Do(t, α)
def
= Poss(t) ∧ [t]α(3.139)
• Test:
Do(φ?, α)
def
= φ ∧ α(3.140)
• Sequence:
Do(δ; δ′, α) def= Do(δ,Do(δ′, α))(3.141)
• Nondeterministic choice:
Do(δ|δ′, α) def= Do(δ, α) ∨Do(δ′, α)(3.142)
• Nondeterministic choice of argument:
Do(pix.δ, α)
def
= ∃x.Do(δ, α)(3.143)
• Iteration:
Do(δ∗, α) def= ∀P.{(α ⊃ P ) ∧(Do(δ, P ) ⊃ P )} ⊃ P(3.144)
where P is some predicate neither appearing in α nor in δ.
For example, if δ is pix. (Room(x) ∧ ¬Clean(x))?; goto(x); clean(x), then Do(δ, α) expands to
∃x. Room(x) ∧ ¬Clean(x) ∧ Poss(goto(x)) ∧ [goto(x)](Poss(clean(x)) ∧ [clean(x)]α)
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Furthermore, conditionals and loops can be defined in terms of the above constructs, and
therefore are considered “syntactic sugar”:
if φ then δ1 else δ2 endIf
def
= [φ?; δ1]|[¬φ?; δ2](3.145)
while φ do δ endWhile
def
= [φ?; δ]∗;¬φ?(3.146)
In the following, we will refer to the set of programs that can be constructed from the above
mentioned constructs as simple Golog.
3.6.2 ConGolog
The original Golog was later generalized to ConGolog by De Giacomo et al. [GLL00]. It
includes the following extensions:
• Concurrency: If δ1 and δ2 are programs, then δ1||δ2 denotes their concurrent execution.
Here and in the following, concurrency is always to be understood as interleaving the
primitive actions performed by the two subprograms. That is to say that ultimately the
execution of concurrent processes boils down to a (not necessarily strictly alternating)
sequence of actions drawn from the involved subprograms.
• Prioritized Concurrency: The construct δ1〉〉δ2 is similar to δ1||δ2 with the additional
requirement that δ1 has higher priority, i.e. δ2 can only proceed its execution when δ1 is
currently blocked or finished.
• Concurrent Iteration: Similar as to how δ∗ may be interpreted as “perform δ zero or
more times in sequence”, δ|| stands for “perform δ zero or more times concurrently”.
• Interrupts: The intuition behind an interrupt < φ → δ > is that δ is triggered once
condition φ becomes true. Interrupts can be defined in terms of other constructs:
< φ→ δ > def= while InterruptsRunning do if φ then δ else ⊥? endIf(3.147)
Here, InterruptsRunning is a special fluent that is set to true by the special action
startInterrupts, and set to false by stopInterrupts. To execute a program δ′ containing
interrupts, we then actually execute
startInterrupts; (δ′〉〉stopInterrupts).(3.148)
• Exogenous Actions: Finally, there may happen changes in the agent’s environment that
are not due to the agent itself. To model such dynamic environments, it is possible to
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define a set of actions that may not be used within a user-defined program, but that are
viewed to be under the control of “nature”. Suppose that this is done through a special
fluent Exo(a) for which we have a corresponding axiom in the Σdef of the basic action
theory. We then have a special program:
δexo
def
= ((pia)(Exo(a)?; a))∗(3.149)
To analyze how executing the agent’s program δ interacts with the dynamic environment,
we then simply have to study the possible executions of δ||δexo.
De Giacomo et al. furthermore present a new semantics that is based on single-step transitions.
For that matter, they use a predicate Trans(δ, s, δ′, s′) whose intuitive meaning is that when δ is
the current program and s the current situation, then there is a transition such that δ′ becomes
the remaining program and s′ is the resulting situation. A transition may either be a primitive
action t, in which case s′ = do(t, s), or a test φ?, in which case s = s′. Another predicate
Final(δ, s) then expresses that δ may legally terminate in s. They provide an axiomatization of
these predicates that ensures that the program constructs have the desired meaning, and that is
moreover compatible with the macro semantics of the original Golog. Below, we will provide
a corresponding semantics for programs in ES.
3.6.3 IndiGolog
While ConGolog already provides a rich amount of expressiveness to define agent behaviour,
there are two issues that make it problematic for real-world applications. On the one hand,
programs are executed offline only: This means that the program interpreter first analyzes the
entire input program in order to find a conforming execution sequence before the first action
is actually done. This soon becomes a problem, in particular for larger programs. Moreover,
especially scenarios where the agent has incomplete knowledge about its environment make it
necessary to gather information at runtime through sensing. IndiGolog [GL99, GLLS04] is
yet another extension to Golog that tackles both these issues.
IndiGolog executes programs online, which means that there is no general lookahead; the
interpreter simply executes the next possible action in each step, treating nondeterminism like
random choices. A new operator Σ(δ) is introduced which has to be used to explicitly mark
subprograms which have to be solved by means of search. This does not represent a loss of
generality since one might still encapsulate the entire program within Σ( · ), but it gives the
programmer much more control over where the system spends its computational effort. In
addition, programs may contain sensing actions for acquiring needed information at runtime.
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t primitive action
α? test condition
(δ1; δ2) sequence
(δ1|δ2) nondeterministic branching
piv.δ nondeterministic choice of argument
δ∗ nondeterministic iteration
{proc P1(~v1) δ1 end; . . .proc Pn(~vn) δn end; δ} procedures
P (~t) procedure call
if α then δ1 else δ2 endIf conditional
while α do δ endWhile while loop
loop δ endLoop infinite loop
(δ1||δ2) concurrent execution
(δ1〉〉δ2) concurrent execution with priorities
δ|| concurrent iteration
< α→ δ > interrupt
Σ(δ) search
Γ(α, δ) guarded execution
Figure 3.2: Golog Constructs
When such an action is executed, a sensing result is obtained (which normally is the current
value of some fluent) and used to update the agent’s knowledge base. Thus, a subsequent choice
in the program that depends on this sensed value can be made online.
The semantics of IndiGolog is defined through appropriately extending the transition se-
mantics of ConGolog, which lends itself particularly well for the online execution of programs.
3.6.4 Golog in ES
The variant of Golog to be employed in this thesis draws its inspiration from all of the above.
Its syntax and semantics is defined as follows:
Definition 3.57 (Golog). A program δ is any expression that can be formed from the con-
structs provided in Figure 3.2. Additionally, we include the abbreviations nil
def
= >? for the
empty program that successfully terminates without doing any action, and fail
def
= ⊥? for the
program that always fails. A configuration 〈z, δ〉 then consists of an action sequence z ∈ Z and
a program δ. Intuitively, z is the history of actions that have already been performed, while δ
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1. 〈z, α?〉 ∈ Fe,w if e, w, z |= α;
2. 〈z, δ1; δ2〉 ∈ Fe,w if 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fe,w and 〈z, δ2〉 ∈ Fe,w;
3. 〈z, δ1|δ2〉 ∈ Fe,w if 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fe,w or 〈z, δ2〉 ∈ Fe,w;
4. 〈z, pix.δ〉 ∈ Fe,w if 〈z, δxn〉 ∈ Fe,w for some n ∈ NO;
5. 〈z, δ∗〉 ∈ Fe,w;
6. 〈z, δ1||δ2〉 ∈ Fe,w if 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fe,w and 〈z, δ2〉 ∈ Fe,w;
7. 〈z, δ1〉〉δ2〉 ∈ Fe,w if 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fe,w and 〈z, δ2〉 ∈ Fe,w;
8. 〈z, δ||〉 ∈ Fe,w;
9. 〈z,Σ(δ)〉 ∈ Fe,w if 〈z, δ〉 ∈ Fe,w;
10. 〈z,Γ(α, δ)〉 ∈ Fe,w if e, w, z 6|= α or 〈z, δ〉 ∈ Fe,w.
Figure 3.3: Program Finality
is the program that remains to be executed.
Given an epistemic state e and a world w, the finality predicate Fe,w over configurations is
the least set that satisfies the rules presented in Figure 3.3. Furthermore, the transition relation
〈z, δ〉 e,w−−→ 〈z′, δ′〉 among configurations is the least set satisfying the rules depicted in Figure
3.4, where
e,w−−→∗ refers to the reflexive transitive closure of e,w−−→.
There are a few noteworthy differences to existing variants of Golog.
1. First, the above semantics is meta-theoretic rather than being defined through an axiom-
atization within the logic. This not only helps to keep the definition simple6, but will also
come in handy in Chapter 5 when we embed it into the semantics of an extension of ES
that allows to express properties about programs.
2. Next, in our definition, there are no test transitions. Instead, transitions are always
physical actions, and tests are merely viewed as conditions for doing actions or terminating
6Among other things, De Giacomo et al. have to reify programs as terms in their semantics for ConGolog,
which is particularly troublesome in light of the fact that programs may contain formulas. Hence, all predicates,
functions and logical connectives have to be reified as well.
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1. 〈z, t〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p,nil〉, if p = |t|zw;
2. 〈z, δ1; δ2〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, γ; δ2〉, if 〈z, δ1〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, γ〉;
3. 〈z, δ1; δ2〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉, if 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fe,w and 〈z, δ2〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
4. 〈z, δ1|δ2〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉, if 〈z, δ1〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉 or 〈z, δ2〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
5. 〈z, pix.δ〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉, if 〈z, δxn〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉 for some n ∈ Nx;
6. 〈z, δ∗〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, γ; δ∗〉, if 〈z, δ〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, γ〉;
7. 〈z, {Env; δ}〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉, if 〈z, δPi(~t)
[Env:Pi(~t)]
〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
8. 〈z, [Env : Pi(~t)]〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉, if 〈z, {Env; δi~vi~t }〉
e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
9. 〈z, (δ1||δ2)〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, (δ′||δ2)〉, if 〈z, δ1〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
10. 〈z, (δ1||δ2)〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, (δ1||δ′)〉, if 〈z, δ2〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
11. 〈z, (δ1〉〉δ2)〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, (δ′〉〉δ2)〉, if 〈z, δ1〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
12. 〈z, (δ1〉〉δ2)〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, (δ1〉〉δ′)〉,
if 〈z, δ2〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉 and there is no γ, p′ such that 〈z, δ1〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p′, γ〉;
13. 〈z, δ||〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, (γ||δ||)〉, if 〈z, δ〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, γ〉;
14. 〈z,Σ(δ)〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p,Σ(δ′)〉,
if 〈z, δ〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉 and 〈z · p, δ′〉 e,w−−→∗〈z · p · z′, δ′′〉 and 〈z · p · z′, δ′′〉 ∈ Fe,w;
15. 〈z,Γ(α, δ)〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p,Γ(α, δ′)〉, if e, w, z |= α and 〈z, δ〉 e,w−−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉.
Figure 3.4: Program Transitions
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execution. This has certain advantages, but also possibly drawbacks. We will discuss this
issue more thoroughly in Section 5.1.3.
3. Our definition works both in a purely objective setting as well as for knowledge-based
programs [Rei01b, CL06a]. The latter refers to the case when we want to encode an
agent that possesses incomplete knowledge about its environment and has to employ
sensing actions to gather necessary information at runtime. Test conditions then are
subjective formulas such as ¬Know(In(bob, kitchen)), which are evaluated with respect to
an epistemic state.
4. Since it is completely sufficient for the purposes of this thesis, we use a simple variant of
the search operator Σ that only returns sequential plans. Note that in general, this may
be insufficient, in particular in the case of an agent with incomplete knowledge that uses
sensing. We may rather have to also worry about the epistemic feasibility [Lev96, SGLL04]
of plans and programs: Consider a conditional statement if φ then a else b endIf . If a
and b are both executable, then no matter whether φ holds or not, there is some successful
execution of the program. Nonetheless, it may not be epistemically feasible, namely when
the agent does not know if φ holds, and it hence does not know which of the two branches
to take. To ensure that the program can indeed be executed physically, it has to be ensured
that the agent in due time comes to know whether φ holds, for instance by sensing φ prior
to testing it.
5. We additionally defined the operator Γ(α, δ) for guarded execution. Intuitively, it executes
δ only as long as the condition α holds. This for instance allows to have programs react
to dynamic changes in the environment happening during the execution of a program,
e.g. due to exogenous actions.
3.7 A Knowledge-Based Agent
We now have all the ingredients for building a knowledge-based agent. Our formalization
provides the following meta-level operations:
1. Initialization: Before the agent starts operating, we provide it with some initial world
knowledge, in particular regarding the preconditions and effects of its actions as well as
the meaning of sensing results.
2. Update: When executing an action physically, incorporate its sensing result. We presume
that the agent chooses its actions according to some online executed Golog program.
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3. Query: Check whether a given formula is known to be true. The query can either be a
user request or a test condition to be evaluated within the agent’s control program.
4. Input: Provide the agent with additional, new information.
We presume that our agent operates in a classical sense-reason-act cycle: First, the program
interpreter evaluates the currently remaining Golog program to determine the next action,
which may involve solving the projection task for test conditions in the program (“reason”).
Physically executing the chosen action (“act”) yields some sensing result to be incorporated
in the knowledge base (“sense”), and a new cycle begins. At any time during its operation,
human users may furthermore interact with the robot by providing it with new knowledge or
requesting information from it.
The interaction with the agent is via an expressive query language that includes non-
objective formulas that can encode facts such as “there is an unknown object in the room.” As
we will see in this section, it suffices, using the techniques introduced in this chapter, to repre-
sent the agent’s beliefs through a finite, objective knowledge base. Semantically, the state of the
system is given by a tuple of the form 〈e, w, σ〉, where e represents the agent’s knowledge, w the
actual world, and σ the history of action performed so far. The above interaction operations
are then formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.58 (Interaction Operations). Let Σ be a set of objective sentences, e ⊆ W,
w ∈ W, t a primitive term or standard name of sort action, σ a sequence of such terms, and α
a sentence. Then
1. INIT(Σ, w) = 〈e, w, 〈〉〉,
where e = {w′ | w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= Σ};
2. EXE(〈e, w, σ〉, t) = 〈e′, w, σ · t〉,
iff e′ = {w′ ∈ e | w′ |= [σ](sf (t) = n)} and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n);
3. ASK(〈e, w, σ〉, α) = “yes”
iff e, w′ |= [σ]α for all w′ ∈ e (and “no” otherwise);
4. TELL(〈e, w, σ〉, α) = 〈e′, w, σ〉,
iff e′ = {w′ ∈ e | e, w′ |= [σ]α}.
The above can be viewed as a generalization of the ASK and TELL operations Levesque and
Lakemeyer suggest for interacting with a static knowledge base [Lev84, LL01], inspired by
similar operations defining abstract data types like stacks and queues. The theorems we discuss
below similarly generalize their corresponding theorems to the above set of operations.
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Note the requirement that the action to be executed is a primitive term or standard name.
We thus forbid that the agent attempts to perform an insufficiently specified action such as
goto(loc(bestfriend(ann))). It is rather forced to first determine the identity of bestfriend(ann),
given in the form of some standard name n. It then moreover needs to identify loc(n) by some
standard name n′, and only then is able to send the command goto(n′) to the execution module.
3.7.1 Regression
First, consider an agent that uses purely regression-based reasoning. Our objective is to rep-
resent the system’s state by a collection of purely standard first-order formulas and reduce
the execution of our interaction operations to standard first-order theorem proving. As an in-
termediate step, the following theorem will show us how our meta-theoretic definition of the
operations translates to a characterization by valid ES sentences.
If Σ is a set of objective sentences and w ∈ W, let <[[Σ]]w = {w′ | w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= Σ}.
Intuitively, e = <[[Σ]]w is the epistemic state represented by the formulas Σ if primitive action
terms are interpreted according to w. Observe that according to the semantics, <[[Σ]]w is the
unique epistemic state such that e, w |= OKnow(Σ).
Theorem 3.59. Let Σ be a basic action theory, α a sentence, φ a fluent sentence, t a primitive
term or standard name of sort action, σ a sequence of such terms, and w ∈ W. Then
1. INIT(Σ, w) = 〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉;
2. EXE(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, t) = 〈<[[Σ ∧ φ]]w, w, σ · t〉
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know([σ](sf (t) = n) ≡ φ) and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n);
3. ASK(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = “yes”
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know([σ]α);
4. TELL(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = 〈<[[Σ ∧ φ]]w, w, σ〉
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know([σ]α ≡ φ).
Proof.
1. Immediate from Definition 3.58.
2. EXE(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, t) = 〈<[[Σ ∧ φ]]w, w, σ · t〉
iff {w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w | w′ |= [σ](sf (t) = n)} = {w′ | w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= Σ ∧ φ},
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Definition 3.58)
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iff {w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w | w′ |= [σ](sf (t) = n)} = {w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w | w′ |= φ},
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by definition of <)
iff for all w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ](sf (t) = n) iff w′ |= φ,
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (equivalent rewriting)
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know([σ](sf (t) = n) ≡ φ),
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by the semantics)
3. ASK(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = “yes”
iff <[[Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α for all w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w (by Definition 3.58)
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know([σ]α) (by the semantics)
4. TELL(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = 〈<[[Σ ∧ φ]]w, w, σ〉
iff <[[Σ ∧ φ]]w = {w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w | <[[Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α} (by Definition 3.58)
iff {w′ | w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= Σ ∧ φ} = {w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w | <[[Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α}
(by definition of <)
iff {w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w | w′ |= φ} = {w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w | <[[Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α} (by definition of <)
iff for all w′ ∈ <[[Σ]]w, w′ |= φ iff <[[Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α (equivalent rewriting)
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(φ ≡ [σ]α) (by the semantics)
The theorem tells us that the initial state of the system can simply be represented by the initial
action theory itself together with an empty action history. After an action t was executed and a
sensing result provided, it suffices to augment the current representation Σ by a fluent sentence
that expresses the necessary and sufficient conditions under which that sensing result is to be
expected, and add t to the action history. A basic, bounded query α can be answered by testing
whether only-knowing the action theory entails currently knowing α. If the system is told some
sentence α about the current situation σ, the knowledge base is to be augmented by a fluent
sentence that is known to be equivalent to [σ]α. Notice that for a fluent sentence φ and a basic
action theory Σ, the theory Σ ∧ φ is also a basic action theory when we view φ as part of the
new Σ0. Therefore, if we start in a state given by INIT(Σ, w), successively applying TELL and
EXE always leads to a state that is itself representable by some action theory Σ′, and we may
pose queries using ASK. Achieving the final reduction of states and operations to first-order
reasoning now is straight forward considering the techniques presented in Section 3.5: We may
eliminate actions using regression, and can treat knowledge by means of || · ||Σ0 , thus acquiring
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the φ in question in the above theorem. Using this idea, we obtain the main result of this section
in form of representation theorems for the semantic definition of our interaction operations:
Theorem 3.60. Let Σ be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉, α a basic, bounded sentence men-
tioning only fluents from D∪F , t a primitive term or standard name of sort action, σ a sequence
of such terms, and w ∈ W. Let R[σ, α] denote R[Σ,Σ, σ, α]. Then
1. INIT(Σ, w) = 〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉;
2. EXE(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, t) = 〈<[[Σ ∧R[σ, sf (t) = n]]]w, w, σ · t〉 iff w |= [σ](sf (t) = n);
3. ASK(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = “yes” iff |= Σ0 ⊃ ||R[σ, α]||Σ0;
4. TELL(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = 〈<[[Σ ∧ ||R[σ, α]||Σ0 ]]w, w, σ〉.
Proof.
1. Immediate from Definition 3.58.
2. EXE(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, t) = 〈<[[Σ ∧R[σ, sf (t) = n]]]w, w, σ · t〉
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know([σ](sf (t) = n) ≡ R[σ, sf (t) = n])
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Theorem 3.59)
iff |= OKnow(Σ0) ⊃ Know(R[〈〉, [σ](sf (t) = n) ≡ R[σ, sf (t) = n]])
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Corollary 3.49)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ ||R[〈〉, [σ](sf (t) = n) ≡ R[σ, sf (t) = n]]||Σ0
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Theorem 3.53)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ ||R[σ, (sf (t) = n)] ≡ R[σ, sf (t) = n]||Σ0
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by definition of R)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ (R[σ, (sf (t) = n)] ≡ R[σ, sf (t) = n])
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by definition of || · ||Σ0)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ > and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by the semantics)
iff w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by the semantics)
3. ASK(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = “yes”
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know([σ]α) (by Theorem 3.59)
iff |= OKnow(Σ0) ⊃ Know(R[σ, α]) (by Corollary 3.49)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ ||R[σ, α]||Σ0 (by Theorem 3.53)
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4. TELL(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = 〈<[[Σ ∧ ||R[σ, α]||Σ0 ]]w, w, σ〉
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know([σ]α ≡ ||R[σ, α]||Σ0) (by Theorem 3.59)
iff |= OKnow(Σ0) ⊃ Know(R[〈〉, [σ]α ≡ ||R[σ, α]||Σ0 ]) (by Corollary 3.49)
iff Σ0 ⊃ ||R[〈〉, [σ]α ≡ ||R[σ, α]||Σ0 ]||Σ0 (by Theorem 3.53)
iff Σ0 ⊃ ||R[σ, α]||Σ0 ≡ ||R[σ, α]||Σ0 (by definition of R and || · ||Σ0)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ > (which is a tautology, therefore the proposition holds)
Example 3.61. As an example of how an agent according to the above formalization operates,
consider the following program for the office robot:
while ¬∃xKnow(x = loc(book)) do lookFor(book) endWhile
The above is what we call a knowledge-based program [Rei01b, CL06a], which refers to a Golog
program executed by an agent with incomplete world knowledge that employs sensing to gather
necessary information at runtime. Syntactically, this manifests itself of course in the facts that
the program contains sensing actions and that all its test conditions are subjective formulas
that only talk about the robot’s beliefs.
Suppose that the robot’s basic action theory consists of the sensing axiom and successor
state axiom we used in Example 3.50:
(sf (a) = y) ≡(3.150)
∃x. a = lookFor(x) ∧ y = loc(x) ∨ ¬∃x(a = lookFor(x) ∧ y = ok)
[a](loc(x) = y) ≡(3.151)
x = robot ∧ ∃x′(a = lookFor(x′) ∧ y = loc(x′))
∨ loc(x) = y ∧ (x 6= robot ∨ ¬∃x′a = lookFor(x′))
We assume that the robot’s initial theory Σ0 is empty, i.e. it does not possess any initial
knowledge about the state of the world. Let w be the actual world.
1. If Σ denotes the above stated BAT, we start with initializing the agent, yielding
INIT(Σ, w) = 〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉.
2. In an online execution of the above program, the first thing to do is to evaluate whether
the loop condition holds. We therefore call
ASK(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉,¬∃xKnow(x = loc(book))).
100 3 LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
According to Theorem 3.60, this reduces to checking whether
|= Σ0 ⊃ ||R[〈〉,¬∃xKnow(x = loc(book))]||Σ0 .
In this case, regression through 〈〉 leaves the formula unchanged. Moreover,
||¬∃xKnow(x = loc(book))||Σ0 = ¬∃xRES[[x = loc(book),Σ0]],
which reduces to ¬∃x⊥ since there are no known locations of book according to the empty
Σ0. The answer is hence “yes” and the program subsequently enters the body of the while
loop.
3. Let l be shorthand for lookFor(book). The system now calls
EXE(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉, l).
Assume w returns room6213 as sensing result, i.e. w |= sf (l) = room6213 . To apply
Theorem 3.60, we need to determine R[〈〉, sf (l) = room6213 ], which by (3.150) and using
simplification is room6213 = loc(book). If Σ′ stands for Σ ∧ room6213 = loc(book), we
thus end up in the state
〈<[[Σ′]]w, w, 〈l〉〉.
4. Next, the loop condition needs to be evaluated once again, which is done by the call
ASK(〈<[[Σ′]]w, w, 〈l〉〉,¬∃xKnow(x = loc(book))).
Theorem 3.60 again states that this is the same as checking
|= Σ′0 ⊃ ||R[〈l〉,¬∃xKnow(x = loc(book))]||Σ′0 ,
where Σ′0 is room6213 = loc(book). Similar as in Example 3.50, applying regression leaves
us with determining whether
|= Σ′0 ⊃ ||¬∃x∃x′. x′ = loc(book) ∧Know(x′ = loc(book) ⊃ x = loc(book))||Σ′0
which amounts to checking if
|= Σ′0 ⊃ ¬∃x∃x′. x′ = loc(book) ∧ RES[[x′ = loc(book) ⊃ x = loc(book),Σ′0]].
Since the location of the book is known to be room6213 , the argument of RES is entailed
by Σ′0 just in case x′ is not room6213 or x is room6213 . Therefore, the resulting first-order
theorem proving task is deciding whether
|= Σ′0 ⊃ ¬∃x∃x′. x′ = loc(book) ∧ (x′ 6= room6213 ∨ x = room6213 ),
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which is equivalent to
|= ¬∃x x = room6213 .
The overall answer to the query is hence “no” and the program interpreter quits the loop,
which finishes the program.
5. Finally suppose that the human user tells the robot that the cup is in the kitchen. This
translates to a call of the form
TELL(〈<[[Σ′]]w, w, 〈l〉〉, loc(cup) = kitchen).
By Theorem 3.60, we have to add
||R[〈l〉, loc(cup) = kitchen]||Σ′0
to the agent’s knowledge base. Because lookFor(book) has no effect on the location of the
cup, regression leaves the formula unchanged. Furthermore, || · ||Σ′0 has no effect on the
formula either since it is objective. The new knowledge base of the agent thus becomes
Σ′′0 = Σ0 ∧ loc(cup) = kitchen, and the resulting system state is
〈<[[Σ′′0]]w, w, 〈l〉〉.
3.7.2 Progression
In Section 3.4.2 we already argued that in real-world applications it is not practical to entirely
rely on regression as the means for projection. Since the agent’s history of executed actions
will keep growing during its lifetime and soon becomes unmanageable for regression, we would
rather have to regularly update the agent’s initial knowledge base such that it reflects the then
current state of the world. That is, we take a somewhat mixed approach where updates after
the physical execution of actions are done using progression, whereas lookahead and reasoning
about future situations still rely on regression.
As opposed to the regression case, system states are now not represented by a basic action
theory whose initial knowledge base refers to the initial situation, but by a theory of the form
[σ]Σ, where Σ is a basic action theory and σ the history of actions performed so far. First, we
need this lemma:
Lemma 3.62. Let Σ be a set of objective sentences, α a basic sentence and σ a sequence of
action standard names and/or primitive terms. Then
|= OKnow([σ]Σ) ⊃ Know([σ]α) iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(α).
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Similar to Theorem 3.59, we then have the following correspondence to valid ES sentences:
Initializing the agent is as before. The update after the execution of an action is now done by
progressing the agent’s current knowledge, conjoined with some fluent sentence that encodes the
information gained from the sensing result of the action. The answer to a query and the result
of telling the agent a sentence now does not depend on the action history anymore. Formally:
Theorem 3.63. Let Σ = Σ0 ∪Σdef ∪Σpost and Σ′ = Σ′0 ∪Σdef ∪Σpost be (first-order) basic action
theories with the same definitional and successor state axioms, α a sentence, φ a fluent sentence,
t a primitive term or standard name of sort action, σ a sequence of such terms, and w ∈ W.
Further suppose that Σ′0 is a (first-order) progression of Σ0 ∧ φ through t wrt Σdef ∪Σpost. Then
1. INIT(Σ, w) = 〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉;
2. EXE(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, t) = 〈<[[[σ · t]Σ′]]w, w, σ · t〉
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(sf (t) = n ≡ φ) and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n)
3. ASK(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = “yes”
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(α);
4. TELL(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = 〈<[[[σ](Σ ∧ φ)]]w, w, σ〉
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(α ≡ φ).
Proof.
1. Immediate from Definition 3.58.
2. EXE(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, t) = 〈<[[[σ · t]Σ′]]w, w, σ · t〉
iff {w′ ∈ <[[[σ]Σ]]w | w′ |= [σ](sf (t) = n)} = {w′ | w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= [σ · t]Σ′},
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Definition 3.58)
iff {w′ | w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= [σ](Σ ∧ sf (t) = n)} = {w′ | w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= [σ · t]Σ′},
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by definition of <)
iff for all w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= [σ](Σ ∧ sf (t) = n) iff w′ |= [σ · t]Σ′,
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (equivalent rewriting)
iff for all w′ '〈〉 w, w′σ |= Σ ∧ sf (t) = n iff w′σ·t |= Σ′,
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Definition 3.35)
iff for all w′ '〈〉 w, w′σ |= Σ ∧ sf (t) = n iff w′σ |= Σ ∧ φ,
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Definition 3.37)
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iff for all w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= [σ](Σ ∧ sf (t) = n) iff w′ |= [σ](Σ ∧ φ),
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Definition 3.35)
iff for all w′ '〈〉 w with w′ |= [σ]Σ, w′ |= [σ](sf (t) = n) iff w′ |= [σ]φ,
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Definition 3.35)
iff |= OKnow([σ]Σ) ⊃ Know([σ](sf (t) = n ≡ φ)),
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by the semantics)
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(sf (t) = n ≡ φ),
where w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Lemma 3.62)
3. ASK(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = “yes”
iff <[[[σ]Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α for all w′ ∈ <[[[σ]Σ]]w (by Definition 3.58)
iff |= OKnow([σ]Σ) ⊃ Know([σ]α) (by the semantics)
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(α) (by Lemma 3.62)
4. TELL(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = 〈<[[[σ](Σ ∧ φ)]]w, w, σ〉
iff <[[[σ](Σ ∧ φ)]]w = {w′ ∈ <[[[σ]Σ]]w | <[[[σ]Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α} (by Definition 3.58)
iff {w′ | w′ '〈〉 w, w′ |= [σ](Σ ∧ φ)}
= {w′ ∈ <[[[σ]Σ]]w | <[[[σ]Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α} (by definition of <)
iff {w′ ∈ <[[[σ]Σ]]w | w′ |= [σ]φ}
= {w′ ∈ <[[[σ]Σ]]w | <[[[σ]Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α} (by definition of <)
iff for all w′ ∈ <[[[σ]Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]φ iff <[[[σ]Σ]]w, w′ |= [σ]α (equivalent rewriting)
iff |= OKnow([σ]Σ) ⊃ Know([σ](φ ≡ α)) (by the semantics)
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(φ ≡ α) (by Lemma 3.62)
Above we slightly abused the notation of progressed worlds introduced in Definition 3.35: When
writing wσ, we actually mean wz such that z is the sequence of coreferring standard names for
the terms in σ. Note that since σ contains only standard names or at most primitive terms of
sort action, and due to our assumption that actions are rigid, the denotation of terms in σ is
the same in any situation z′.
Similar to the regression case, we can implement the interaction operations with the help of
regression and the Representation Theorem. Note that regression is still needed: In the EXE
case, we need it to replace the sensing result formula (sf (t) = n) by the right-hand side of the
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sensing axiom. Moreover, the argument α for TELL and ASK may still contain [ · ] operators.
It is however not necessary to regress through the entire history of already executed actions,
but only through those that are part of the query.
Theorem 3.64. Let Σ = Σ0 ∪Σdef ∪Σpost and Σ′ = Σ′0 ∪Σdef ∪Σpost be (first-order) basic action
theories with the same definitional and successor state axioms over 〈D,F〉, α a basic, bounded
sentence mentioning only fluents from D ∪ F , t a primitive term or standard name of sort
action, σ a sequence of such terms, and w ∈ W. Let R[α] denote R[Σ,Σ, 〈〉, α]. Then
1. INIT(Σ, w) = 〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉;
2. EXE(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, t) = 〈<[[[σ][t]Σ′]]w, w, σ · t〉 iff w |= [σ](sf (t) = n)
and Σ′0 is a (first-order) progression of Σ0∧R[(sf (t) = n)] through t wrt Σdef∪Σpost.
3. ASK(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = “yes” iff |= Σ0 ⊃ ||R[α]||Σ0;
4. TELL(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = 〈<[[[σ](Σ ∧ ||R[α]||Σ0)]]w, w, σ〉.
Proof.
1. Immediate from Definition 3.58.
2. EXE(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, t) = 〈<[[[σ][t]Σ′]]w, w, σ · t〉
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(sf (t) = n ≡ R[sf (t) = n])
where Σ′0 is a progression of Σ0 ∧R[sf (t) = n] through t wrt Σdef ∪ Σpost
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Theorem 3.63)
iff |= OKnow(Σ0) ⊃ Know(R[sf (t) = n ≡ R[sf (t) = n]])
where Σ′0 is a progression of Σ0 ∧R[sf (t) = n] through t wrt Σdef ∪ Σpost
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Corollary 3.49)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ ||R[sf (t) = n ≡ R[sf (t) = n]]||Σ0
where Σ′0 is a progression of Σ0 ∧R[sf (t) = n] through t wrt Σdef ∪ Σpost
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by Theorem 3.53)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ ||R[sf (t) = n] ≡ R[sf (t) = n]||Σ0
where Σ′0 is a progression of Σ0 ∧R[sf (t) = n] through t wrt Σdef ∪ Σpost
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by definition of R)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ (R[sf (t) = n] ≡ R[sf (t) = n])
where Σ′0 is a progression of Σ0 ∧R[sf (t) = n] through t wrt Σdef ∪ Σpost
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by definition of || · ||Σ0)
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iff |= Σ0 ⊃ >,
Σ′0 is a progression of Σ0 ∧R[sf (t) = n] through t wrt Σdef ∪ Σpost
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by the semantics)
iff Σ′0 is a progression of Σ0 ∧R[sf (t) = n] through t wrt Σdef ∪ Σpost
and w |= [σ](sf (t) = n) (by the semantics)
3. ASK(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = “yes”
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(α) (by Theorem 3.63)
iff |= OKnow(Σ0) ⊃ Know(R[α]) (by Corollary 3.49)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ ||R[α]||Σ0 (by Theorem 3.53)
4. TELL(〈<[[[σ]Σ]]w, w, σ〉, α) = 〈<[[[σ](Σ ∧ ||R[α]||Σ0)]]w, w, σ〉
iff |= OKnow(Σ) ⊃ Know(α ≡ ||R[α]||Σ0) (by Theorem 3.63)
iff |= OKnow(Σ0) ⊃ Know(R[α ≡ ||R[α]||Σ0 ]) (by Corollary 3.49)
iff Σ0 ⊃ ||R[α ≡ ||R[α]||Σ0 ]||Σ0 (by Theorem 3.53)
iff Σ0 ⊃ (||R[α]||Σ0 ≡ ||R[α]||Σ0) (by definition of R and || · ||Σ0)
iff |= Σ0 ⊃ > (which is a tautology, therefore the proposition holds)
Example 3.65. To illustrate the progression-based agent, consider the robot from Example
3.61 again, and suppose we want to execute the same program.
1. Initialization is exactly as before:
INIT(Σ, w) = 〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉.
2. The first evaluation of the loop condition is also exactly as in Example 3.61 due to the
fact that Theorems 3.60 and 3.64 coincide when the history σ is empty. The answer to
ASK(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉,¬∃xKnow(x = loc(book)))
is therefore “yes”.
3. To handle the call
EXE(〈<[[Σ]]w, w, 〈〉〉, l)
where room6213 is the sensing result, we needR[sf (l) = room6213 ], which again simplifies
to room6213 = loc(book). Recall that we assumed an initially empty Σ0, which is why
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we only need to determine the progression of {room6213 = loc(book)} through l wrt
Σdef ∪ Σpost. According to the SSA (3.151), lookFor(book) does not change the value of
loc(book). What however does change is the location of the robot, which becomes the
same as the location of the object that is searched. Therefore the progression is
Σ′0 = {loc(robot) = loc(book), loc(book) = room6213}.
If Σ′ = Σ′0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost, the resulting system state hence is
〈<[[[l]Σ′]]w, w, 〈l〉〉.
4. Next, the loop condition needs to be evaluated once again, which is done by the call
ASK(〈<[[[l]Σ′]]w, w, 〈l〉〉,¬∃xKnow(x = loc(book))).
Theorem 3.64 states that this is the same as checking
|= Σ′0 ⊃ ||R[¬∃xKnow(x = loc(book))]||Σ′0 .
Observe that in contrast to the regression case, we here do not have to regress through 〈l〉,
hence regression leaves the above formula unchanged. It remains to be checked whether
|= Σ′0 ⊃ ¬∃xRES[[x = loc(book),Σ′0]].
As the location of the book is known to be room6213 , this reduces to
|= Σ′0 ⊃ ¬∃x. x = room6213 .
The consequence of the implication is obviously unsatisfiable, therefore we get “no” as the
overall answer, forcing the program interpreter to quit the loop and finish the program,
as before.
5. If the human user again tells the robot that the cup is in the kitchen, we are faced with
a call of the form
TELL(〈<[[[l]Σ′]]w, w, 〈l〉〉, loc(cup) = kitchen).
By Theorem 3.64, we have to add
||R[loc(cup) = kitchen]||Σ′0
to the agent’s knowledge base. As the formula is both static and objective, neither R nor
|| · ||Σ′0 has any effect on it. We simply add it to the existing knowledge base, yielding
Σ′′0 = Σ′0 ∧ loc(cup) = kitchen and the new system state being
〈<[[[l]Σ′′0]]w, w, 〈l〉〉.
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3.8 Discussion
3.8.1 Summary
In this chapter, the logical foundations for building a knowledge-based agent were established.
We argued that it is reasonable to adopt the idealized perspective that the agent is a logically
omniscient first-order reasoner, and that the modal Situation Calculus variant ES is particularly
suited as underlying logic. It was then shown how basic action theories can be used to encode
dynamic domains, and that regression and progression are two possible means for solving the
projection problem, which means reducing reasoning about actions and future situations to
standard first-order theorem proving.
Furthermore, when we include epistemic operators in order to represent the sensing and
knowledge of an agent, a similar reduction to first-order reasoning is possible via Lakemeyer and
Levesque’s Representation Theorem. The Golog language moreover allows to define complex
actions (i.e. programs) that include imperative and nondeterministic parts, thus enabling us to
intermingle programming and planning. Finally, we discussed how all of the above can be put
together to implement a knowledge-based agent.
There are many important issues involved with the design and implementation of (physical)
agents that are beyond the scope of this thesis and were hence not addressed at all. First,
real-world applications typically come with some kind of uncertainty: Information provided by
sensors is usually noisy, actuators work in a certain margin of error, and intended actions may
simply fail or not yield the desired outcome. Decision-theoretic variants of Golog such as
DTGolog [BRST00] and Readylog [FL08] amalgamate the language with stochastic actions
and utilities; a corresponding formalization based on ES is presented by Ziegelmayer [Zie06].
A more fundamental approach is to integrate probabilities directly into the Situation Calculus
[BHL95] or ES [GL07, BL11].
Another issue that we completely neglect in this thesis, but that is all the more important,
is that an autonomous robot with an open-ended task should be capable of learning [Mit97].
Ideally, the learning process is integrated with the high-level control of the agent and accounts
for uncertainty [BL12]. Furthermore, if an agent operates within a multi-agent scenario [HL01],
we may need to explicitly represent other agents and their beliefs [BL10a, BL10b]. Moreover,
in the context of an embodied agent such as an autonomous robot, there is the fundamental
problem of symbol grounding [Har90], which, stated simply, corresponds to the question of how
patterns of subsymbolic sensory data (say camera images of a cup of coffee) relate to the robot’s
internal symbolic representation (e.g. the standard name cup). Somewhat related to this is the
issue of how fuzzy, qualitative notions such as “close to” and “far from” are to be coped with at
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the symbol level [SFL11, SFL12b]. Finally, for actually building an autonomous domestic robot
one has to integrate low-level components such as localization, navigation, face recognition and
natural language processing with the high-level control within a software framework [NFBL10]
and a hardware platform [SFL12a].
3.8.2 Comparison to Other Formalizations
Since its original introduction by Lakemeyer and Levesque in 2004 [LL04], authors have used
different variants of the logic ES. We want to briefly discuss in what aspects the definition
presented in this chapter, which is in fact yet another such variant, differs and where it coincides
with the ones in existing literature.
Terms and Standard Names: Originally, Lakemeyer and Levesque [LL04] did not make
a distinction between terms and standard names in ES, and also not even between sorts. It
was simply assumed that the (non-sorted) universe of discourse consists of the set of all ground
terms, which still allows for a substitutional interpretation of quantification. The semantics
definition thus was extremely simple and elegant and allowed to focus on the innovative aspects
of the new logic.
However, apart from the fact that it is thus not possible to have the agent being ignorant
about the identity of a term such as bestfriend(bob), the application of the Representation
Theorem becomes problematic as we have to exclude function symbols in order to be still
able to enumerate all individuals in the knowledge base and the query formula. Since actions
typically have parameters, additional machinery is necessary to remove them from regression
results [CL06a]. Here, we therefore resort to a definition similar to Lakemeyer and Levesque’s
later formalization [LL05a] that includes different sorts and where worlds may disagree on the
denotation of terms. One important consequence of this is the requirement mentioned in Section
3.7 that in order for an action to be epistemically feasible, it has to be given in the form of a
primitive term or a standard name.
Progression: The semantical account of the progression of a theory used in an earlier publi-
cation [CELN07] was the ES counterpart of an updated definition of progression Reiter gave in
his book [Rei01a]. It turned out that this new variant is actually weaker than the original one
[LR97] in the sense that a BAT can have multiple progressions that are not logically equivalent,
as pointed out by Vassos, Lakemeyer and Levesque [VLL08]. Section 3.4.2 therefore introduces
a new definition that is based on Lakemeyer and Levesque’s notion of progressed worlds [LL09a],
and Theorem 3.39 establishes the correspondence to Lin and Reiter’s original version.
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Action Executability: The role of action preconditions has changed since Reiter presented
his solution to the frame problem [Rei91]. Originally, Poss served as a guard for the SSA:
Poss(a, s) ⊃ [F (~x, do(a, s)) ≡ γ+F ∨ F (~x, s) ∧ ¬γ−F ]
The value of fluents is thus only defined for situations that are the result of a possible action.
Later formulations however typically drop the Poss atom in front of the SSA, as we did here.
Often, this is simply a matter of keeping the formalism as simple as possible. As long as we
only let the agent execute possible actions, we simply do not care about what values fluents
have in situations that are unreachable anyway. Nevertheless, there is also a somewhat more
philosophical justification for this.
We can distinguish two different types of possibility. On the one hand, there is physical
possibility, such as in ”it is not possible to walk through a wall”. Lakemeyer and Levesque
[LL10] take this view in their recent definition of ES, where the sensing compatibility relation
w′ 'z·p w includes the requirement that the action p is possible in z according to w′. The
agent thus comes to believe that Poss(p) was indeed true after executing p, even if it was not
in reality.
We take a different perspective in this thesis: We define the act of doing an action as the
agent’s decision or commitment to it, which manifests itself once it sends the corresponding
control signals to its actuators. In this sense, actions are always possible, only the effects that
they have may differ, and it lies in the domain designer’s responsibility to appropriately reflect
them in the successor state axioms. For example, if the robot believes it is standing one meter
away from the wall, when in fact it is only 20 centimeters away, and it decides to do the action
forward(100), then it tells its wheel actuators to roll forward by one meter. What will happen
is that the robot indeed rolls the .2 meters towards the wall and, when it touches the wall, keeps
spinning its wheels for a little while. The effect of that action in that case is that the robot
ends up right in front of the wall. Depending on the circumstances, effects may differ, e.g. if the
wall is thin and the robot is very strong, the wall may crush etc. In any case, we can represent
these effects through appropriate SSAs.
In the latter scenario, the Poss predicate merely serves as another means of defining or
restricting the agent’s behaviour, similar (or in addition) to what the Golog program does.
This can be for reasons of safety (e.g. the robot should not attempt to move forward by one
meter if its distance is less than that because that may cause damage), or Poss could also act
as some sort of search control (e.g. it makes no sense to consider a putdown action if the robot
is not holding anything). In both cases, it is conceivable to perform an action yet believe it was
not “possible” in the sense that it was not safe or not targeted towards the agent’s goal.
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Chapter 4
Planning in Golog
In the previous chapter we established ES and Golog as appropriate means for the represen-
tation and control of a logic-based agent. Furthermore it was shown that the central reasoning
task of projection, be it by means of regression or by progression, can be reduced to the task
of theorem proving within standard first-order logics. Thus, in principle, to implement such an
agent, all that is needed is a Golog interpreter together with an FOL theorem prover.
However, evaluation shows [Gry10] that a naive implementation of this approach is only
practicable in terms of expressiveness, but very poor in performance. The reason is that although
Golog is a suitable means for the overall control of the agent, including sensing updates and
plan monitoring, it nevertheless performs bad on certain tasks which involve a large amount
of planning. Recall that in Section 3.6 we argued that Golog’s nondeterministic constructs
allow to put as much or as little nondeterminism into a program as desired, and that thus the
full range between deterministic programming and pure, uninformed planning can be exploited
by the domain designer. For example, assume that our office robot has the task to serve coffee
to all people in the office who want some. A (highly nondeterministic) control program in this
case might look as follows:
while ∃x(WantsCoffee(x) ∧ ¬HasCoffee(x)) do
pia[Appropriate(a)?; a]
endWhile
(4.1)
The program says that as long as there exists a person x who wants coffee and has not yet re-
ceived any, the robot should nondeterministically choose some appropriate action a and execute
it. What constitutes an appropriate action in this context can be constrained by accordingly
defining the Appropriate(a) predicate; in the simplest case, it simple admits every executable
action, or all actions from a restricted subset. Any successful execution trace of such a program
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proc dailyRoutine()
makeCoffee();
achieve(∀x(WantsCoffee(x) ⊃ HasCoffee(x)));
getMail();
achieve(∀x(Letter(x) ⊃ On(x, desk(Addressee(x)));
. . .
endProc
Figure 4.1: Control procedure for the daily routine of an office robot
will then consist of a sequence of actions that, when executed, lead to a situation in which
the goal formula ¬∃x(WantsCoffee(x) ∧ ¬HasCoffee(x)) holds. Solving this program through
lookahead thus is nothing else than sequential planning in the classical sense. In fact, we can
plan for any desired formula φ in a similar manner:
while ¬φ do pia[Appropriate(a)?; a] endWhile(4.2)
Let in the following achieve(φ) denote this program. We have argued that the Golog language
allows the programmer to restrain the search space by including domain-dependent knowledge
about what the solution to a certain task looks like, and how a problem divides into subproblems.
While in many cases, specifying and implementing an agent in this manner is what makes the
task feasible in the first place, for most physical agents, there are nevertheless certain subtasks
which can hardly or not at all be constrained or subdivided any further. Typically, these are
subproblems that are rather combinatorial in nature, which is to say that in these cases it is
clear what needs to be done and which action operators are appropriate to fulfill the task, but it
has to be figured out by the system what the right order of execution is. It is in these cases that
we have to resort to something like our achieve(φ) subprogram above. Typical instances of
this are scheduling currently pending requests to the system, finding a route through a certain
topology, or combinations of these two. For example, our office robot may have a daily routine
as sketched out in Figure 4.1. Although that procedure’s overall structure is quite deterministic,
it nonetheless contains subproblems where planning has to be applied. After going to the coffee
machine and making coffee, the robot may be required to bring coffee to people at different
locations in the building (possibly at specific times), and therefore needs to plan for a route and
schedule that ensures that all such requests get fulfilled in time, preferably using as few actions
(or as little time and energy) as possible. Similarly, after going to the mail inbox and fetching
all incoming mail, the letters need to be brought to their corresponding recipients’ desks, which
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again involves planning for a corresponding route.
There is a huge variety of special purpose planners that outperform any existing Golog
interpreter when it comes to such planning tasks. This is not at all surprising in light of the
fact that Golog interpreters such as IndiGolog [GLLS04] or Readylog [FL08] usually do
their lookahead by means of simple blind search, whereas state-of-the-art planners resort to a
variety of sophisticated techniques and heuristics to enhance their performance.
In fact, despite their common origin, research on action logics on the one hand and auto-
mated planning on the other hand have developed rather independently in the past. This is
mainly due to the fact that work on action languages focused on formalisms of high expressive-
ness, whereas planning researchers were concerned with their systems’ computational efficiency.
Of course, there is a trade-off between the two, which is why the usage of highly expressive lan-
guages such as Golog comes at the cost of limited efficiency, while efficient planners such as
FF [HN01] require an input language with restricted expressiveness.
During the last one and a half decades however, one could observe that the two fields be-
gan to converge again. Exemplary for this trend is the development of the planning domain
definition language PDDL [GHK+98], which has served as the input language for systems par-
ticipating at the biennial international planning competition IPC [McD00], and which extends
simple STRIPS-based planning by features such as conditional effects, time, concurrency, plan
constraints and preferences. By now, PDDL has become a de-facto standard for the descrip-
tion of planning domains and problems, and it is understood by a multitude of state-of-the-art
planners which have been developed since then.
It seems more than natural to try to exploit these achievements from the field of planning
and apply them in the context of Golog, with the aim of thus acquiring a system which is both
expressive and able to efficiently solve planning problems. The approach we will follow here is
to embed existing PDDL planners into Golog, where the idea is that whenever the Golog
interpreter encounters a planning subtask in the form of (4.2), it translates it into a PDDL
problem, then calls the planner on this problem, and continues its execution on the returned
solution plan.
In order for this approach to be sound, we first have to establish a common semantical basis
to ensure that a plan returned by the PDDL planner is also a legal plan within ES for the
situation from which the planner was called. We will do this by showing how to map a PDDL
domain to a basic action theory that admits the same set of legal plans. Although it may seem
that a translation in the opposite direction is what we actually need to embed a PDDL planner
into Golog, there are at least two reasons in favor of this approach.
On the one hand, it is simpler. The reason is that PDDL is far more restricted in expres-
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siveness than ES. While ES basic action theories can use the full power of first-order logic,
PDDL descriptions, among other things, contain the domain-closure and closed-world assump-
tions, i.e. it is assumed that the universe of discourse is finite, that all individuals are known,
and that the complete current state is given through a set of positive literals. If we wanted to
represent instances of the more expressive formalism by means of the less expressive one, we
would have to find and apply restrictions that ensure that the input is still representable in the
target language. On the other hand, the opposite is much more straightforward: Here, we will
simply construct a basic action theory Σ = Map(P ) for a given PDDL problem P that admits
the same plans. We then use the inverse operation P = Map−1(Σ) of this mapping for embed-
ding the PDDL planner into Golog. This means that we assume that the basic action theory
used by the Golog system is in a form that could result as the output of the Map operation,
and that in calls to the planner, a corresponding PDDL problem is reconstructed. Technically,
this does not guarantee that one covers the largest possible class of action theories that can be
translated to PDDL. For this purpose, it is necessary to also analyze possible translations in
the backward direction, which is done formally in [ENLC06], [RN07], and [RHN08] for the ADL
subset of PDDL. Those results, which we will discuss in more detail at then end of Section
4.2 below, basically show that though Map−1 does not fully cover all translatable BATs, it is
nonetheless a very close approximation.
On the other hand, the mapping can also be viewed as an alternative, declarative semantics
for the planning formalism. Originally, the first version of PDDL [GHK+98] was not accom-
panied by a formal semantics. The language was rather intended as a standard syntax for a
commonly accepted semantics for STRIPS, as described by Lifschitz [Lif87]. The first formal
semantics was provided for PDDL version 2.1 by Fox and Long [FL03], who extended Lifschitz’
state-transitional definition to also cope with the newly added numeric and temporal features
of PDDL. In any case, the meaning of action operators is defined meta-theoretically through
the addition and deletion of literals, which already Lin and Reiter [LR97] identified as prob-
lematic, in particular for logically incomplete theories. Moreover, the additional machinery for
the temporal and numeric features of PDDL 2.1 makes the semantics rather complicated (in
[FL03], the description spans 17 pages) and thus quite difficult to grasp for a human reader.
In [LR97], Lin and Reiter show that STRIPS can be viewed as a mechanism for computing
the progression with respect to a certain form of successor state axioms, which they call strongly
context free:
[a]F (~x) ≡ (∃~v1)a = g1(~w1) ∨ · · · ∨ (∃~vm)a = gm(~wm) ∨
F (~x) ∧ ¬(∃~y1)a = h1(~z1) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬(∃~yn)a = hn(~zn)
(4.3)
The gi and hj are action symbols, not necessarily distinct, and the ~wi and ~zj are variables
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that include all of the ~x, and where the remaining variables are the existentially quantified ~vi
and ~yj , respectively. The correspondence with STRIPS becomes clear once we instantiate the
successor state axioms by some ground action g(~o). Simplifying the resulting formula using the
unique names assumption for actions results in a formula of the form:
[g(~o)]F (~x) ≡ ~x = ~o1 ∨ · · · ∨ ~x = ~om ∨ F (~x) ∧ ~x 6= ~c1 ∧ · · · ∧ ~x 6= ~cn(4.4)
In the most common closed-world case, the ~oi correspond to the instances of F that have to be
added, while the ~ci are the ones that need to be deleted from the current state. In this case,
the assumption is that the only situation-dependent sentences in the initial database Σ0 are of
the form
F (~x) ≡ ~x = ~d1 ∨ · · · ∨ ~x = ~dr,(4.5)
where we have one such sentence for each fluent F . The progression can now easily be determined
when we insert (4.5) into (4.4), which yields
[g(~o)]F (~x) ≡ ~x = ~o1 ∨ · · · ∨ ~x = ~om ∨
(~x = ~d1 ∨ · · · ∨ ~x = ~dr) ∧ ~x 6= ~c1 ∧ · · · ∧ ~x 6= ~cn.
(4.6)
This sentence can further be simplified when we assume that the ~oi, ~di and ~ci are all standard
names. Because of them being unique, ~x = ~di already implies ~x 6= ~cj for all ~cj distinct from ~di.
We can therefore drop the inequalities ~x 6= ~cj and simply remove all the ~x = ~di such that ~di is
identical to any one of the ~cj , which gives a sentence of the form
[g(~o)]F (~x) ≡ ~x = ~o1 ∨ · · · ∨ ~x = ~om ∨ ~x = ~di1 ∨ · · · ∨ ~x = ~diq .(4.7)
When we do this transformation for all the fluents in the basic action theory, and if we drop
the leading [g(~o)] operators, what we obtain is nothing else than the progression of an initial
database of sentences of the form (4.5) through g(~o) with respect to the strongly context free
successor state axioms (4.3)! Moreover, since (4.7) is of the same form as (4.5), this procedure
can be iterated for further actions.
Lin and Reiter have thus shown an exact correspondence between how states and their
updates are represented within a STRIPS system, and a certain form of Situation Calculus
basic action theories. They argue that the state-transitional semantics for STRIPS defined
through meta-theoretic addition and deletion of literals can be viewed as a mere mechanism for
computing the progression of a corresponding BAT through a given action. The basic action
theory on the other hand is considered the declarative specification of the system, given in the
form of axioms that are expressed in a logical language whose semantics is well-defined and
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whose properties are well understood. Moreover, obtaining the STRIPS operators from the
precondition and successor state axioms is a completely mechanical process, meaning that is
straightforward to devise a procedure that compiles the Situation Calculus axiomatization into
a corresponding STRIPS description.
It is with this very same motivation that we will in the following provide a Situation-Calculus-
based (or more precisely, ES-based) declarative semantics for the Planning Domain Definition
Language PDDL, which is basically an extension of STRIPS by numerous new features. As
mentioned above, the existing, meta-theoretic definition of PDDL’s semantics is lengthy and
complicated. We believe that our alternative, declarative semantics is not only more accessible
to a human reader, but that a common, logical representation also allows an easy comparison
to other action formalisms. Finally, the new semantics provides the theoretical justification for
embedding PDDL-based planners into the Golog system, as described above.
It should be noted that resorting to ES instead of the classical Situation Calculus brings at
least two advantages in this context: On the one hand, in many planning formalisms (including
PDDL) the assumption is made that distinct constants c and d refer to distinct individuals.
To achieve this in the Situation Calculus, we have to include pairwise inequalities (c 6= d)
in our background axiomatization. Since the distinctness of standard names is already built
into ES’s semantics, no such inequality axioms are required when we treat all such c and d as
standard names. On the other hand, and more importantly, there are no situation terms in ES.
If Holding(x) is a fluent predicate that is used in the planning formalism, its counterpart in
the Situation Calculus requires to be extended by a situation argument, yielding Holding(x, s).
As ES does not contain situation terms, no such transformation is needed, and indeed entire
formulas can be used across both formalisms without modification.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The following section gives a gen-
eral introduction to the Planning Domain Definition Language PDDL. Section 4.2 then shows
how the semantics of an important subset of PDDL, namely its ADL fragment, can be repre-
sented by ES basic action theories, including a formal proof of the correctness of the mapping.
An empirical evaluation as presented in Section 4.3 shows that embedding a PDDL planner
into Golog is indeed beneficial in terms of the system’s overall runtime, without any loss in
expressiveness.
4.1 The Planning Domain Definition Language
Since the introduction of STRIPS [FN71] in 1971, AI planning has been an area of ongoing
research. While the STRIPS planning system itself was definitely ground-breaking, its rep-
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resentation formalism was far more influential. Most planners that were developed after the
first linear planners of the early 1970s [Sus75], be it the partial-order planners that dominated
in the following two decades [PW92] or the seminal graph-planning systems of the mid 1990s
[BF97], were based on some variant, extension or derivative of the original STRIPS language.
Most notably, Pednault proposed his Action Description Language ADL [Ped89, Ped94] as a
“middle-ground” between the highly restricted original STRIPS and the full first-order expres-
siveness of the Situation Calculus. In particular, the formalism kept the action-centered view
of STRIPS, but instead of the simple add and delete lists allowed to attach a condition (in
the form of a formula) to each effect, and instead of only allowing positive ground atoms to be
tested in action preconditions, allowed to include negation, disjunction, and quantification.
The different planners that have been developed over the years supported different input
languages, i.e. extensions of STRIPS or subsets of ADL. The UCPOP system [PW92] for
instance could handle planning problems that contain universal quantification and conditional
effects (hence the letters ’U’ and ’C’ in the acronym), but neither existential quantification nor
disjunction in preconditions. Furthermore, each system used its own syntax. Direct comparisons
between planners were hence done only occasionally, and it was therefore difficult to judge the
overall progress in the field.
For this reason, and inspired by similar activities in other fields, the International Planning
Competition (IPC) was introduced and first held at the 1998 AI Planning Systems conference
(AIPS). The goal of the competition was to create a repository of planning domains and prob-
lems, to provide a benchmark for planners that allow researchers to compare their system to
the state of the art, and to focus and drive research towards more realistic applications.
The Planning Domain Definition Language PDDL [GHK+98] was designed by the com-
petition committee to serve as the standardized input syntax for the systems participating in
the competition. One of the major design goals was that the planning domains and problems
formulated with PDDL should only provide “physics, not advice”, i.e. it only describes what
the world is like and how actions can possibly change it, but does not give any hints on which
actions need to be applied in which order to achieve certain goals.
At the most basic level, PDDL simply provides yet another new representation for the
STRIPS formalism. On top of that, the current version 3 of the language includes all of the
expressiveness of ADL, an explicit (numeric) notion of time, durative processes, plan constraints
and preferences, and more. To be able to identify the different fragments, PDDL uses so-called
requirement flags that indicate which features of the language are used in the formulation of a
given planning domain. Since typically a planning system only supports a certain subset of the
features, it is thus easy for the planner to decide whether it can deal with a given problem or
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not.
PDDL utilizes a LISP-like syntax. The general domain of a planning problem is defined
separate from the problem itself so that the same domain definition can be reused for different
planning problem instances. Figure 4.2 provides an example definition of the office robot domain
in PDDL. After the declaration of the domain name, a list of the requirements for the domain
is given. In this case, the domain uses a simple STRIPS representation, but where in addition
domain objects will be typed. The following lines then defines physob (“physical object”)
and location as the types used within the domain, and robot as a constant of type physob,
where the term “constant” in this context refers to an object name that has to be present in
all instances of this domain. It follows a declaration of the (fluent) predicates, in this case
at, holding, hand-empty, and portable, along with their arguments and their corresponding
types. The leading question marks are used to distinguish variables as well as predicate and
action arguments from other designators.
Next is a list of the action operators, each of which being given by its parameters, its
precondition, and its effect. For the pickup action for instance, we require that the object ?x to
be picked up is at the same location ?l as the robot, that the robot’s hand is currently empty,
and that ?x is a portable object. As an effect, the robot will be holding the object after the
action, and its hand will no longer be empty.
The formulation here may seem a bit redundant to the reader. Note that this is due to
the :strips requirement flag being set, which implies that preconditions may not contain any
negation, disjunction or quantification. This disallows that we test in the precondition whether
there exists a location that is the same for the robot and ?x, which is why the location was
put as an additional argument of the action. For the same reason, we cannot simply check
whether the robot’s hand is empty by requiring that there does not exist any object currently
being held, and hence the additional predicate hand-empty is used to encode this property.
Functional fluents such as the ones we used in the basic action theory of Section 3.3 are not
included in the :strips fragment either, and hence the location of physical objects is encoded
by the predicate at in this domain formulation.
None of the above would be necessary in the more expressive :adl fragment. Note however
that it is quite common that IPC planning domains are reformulated for different fragments of
PDDL because of the above mentioned fact that certain planners can handle only certain parts
of the language. Yet this does not mean that the higher expressiveness is of no use. On the
contrary: While it is most of the time possible to “compile away” certain features, generally
the problem description, the length of the plan, or both will considerably grow in size, in the
worst case up to an exponential blow-up [Neb00].
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(define (domain office-robot)
(:requirements :strips :typing)
(:types physob location)
(:constants robot - physob)
(:predicates (at ?x - physob ?l - location)
(holding ?x - physob)
(hand-empty)
(portable ?x - physob)
...
)
(:action pickup
:parameters (?x - physob ?l - location)
:precondition (and (at ?x ?l)
(at robot ?l)
(hand-empty)
(portable ?x)
)
:effect (and (holding ?x)
(not (hand-empty))
)
)
(:action putdown
...
)
...
)
Figure 4.2: Office robot domain defined in the STRIPS fragment of PDDL
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(define (problem office-robot-problem)
(:domain office-robot)
(:objects cup1 cup2 - physob
office-ann office-bob kitchen hallway - location
)
(:init (at robot hallway)
(at cup1 kitchen)
(at cup2 kitchen)
(hand-empty)
(portable cup1)
(portable cup2)
)
(:goal (and (at cup1 office-ann) (at cup2 office-bob)))
)
Figure 4.3: PDDL planning problem instance for the office robot domain
Figure 4.3 shows an exemplary problem instance for the above domain. In the first line
the problem is given a name, and in the second one the corresponding planning domain is
referenced. It follows a list of the objects in the domain with associated types, where in this
case the notation is to be read such that both cup1 and cup2 are of type physob, whereas
office-ann, office-bob, kitchen and hallway are all of type location. Next, the initial
state of the planning problem is provided in the form of positive literals (atoms) that are
supposed to hold initially. In this case, the robot initially is at the hallway, whereas cup1 and
cup2 are in the kitchen, the robot’s hand is empty, and both cups are portable objects. Note that
PDDL includes the closed-world assumption: Every fact that is not explicitly mentioned to be
true here is assumed to be false. For example, since nothing is said within the initial description
about the state of the predicate holding, the atoms (holding cup1) and (holding cup2) will
by default not hold initially. Finally, a goal is provided in the form of a formula for which the
same restrictions apply as for preconditions of actions. As in this domain only the :strips
requirement flag is set, the formula has to be a conjunction of positive literals.
The IPC has taken place biennially since 1998.1 The PDDL language has undergone several
revisions since then, where new features were introduced, but also others were dropped. The first
1More precisely, up to today, the competition was held in the years 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and
2011.
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version for the 1998 competition, presented in [GHK+98], supported on top of basic STRIPS-
style action definitions also the conditional effects of ADL. Moreover, it included definitions for
axioms, safety constraints, hierarchical actions, and numerical fluents. Here, an “axiom” means
a formula that relates the truth value of a certain predicate that is not explicitly defined to the
values of other predicates. Safety constraints are formulas that invalidate a plan once they get
violated at some intermediate state. The term “hierarchical actions” refers to the possibility
to decompose actions into several subtasks as it is done in hierarchical task network planning.
Numerical fluents are state-dependent functions whose arguments are from the set of domain
objects and whose values are numbers. Furthermore, in addition to the standard closed-world
case, the original PDDL also allowed to define open-world planning problems where states were
represented as consistent, but not necessarily complete sets of literals. If such a state contains a
positive literal P , then the atom P is known to be true in that state, whereas if ¬P is contained,
P is known to be false. If P is not mentioned at all, then the truth state of P is unknown.
None of these additional features were actually used in the 1998 planning competition, as all
five of the participating planners supported either STRIPS only or at most the ADL subset.
Similarly, only the (closed-world) ADL fragment was used in the 2000 competition. Every
subsequent extension of PDDL afterwards then added to this subset, rather than the original
PDDL.
The first such extension was for the third IPC in 2002. In [FL03], Fox and Long present
version 2.1 of PDDL that extends the previous version by numerics, time, and concurrent
durative processes. They propose a hierarchy of sublanguages of increasing expressiveness:
• Level 1 consists of the purely logical, non-numerical STRIPS and ADL subsets with
instantaneous actions;
• level 2 contains all of level 1, and additionally allows the usage of numeric fluent functions;
• level 3 extends level 2 by discretized durative actions;
• level 4 in addition includes continuous durative actions and
• level 5 contains all of the above plus spontaneous events and physical processes.
The difference between discretized and continuous durative actions is that the former have
only effects that take place at the start or end time points of the action’s durations, whereas
the latter may also contain effects that induce a continuous change of some numeric property
during the time interval in which the action is executed. Level 5 furthermore is actually not
part of the “official” PDDL 2.1, but an extension called PDDL+ [FL06] which introduces
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autonomous processes that may be either triggered by the agent’s actions itself or by effects of
other processes.
The next update was provided with PDDL 2.2 [EH04], which was used at the fourth com-
petition in 2004. It adds two new features to the previous version: On the one hand, so-called
timed-initial literals can be provided in the description of the initial state. A ground literal
can thus be defined to become true at a pre-determined, explicit time point, which is mainly
useful to encode time windows in which certain activities have to or must not occur, e.g. the
opening hours of shops. On the other hand, version 2.2 re-introduces the axioms of PDDL 1.2,
where the corresponding fluents that are defined by those axioms are now referred to as derived
predicates. There is a good reason for the latter: As it was shown in [THN05], although it is
in general possible to “compile away” such axioms, such a compilation cannot be done if it is
required that the size of planning problem description and the length of the plan do not grow
more then polynomially. This is to say that derived predicates are not only “syntactic sugar”,
but they contribute a reasonable amount of expressiveness to the formalism.
For the fourth IPC in 2006, PDDL was yet extended again, yielding version 3.0. It allows to
define trajectory constraints that express requirements about the intermediate steps of a plan,
as opposed to normal goals which only talk about the final state to be reached. Moreover,
PDDL 3.0 provides the possibility to express soft goals and constraints, also called preferences.
As opposed to their strong counterparts, soft constraints are not required to hold for a plan to
be valid, but are considered “nice to have”, where the more of them are fulfilled in the plan,
the more preferred it is. Preferences in PDDL are defined quantitatively, i.e. plan quality is
measured by a numeric metric, whose value depends on which soft goals are satisfied (or not)
in the given plan.
Figure 4.4 presents an overview of all requirement flags supported by PDDL 3.0, along with
their corresponding meaning.
4.2 The ADL Fragment
As discussed earlier, Lin and Reiter already showed in [LR97] how the STRIPS updating
mechanism of adding and deleting literals corresponds to progression with respect to strongly
context-free successor state axioms. In this section, a similar mapping is provided for PDDL’s
ADL subset, which is obtained by using that part of the PDDL syntax described in [GL05a]
that is accessible through the :adl requirement flag. As can be seen from Figure 4.4, this means
that this sublanguage extends STRIPS by supporting equality, conditional effects, typing, as
well as negation, disjunction and quantifiers within preconditions. The main result of this
4.2 The ADL Fragment 123
Requirement Description
:strips Basic STRIPS-style adds and deletes.
:typing Allow type names in declarations of variables.
:negative-preconditions Allow not in goal descriptions.
:disjunctive-preconditions Allow or in goal descriptions.
:equality Support = as built-in predicate.
:existential-preconditions Allow exists in goal descriptions.
:universal-preconditions Allow forall in goal descriptions.
:quantified-preconditions = :existential-preconditions
+ :universal-preconditions.
:conditional-effects Allow when in action effects.
:fluents Allow function definitions and use of effects us-
ing assignment operators and arithmetic pre-
conditions.
:adl = :strips + :typing
+ :negative-preconditions
+ :disjunctive-preconditions
+ :equality
+ :quantified-preconditions
+ :conditional-effects
:durative-actions Allows durative actions. Note that this does not
imply :fluents.
:derived-predicates Allows predicates whose truth value is defined
by a formula.
:timed-initial-literals Allows the initial state to specify literals that
will become true at a specified time point, im-
plies :durative-actions.
:preferences Allows use of preferences in action preconditions
and goals.
:constraints Allows use of constraints fields in domain and
problem files. These may contain modal opera-
tors supporting trajectory constraints.
Figure 4.4: PDDL requirement flags and their meaning. Source: [GL05a]
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section can thus be seen as a generalization of Lin and Reiter’s.
We start by presenting the language’s syntax and semantics, after which the mapping to ES
basic action theories is shown, followed by a corresponding correctness proof and a discussion
of how the two formalisms relate in terms of expressiveness.
4.2.1 Language Definition
Instead of resorting to the original LISP-like syntax of PDDL, we use a more logic-like notation
here. In particular, we will already use symbols from the ES alphabet to define ADL problems,
which simplifies the later mapping between the two formalisms. We need the following formal
definitions:
Definition 4.1 (ADL Domains). An ADL domain is given by D = 〈T, E, OD, F, A〉, where
• T = {τ1, . . . , τk,Object} is a finite list of types, each of which is a unary rigid predicate
symbol, and where Object is a special type that is always included;
• E is a finite list of statements of the form
τi : (either τi1 · · · τiki ),(4.8)
where ki ≥ 2, and which intuitively means that τi ∈ T \ {Object} is a compound type
defined as the union of the distinct τij ∈ T \ {Object}. We require that each type appears
on the left-hand side of at most one such statement, and that if τij appears on the right-
hand side of an “either” statement, it does not appear on the left-hand side of any.
Types distinct from Object that are not defined as compound types in this way are called
primitive. In the special case that the number k of types distinct from Object in T is zero,
we consider Object a primitive type. Otherwise, it is implicitly understood as the most
general supertype, i.e. the union of all primitive types.
• OD = {o1:τo1 , . . . , ol:τol} is a finite list of “constants” with associated types, where each oi
is an object standard name and each τoi ∈ T is primitive;
• F = {F1:(τ1F1 · · · τm1F1 ), . . . , Fm:(τ1Fm · · · τmmFm )} is a finite list of fluent predicates with asso-
ciated types (from T) for their arguments;
• and A = {ω1, . . . , ωn} is a finite list of action operators with respect to 〈T, E, OD, F〉 according
to Definition 4.4.
Here and in the following we also assume without further mentioning that symbols such as
constants, predicates and the like are are always distinct.
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Definition 4.2 (ADL Problems). An ADL problem is given by P = 〈D, OP, I, G〉, where
• D = 〈T, E, OD, F, A〉 is an ADL domain according to Definition 4.1;
• OP = {ol+1:τol+1 , · · · , ol+q:τol+q} is a finite list of object standard names with associated
primitive types from T,
• I is the initial state in form of a finite set of ground atoms with respect to 〈T, E, OP ∪ OD, F〉
according to Definition 4.3;
• G is the goal in form of a precondition formula with respect to 〈T, E, OD ∪ OP, F, ∅〉 according
to Definition 4.5.
Definition 4.3 (ADL Atoms). An ADL atom with respect to 〈T, E, O, F, V〉 is of the form
Fi(o1, . . . , omi), where Fi:(τ
1
Fi
· · · τmiFi ) ∈ F and for each tj , either tj is an object variable such
that (tj:τ) ∈ V and τ ≤ τ jFi , or tj is an object standard name with (tj:τ) ∈ O and τ ≤ τ
j
Fi
.
Here, by τ ≤ τ ′ we mean that either τ and τ ′ are identical, or (τ ′:(either · · · τ · · · )) ∈ E, or τ ′ is
identical to Object . An ADL ground atom with respect to 〈T, E, O, F〉 is an ADL atom without
variables, i.e. an ADL atom with respect to 〈T, E, O, F, ∅〉.
Definition 4.4 (ADL Operators). An ADL operator with respect to 〈T, E, OD, F〉 is given by
ωj = 〈gj , $j , pij , j〉, where
• gj is an nj-ary action function symbol;
• $j = {y1gj :τ1gj , . . . , y
nj
gj :τ
nj
gj } is a list of object variables with associated types, called the
parameters of ωj ;
• pij is a precondition formula with respect to 〈T, E, OD, F, $j〉 according to Definition 4.5;
• j is an ADL effect with respect to 〈T, E, OD, F, gj , $j〉 according to Definition 4.6.
Definition 4.5 (ADL Precondition Formulas). The ADL precondition formulas with respect
to 〈T, E, O, F, V〉 are the least set such that:
1. If F (~t) is an ADL atom with respect to 〈T, E, O, F, V〉, then it is an ADL precondition
formula with respect to 〈T, E, O, F, V〉.
2. If for each ti, either ti is an object variable such that (ti:τ) ∈ V or ti is an object standard
name with (ti:τ) ∈ O, then (t1 = t2) is an ADL precondition formula with respect to
〈T, E, O, F, V〉. Note that as opposed to the case above, no type consistency is required
here.
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3. If φ1 and φ2 are ADL precondition formulas with respect to 〈T, E, O, F, V〉, then φ1 ∧ φ2
and ¬φ1 are also ADL precondition formulas with respect to 〈T, E, O, F, V〉.
4. If φ is an ADL precondition formula with respect to 〈T, E, O, F, V〉 and (x:τ) ∈ V is an
object variable with associated type τ ∈ T , then ∀x:τ.φ is an ADL precondition formula
with respect to 〈T, E, O, F, V \ {x:τ}〉.
Definition 4.6 (ADL Effects). An ADL effect with respect to 〈T, E, OD, F, gj , $j〉 is a finite
collection of expressions of the form
∀~xi:~τFi . γ+Fi,gj ⇒ Fi(~xi),(4.9)
and expressions of the form
∀~xi:~τFi . γ−Fi,gj ⇒ ¬Fi(~xi),(4.10)
where (Fi:~τFi) ∈ F, and the effect conditions γ+Fi,gj and γ−Fi,gj are precondition formulas with
respect to 〈T, E, OD, F, {~xi:~τFi} ∪$j〉. We call (4.9) a positive effect and (4.10) a negative effect
for Fi.
Example 4.7. As an example, consider our office robot again. One possible encoding is given
as follows. Let the domain be
D = 〈T, E, OD, F, A〉
where
T = {Physob, Location, Robot , Cup, Letter , Object}
E = {Physob : (either Robot Cup Letter)}
OD = {robot : Robot}
F = {At : (Physob Location), Holding : (Physob), Portable : (Physob),
Nextto : (Location Location)}
A = {ω1, ω2, ω3}
The operators are defined as follows:
ω1 = 〈 pickup,
{y : Physob},
∃x : Location. At(robot , x) ∧At(y, x) ∧ Portable(y) ∧ ¬∃x′Holding(x′),
{∀x : Physob. x = y ⇒ Holding(x)} 〉
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ω2 = 〈 putdown,
{y : Physob},
Holding(y),
{∀x : Physob. x = y ⇒ ¬Holding(x)} 〉
ω3 = 〈 goto,
{y1 : Location, y2 : Location},
At(robot , y1) ∧ (Nextto(y1, y2) ∨NextTo(y2, y1)),
{∀x1 : Physob ∀x2 : Location. (x1 = robot ∧ x2 = y2)⇒ At(x1, x2),
∀x1 : Physob ∀x2 : Location. (x1 = robot ∧ x2 = y1)⇒ ¬At(x1, x2),
∀x1 : Physob ∀x2 : Location. (Holding(x1) ∧ x2 = y2)⇒ At(x1, x2),
∀x1 : Physob ∀x2 : Location. (Holding(x1) ∧ x2 = y1)⇒ ¬At(x1, x2)} 〉
Note that as opposed to the formalization given in Figure 4.2 which uses only the STRIPS
subset of PDDL, we here exploit the full expressiveness of the ADL fragment. In particular,
preconditions such as ¬∃x′Holding(x′) may contain negation and quantification, which is why
additional predicates like HandEmpty are unnecessary. Moreover, conditional effects allow us
to properly encode the fact that when the robot moves, all objects that it holds move along
with it. An example problem for this domain is
P = 〈D, OP, I, G〉
where
OP = {cup1 : Cup, cup2 : Cup,
officeann : Location, officebob : Location, kitchen : Location, hallway : Location}
I = {At(robot , hallway), At(cup1, hallway), At(cup2, kitchen),
Holding(cup1), Portable(cup1), Portable(cup2),
NextTo(officeann, hallway), NextTo(officebob, hallway), NextTo(kitchen, hallway)}
G = At(cup1, officeann) ∧At(cup2, officebob)
4.2.2 Semantics
Definition 4.8 (ADL Object Domains). Let τ ∈ T be a type. We define |τ |(T, E, O), the domain
of τ with respect to 〈T, E, O〉, inductively as follows:
• |τ |(T, E, O) = {o | (o:τ) ∈ O}, if τ ∈ T is primitive;
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• |τ |(T, E, O) = |τi1 |(T, E, O) ∪ · · · ∪ |τiki |(T, E, O), if (τ : (either τi1 · · · τiki )) ∈ E;
• |τ |(T, E, O) = {o | (o:τ ′) ∈ O}, if τ = Object .
Definition 4.9 (ADL States). An ADL state with respect to 〈T, E, O, F〉 is a finite set of ground
atoms with respect to 〈T, E, O, F〉.
Definition 4.10 (Truth of ADL Formulas). Let S be an ADL state with respect to 〈T, E, O, F〉.
Then
1. S |= F (~o) iff F (~o) ∈ S;
2. S |= (o1 = o2) iff o1 and o2 are identical;
3. S |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff S |= φ1 and S |= φ2;
4. S |= ¬φ iff S 6|= φ;
5. S |= ∀x:τ.φ iff S |= ∧
o∈|τ |(T,E,O)
φxo .
Definition 4.11 (ADL Ground Actions). Let ωj = 〈gj , ~yj:~τgj , pij , j〉 be an ADL operator with
respect to 〈T, E, OD, F〉. A ground action for ωj with respect to O is a term of the form gj(~o),
where ~o ∈ |~τgj |(T, E, O).
Definition 4.12 (ADL Updates). Let S be an ADL state with respect to 〈T, E, O, F〉 and gj(~o)
a ground action for ωj = 〈gj , ~yj:~τgj , pij , j〉 with respect to O. Then
Adds = {Fi(~c) | (∀~xi:~τFi . γ+Fi,gj ⇒ Fi(~xi)) ∈ j ,(4.11)
~c ∈ |~τFi |(T, E, O) and S |= (γ+Fi,gj )
~xi ~yj
~c ~o }
Dels = {Fi(~c) | (∀~xi:~τFi . γ−Fi,gj ⇒ ¬Fi(~xi)) ∈ j ,(4.12)
~c ∈ |~τFi |(T, E, O) and S |= (γ−Fi,gj )
~xi ~yj
~c ~o }
The updated state for S with respect to gj(~o) is
S′ = (S \Dels ) ∪Adds .(4.13)
Definition 4.13 (ADL Plans). Let P = 〈D, OP, I, G〉 be an ADL problem and D = 〈T, E, OD, F, A〉
a corresponding ADL domain. A plan P for P is given by a finite sequence of ground actions
〈gj1(~o1), . . . , gjk(~ok)〉 for the operators ωj = 〈gj , $j , pij , j〉 ∈ A with respect to OD∪OP. P induces
a trace of states S0, S1, . . . , Sk, where S0 = I is the initial state, and each Si is the updated
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state for Si−1 with respect to gji(~o). The plan is executable when for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the
precondition is satisfied, i.e.
Si |= (piji)
~yji
~oi
.(4.14)
It is furthermore valid if it is executable and the goal formula holds in the final state:
Sk |= G.(4.15)
Example 4.14. Let S0 be the state that is given by the initial state I given in Example 4.7:
S0 = {At(robot , hallway), At(cup1, hallway), At(cup2, kitchen),
Holding(cup1), Portable(cup1), Portable(cup2),
NextTo(officeann, hallway), NextTo(officebob, hallway), NextTo(kitchen, hallway)}
For the ground action goto(hallway , officeann), we obtain
Adds = {At(robot , officeann), At(cup1, officeann)}
Dels = {At(robot , hallway), At(cup1, hallway)}.
The updated state for S0 with respect to goto(hallway , officeann) thus is
S1 = {At(robot , officeann), At(cup1, officeann), At(cup2, kitchen),
Portable(cup1), Portable(cup2),
NextTo(officeann, hallway), NextTo(officebob, hallway), NextTo(kitchen, hallway)}.
Moreover, it is easy to check that the plan
P = 〈 goto(hallway , officeann), putdown(cup1), goto(officeann, hallway), goto(hallway , kitchen),
pickup(cup2), goto(kitchen, hallway), goto(hallway , officebob), putdown(cup2) 〉
is both executable and valid for the goal formula
G = At(cup1, officeann) ∧At(cup2, officebob).
4.2.3 The Mapping
Let P = 〈D, OP, I, G〉 be an ADL problem, where D = 〈T, E, OD, F, A〉 is an ADL domain. As we will
see, constructing a corresponding basic action theory Map(P) is actually quite straightforward.
We define
Map(P) = Map0(T, E, OD ∪ OP, F, I) ∪ Mappre(A) ∪ Mappost(F, A),(4.16)
each of which we will now discuss in further detail.
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The Initial Database
Map0(T, E, O, F, I) is the initial database of the translated basic action theory. Obviously, we
need it to encode the initial state I of our PDDL problem, which we achieve by requiring that
it includes for each Fi:~τFi ∈ F a sentence of the form
Fi(~xi) ≡ (~xi = ~o1 ∨ · · · ∨ ~xi = ~oko),(4.17)
where {~o1, . . . , ~oko} = {~o | Fi(~o) ∈ I}.
Additionally, we make Map0(T, E, O, F, I) contain all information about typing. For each
primitive type τi ∈ T, we therefore include a sentence of the form
τi(x) ≡ (x = oi1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = oili ),(4.18)
where {oi1 , . . . , oili} = {o | (o:τi) ∈ O}. Furthermore, for each compound type definition
(τi:(eitherτi1 · · · τiki )) ∈ E, we have a sentence of the form
τi(x) ≡ (τi1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ τiki (x)).(4.19)
Finally, in case Object is not primitive, the set also includes the single sentence
Object(x) ≡ (τj1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ τjlp (x)),(4.20)
where {τj1 , . . . , τjlp} = {τ | τ ∈ T primitive}.
Example 4.15. For the domain and problem given in Example 4.7, we obtain:
At(x1, x2) ≡ (x1 = robot ∧ x2 = hallway ∨ x1 = cup1 ∧ x2 = hallway ∨
x1 = cup2 ∧ x2 = kitchen)
Holding(x1) ≡ (x1 = cup1)
Portable(x1) ≡ (x1 = cup1 ∨ x1 = cup2)
Nextto(x1, x2) ≡ (x1 = officeann ∧ x2 = hallway ∨ x1 = officebob ∧ x2 = hallway ∨
x1 = kitchen ∧ x2 = hallway)
Robot(x) ≡ (x = robot)
Location(x) ≡ (x = officeann ∨ x = officebob ∨ x = kitchen ∨ x = hallway)
Cup(x) ≡ (x = cup1 ∨ x = cup2)
Letter(x) ≡ ⊥
Physob(x) ≡ (Robot(x) ∨ Cup(x) ∨ Letter(x))
Object(x) ≡ (Location(x) ∨ Robot(x) ∨ Cup(x) ∨ Letter(x))
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The Precondition Axiom
In order to construct a precondition axiom, we basically use the simple solution to the qualifi-
cation problem as discussed in Section 3.3.1. That is to say that for the precondition formula
pij of each of the operators ωj = 〈gj , $j , pij , j〉 ∈ A we assume a necessary precondition axiom:
Poss(a) ⊃ ∃~yj:~τgj . a = gj(~yj) ∧ pij(4.21)
Next, we make the completeness assumption that these axioms represent all the necessary and
sufficient conditions for an action to be executable, yielding
pi
def
=
∨
1≤j≤n
∃~yj:~τgj . a = gj(~yj) ∧ pij .(4.22)
The single precondition axiom of our basic action theory then is
Mappre(A) = {Poss(a) ≡ pi}.(4.23)
Example 4.16. For the domain and problem given in Example 4.7, we obtain:
Poss(a) ≡
∃y : Physob (a = pickup(y) ∧ ∃x : Location. At(robot , x) ∧At(y, x) ∧ Portable(y)
∧ ¬∃x′Holding(x′)) ∨
∃y : Physob (a = putdown(y) ∧Holding(y)) ∨
∃y1 : Location∃y2 : Location (At(robot , y1) ∧ (Nextto(y1, y2) ∨Nextto(y2, y1)))
The Successor State Axioms
Similarly, the successor state axioms are almost identically constructed as in Reiter’s solution
to the frame problem (cf. Section 3.3.2). First, for each fluent predicate Fi:~τFi ∈ F, we collect
all its positive and negative effects from all operators in A:
γ+Fi
def
=
∨
(∀~xi:~τFi . γ+Fi,gj⇒Fi(~xi))∈ j
∃~yj .a = gj(~yj) ∧ γ+Fi,gj(4.24)
γ−Fi
def
=
∨
(∀~xi:~τFi . γ−Fi,gj⇒¬Fi(~xi))∈ j
∃~yj .a = gj(~yj) ∧ γ−Fi,gj(4.25)
The set Mappost(F, A) then consists of one successor state axiom of the form
[a]Fi(~xi) ≡ γ+Fi ∧ ~τFi(~xi) ∨ Fi(~xi) ∧ ¬γ−Fi(4.26)
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for each of the Fi. Note that the only difference to Reiter’s SSAs is that we have the additional
requirement that Fi’s type constraints have to be met by the ~xi in order for Fi(~xi) to become
true.
Example 4.17. For the domain and problem given in Example 4.7, we obtain:
γ+At = ∃y1 : Location ∃y2 : Location (a = goto(y1, y2) ∧ x1 = robot ∧ x2 = y2) ∨
∃y1 : Location ∃y2 : Location (a = goto(y1, y2) ∧Holding(x1) ∧ x2 = y2)
γ−At = ∃y1 : Location ∃y2 : Location (a = goto(y1, y2) ∧ x1 = robot ∧ x2 = y1) ∨
∃y1 : Location ∃y2 : Location (a = goto(y1, y2) ∧Holding(x1) ∧ x2 = y1)
γ+Holding = ∃y : Physob (a = pickup(y) ∧ x = y)
γ−Holding = ∃y : Physob (a = putdown(y) ∧ x = y)
γ+Portable = γ
−
Portable = γ
+
Nextto = γ
−
Nextto = ⊥
With simplification, the successor state axioms thus are:
[a]At(x1, x2) ≡
∃y1 : Location ∃y2 : Location (a = goto(y1, y2) ∧
(x1 = robot ∨Holding(x1)) ∧ x2 = y2) ∧ Physob(x1) ∧ Location(x2) ∨
At(x1, x2) ∧ ¬(∃y1 : Location ∃y2 : Location (a = goto(y1, y2) ∧
(x1 = robot ∨Holding(x1)) ∧ x2 = y1))
[a]Holding(x1) ≡
∃y : Physob(a = pickup(y) ∧ x = y) ∧ Physob(x1) ∨
Holding(x1) ∧ ¬(∃y : Physob(a = putdown(y) ∧ x = y))
[a]Portable(x1) ≡ Portable(x1)
[a]Nextto(x1, x2) ≡ Nextto(x1, x2)
4.2.4 Correctness
The first observation is that the above constructed theory is indeed of the right form to be a
basic action theory:
Lemma 4.18. Let P be an ADL problem. Then Map(P) is a basic action theory with respect
to 〈D,F〉 = 〈{Poss}, {F1, . . . , Fn}〉.
The next lemma shows that Map0 correctly captures the ADL problem’s typing information:
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Lemma 4.19. Let S be an ADL state with respect to 〈T, E, O, F〉, τ ∈ T be a type, n be any
standard name, and w any world such that w |= Map0(T, E, O, F, S). Then
n ∈ |τ |(T, E, O) iff w |= τ(n)
Proof. We distinguish the three cases of Definition 4.8:
• τ = τi ∈ T is primitive:
n ∈ |τ |(T, E, O)
iff (n:τ) ∈ O (by Definition 4.8)
iff n is among the oij in (4.18) (by assumption)
iff w |= τ(n) (since w |= (4.18))
• τ = τi is compound with (τi:(either τi1 · · · τiki )) ∈ E:
n ∈ |τ |(T, E, O)
iff n ∈ |τi1 |(T, E, O) or · · · or n ∈ |τiki |(T, E, O) (by Definition 4.8)
iff w |= τi1(n) or · · · or w |= τiki (n) (by the first item)
iff w |= (τi1(n) ∨ · · · ∨ τiki (n)) (by the ES semantics)
iff w |= τ(n) (since w |= (4.19))
• τ = Object and Object is not primitive:
n ∈ |Object |(T, E, O)
iff (n:τ ′) ∈ O for some primitive τ ′ ∈ T (by Definition 4.8)
iff w |= τ ′(n) for some primitive τ ′ ∈ T (as in the first item)
iff w |= Object(n) (since w |= (4.20))
Furthermore, Map0 ensures that the truth of static formulas corresponds to that of the original
ADL state:
Lemma 4.20. Let S be an ADL state with respect to 〈T, E, O, F〉, φ be a precondition formula
with respect to 〈T, E, O, F, ∅〉, and w any world such that w |= Map0(T, E, O, F, S). Then
S |= φ iff w |= φ.
Proof. The proof is by induction over the structure of φ:
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• φ = Fi(~c):
S |= Fi(~c)
iff Fi(~c) ∈ S (by the ADL semantics)
iff ~c is one of the ~oj in (4.17) (by assumption)
iff w |= Fi(~c) (since w |= (4.17))
• φ = (c1 = c2):
S |= (c1 = c2)
iff c1 and c2 are identical (by the ADL semantics)
iff w |= (c1 = c2) (by the ES semantics)
• φ = φ1 ∧ φ2:
S |= φ1 ∧ φ2
iff S |= φ1 and S |= φ2 (by the ADL semantics)
iff w |= φ1 and w |= φ2 (by induction)
iff w |= φ1 ∧ φ2 (by the ES semantics)
• φ = ¬φ′:
S |= ¬φ′
iff S 6|= φ′ (by the ADL semantics)
iff w 6|= φ′ (by induction)
iff w |= ¬φ′ (by the ES semantics)
• φ = ∀x:τ.φ′:
S |= ∀x:τ.φ′
iff S |= ∧o∈|τ |(T,E,O) φ′xo (by the ADL semantics)
iff S |= φ′xo for all o ∈ |τ |(T, E, O) (by the ADL semantics)
iff w |= φ′xo for all o ∈ |τ |(T, E, O) (by induction)
iff w |= φ′xo for all o such that w |= τ(o) (by Lemma 4.19)
iff w |= ∀x.τ(x) ⊃ φ′ (by the ES syntax and semantics)
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We proceed to the central lemma of this section, showing that the BAT given by Map induces
the same truth values for fluent atoms in the successor situation as the corresponding update
to the ADL state:
Lemma 4.21. Let
1. D = 〈T, E, OD, F, A〉 be an ADL domain;
2. P = 〈D, OP, I, G〉 be an ADL problem;
3. Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost = Map(P);
4. gr(~o) be a ground action with respect to some operator ωr = 〈$r, pir, r〉 ∈ A;
5. I′ be the state update for I with respect to gr(~o);
6. and w be any world such that w |= Σ.
Then
w |= [p]Fi(~n) iff Fi(~n) ∈ I′.
Proof.
w |= [p]Fi(~n)
iff w[Fi(~n), p] = 1 (by the ES semantics)
iff w |= γFi~xi a~n p (since w |= Σpost by assumption)
iff w |= γFi~xi a~n gr(~o) (since p = |gr(~o)|
〈〉
w by assumption)
iff w |= (γ+Fi)
~xi a
~n gr(~o)
∧ ~τFi(~n) ∨ Fi(~n) ∧ ¬(γ−Fi)
~xi a
~n gr(~o)
(by the definition of γFi as in (4.26))
iff w |= (γ+Fi)
~xi a
~n gr(~o)
and w |= ~τFi(~n) or w |= Fi(~n) and w 6|= (γ−Fi)
~xi a
~n gr(~o)
(by the ES semantics)
iff w |= ∨ ∃~yj .gr(~o) = gj(~yj) ∧ (γ+Fi,gj )~xi~n and w |= ~τFi(~n)
or w |= Fi(~n) and w 6|=
∨ ∃~yj .gr(~o) = gj(~yj) ∧ (γ−Fi,gj )~xi~n
where the first disjunction ranges over all the positive effects (∀~xi:~τFi . γ+Fi,gj ⇒ Fi(~xi))
and the second one over all the negative effects (∀~xi:~τFi . γ−Fi,gj ⇒ ¬Fi(~xi))
(by the definitions of γ+Fi and γ
−
Fi
in (4.24) and (4.25), respectively)
iff (∀~xi:~τFi . γ+Fi,gr ⇒ Fi(~xi)) ∈ r s.t. w |= (γ+Fi,gr)
~xi ~yr
~n ~o and w |= ~τFi(~n)
or w |= Fi(~n) and
for all (∀~xi:~τFi . γ−Fi,gr ⇒ ¬Fi(~xi)) ∈ r, w 6|= (γ−Fi,gr)
~xi ~yr
~n ~o
(by unique names for actions)
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iff (∀~xi:~τFi . γ+Fi,gr ⇒ Fi(~xi)) ∈ r s.t. I |= (γ+Fi,gr)
~xi ~yr
~n ~o and ~n ∈ |~τFi |(T, E, O)
or Fi(~n) ∈ I and
for all (∀~xi:~τFi . γ−Fi,gr ⇒ ¬Fi(~xi)) ∈ r, I 6|= (γ−Fi,gr)
~xi ~yr
~n ~o
(by Lemmas 4.19 and 4.20 and the ADL semantics)
iff (∀~xi:~τFi . γ+Fi,gr ⇒ Fi(~xi)) ∈ r s.t. I |= (γ+Fi,gr)
~xi ~yr
~n ~o and ~n ∈ |~τFi |(T, E, O)
or Fi(~n) ∈ I and ~n ∈ |~τFi |(T, E, O) and
for all (∀~xi:~τFi . γ−Fi,gr ⇒ ¬Fi(~xi)) ∈ r, I 6|= (γ−Fi,gr)
~xi ~yr
~n ~o
(since Fi(~n) ∈ I implies ~n ∈ |~τFi |(T, E, O) according to Definition 4.9)
iff Fi(~n) ∈ Adds or Fi(~n) ∈ I and Fi(~n) 6∈ Dels (by (4.11) and (4.12))
iff Fi(~n) ∈ I′ (by (4.13))
Finally, we have everything at hand for our main theorem: That indeed the updated ADL state
corresponds to the progression of the basic action theory Map(P):
Theorem 4.22. Let
1. D = 〈T, E, OD, F, A〉 be an ADL domain;
2. P = 〈D, OP, I, G〉 be an ADL problem;
3. Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost = Map(P);
4. gr(~o) be a ground action with respect to some operator ωr ∈ A;
5. and I′ be the state update for I with respect to gr(~o).
Let further Σ′0 denote Map0(T, E, OD ∪ OP, F, I′). Then Σ′0 is a progression of Σ0 through gr(~o)
with respect to Σdef ∪ Σpost.
Proof. By Lemma 4.18, Σ′0∪Σdef∪Σpost is a basic action theory, which means that Σ′0 is a set of
fluent sentences, and hence has the right form for a progression. According to Definition 3.37,
we are left to show that for any world w′, w′ |= Σ′0 iff there is a world w such that w |= Σ and
w′Σ = wp, where p = |gr(~o)|〈〉w .
“⇐”: Let w |= Σ, w′Σ = wp, and p = |gr(~p)|〈〉w . We have to show that w′ |= Σ′0.
• w′ |= (4.17) (constructed using I′):
w′ |= Fi(~c)
iff w′[Fi(~c), 〈〉] = 1 (by the ES semantics)
iff w′Σ[Fi(~c), 〈〉] = 1 (by Definition 3.31)
4.2 The ADL Fragment 137
iff wp[Fi(~c), 〈〉] = 1 (by assumption)
iff w[Fi(~c), p] = 1 (by Definition 3.35)
iff Fi(~c) ∈ I′ (by Lemma 4.21)
• w′ |= (4.18):
w′ |= τi(c)
iff w′[τi(c), 〈〉] = 1 (by the ES semantics)
iff w′Σ[τi(c), 〈〉] = 1 (by Definition 3.31)
iff wp[τi(c), 〈〉] = 1 (by assumption)
iff w[τi(c), p] = 1 (by Definition 3.35)
iff w[τi(c), 〈〉] = 1 (by the rigidity constraint)
iff w |= τi(c) (by the ES semantics)
iff c is among the oij in (4.18) (since w |= (4.18) by assumption)
• w′ |= (4.19):
w′ |= τi(c)
iff w |= τi(c) (as above)
iff w |= τij (c) for one of the τij (since w |= (4.19) by assumption)
iff w′ |= τij (c) for one of the τij (again as above, in reverse order)
• w′ |= (4.20):
w′ |= Object(c)
iff w |= Object(c) (as above)
iff w |= τj(c) for some prim. τj ∈ T (since w |= (4.20) by assumption)
iff w′ |= τj(c) for some prim. τj ∈ T (again as above, in reverse order)
“⇒”: Let w′ |= Σ′0. We construct w as follows. First let w′′ be a world such that for all the Fi
and all ~n,
w′′[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = 1 iff Fi(~n) ∈ I(4.27)
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and for all the τi and all n,
w′′[τi(n), 〈〉] =

1, if τi ∈ T is primitive and (n:τi) ∈ O
1, if (τi:(either τi1 · · · τiki )) ∈ E and
(n:τij ) ∈ O for some j with 1 ≤ j ≤ ki
1, if τi = Object and (n:τj) ∈ O for some j
0, else
(4.28)
For all other predicates, let
w′′[P (~n), p · z] = w′[P (~n), z],(4.29)
and similarly for all primitive terms,
w′′[t, p · z] = w′[t, z].(4.30)
Now let w be w′′Σ. We have to show that w |= Σ and wp = w′Σ. For the former, note that we get
w′′ |= (4.17), w′′ |= (4.18), w′′ |= (4.19) and w′′ |= (4.20) (the latter only case that Object is not
primitive) immediately by the construction above. Hence w′′ |= Σ0, and therefore by Lemma
3.32 (2), w |= Σ. It remains to be proven that wp = w′Σ, meaning that for all primitive formulas
β and all primitive terms t,
wp[β, z] = w
′
Σ[β, z](4.31)
wp[t, z] = w
′
Σ[t, z](4.32)
Since we do not use any functional fluents here, the primitive terms can be handled quickly as
follows:
wp[t, z]
= w[t, p · z] (by Definition 3.35)
= w′′[t, p · z] (by Definition 3.31, since no functional fluents in D ∪ F)
= w′[t, z] (by assumption (4.30))
= w′Σ[t, z] (again by Definition 3.31)
As an immediate consequence we get that for any ground term t,
|t|zwp = |t|zw′Σ .(4.33)
Furthermore, in the exact same manner as for the primitive terms, we can prove wp[P (~n), z] =
w′Σ[P (~n), z] for all primitive formulas that involve predicates P 6∈ D ∪ F ∪ {τ1, . . . , τk,Object}.
The types τ , including Object , can be treated as follows:
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wp[τ(n), z] = 1
iff w[τ(n), p · z] = 1 (by Definition 3.35)
iff w[τ(n), 〈〉] = 1 (by the rigidity constraint)
iff n ∈ |τ |(T, E, O) (by Lemma 4.19)
iff w′Σ[τ(n), 〈〉] = 1 (by Lemma 4.19)
iff w′Σ[τ(n), z] = 1 (by the rigidity constraint)
It remains to be shown that wp and w
′
Σ agree on all primitive formulas involving one of the Fi
or Poss. For this matter, we prove a more general property, namely that for any fluent sentence
φ with respect to 〈D,F〉,
wp, z |= φ iff w′Σ, z |= φ.(4.34)
The proposition to be proven then corresponds to the special case where φ = Fi(~n). The proof
is by an outer induction on the length of z, and a sub-induction on the structure of φ. Note that
below the distinction between the case z = 〈〉 and the case z = z′ · p′ for the outer induction
is only necessary for φ = Fi(~t). For all the other constructs and symbols, the two cases can be
proven identically.
• φ = Fi(t1, . . . , tmi), Fi ∈ F , case z = 〈〉:
wp, 〈〉 |= Fi(t1, . . . , tmi)
iff wp[Fi(n1, . . . , nmi), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉wp (by the ES semantics)
iff wp[Fi(n1, . . . , nmi), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by (4.33))
iff w[Fi(n1, . . . , nmi), p] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by Definition 3.35)
iff Fi(n1, . . . , nmi) ∈ I′, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by Lemma 4.21)
iff w′[Fi(n1, . . . , nmi), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (since w
′ |= (4.17))
iff w′Σ[Fi(n1, . . . , nmi), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff w′Σ |= Fi(t1, . . . , tmi) (by the ES semantics)
• φ = Fi(t1, . . . , tmi), Fi ∈ F , case z = z′ · p′:
wp, z |= Fi(~t)
iff wp[Fi(~n), z
′ · p′] = 1, where ~n = |~t|z′·p′wp (by the ES semantics)
iff wp[Fi(~n), z
′ · p′] = 1, where ~n = |~t|z′·p′
w′Σ
(by (4.33))
iff w[Fi(~n), p · z′ · p′] = 1, where ~n = |~t|z
′·p′
w′Σ
(by Definition 3.35)
140 4 PLANNING IN GOLOG
iff w, p · z′ |= (γFi)~xi a~n p′ , where ~n = |~t|z
′·p′
w′Σ
(since w |= Σpost)
iff wp, z
′ |= (γFi)~xi a~n p′ , where ~n = |~t|z
′·p′
w′Σ
(by Lemma 3.36 (2))
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= (γFi)~xi a~n p′ , where ~n = |~t|z
′·p′
w′Σ
(by the outer induction)
iff w′Σ[Fi(~n), z
′ · p′] = 1, where ~n = |~t|z′·p′
w′Σ
(since w′Σ |= Σpost)
iff w′Σ |= Fi(~t) (by the ES semantics)
• φ = G(t1, . . . , tk), G rigid:
wp, z |= G(t1, . . . , tk)
iff wp[G(n1, . . . , nk), z] = 1, where nj = |tj |zwp (by the ES semantics)
iff wp[G(n1, . . . , nk), z] = 1, where nj = |tj |zw′Σ (by (4.33))
iff w′Σ[G(n1, . . . , nk), z] = 1, where nj = |tj |zw′Σ (see below)
iff w′Σ, z |= G(t1, . . . , tk) (by the ES semantics)
In the third step we made use of the fact that the proposition (4.31) has already been
proven further above for all primitive formulas β involving types τ or some predicate
P 6∈ D ∪ F ∪ {τ1, . . . , τk,Object}.
• φ = (t1 = t2):
wp, z |= (t1 = t2)
iff |t1|zwp = |t2|zwp (by the ES semantics)
iff |t1|zw′Σ = |t2|
z
w′Σ
(by (4.33))
iff w′Σ, z |= (t1 = t2) (by the ES semantics)
• φ = φ1 ∧ φ2:
wp, z |= φ1 ∧ φ2
iff wp, z |= φ1 and wp, z |= φ2 (by the ES semantics)
iff w′Σ, z |= φ1 and w′Σ, z |= φ2 (by induction)
iff w′Σ, z |= φ1 ∧ φ2 (by the ES semantics)
• φ = ¬φ′:
wp, z |= ¬φ′
iff wp, z 6|= φ′ (by the ES semantics)
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iff w′Σ, z 6|= φ′ (by induction)
iff w′Σ |= ¬φ′ (by the ES semantics)
• φ = ∀xφ′:
wp, z |= ∀xφ′
iff wp, z |= φ′xn for all n ∈ Nx (by the ES semantics)
iff w′Σ, z |= φ′xn for all n ∈ Nx (by induction)
iff w′Σ, z |= ∀xφ′ (by the ES semantics)
Finally, we show that (4.31) also holds for primitive formulas with Poss:
wp[Poss(n), z] = 1
iff w[Poss(n), p · z] = 1 (by Definition 3.35)
iff w, p · z |= ϕPoss an (since w |= Σdef by assumption)
iff wp, z |= ϕPoss an (by Lemma 3.36 (2))
iff w′Σ, z |= ϕPoss an (by (4.34))
iff w′Σ[Poss(n), z] = 1 (since w
′
Σ |= Σdef by Lemma 3.32 (2))
We note that the above result also implies that executability and validity of plans is preserved
by our mapping:
Corollary 4.23. Let P = 〈gj1(~o1), . . . , gjk(~ok)〉 be an ADL plan for the problem P. Then
P is executable iff Map(P) |= [gj1(~o1)] · · · [gjl(~ol)]Poss(gjl+1(~ol+1)) for all l with 0 ≤ l < k
P is valid iff Map(P) |= [gj1(~o1)] · · · [gjk(~ok)]G
Proof. Obvious from Definition 4.13, Lemma 4.20, and Theorems 3.38 and 4.22.
Example 4.24. The following sentences comprise a progression of the initial theory given in
Example 4.15 through goto(hallway , officeann) with respect to the precondition axiom presented
in Example 4.16 and the successor state axioms shown in Example 4.17:
At(x1, x2) ≡ (x1 = robot ∧ x2 = officeann ∨ x1 = cup1 ∧ x2 = officeann ∨
x1 = cup2 ∧ x2 = kitchen)
Holding(x1) ≡ (x1 = cup1)
Portable(x1) ≡ (x1 = cup1 ∨ x1 = cup2)
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Nextto(x1, x2) ≡ (x1 = officeann ∧ x2 = hallway ∨ x1 = officebob ∧ x2 = hallway ∨
x1 = kitchen ∧ x2 = hallway)
Robot(x) ≡ (x = robot)
Location(x) ≡ (x = officeann ∨ x = officebob ∨ x = kitchen ∨ x = hallway)
Cup(x) ≡ (x = cup1 ∨ x = cup2)
Letter(x) ≡ ⊥
Physob(x) ≡ (Robot(x) ∨ Cup(x) ∨ Letter(x))
Object(x) ≡ (Location(x) ∨ Robot(x) ∨ Cup(x) ∨ Letter(x))
4.2.5 Expressivity
As mentioned earlier, while the above presented mapping is useful in that it can be seen as
a declarative semantics for PDDL expressed in ES, embedding PDDL planners into Golog
actually requires to translate in the other direction. Our approach is to assume that the involved
axioms in the basic action theory Σ are of a form that could result as the output of the Map
operation, and then simply take the inverse of Map to translate a planning subproblem in
Golog to a corresponding PDDL problem instance admitting the same plans. However, it is
not guaranteed that we thus cover the largest possible class of translatable action theories. For
this purpose, it is also necessary to consider possible translations in the backward direction,
and develop a deeper understanding of how the two formalisms relate in terms of expressivity.
Nebel’s compilation scheme framework [Neb00], which he uses to compare different subsets
of propositional ADL, provides a means to analyze the expressivity of planning formalisms in a
formal manner. The underlying idea is to measure the relative expressiveness of two formalisms
considering possible compilations of one into the other. As opposed to polynomial many-one
reductions as they are often used in complexity theory, it is not required that the compilation is
carried out in polynomial time, but can indeed use arbitrary computational resources. However,
the result should be expressible in polynomial space. Moreover, another requirement is that
the compilation works only on the domain description (i.e. operators and symbols), but is
independent of the individual instance (i.e. initial state and goal). Of course, compilations have
to be solution preserving, i.e. there is a plan for the original task iff there is a plan for the result
task. The relative expressivity of two planning formalisms is then measured in terms of the
length of the generated plans. If it is possible to come up with a compilation scheme where the
size of the shortest plan for the result task is bounded linearly by the size of an optimal plan for
the source task, it is concluded that the target formalism is at least as expressive as the source
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formalism. Otherwise, if plans necessarily have to grow faster than linear, the source formalism
is more expressive.
Based on earlier work [ENLC06], Ro¨ger et al. [RN07, RHN08] analyzed the relative expres-
siveness between basic action theories of the classical Situation Calculus and the ADL fragment
of PDDL. It turned out that compilation schemes always directly provide a polynomial-time
translation to PDDL and that the resulting plans can directly be interpreted as solution sit-
uations for the source task. They then identified a maximal subset of BATs that has equal
expressiveness as the ADL fragment, and that is given by those action theories that provide
full information on the initial state in an explicit (non-compact) form. More precisely, the cor-
responding class of BATs can roughly be characterized as those whose initial theory consists of
exactly the following:
1. For each relational fluent and rigid predicate F , an expression of the form
F (x1, . . . , xn, S0) ≡ (x1 = c11 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = c1n ∨ · · · ∨ x1 = cm1 ∧ · · · cmn);
2. a similar expression for each function except constants and action functions with object
arguments;
3. unique names axioms ci 6= cj for each pair ci, cj of distinct constants;
4. optionally, a domain closure axiom of the form
∀x. x = c1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = ck.
That is to say that no incomplete knowledge whatsoever is allowed in the initial theory of the
BAT, but the initial instances of fluents and rigids have to be enumerated explicitly. Con-
sequently, even the presence of a single unary fluent with an unknown initial value lifts the
corresponding BAT beyond what the expressiveness of PDDL’s ADL fragment. For a simi-
lar reason, functions may not be used in a way that they introduce new (unnamed) objects.
Furthermore, since in the classical Situation Calculus, distinct constants may refer to the same
individual, which is not possible in PDDL, unique name axioms are required. Interestingly, the
domain closure axiom may be omitted, although PDDL makes the domain closure assumption,
whereas the Situation Calculus in general does not. The reason is that the other requirements
on the initial database are so restrictive that unmentioned objects in the action theory have only
a minor influence on possible plans. Indeed, similar to the Universal Generalization principle
presented in Section 3.2.3 or the Representation Theorem discussed in Section 3.5.3, all unmen-
tioned objects can be treated interchangeably, and thus only models with up to k additional
objects have to be considered, where k is the maximal number of nested quantifiers.
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Considering the form of initial theory axioms (4.17) to (4.20) as given in Section 4.2.3, it
becomes apparent that our Map operation yields a very close, though not exact approximation of
the set of translatable BATs. Obviously, support for rigid predicates and functional fluents can
be added in a straight-forward manner by simulating them through relational fluents. Moreover,
as long as we resort to standard names instead of constant symbols, unique names axioms are of
course unnecessary. The most convenient fact for the embedding of PDDL planners into Golog
is that we do not have to worry about the domain closure assumption. Note that the above
stated domain closure axiom is unsatisfiable in ES, and that we instead ensured finite domains
by resorting to typed quantification in preconditions and conditional effects. It follows from
the above that we do not have to enforce this special form of quantification when translating to
PDDL as long as it is ensured that the agent possesses complete knowledge about all fluents
and rigids involved in a planning subtask.
4.3 Evaluation
The previously presented theoretical results provide insights on the semantical compatibility
between Golog and PDDL and how they compare in terms of expressiveness. In this section,
we complement these results with an empirical evaluation that shows that equipping a Golog
system with a PDDL planner pays off in terms of the runtime performance of the overall system.
For that matter, we study a number of example application domains and compare the needed
computation times for varying problem sizes and difficulties.
4.3.1 Embedding PDDL Planning into Golog
IndiGolog
Out of the many Golog variants that were discussed in Section 2.1 and among those formally
defined in Section 3.6, we chose to use an implementation of IndiGolog [GLLS04]. The latter
possesses a number of features that makes it particularly suited for many practical scenarios.
First, it works in cases where agents only have incomplete knowledge about the state of the
world, and where sensing actions can and most often have to be used in order to gather further
information that is required to fulfill the task. Furthermore, so-called exogenous actions reflect
changes in a dynamic environment that are not caused by an action of the agent.
Moreover, an important aspect about the language is that programs are executed in an
incremental, online manner. Unlike in the original Golog, where the system searches for an
action sequence that constitutes a legal execution of the entire input program, IndiGolog does
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not apply a general lookahead, but leaves it to the programmer to explicitly state which parts
of the program ought to be solved by means of search so that the system puts its computational
effort where it is actually needed.
For our experimental results, we resorted to a Prolog implementation of an IndiGolog
agent system developed and maintained by Sebastian Sardin˜a and Stavros Vassos, and that is
based on code originally written by Hector Levesque and Maurice Pagnucco. The framework is
available on Sourceforge2 under an Open Source license.
The FF PDDL Planner
The FF3 planning system developed by Hoffmann [HN01] is a fully automated system for
classical planning that supports the full ADL fragment of PDDL. It has proven its quality by
winning the automated track of the planning competition in 2000 and being used as the basis
for many state-of-the-art planners that have been developed later on.
FF performs a forward search in the state space, guided by a heuristic function that is
automatically extracted from the domain description. The heuristic gets derived from the
corresponding relaxed planning task that results from the original one by ignoring the delete
effects of the actions. This relaxed task can be solved in polynomial time and the number of
actions in the resulting plan provides an estimate for the goal distance in the original task.
Furthermore, the relaxed task is used to identify so-called helpful actions that are expected to
be a good choice for the next action and which hence are considered first during search. The
search method used by the FF system is a variant of hill-climbing called enforced hill climbing.
The main difference to the standard algorithm is that in the case of a plateau it switches to
best first search until a node with a strictly better evaluation is found.
The Integration
For the integration, we implemented the previously mentioned idea that whenever a planning
subproblem arises during the execution of a Golog program, it is translated into PDDL and
the planner is called. The resulting plan is translated back and Golog resumes executing that
plan.
In order to formalize planning subproblems, we use a special form of the achieve operator
that takes a goal formula and a list of operators to be used as arguments. In terms of the
2http://sourceforge.net/projects/indigolog/
3http://fai.cs.uni-saarland.de/hoffmann/ff.html
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IndiGolog constructs presented in Section 3.6.3, it is semantically defined as follows:
solve(φ, [g1, . . . , gk])
def
= Σ( while ¬φ do pia [(a ∈ [g1, . . . , gk])?; a] endWhile )
Note that due to the fact that IndiGolog executes programs online by default, we need the
search operator Σ here in order to tell the interpreter that it indeed has to apply lookahead
to find a suitable execution sequence before it starts to execute any actions. In place of the
Appropriate(a) condition we simply have the requirement that the actions of the plan are chosen
from the provided list:
a ∈ [g1, . . . , gk] def=
∨
j
∃~yj :~τgj . a = gj(~yj).
To compare the performance of the combined system against pure Golog, we considered
two different implementations of solve. In one, the task is translated into a PDDL planning
problem, which is then referred to FF. The other uses an internal lookahead mechanism of
IndiGolog that solves planning problems by means of a (blind) iterative deepening search.
Both planners were of course provided with the same amount of information: a list of
available actions, the fluent predicates involved (including their initial values) as well as the
types of objects, fluent parameters and action parameters. Whereas the internal method directly
uses the appropriate part of the Golog domain axiomatization, FF is given the corresponding
PDDL translation as described earlier.
Since PDDL makes the closed-world assumption, we have the requirement that whenever a
planning subtask is to be executed, the agent possesses complete information about all necessary
fluents. For two reasons, this restriction is not as harsh as it may seem at first glance. On the
one hand, it only applies to the fluents that are part of the planning subproblem, i.e. those that
are mentioned in preconditions and effects of actions listed in the solve statement. This means
that we really only make a local closed-world assumption [EGW97] within the context of the
planning task, and that the agent may still be ignorant about other aspects of its environment.
On the other hand, the values of the involved fluents may even be unknown to the agent at times,
as long as it acquires the necessary information “just in time” before calling the planner. Thus,
for the epistemic feasibility of our programs, it is sufficient to make a dynamic closed-world
assumption [GLS01].
4.3.2 Experiments and Results
For the evaluation, we designed three example application domains. The first one is a logistics
scenario in which trucks have to be used in order to transport packages between locations. In
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the second domain, Golog is used to implement an elevator control. The third domain is a
variant of our running office robot example where it is the task of the robot to transport letters
between the workers’ offices.
While the first two examples are inspired by similar domains used in the International
Planning Competition, all three application scenarios go beyond what can be done with classical,
sequential planning. This is either due to dynamic changes happening during the execution of
plans, or because of the agent having to gather information at runtime by means of sensing.
The details will be discussed below.
For our experiments, we have extended the IndiGolog framework by a simple simulator
that plays the role of the outside world. It runs in a separate instance of Prolog and com-
municates with Golog via TCP/IP sockets. The basic idea is to keep track of the (relevant
part of the) world state using Prolog’s assert and retract mechanism. When an exogenous
action occurs and what sensing result is returned after the execution of an action can then be
defined as conditions with respect to the simulated state. All experiments were performed on a
PC with an Intel Core 2 Duo E6750 CPU running at 2.66 GHz with 2 GB of memory.
Logistics Domain
The first domain that we studied serves as a representative for all kinds of
logistics applications. The task is to transport packages to their destination
locations, using a number of trucks which can only hold one package at
a time. The direct connections between locations form a (not necessarily
complete) graph structure. The domain has the dynamic aspect that new
packages keep arriving at runtime, represented by exogenous actions, and
have to be picked up and delivered in turn.
In the logistics domain, we defined a control program using prioritized interrupts:
proc mainControl
〈 UndeliveredPackages → deliverPackages 〉 〉〉 〈 ¬ Finished → wait 〉
endProc
The program is to be understood as follows. In each cycle of the (implicit) main loop, if there
are packages that have not yet been delivered compute a plan to deliver them and execute it.
If this is not the case but execution is not yet finished, do nothing for one cycle. Otherwise
terminate.
Here, Finished is a fluent that serves as a flag for signalling when program execution is sup-
posed to halt. This is necessary in order to be able to perform finite experiments for a task that
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is indeed open-ended: While delivering the currently pending packages, new delivery requests
keep arriving, each of which being modelled by an exogenous action new package(p,l,d) that
sets the current location of package p to l and its destination to d. Since the system does not
know in advance when and how many new package arrivals will occur, a special exogenous action
no more packages is used to set Finished to > after the last new package event indicating that
the experiment ends at this point. The condition UndeliveredPackages is used to test whether
there are still packages to be delivered:
UndeliveredPackages
def
=
∃p : Package ∃l : Location ∃d : Location. At(p, l) ∧Destination(p, d) ∧ (l 6= d)
The deliverPackages procedure is the part where planning comes into play:
proc deliverPackages
solve( ∀p : Package ∀d : Location. Destination(p, d) ⊃ At(p, d),
[load,unload,drive] )
endProc
For both of the planners, we considered two variants. In the first one, once a plan is found
it gets executed entirely. Packages arriving during that time are ignored until plan execution
finishes and the next call to the planner is made. In the other variant, the system aborts the
current plan and performs a re-planning after each new package event. The latter is obtained
by nesting planning instances δ = solve(φ, [g1, . . . , gk]) within the Γ(α, δ) construct for guarded
execution introduced in Section 3.6.3, where α expresses the condition that a new package has
just arrived.
We performed a series of experiments where the number of locations varied between 3 to
7, the number of trucks between 2 and 3 and the number of dynamically arriving packages
among 3 and 5. For each combination, we created 10 different domain instances. The initial
locations of trucks and packages as well as the destinations of the packages are chosen randomly.
Two locations are connected with a probability of 50%; additional random edges ensure that
the roadmap graph forms a single connected component. In each instance, there is one initial
package, and the intervals between the arrival times of new packages vary between 2 and 8
steps, where one step corresponds to the execution of a primitive, non-exogenous action.
For each planner variant and domain instance we measured the overall runtime of the system
and the number of steps (minus the number of wait actions) that were taken until termination.
Runs that did not terminate within 300 seconds were aborted. The runtime includes a wait in-
terval of 0.5 seconds after each executed action which was reserved to handle the communication
with and the state update of the simulator.
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Figure 4.5: Logistics: Median runtimes in seconds
Table 4.1 on page 158 summarizes the results of the experiments. The columns titled
“solved” shows how many of the 10 instances were solved within the time limit by each method.
Here, “P” refers to the variant where FF was used for planning while “G” means that the
internal Golog planning mechanism was used. Further “R” means the variant where instant
re-planning was done after the arrival of a new request and “N” the one where the current
plan was not immediately aborted. The median runtimes for each combination are given in the
columns titled “times” and are moreover shown graphically in Figure 4.5, using a logarithmic
scale. In those cases where the run did not finish within the timeout the value is set to the
maximal time of 300 seconds. The columns titled “steps” contains the median number of steps
that were taken, considering only instances that were solved by all methods.
The results clearly show that using FF instead of the internal planner has a large impact on
the necessary computation time of the system, letting it solve instances within seconds which
otherwise would require several minutes. Although FF is a satisficing planner, which means
that it may return suboptimal plans in terms of plan length, the number of steps required by
the combined system is only slightly higher than when the internal planner is used, where the
latter is guaranteed to find optimal plans due to its iterative deepening strategy.
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Elevator Domain
The second test domain has been inspired by the miconic elevator domains
of the International Planning Competition in 2000. There is an elevator
moving between the floors of a building. At some floors passengers are
waiting and should be transported to their respective destination floor.
During the program execution new passengers arrive randomly.
There are three sorts of actions that can be used to serve the passengers:
Movement actions move the elevator from one floor to an adjacent floor.
Since an elevator can move faster if it does not have to stop at each floor, there are also actions
for fast movements that overcome two floors within one step. The third sort of actions are the
stop actions which cause all passengers waiting at the current floor to enter the elevator and
drop off all boarded passengers whose destination is the current floor. The experimental setting
for the elevator domain is analogous to the one of the logistics domain and uses the following
main program:
proc mainControl
〈 UnservedPassengers → servePassengers 〉 〉〉 〈 ¬ Finished → wait 〉
endProc
Planning is used to serve the passengers that have not reached their destination yet:
proc servePassengers
solve(∀p : Passenger . Served(p), [move fast,move,stop] )
endProc
Again, we tested two versions of solve, one calling the internal planner, the other calling the
FF system, each with and without re-planning on the arrival of a new passenger.
For the benchmark instances of this domain we let the number of new passengers vary
among 3, 5, 7 and 9 and the number of floors between 5 and 8. As above, we created 10 differ-
ent instances for each combination, choosing the passengers’ origins and destinations randomly.
Initially there is always one passenger request and the intervals between newly arriving passen-
gers lie between 2 and 8 steps. The timeout was once more set to 300 seconds and the interval
between action executions to 0.5 seconds.
Similar to the previous domain, Table 4.2 on page 159 summarizes the results for elevator
domain. The median runtimes for each combination are moreover shown graphically in Figure
4.6. Again, the variants with the external planner performed much better than the ones using
the internal search method. The fifth row of the table also shows an interesting detail: The
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Figure 4.6: Elevator: Median runtimes in seconds
re-planning strategy sometimes causes the overall number of steps to increase. This happens
when a current plan is discarded to serve a new request, and when later another new request is
made it turns out that following the original plan would have been less costly.
Mail Delivery Robot Domain
The third domain is a variant of a common application example [TLL+97]
of a mobile robot operating in an office environment, where it has to deliver
letters and parcels between the workers’ mailboxes. Here, the structure of
the building is assumed to consist of a number of hallways, which are
connected (e.g. by an elevator) to other hallways, and where there is a
certain number of offices at each hallway. Each office may contain one or
multiple different mailboxes, each of which serving for both incoming and
outgoing mails.
This domain involves sensing since the robot must look into a mailbox in order to find out
how many and which letters it currently contains. Furthermore, before the agent actually knows
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where to deliver a letter, it has to pick it up and read off the addressee. The mail delivery robot
is controlled as follows:
proc mainControl
while ¬Finished do
(pir m : Mailbox ) getLettersFrom(m); deliverLetters
endWhile
endProc
Here, pir denotes a variant of the non-deterministic choice of argument where the argument’s
instantiation is picked randomly. In case of the normal pi construct, IndiGolog otherwise
instantiates the variable always with the first applicable symbol, which would cause the program
above to pick the same mailbox in each cycle of the loop. Once the next mailbox that should
be visited is chosen, the path to it is determined by means of planning:
proc getLettersFrom(m)
(pi l : Location) At(m, l)?; solve(RobotAt(l), [move]); takeAllLetters(m)
endProc
Taking letters out of a mailbox requires sensing:
proc takeAllLetters(m)
look into(m);
while ∃ l : Letter . In(l,m) do
(pi l : Letter) In(l,m)?; take out(l,m); look at(l); look into(m)
endWhile
endProc
look into(m) is a sensing action whose outcome is a constant l denoting one of the letters in
the box (i.e. the robot can always only “see” the topmost one). Thus, the agent gets to know
that In(l,m) is currently true. In case the mailbox is empty, the return value is instead simply
the special constant “empty”. After picking up l, action look at(l) is applicable and causes
Addressee(l,m′) to become known to the agent for some mailbox m′, which is the destination
of letter l. For delivering the letters obtained like this, another call to the planner is made:
proc deliverLetters
solve(∀ l : Letter . (∃m : Mailbox .Addressee(l,m)) ⊃ Delivered(l), [put in,move] )
endProc
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Figure 4.7: Mail Delivery: Median runtimes in seconds
Again, we studied the system’s behavior for the case in which solve uses the internal planner
and for the case where FF is called instead. Since there are no exogenous actions in this
scenario, we do not consider dynamic re-planning.
In our benchmark scenarios the number of offices varies among 4, 8 and 16, the number of
hallways among 2, 4 and 8, and the number of letters among 2, 4, 8 and 16. As in the other
domains we created 10 instances for each combination, the offices being connected randomly to
some hallway and hallways being connected to one another in a tree-like fashion. There are as
many mailboxes as offices, but they are placed randomly. Therefore, it is possible that an office
contains multiple mailboxes, only one, or even none at all. The origins and addressees of the
letters are also chosen randomly. Once more we used a timeout of 300 seconds and an action
execution interval of 0.5 seconds.
Table 4.3 on page 160 once again summarizes the results for this domain. The median
runtimes for each combination are shown graphically in Figure 4.7. The results for this domain
are again quite conclusive. The controller using FF was able to solve more tasks and throughout
required less computation time. In terms of steps, the two methods are comparable, but the
results are somewhat erratic, which is mostly because of the randomized strategy that was used.
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4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Summary
This chapter was about planning in Golog. We argued that while Golog is an appropriate
means for the overall control of a knowledge-based agent, and although Golog supports plan-
ning in principle, current implementations typically perform very bad when it comes to pure
planning subtasks. On the other hand, there is a multitude of state-of-the-art planning sys-
tems that use various techniques and heuristics that make them highly efficient. We proceeded
with an overview of the Planning Domain Definition Language PDDL that is used as input
language at the International Planning Competition. Next, we addressed an important subset
of PDDL, namely its ADL fragment, and showed how ADL problems can be mapped to ES
basic action theories. The formal correspondence was shown in terms of the progression of the
translated action theories, and the translation can thus be seen as a declarative semantics for
PDDL. Moreover, it serves as the theoretical foundation for the embedding of PDDL planners
into Golog, which we evaluated using the example of IndiGolog and the FF planner. For
that purpose, three example application domains were considered in which classical planning
subproblems arise in the course of the execution of a high-level program. A series of experiments
showed that the integration of the external planner drastically increases performance in terms
of computation time.
4.4.2 Comparison to Related Work
ADL was originally introduced by Pednault [Ped89, Ped94] as a “middle-ground” between
the highly restricted original STRIPS and the full first-order expressiveness of the Situation
Calculus. He defined a state-transitional semantics for the language in terms of additions and
deletions of tuples in relations and functions of first-order Tarskian structures. He also provided
a method for deriving a Situation Calculus axiomatization, but did not show the semantics
correspondence in terms of progression, as was done by Lin and Reiter [LR97] in the case of
STRIPS. Moreover, he already recognized that in general, a progression may not exist, but
did not explore classes of formulas where this could be guaranteed. In the case of the ADL
fragment of PDDL, the reason that progression is always possible is of course the fact that
PDDL makes the closed-world assumption, and that all true instances of fluent predicates can
be enumerated.
The idea of defining a declarative semantics for PDDL by means of ES basic action theories
has been extended to larger subsets of PDDL. In his master’s thesis, Hu [Hu06] considered
a fragment that includes all the numeric and temporal features introduced in PDDL 2.1 and
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2.2. Among other things, the presented mapping employs a representation proposed by Pinto
[Pin94] and Reiter [Rei98] where a durative process a that happens in a time interval [t1, t2]
is represented in terms of two classical, instantaneous actions start(a, t1) and end(a, t2) that
start and end the process, respectively. Book-keeping auxiliary fluents and their corresponding
successor state axioms are used to memorize the status of currently executed processes as
well as the truth values of conditions used within inter-temporal effects. Continuous change
is encoded by assigning functions of time to fluents, rather than constant values. Thus, the
temporal domain is expressed as a normal basic action theory, which can then be used in the
usual manner regarding regression, progression, and the execution of Golog programs. These
results, which are summarized in [CHL07], do not only serve as the theoretical justification for
embedding temporal PDDL planners such as Tempo [CKMW07] into Golog. By encoding
the new semantics in terms of constraint programming, Hu [Hu07] also obtained a new temporal
planner that could solve more planning problems than the (then) state of the art.
In her diploma thesis, Han [Han09] furthermore extends the declarative semantics to also
incorporate the remaining features of PDDL 2.2 and 3.0, which include plan constraints and
derived predicates. To handle plan constraints, which resemble modal operators from linear-
time temporal logics [Eme90], she introduced auxiliary fluents that keep track of the truth values
of the constraints throughout the intermediate situations of a plan, and provided corresponding
successor state axioms. She also provided two possible encodings for derived predicates, which
are fluents whose values depend on other fluents, possibly including cyclic dependencies: On the
one hand, the semantics of axioms for derived predicates can be expressed by means of second-
order definitional axioms in ES. On the other hand, the closed-world assumption of PDDL also
allows to determine all instances of derived predicates and compile them into the initial theory
and successor state axioms, thus again acquiring a standard first-order basic action theory.
Finally, Zhu [Zhu10] presents a similar mapping between the Temporal Action Logic TAL
[DGKK98] and ES. Among other things, this includes a representation of TAL’s concept
of occlusion, which refers to the fact that the exact value of a fluent is unknown within the
execution interval of a durative action that affects that fluent. In Zhu’s representation, this is
encoded by having auxiliary predicates as guards for the successor state axioms, thus allowing
the corresponding fluents to vary arbitrarily when being occluded. Since TAL is the input
language for the TALplanner [DK01b] system, the mapping again serves as the theoretical
justification for embedding the corresponding planner into Golog. Zhu’s evaluation shows
that this not only yields a similar increase of runtime performance as in the PDDL case, but
that it is also highly beneficial to make use of TALplanner’s ability to incorporate user-provided
domain-dependent control knowledge for guiding its search.
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Further mappings between action logics and planning formalisms have been studied. Schiffel
and Thielscher [ST05, ST06] explored the formal connections between Situation Calculus and
Golog on the one hand and Fluent Calculus and FLUX on the other hand. Drescher [DT08]
presented another declarative semantics for the ADL fragment of PDDL extended with plan
constraints, however formulated in the Fluent Calculus. Thielscher [Thi11] proposed a Unify-
ing Action Calculus that encompasses a variety of existing action logics such as the Situation
Calculus, the Fluent Calculus, ADL, and the Event Calculus in order to facilitate comparisons
and translations between the different formalisms.
Moreover, there has been other work on the integration of Golog and planning. One
particularly notable approach is due to Baier, Fritz and McIlraith [BFM07] who developed a
polynomial-time algorithm for compiling a Golog program into a planning problem of PDDL
2.1. Thus, the domain-dependent procedural control knowledge that is given by the program
can be exploited by any domain-independent PDDL planner. It is also conceivable to apply
their method in an integrated Golog-PDDL system as described in this chapter, thus being
able to not only refer sequential planning tasks (i.e. solve statements) to the planner, but
entire Golog subprograms, albeit only ones throughout which the closed-world assumption
is guaranteed to hold. In subsequent work, Fritz, Baier and McIlraith [FBM08] furthermore
present a similar compiler that takes a ConGolog program and a basic action theory and
produces a new basic action theory that permits exactly the execution traces of the input
program. Proving properties of programs thus becomes much simpler and can in some cases be
reduced to standard regression-based reasoning.
Blom and Pearce [BP10] propose to apply relaxation-based heuristics, a popular technique
used in classical planners, directly within an offline Golog interpreter, using a relaxed variant
of regression. In a certain sense, they therefore also take advantage of results from classical
planning, although in a different manner. Since PDDL serves as the common interface to
all planners supported by it, our embedding lets us benefit from the newest developments in
state-of-the-art planning without the need to re-implement the corresponding techniques and
heuristics in the Golog interpreter. On the other hand, Blom and Pearce’s approach considers
the interpretation of the entire program, rather than being restricted to certain subproblems
only. Of course, none of these approaches for integrating planning and Golog is exclusive, but
they can be used together in a complementary fashion.
4.4.3 Future Work
With the results presented in this chapter together with the related work discussed above,
the idea of mapping PDDL to ES for embedding state-of-the-art planners into Golog has
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more or less been studied exhaustively. The most recent extension of PDDL (now version 3.1)
introduces object functions with finite domains as a new feature. However, they are merely
syntactic sugar as it is easy to see that functional, non-numeric fluents can be simulated by
relational ones.
Regarding possible directions for future work, it seems to be more interesting to aim at
increasing Golog’s performance in situations where the closed-world assumption is not appli-
cable due to the agent only possessing partial world knowledge, while preferably retaining as
much of first-order expressiveness as possible. One promising approach is to build upon results
on so-called proper+ knowledge bases [LL02], which are an expressive class of first-order theories
with disjunctive information. Liu, Lakemeyer and Levesque [LLL04, LL05b] introduce the logic
SL in which query evaluation is classically sound, yet only sometimes complete, and which is
particularly suited to represent agents that have limited computational resources. Moreover,
they present a reasoning service based on SL that is decidable for proper+ knowledge bases,
and even tractable in the case that the number of variable symbols is bounded.
The first step towards applying SL-based reasoning in Golog is to generalize the static
logic SL to dynamic domains. In [CL09], an extension called SLA is introduced which resorts
to regression for solving the projection problem, and which is shown to be sound in terms of ES
entailments. SLA forms the basis for a new Golog search operator that prefers solution plans
that are the computationally cheapest to discover, rather than the shortest ones. While the
latter approach has some appeal to it, it is not entirely practical: As mentioned before, solely
relying on regression is problematic due to the agent’s history of executed actions growing over
time and because regression tends to blow up the query. An alternative extension of SL which
is based on progression is presented by Capes [Cap10]. It would be interesting to see how
his approach can be leveraged to come up with a corresponding progression-based planning
construct, in particular in combination with recent results by Liu and Lakemeyer [LL09b] who
show that if actions have only local effects, the progression of proper+ knowledge bases is not
only guaranteed to exist, but can be computed efficiently.
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Letters Offices Hallways Tasks
solved time(s) steps
G P G P G P
10 4 2 10 6 10 133.0 29.5 50.5 51.0
10 4 4 10 6 10 105.5 30.0 49.5 51.0
10 4 8 10 4 10 300.0 30.0 54.0 50.0
10 8 2 10 4 10 300.0 39.0 68.5 63.0
10 8 4 10 5 10 193.0 38.5 61.0 67.0
10 8 8 10 5 10 210.5 35.0 71.0 59.0
10 16 2 10 5 10 227.0 59.0 92.0 93.0
10 16 4 10 6 10 268.0 52.0 92.0 93.5
10 16 8 10 7 10 148.5 57.0 91.0 95.0
15 4 2 10 1 10 300.0 40.5 69.0 72.0
15 4 4 10 1 10 300.0 41.0 69.0 70.0
15 4 8 10 0 10 300.0 37.5 – –
15 8 2 10 1 10 300.0 50.0 101.0 92.0
15 8 4 10 0 10 300.0 49.5 – –
15 8 8 10 2 10 300.0 48.0 76.0 95.0
15 16 2 10 2 10 300.0 66.0 134.5 114.5
15 16 4 10 2 10 300.0 69.5 112.5 105.5
15 16 8 10 0 10 300.0 70.5 – –
Table 4.3: Mail Domain: Solved instances, median runtime, median number of steps
Chapter 5
Golog Verification
Thus far we have been concerned with the representation and control of agents. We have argued
that ES is appropriate as the underlying logic and Golog as a language for defining the agent’s
behaviour. Furthermore it was shown in the previous chapter that embedding efficient planners
can help to enhance a corresponding system’s performance, thus making a Golog-based agent
a suitable means for the control of autonomous agents such as mobile robots.
Before deploying a Golog program onto the actual robot and executing it in the physical
world, it is often desirable if not crucial to verify that it indeed fulfills its intended purpose and
meets certain requirements. In this respect, designing and implementing agents with Golog is
no different from industrial hardware and software development in general, where verification
is a critical and major part of the overall development process [BK08]. On the one hand, this is
due to the fact that it is usually more costly to fix an error the later in the process it is detected.
One of many cautionary and well-known examples was a bug in the floating point division unit
of Intel’s Pentium II processors whose replacement caused a loss of about 475 million US dollars,
not to mention the damage this had to the company’s reputation. More importantly, in many
areas hardware and software reliability is directly related to the safety of human beings, for
instance in missiles, spaceships, airplanes, power plants, traffic control, and medical devices, to
name but a few.
There are a number of established techniques for verification. In the case of software,
important approaches are peer reviewing and testing. The former refers to the process of proof-
reading the uncompiled code, preferably by software engineers that were not themselves involved
in the actual programming. The latter means to actually execute the software and compare the
output that it produces for certain inputs with what is to be expected according to the system’s
specification. Hardware verification furthermore typically includes simulation, which is a form
of testing using a software model of the system and its environment, and/or emulation, which
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is also a form of testing, but using a hardware prototype.
Of course, all these techniques can (and should) in some form be applied to the verification
of Golog-based agents and robots as well. However, there is yet another technique that is
especially interesting for us in this context, namely that of formal verification. This means one
expresses both the system description and the specification of its desired properties in some
formal (logical) manner, and then formally proves that according to the description, the system
indeed satisfies the specification. This approach lends itself particularly well to knowledge-based
agents because it is unnecessary to have a description of the system that is separate from the
actual implementation, which is prone to errors and inaccuracy. It is rather possible to do the
verification with the very same underlying logical representation that is already used for the
actual control of the agent! Although there could possibly still be flaws in the agent’s design,
it can be excluded that this is due to a mismatch between description and implementation, as
they are one and the same.
Regarding formal verification of Golog programs, the first thing to note is that if the agent
performs an open-ended task, such as in our envisioned mobile robot scenario, it will (at least
ideally) operate indefinitely. Its corresponding control program is hence a non-terminating one.
In the case of our office robot example, a program for the task of delivering coffee to the workers
on request might look like this:
loop
if¬Empty(queue)
then (pix) selectRequest(x); pickupCoffee; bringCoffee(x)
else wait
endIf
endLoop
(5.1)
Here we assume that the robot internally maintains a queue of coffee requests which will be
served in order of their arrival. In each cycle of an infinite loop (denoted by the loop construct),
if the queue is currently not empty, the robot chooses the next pending request x (by means
of the selectRequest(x) action), gets a cup of coffee from the coffee machine (pickupCoffee) and
brings it to person x (bringCoffee(x)). Otherwise, it waits for a short period (wait). Requests
are represented by exogenous actions requestCoffee(x), where x denotes the requesting person.
Note that here we resort to a more abstract encoding of the robot to keep the example
simple. The pickupCoffee action for instance is now assumed to not only denote the actual
grabbing of the coffee cup, but to also include the process of moving to the coffee machine first.
Similarly, bringCoffee(x) is supposed to be a delivery action that covers also the subtask of first
getting to x’s location.
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The following are two examples for questions that we may want to have answered for the
above program before deploying it to the robot:
1. Will every request eventually be served by the robot?
2. Is it possible that no request is ever served at all?
Surprisingly, the verification of such properties for non-terminating Golog programs has so
far received little attention within the Situation Calculus community. A notable exception is
a paper by De Giacomo, Ternovska and Reiter [GTR97], from which also the above example
is adapted. They show how the semantics of non-terminating processes can be defined by
means of (second-order) Situation Calculus axioms, how properties such as 1 and 2 above can
be expressed using (second-order) fixpoint formulas, and that it is then possible to prove the
satisfaction of these properties given the aforementioned axioms.
For verifying properties of non-terminating Golog programs in practice, there are however
at least two problems with this. The first one is in terms of representation and comprehensibility.
For instance, property 1 is expressed in [GTR97] as follows:
Fair(δ0,S0 )
def
=
(∀x, δ, s)Trans∗(δ0,S0 , δ, do(requestCoffee(x), s)) ⊃
EventuallyServed(x, δ, do(requestCoffee(x), s))
Recall that S0 denotes the initial situation, whereas a term of the form do(a, s) means the
situation resulting from doing action a in situation s. Trans∗ refers to the transitive closure of
the Trans(δ, s, δ′, s′) predicate which defines valid transitions from programs δ and situations s
to resulting programs δ′ and resulting situations s′. EventuallyServed is then defined by
EventuallyServed(x, δ1, s1)
def
=
µP,δ,s{[(∃s′′)s = do(selectRequest(x), s′′)] ∨
[((∃δ′, s′)Trans(δ, s, δ′, s′)) ∧ (∀δ′, s′)Trans(δ, s, δ′, s′) ⊃ P (δ′, s′)]}(δ1, s1)
where the notation µP,δ,s denotes a least fixpoint according to the following formula:
(∀~x){µP,~yΦ(P, ~y)(~x) ≡ [(∀P )[(∀~y)Φ(P, ~y) ⊃ P (~y)] ⊃ P (~x)])}
We will not explain these definitions in any more detail here since they are unnecessary for our
further treatment. The above formulas shall merely illustrate that formulating properties in this
manner is obviously quite involved due to the heavy reliance on second-order quantification. The
underlying µ-calculus and inductive fixpoint definitions are typically difficult to grasp even for
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the mathematically inclined, all the more so for a Golog programmer and domain designer
who is most likely not an expert in logic.
The second problem with existing work on the verification of nonterminating Golog pro-
grams is that proving properties manually, be it in the formalism of [GTR97] or a different one,
is not only tedious, but also prone to errors. A much more desirable solution would be if verifi-
cation could be done automatically, using an appropriate algorithm. Nowadays the automated,
formal verification of nonterminating processes is typically associated with model checking, a
form of formal verification whose popularity has steadily grown since its introduction in the
early 1980s [CE81, CES86, QS82]. In a nutshell, the idea is to have a model of the system,
its possible states and their relation among another in the form of a finite graph structure (a
so-called transition system). The specification to be verified is typically expressed in terms of
formulas of temporal logic. Verification is then done by checking the satisfaction of these for-
mulas by a systematic, graph-theoretic analysis of the model. The approach can furthermore be
boosted to handle very large state spaces by resorting to compact, implicit representations such
as ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDD) [Bry86], which is referred to as symbolic model
checking [BCM+92, McM93]. Using appropriate finite representations, it is even possible to
treat infinite-state systems [BCMS01], for example by means of pushdown automata [BEM97],
petri nets [Esp94], or variants of Minsky’s counter machines [Dem06], to name but a few.
In the face of this abundance of results on model checking, it is conceivable to verify Golog
programs by an approach similar to the embedding of PDDL planners described in Chapter 4,
namely by translating program and specification properties into the model checking algorithm’s
input formalism, and then call the model checker on that input. However, even in the case of
compact infinite-state representations, the underlying formalisms are usually chosen very care-
fully to ensure decidability or even tractability of the model checking method. Consequently,
these formalisms are of very restricted expressiveness, in particular regarding first-order quan-
tification, which is either supported only in a very limited fashion, or not at all. On the other
hand, the first-order expressiveness of the Situation Calculus or ES is considered a desirable
feature that one would rather not give up, but often the reason why the corresponding language
was chosen in the first place. It seems preferable to be able to do the verification in the very
same expressive formalism that we use for the actual control and specification of our agent.
In this chapter, we will present a solution that addresses both these issues. On the one
hand, a new logic is proposed that extends ES by constructs that allow to express statements
about Golog programs and their properties. By resorting to operators known from temporal
logics and fixing their meaning within the semantics, we thus acquire an expressive, yet concise
and readable formalism without the need for any second-order axioms.
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On the other hand, we will then discuss several algorithms for the automated verification
of properties of both terminating and nonterminating Golog programs expressed by means
of this new logic. Although they clearly draw their inspiration from the classical approaches
to symbolic CTL and CTL∗ model checking, the proposed methods do not perform model
checking in the strict sense of the term as they do not operate on a single, simplified model
of the system in question. Instead, they are similar in spirit to the well-known approaches to
classical reasoning tasks in the Situation Calculus such as Reiter’s Regression or Lakemeyer
and Levesque’s Representation Theorem: Given a theory that describes the dynamics and the
knowledge of the agent, we have a meta-level operation that iteratively transforms the original
query into an equivalent expression that is in a sense “easier” to answer. This is achieved
by “factoring out” the non-classical aspects of the query, thus reducing the original problem
to a finite number of instances of classical FOL theorem proving. In the case of verifying
Golog programs, this amounts to iteratively applying regression-based formula manipulations
until a fixpoint is reached. Fixpoints are thus merely calculated at the meta-level, rather than
being constructed in the language through second-order induction axioms, as was done by
De Giacomo, Ternovska and Reiter. We will further establish that the proposed methods are
sound and discuss under which circumstances they are also complete.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the new ex-
tended logic called ESG. In Section 5.2, the so-called characteristic graphs of Golog programs
are discussed, which constitute a paramount ingredient to our verification algorithms. The first
such algorithm for nonterminating programs and a substantial subclass of query properties is
presented in Section 5.3, together with a discussion of the method’s soundness and complete-
ness. Section 5.4 then deals with an extended method that is capable of treating (almost) all
properties that can be expressed in ESG. In Section 5.5 we briefly discuss the verification of
terminating programs, which can be done in a similar manner. As an implementation of the
presented algorithms requires a compact representation of first-order formulas, a first-order ex-
tension of binary decision diagrams (BDDs) is proposed in Section 5.6, before we conclude with
Section 5.7.
5.1 The Logic ESG
Let us first address the issue of an appropriate representation for properties of both nontermi-
nating and terminating Golog programs. As far as terminating programs are concerned, we
have already discussed a possibility to express a form of such properties, namely by means of
the Do macro operator presented in Section 3.6.1. Recall that for a simple Golog program δ,
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Do(δ, α) expands to a formula that describes all and only conditions under which some success-
ful execution of δ exists such that afterwards α holds. Lakemeyer and Levesque introduced Do
in order to show that it is possible to define a semantics for Golog in ES that is equivalent to
the one defined based on the Situation Calculus [LRL+97]. The latter however turned out to be
problematic when it comes to extensions of the language that include some form of (interleaved)
concurrency, such as by means of the || operator, which is why De Giacomo, Lespe´rance and
Levesque proposed their now well-known transition semantics for ConGolog [GLL00].
In Chapter 3, we defined a similar semantics for programs including concurrency, however
in a meta-logical fashion using the transition relation −→ and the finality predicate F . What we
want now is to be able to express statements about programs within our logic. For expressing
postconditions of programs similar to Do, we propose to extend the [ · ] operator to admit
arbitrary programs δ, instead of only primitive actions. Staying consistent with notational
conventions in modal logics, we then define the formula
[δ]α
to mean that after any successful execution of δ, α will hold, while 〈δ〉α denotes the operator’s
existential dual, meaning that α holds after some execution of δ:
〈δ〉α def= ¬[δ]¬α.
Since a primitive action is only a special case of a Golog program, the operator keeps its
original meaning for such actions. We furthermore get that, in a sense (that we will make
precise in the course of this chapter), 〈δ〉α is equivalent to Do(δ, α). However, whereas the
latter is only defined for simple Golog programs, the former works on any member of the
Golog family whose constructs we can define via −→ and F .
Postconditions are of course useless in the case of non-terminating programs. What we need
instead is a means of expressing facts not only for single situations, but for (possibly infinite)
sequences of them. As argued above, we do not consider fixpoint definitions and second-order
formulas appropriate for this, but propose to resort to operators known from temporal logics,
which are much easier to read and more intuitive to grasp. For this purpose, we first introduce
yet another new modal operator [[ · ]] such that
[[δ]]ϕ
denotes that for all possible execution traces of δ, the formula ϕ holds. Apart from the logical
constructs we have used so far, the trace formula ϕ then may contain temporal subformulas of
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the form Xψ (ψ holds in the next situation) and (φ U ψ) (φ holds until ψ holds). Again, the
above operator has an existential counterpart 〈〈 · 〉〉 that we can define by
〈〈δ〉〉ϕ def= ¬[[δ]]¬ϕ.
Note that the temporal constructs X and U are indeed sufficient for our purposes since we can
define further operators as “syntactic sugar”: Fφ (read: “eventually φ” or “finally φ”) denotes
(> U φ), and Gφ (read: “always φ” or “generally φ”) stands for ¬F¬φ. If δ is the program
(5.1) together with an encoding of the domain’s exogenous actions, then the two properties
mentioned earlier can be expressed as follows:
[[δ]]G(Occ(requestCoffee(x)) ⊃ FOcc(selectRequest(x)))(5.2)
〈〈δ〉〉G¬∃x(Occ(selectRequest(x)))(5.3)
where (5.2) reads “for all possible executions of δ, it is always the case that whenever a
requestCoffee(x) action occurs, then eventually there will be a corresponding selectRequest(x)
action”, i.e. every request will eventually be served. (5.3) is further to be read as “there is a
possible execution trace of δ such that at all points in time, no selectRequest(x) action occurs,
i.e. no request is ever served. It is justified to argue that (5.2) and (5.3), which both take not
more than one line, are a much more compact representation of the properties, and probably
also more readable once one is familiar with the meaning of G and F. Before showing how we
can automatically verify such properties, we will now define this new logic, which we call ESG
(where the G stands for Golog), formally.
5.1.1 Syntax
Terms are defined as before, i.e. we have variables, standard names and compound terms which
come in the three sorts object , action and number .
Programs
As opposed to Chapter 3 where we used programs only meta-theoretically, they now become
a part of the language. Also different from the original ConGolog semantics [GLL00] where
programs were introduced as terms whose meaning is defined axiomatically, the program con-
structs are now logical (built-in) symbols with a fixed meaning. The programs we consider here
are the ones admitted by the following grammar:
δ ::= t | α? | δ1; δ2 | δ1|δ2 | pix.δ | δ1||δ2 | δ∗(5.4)
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That is we allow primitive actions t (where t can be any action term), tests α? (where α is a
static situation formula as defined below), sequence, nondeterministic branching, nondetermin-
istic choice of argument, concurrency, and nondeterministic iteration. Recall that thus also if
statements and while loops are included:
if φ then δ1 else δ2 endIf
def
= [φ?; δ1] | [¬φ?; δ2](5.5)
while φ do δ endWhile
def
= [φ?; δ]∗;¬φ?(5.6)
The infinite loop for non-terminating programs furthermore is given by:
loop δ endLoop
def
= while > do δ endWhile(5.7)
We will also sometimes write loop δ endLoop as δω. Note that it would not represent a problem
to let the new logic include the entire Golog language as presented in Section 3.6, but to keep
things simple and because of the fact that the verification algorithms we are going to discuss
only work on this subset of Golog (for reasons that will become apparent in Section 5.2),
we restrict ourselves to the above set of constructs. Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise
stated, whenever we speak of a “program”, it will be implicitly assumed that this means a
Golog program according to (5.4).
Situation Formulas
Also for the purpose of simplicity of the language, we will only consider objective formulas in
this chapter, which now come in two different “flavours”, as given by the following definition:
Definition 5.1 (Situation Formulas). The situation formulas are the least set such that
• if t1, . . . , tk are terms and P is a (fluent or rigid) k-ary predicate symbol, then P (t1, . . . , tk)
is a situation formula;
• if t1 and t2 are terms, then (t1 = t2) is a situation formula;
• if α and β are situation formulas, x is a variable, P is a (fluent or rigid) predicate symbol,
δ is a program, and φ is a trace formula (defined below), then α∧β, ¬α, ∀x.α, ∀P.α, α,
[δ]α, and [[δ]]φ are situation formulas.
Situation formulas are similar to objective formulas as we used them in the previous chapters:
Intuitively, they express properties which are (or are not) satisfied by single situations, albeit
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this may include references to other situations by means of [ · ], , or [[ · ]]. We again include
further constructs such as ⊃ and ∃ as abbreviations, as before. Moreover, let
〈δ〉α def= ¬[δ]¬α(5.8)
〈〈δ〉〉ϕ def= ¬[[δ]]¬ϕ.(5.9)
Trace Formulas
Furthermore, we have a new type of formulas as follows:1
Definition 5.2 (Trace Formulas). The trace formulas are the least set such that
• if α is a situation formula, then it is also a trace formula;
• if φ and ψ are trace formulas and x is a variable, then φ ∧ ψ, ¬φ, ∀x.φ, Xφ, and φ U ψ
are also trace formulas.
These formulas, as the name suggests, are used to talk about traces of situations, i.e. finite
or infinite sequences of actions. We will use them for representing the temporal properties of
program execution traces. In addition to the usual abbreviations, we also have
Fφ
def
= (> U φ)(5.10)
Gφ
def
= ¬F¬φ.(5.11)
Definitions
Because of the new modal operators, we have to revise the definitions of static and bounded
formulas:
Definition 5.3 (Static Formulas). A situation formula α is static when it contains no [ · ], no
 and no [[ · ]] operators.
Definition 5.4 (Bounded Formulas). A situation formula α is bounded when it contains no 
operators, no [[ · ]] operators, and [t] operators only in case the argument is an atomic action t.
5.1.2 The Semantics
Worlds in ESG are defined exactly as they are in ES (Definition 3.6), and so is the denotation
of terms (Definition 3.7).
1Note that we present situation formulas and trace formulas in separate definitions for the sake of readability.
Since they mutually depend on each other, we would actually have to define them in a single, inductive definition.
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Programs
Programs are interpreted as described in Section 3.6. For convenience, their semantics is re-
peated below for the subset of programs we employ in this chapter. Recall that a configuration
〈z, δ〉 consists of an action sequence z and a program δ, where intuitively z is the history of
actions that have already been performed, while δ is the program that remains to be executed.
Since ESG is purely objective, we further do not have to include epistemic states.
Definition 5.5 (Program Transition Semantics). The transition relation
w−→ among configura-
tions, given a world w, is the least set satisfying
1. 〈z, t〉 w−→ 〈z · p,nil〉, if p = |t|zw;
2. 〈z, δ1; δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, γ; δ2〉, if 〈z, δ1〉 w−→ 〈z · p, γ〉;
3. 〈z, δ1; δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉, if 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fw and 〈z, δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
4. 〈z, δ1|δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉, if 〈z, δ1〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉 or 〈z, δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
5. 〈z, pix.δ〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉, if 〈z, δxn〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉 for some n ∈ Nx;
6. 〈z, δ∗〉 w−→ 〈z · p, γ; δ∗〉, if 〈z, δ〉 w−→ 〈z · p, γ〉;
7. 〈z, δ1||δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′||δ2〉, if 〈z, δ1〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉;
8. 〈z, δ1||δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ1||δ′〉, if 〈z, δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉.
The set of final configurations Fw of a world w is the smallest set such that
1. 〈z, α?〉 ∈ Fw if w, z |= α;
2. 〈z, δ1; δ2〉 ∈ Fw if 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fw and 〈z, δ2〉 ∈ Fw;
3. 〈z, δ1|δ2〉 ∈ Fw if 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fw or 〈z, δ2〉 ∈ Fw;
4. 〈z, pix.δ〉 ∈ Fw if 〈z, δxn〉 ∈ Fw for some n ∈ Nx;
5. 〈z, δ∗〉 ∈ Fw;
6. 〈z, δ1||δ2〉 ∈ Fw if 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fw and 〈z, δ2〉 ∈ Fw.
Temporal properties that we express by situation formulas refer to traces, as defined below.
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Definition 5.6 (Traces). A trace is a possibly infinite sequence of action standard names. That
is, in addition to the finite action sequences that we have considered so far, we now allow for
infinite sequences as well. Formally, an infinite trace pi is given by a mapping from the natural
numbers to action standard names:
pi : N→ NA
We will often write such a trace as pi = p1·p2·p3 · · · in our meta-theoretic notation. Furthermore,
let pi(i) stand for the finite sequence that consists of the first i elements of pi, where pi(0) is the
empty sequence 〈〉.
As a notational convention, we use τ to denote arbitrary traces, z for finite ones (as before)
and pi for infinite ones. Moreover, let Z = NA∗ be the set of all finite traces (as before),
Π = NAω the set of all infinite traces, and T = Z ∪Π the set of all traces.
We can now define the traces admitted by a given program:
Definition 5.7 (Traces of Programs). Let
w−→∗ denote the reflexive and transitive closure of
w−→. Given a world w and a finite sequence of action standard names z, the set of traces of a
program δ is
||δ||zw = {z′ ∈ Z | 〈z, δ〉 w−→∗〈z · z′, δ′〉 and 〈z · z′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw} ∪(5.12)
{pi ∈ Π | 〈z, δ〉 w−→ 〈z · pi(1), δ1〉 w−→ 〈z · pi(2), δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · pi(3), δ3〉 w−→ · · ·
where for all i ≥ 0, 〈z · pi(i), δi〉 6∈ Fw}
In words, the finite traces admitted by some δ given w and z are those that correspond to a
finite number of transitions by means of which a final configuration is reachable. Its infinite
traces are given by all infinite sequences of transitions that never visit any final configuration.2
Situation and Trace Formulas
We are now equipped to define the truth of formulas:
Definition 5.8 (Truth of Situation and Trace Formulas). Given a world w ∈ W and a situation
formula α, we define w |= α as w, 〈〉 |= α, where for any z ∈ Z:
1. w, z |= F (t1, . . . , tk) iff w[F (n1, . . . , nk), z] = 1, where ni = |ti|zw;
2. w, z |= (t1 = t2) iff n1 and n2 are identical, where ni = |ti|zw;
2Similar to an infinite trace, an infinite sequence of transitions 〈z0, δ0〉 w−→ 〈z1, δ1〉 w−→ 〈z2, δ2〉 w−→ 〈z3, δ3〉 w−→ · · ·
is to be understood formally as a function that maps each natural number k to a configuration 〈zk, δk〉 such that
for all i ≥ 0, 〈zi, δi〉 w−→ 〈zi+1, δi+1〉.
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3. w, z |= α ∧ β iff w, z |= α and w, z |= β;
4. w, z |= ¬α iff w, z 6|= α;
5. w, z |= ∀x.α iff w, z |= αxn for all n ∈ Nx;
6. w, z |= ∀P.α iff w′, z |= α for all w′ z∼P w;
7. w, z |= α iff w, z · z′ |= α for all z′ ∈ Z;
8. w, z |= [δ]α iff for all finite z′ ∈ ||δ||zw, w, z · z′ |= α;
9. w, z |= [[δ]]φ iff for all τ ∈ ||δ||zw, w, z, τ |= φ.
The truth of trace formulas φ is defined as follows for w ∈ W, z ∈ Z, and traces τ ∈ T :
1. w, z, τ |= α iff w, z |= α, if α is a situation formula;
2. w, z, τ |= φ ∧ ψ iff w, z, τ |= φ and w, z, τ |= ψ;
3. w, z, τ |= ¬φ iff w, z, τ 6|= φ;
4. w, z, τ |= ∀x.φ iff w, z, τ |= φxn for all n ∈ Nx;
5. w, z, τ |= Xφ iff τ = p · τ ′ and w, z · p, τ ′ |= φ;
6. w, z, τ |= φ U ψ iff there is z′ such that τ = z′ · τ ′ and w, z · z′, τ ′ |= ψ and for all z′′ 6= z′
with z′ = z′′ · z′′′, w, z · z′′, z′′′ · τ ′ |= φ.
Most of the rules for situation formulas are the same as the ones for objective formulas stated
in Definition 3.8, except for the new rules 8 and 9. According to the above, a formula α is true
after the execution of a program δ if α holds in all situations reachable by some finite trace of
δ. Among other things this implies that any formula α, even if it is unsatisfiable, is always true
“after” a non-terminating program:
|= [anyω]α(5.13)
While at first glance this may seem counter-intuitive, it indeed makes sense as the [δ] operator
constitutes a form of a universal quantification over the set of all finite traces of δ, which
vacuously holds whenever this set is empty. The intuition behind this becomes apparent once
we rephrase the reading of [δ]α as “whenever program δ terminates, α will hold”.
Rule 9 on the other hand says that [[δ]]φ holds if the trace formula φ is satisfied for all traces
of δ, including infinite ones. As suggested by their name, trace formulas are interpreted with
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respect to a trace τ (in addition to a world w and an action sequence z), which is why the above
definition contains an additional, separate set of rules for such formulas, of which the last two
are the most interesting ones: Rule 5 says that Xφ holds if φ holds after the next action of τ ,
while rule 6 says that (φ U ψ) is true if ψ holds after some finite (possibly empty) prefix of τ ,
and φ is satisfied at all preceding situations.
5.1.3 Properties
Before getting to the verification of programs, let us first have a look at some properties of
our new logic that demonstrate how ESG relates to ES and Golog. First of all we have that
objective ES is a part of ESG:
Theorem 5.9. Let α be an objective ES sentence (possibly with second-order quantification),
|=ES denote validity according to Definition 3.8, while |=ESG denotes validity according to Defi-
nition 5.8. Then
|=ES α iff |=ESG α.
Proof. The theorem can be proven by showing w, z |=ES α iff w, z |=ESG α via induction on α,
where |=ES denotes satisfaction according to Definition 3.8, whereas |=ESG denotes satisfaction
according to Definition 5.8. The underlying definition of worlds, the denotation of terms as well
as the semantic rules for atoms and all constructs is identical except for [ · ] and [[ · ]], hence the
claim is obvious in these cases. Since α is assumed to be a formula of ES, it does not contain
any [[ · ]] at all. Furthermore, the only appearances of [ · ] are with an argument that is an atomic
action term t, so we are only left to show the equivalence in this case.
For an atomic action t, the only possible transition rule in Definition 5.5 is the first one,
i.e. 〈z, t〉 w−→ 〈z · p,nil〉, if p = |t|zw. Furthermore 〈z · p,nil〉 ∈ Fw, therefore ||t||zw = {p}. Then we
have:
w, z |=ESG [t]α
iff for all z′ ∈ ||t||zw, w, z · z′ |=ESG α (by Definition 3.8)
iff w, z · p |=ESG α, where p = |t|zw (since ||t||zw = {p})
iff w, z · p |=ES α, where p = |t|zw (by induction)
iff w, z |=ES [t]α (by Definition 5.8)
Hence we get |=ES α iff |=ESG α.
Next we will show the relation of the transition semantics of Golog provided in Definition 5.5
to Lakemeyer and Levesque’s Do macro definition [LL05a] as given in Definition 3.56. First we
have the following lemma:
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Lemma 5.10.
1. z′ ∈ ||t||zw iff z′ = p = |t|zw;
2. z′ ∈ ||φ?||zw iff z′ = 〈〉 and w, z |= φ;
3. z′ ∈ ||δ1; δ2||zw iff z′ = z1 · z2 for some z1 ∈ ||δ1||zw and some z2 ∈ ||δ2||z·z1w ;
4. z′ ∈ ||δ1|δ2||zw iff z′ ∈ ||δ1||zw ∪ ||δ2||zw;
5. z′ ∈ ||pix.δ||zw iff z′ ∈ ||δxn||zw for some n ∈ Nx;
6. z′ ∈ ||δ∗||zw iff z′ = z0 · z1 · · · zk for some k ≥ 0, z0 = 〈〉 and zi+1 ∈ ||δ||z·z0···ziw .
Proof.
1. Obvious from the facts that 〈z, t〉 6∈ Fw, that 〈z, t〉 w−→ 〈z · p,nil〉 with p = |t|zw is the only
transition step for t in Definition 5.5, and that 〈z,nil〉 ∈ Fw.
2. This item is a direct consequence of the facts that there is no transition rule for φ? in
Definition 5.5 and that 〈z, φ?〉 ∈ Fw only in case that w, z |= φ.
3. We prove this item by induction on the length of z′. We will use the following direct
consequence of Definition 5.7:
p · z′ ∈ ||δ||zw iff 〈z, δ〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′〉 and z′ ∈ ||δ′||z·pw .(5.14)
• z′ = 〈〉:
〈〉 ∈ ||δ1; δ2||zw
iff 〈z, δ1; δ2〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.7)
iff 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fw and 〈z, δ2〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.5)
iff 〈〉 ∈ ||δ1||zw and 〈〉 ∈ ||δ2||z·〈〉w (by Definition 5.7)
• z′ = p · z′′:
p · z′′ ∈ ||δ1; δ2||ww
iff 〈z, δ1; δ2〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.7)
iff 〈z, δ1; δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉, 〈z · p, δ′′〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉
and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by definition of w−→∗)
iff ( δ′′ = γ; δ2 and 〈z, δ1〉 w−→ 〈z · p, γ〉 or 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fw and 〈z, δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉 ),
〈z · p, δ′′〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.5)
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iff 〈z, δ1〉 w−→ 〈z · p, γ〉 and z′′ ∈ ||γ; δ2||z·pw or
〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fw, 〈z, δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉 and z′′ ∈ ||δ′′||z·pw (by Definition 5.7)
iff 〈z, δ1〉 w−→ 〈z · p, γ〉, z′′ = z′1 · z′2, z′1 ∈ ||γ||z·pw and z′2 ∈ ||δ2||z·p·z
′
1
w or
〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fw, 〈z, δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉 and z′′ ∈ ||δ′′||z·pw (by induction)
iff p · z′1 ∈ ||δ1||zw, z′2 ∈ ||δ2||z·p·z
′
1
w and p · z′′ = (p · z′1) · z′2 or
〈〉 ∈ ||δ1||zw, p · z′′ ∈ ||δ2||zw and p · z′′ = 〈〉 · (p · z′′) (by (5.14))
iff p · z′′ = z1 · z2 for some z1 ∈ ||δ1||zw and some z2 ∈ ||δ2||z·z1w
4. This item can be shown by distinguishing two cases:
• z′ = 〈〉:
〈〉 ∈ ||δ1|δ2||zw
iff 〈z, δ1|δ2〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.7)
iff 〈z, δ1〉 ∈ Fw or 〈z, δ2〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.5)
iff 〈〉 ∈ ||δ1||zw or 〈〉 ∈ ||δ2||zw (by Definition 5.7)
iff 〈〉 ∈ ||δ1||zw ∪ ||δ2||zw
• z′ = p · z′′:
p · z′′ ∈ ||δ1|δ2||zw
iff 〈z, δ1|δ2〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.7)
iff 〈z, δ1|δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉, 〈z · p, δ′′〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉
and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by definition of w−→∗)
iff ( 〈z, δ1〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉 or 〈z, δ2〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉 ),
〈z · p, δ′′〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.5)
iff ( 〈z, δ1〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 or 〈z, δ2〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 )
and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by definition of w−→∗)
iff p · z′′ ∈ ||δ1||zw or p · z′′ ∈ ||δ2||ww (by Definition 5.7)
iff p · z′′ ∈ ||δ1||zw ∪ ||δ2||ww
5. For this item we make a similar case distinction as above:
• z′ = 〈〉:
〈〉 ∈ ||pix.δ||zw
iff 〈z, pix.δ〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.7)
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iff 〈z, δxn〉 ∈ Fw for some n ∈ Nx (by Definition 5.5)
iff 〈〉 ∈ ||δxn||zw for some n ∈ Nx (by Definition 5.7)
• z′ = p · z′′:
p · z′′ ∈ ||pix.δ||zw
iff 〈z, pix.δ〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.7)
iff 〈z, pix.δ〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉, 〈z · p, δ′′〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉
and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by definition of w−→∗)
iff 〈z, δxn〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉 for some n ∈ Nx,
〈z · p, δ′′〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.5)
iff 〈z, δxn〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉
and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw for some n ∈ Nx (by definition of w−→∗)
iff p · z′′ ∈ ||δxn||zw for some n ∈ Nx (by Definition 5.7)
6. For this item, we make again an induction on the length of z′:
• z′ = 〈〉: Obvious, since 〈〉 ∈ ||δ∗||zw and z′ = z0 with z0 = 〈〉.
• z′ = p · z′′:
p · z′′ ∈ ||δ∗||zw
iff 〈z, δ∗〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.7)
iff 〈z, δ∗〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′〉, 〈z · p, δ′′〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉
and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by definition of w−→∗)
iff δ′′ = γ; δ∗, 〈z, δ〉 w−→ 〈z · p, γ〉, 〈z · p, δ′′〉 w−→∗〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉
and 〈z · p · z′′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Definition 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ〉 w−→ 〈z · p, γ〉 and z′′ ∈ ||γ; δ∗||zw (by Definition 5.7)
iff p · z′′ = p · z′′1 · z′′2 , p · z′′1 ∈ ||δ||zw and z′′2 ∈ ||δ∗||z·z
′′
1
w (by (5.14))
iff p · z′′ = p · z′′1 · z′′2 , p · z′′1 ∈ ||δ||zw
and z′′2 = 〈〉 · z′1 · · · z′k with z′i ∈ ||δ||
z·z′′1 ··z′1···z′i
w (by induction)
iff p · z′′ = 〈〉 · (p · z′′1 ) · z′1 · · · z′k
with p · z′′1 ∈ ||δ||zw and z′i ∈ ||δ||z·z
′′
1 ·z′1···z′i
w
iff p · z′′ = z0 · z1 · · · zk+1 with z0 = 〈〉 and zi ∈ ||δ||z·z1···ziw
We further need the following definition:
5.1 The Logic ESG 177
Definition 5.11 (Precondition Extension). Let δ be a program. Then δp, called the precondi-
tion extension of δ, denotes the result of replacing every atomic action t in δ by Poss(t)?; t.
The above is necessary because according to Do, an atomic action action can only be executed
in case its precondition holds, while this is not required in the transition semantics of Definition
5.5.3 We then have:
Theorem 5.12. Let δ be a simple Golog program. Then
|= Do(δ, α) ≡ 〈δp〉α.
Proof. We prove w, z |= Do(δ, α) iff w, z |= 〈δp〉α by structural induction on δ:
• δ = t:
w, z |= Do(t, α)
iff w, z |= Poss(t) ∧ [t]α (by Definition 3.56)
iff w, z |= Poss(t) and w, z · p |= α, where p = |t|zw (by the semantics)
iff ||Poss(t)?||zw = {〈〉} and ||t||zw = {p} and w, z · p |= α, where p = |t|zw
(by Lemma 5.10 items 1 and 2)
iff ||Poss(t)?; t||zw = {p} and w, z · p |= α, where p = |t|zw (by Lemma 5.10 item 3)
iff for some z′ ∈ ||Poss(t)?; t||zw, w, z · z′ |= α
iff w, z |= 〈Poss(t)?; t〉α (by the semantics)
iff w, z |= 〈tp〉α
• δ = φ?
w, z |= Do(φ?, α)
iff w, z |= φ ∧ α (by Definition 3.56)
iff w, z |= φ and w, z |= α (by the semantics)
iff ||φ?||zw = {〈〉} and w, z |= α (by Lemma 5.10 item 2)
iff for some z′ ∈ ||φ?||zw, w, z · z′ |= α
iff w, z |= 〈φ?〉α (by the semantics)
iff w, z |= 〈φ?p〉α (since φ?p = φ?)
3Of course we could define an alternative version of the transition semantics that also includes preconditions,
but then the meaning of the [t] operator in case of atomic actions would differ from the one it has in ES.
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• δ = δ1; δ2:
w, z |= Do(δ1; δ2, α)
iff w, z |= Do(δ1,Do(δ2, α)) (by Definition 3.56)
iff w, z |= 〈δ1p〉Do(δ2, α) (by induction)
iff for some z′ ∈ ||δ1p||zw, w, z · z′ |= Do(δ2, α) (by the semantics)
iff for some z′ ∈ ||δ1p||zw, w, z · z′ |= 〈δ2p〉α (by induction)
iff for some z′ ∈ ||δ1p||zw and some z′′ ∈ ||δ2p||zw, w, z · z′ · z′′ |= α (by the semantics)
iff for some z′′′ ∈ ||δ1p; δ2p||zw, w, z · z′′′ |= α (by Lemma 5.10 item 3)
iff w, z |= 〈δ1p; δ2p〉α (by the semantics)
iff w, z |= 〈(δ1; δ2)p〉α (since δ1p; δ2p = (δ1; δ2)p)
• δ = δ1|δ2:
w, z |= Do(δ1|δ2, α)
iff w, z |= Do(δ1, α) ∨Do(δ2, α) (by Definition 3.56)
iff w, z |= Do(δ1, α) or w, z |= Do(δ2, α) (by the semantics)
iff w, z |= 〈δ1p〉α or w, z |= 〈δ2p〉α (by induction)
iff for some z′ ∈ ||δ1p||zw or some z′ ∈ ||δ2p||zw, w, z · z′ |= α (by the semantics)
iff for some z′ ∈ ||δ1p||zw ∪ ||δ2p||zw, w, z · z′ |= α (by set theory)
iff for some z′ ∈ ||δ1p|δ2p||zw, w, z · z′ |= α (by Lemma 5.10 item 4)
iff w, z |= 〈δ1p|δ2p〉α (by the semantics)
iff w, z |= 〈(δ1|δ2)p〉α (since δ1p|δ2p = (δ1|δ2)p)
• δ = pix. δ1:
w, z |= Do(pix. δ1, α)
iff w, z |= ∃x. Do(δ1, α) (by Definition 3.56)
iff for some n ∈ Nx, w, z |= Do(δ1, α)xn (by the semantics)
iff for some n ∈ Nx, w, z |= Do(δ1xn, α) (see below)
iff for some n ∈ Nx, w, z |= 〈δ1xnp〉α (by induction)
iff for some n ∈ Nx and some z′ ∈ ||δ1xnp||zw, w, z · z′ |= α (by the semantics)
iff for some n ∈ Nx and some z′ ∈ ||(δ1p)xn||zw, w, z · z′ |= α (since δ1xnp = (δ1p)xn)
iff for some z′ ∈ ||pix. δ1p||zw, w, z · z′ |= α (by Lemma 5.10 item 5)
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iff w, z |= 〈pix. δ1p〉α (by the semantics)
iff w, z |= 〈(pix. δ1)p〉α (since pix. δ1p = (pix. δ1)p)
Above we used that Do(δ1, α)
x
n = Do(δ1
x
n, α), which can be shown by a simple induction
on δ, where we assume without loss of generality that x does not appear freely in α.
• δ = δ1∗:
“⇒”: Let w, z |= Do(δ1∗, α). Therefore for all w′ with w′ z∼P w, if w′, z |= (α ⊃ P ) and
w′, z |= (Do(δ1, P ) ⊃ P ), then w′[P, z] = 1. Now let w0 be a world such that for all z′,
w0[P, z · z′] = 1 iff there is some z′′ ∈ ||(δ1∗)p||z·z′with w, z · z′ · z′′ |= α(5.15)
and which is otherwise like w. Clearly, w0
z∼P w. We will now show that
(i) w0, z |= (α ⊃ P ) and
(ii) w0, z |= (Do(δ1, P ) ⊃ P ).
From this it follows that w0[P, z] = 1, and hence by (5.15) that there is some z
′′ ∈ ||(δ1∗)p||zw
with w, z · z′′ |= α, therefore w, z |= 〈(δ1∗)p〉α.
To prove (i), let w0, z · z′ |= α. Recall that it is assumed that α does not contain P , hence
it is easy to show (by an induction on the structure of α) that also w, z · z′ |= α. Since
〈〉 ∈ ||δ1∗p||z·z′w for any z′, we have w0[P, z · z′] = 1.
For (ii), let w0, z · z′ |= Do(δ1, P ). By induction, w0, z · z′ |= 〈δ1p〉P . Semantically this
means that there is some z′′ ∈ ||δ1p||z·z′w0 such that w0[P, z · z′ · z′′] = 1. Since P is assumed
to not occur freely in δ1, it is also easy to show that z
′′ ∈ ||δ1p||z·z′w . By (5.15), there is
some z′′′ ∈ ||(δ1∗)p||z·z′·z′′w with w, z ·z′ ·z′′ ·z′′′ |= α. Lemma 5.10 item 6 implies that z′′′ has
the form z0 · z1 · · · zk, where z0 = 〈〉 and zi+1 ∈ ||δ1p||z·z′·z′′·z0···ziw . Using Lemma 5.10 item
6 again, and since z′′ ∈ ||δ1p||z·z′w , we obtain that z′′ · z′′′ ∈ ||(δ1∗)p||z·z
′
w as well. Therefore,
w0[P, z · z′] = 1.
“⇐”: Let w, z |= 〈(δ1∗)p〉α and for some w′ with w′ z∼P w, let
(i) w′, z |= (α ⊃ P ) and
(ii) w′, z |= (Do(δ1, P ) ⊃ P ).
We have to show that w′[P, z] = 1. By induction, Do(δ1, P ) is equivalent to 〈δ1p〉α,
therefore (ii) holds just in case that
(iii) for all z′′, if w′[P, z · z′′ · z′′′] = 1 for some z′′′ ∈ ||δ1p||z·z′′w , then also w′[P, z · z′′] = 1.
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By assumption, there is some z′ ∈ ||(δ1∗)p||zw and w, z · z′ |= α. By Lemma 5.10 item
6, z′ = z0 · z1 · · · zk, where z0 = 〈〉 and zi+1 ∈ ||δ1p||z·z0···ziw . Using (i) and the (again
easily provable) fact that w, z · z′ |= α iff w′, z · z′ |= α, we obtain w′[P, z · z′] = 1.
Applying (iii) repeatedly, we get w′[P, z · z0 · · · zi] = 1 for all 0 ≤ i < k. Thus in particular
w′[P, z] = 1.
Note that with the above theorem we also indirectly established the relation of our new transition
semantics to the original Situation Calculus definition of Golog [LRL+97] since it was shown
in [LL05a] that the ES Do is (under certain assumptions) equivalent to the Situation Calculus
Do. On the other hand, there is a discrepancy between our transition semantics and the one
provided for the original ConGolog of De Giacomo et al. [GLL00]: Whereas they treat tests
as an additional form of transitions (that leave the current situation unchanged), we regard
them here as mere conditions (e.g. for program termination, for branching etc) and require that
every transition actually corresponds to a physical action.
The difference between the two lies in the question of when during the execution of a
concurrent program δ1||δ2 it is possible to switch from one subprocess to the other. The semantics
of De Giacomo et al. allows executions which switch over from one process to the other only to
do a single test transition, and immediately switch back again to the first process. Sometimes,
this behaviour may be desired, e.g. when a test φ? plays the role of a “wait for” action that is
supposed to block a process until a certain condition becomes true. Often however this needs
to be avoided, in particular in the case of conditionals and while loops. For instance, when we
have a conditional statement
if φ then δ1 else δ2 endIf ,
it does not seem to make much sense to allow an execution in which φ is first successfully tested
to be true, after which a switch to a concurrent process occurs, that process turns φ to false,
and finally execution continues with the δ1 branch. For this reason, De Giacomo et al. introduce
synchronized versions of if and while that ensure that once the decision of which branch to
chose or whether to enter the body of the loop has been made, at least one physical action is
performed before program execution switches to a concurrent process again. The advantage of
not having tests as transitions, as is done in this thesis, is that we get synchronization “for free”
and can thus stick with the simple definitions of if -then-else and while as given in (5.5) and
(5.6), respectively.
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5.1.4 The Coffee Robot Example
Throughout this chapter, we will keep referring to our running example of the coffee delivery
robot. Below is the definition of the corresponding basic action theory. BATs in ESG are no
different from those we formulate in ES, and hence also all related results, in particular regarding
regression, are still valid.
The actions at the robot’s disposal are assumed to be wait (do nothing for a while),
selectRequest(x) (select x’s request to be served next), pickupCoffee (grab a cup of coffee)
and bringCoffee(x) (bring a cup of coffee to x). Additionally, there is an exogenous action
requestCoffee(x) that represents people sending coffee requests to the robot. The main fluents in
this domain are queue (the current queue of requests, functional) and HoldingCoffee (relational).
Sometimes we will also abbreviate selectRequest , requestCoffee, pickupCoffee, bringCoffee and
HoldingCoffee by sR, rC , pC , bC and HC , respectively.
Queues
As mentioned earlier, we imagine that the robot keeps an internal queue of the currently pending
coffee requests. Deviating from the original formulation in [GTR97], we do not axiomatize the
queue using second-order inductive definitions, but for the sake of simplicity resort to a k-ary
function symbol list , where k is the maximal size of the queue. The arguments of list then
denote the requests stored in the queue, where a distinguished standard name e is used to
represent an empty slot. If k = 3, then list(ann, bob, e) for example encodes the queue where
Ann’s request is at the top, Bob’s is second and no third request has been added yet.
We require in this case that queues satisfy the unique names assumption. We can achieve
this by putting the following into the initial theory Σ0:
list(x1, . . . , xk) = list(y1, . . . , yk) ⊃ x1 = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk = yk(5.16)
Since by default all object function symbols were defined to be fluent, we also include the
following successor state axiom in Σpost:
[a]list(x1, . . . , xk) = y ≡ list(x1, . . . , xk) = y(5.17)
Consequently, (5.16) will then hold in all situations.
As a more convenient notation we will often write 〈x1, . . . , xk〉 instead of list(x1, . . . , xk),
but it should be kept in mind that queues are really only ordinary terms when it comes to their
semantical interpretation, regression and the like.
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We will furthermore use some abbreviations related to queues to express when an item is
the first element of a queue, a queue is empty or full, a queue has at least one free slot, or what
is the resulting queue when an element is added or removed, respectively:
IsFirst(q, x)
def
= ∃x2 . . . ∃xk. q = 〈x, x2, . . . , xk〉(5.18)
Empty(q)
def
= q = 〈e, . . . , e〉(5.19)
Full(q)
def
= ∃x1 . . . ∃xk. q = 〈x1, . . . , xk〉 ∧
k∧
i=1
xi 6= e(5.20)
LastFree(q)
def
= ∃x1 . . . ∃xk−1. q = 〈x1, . . . , xk−1, e〉(5.21)
Enqueue(qo, x, qn)
def
=
k−1∨
i=0
∃x1 . . . ∃xi.
i∧
j=1
xj 6= e ∧(5.22)
qo = 〈x1, . . . , xi, e, . . . , e〉 ∧ qn = 〈x1, . . . , xi, x, e, . . . , e〉
Dequeue(qo, x, qn)
def
= ∃x2 . . . ∃xk. qo = 〈x, x2, . . . , xk〉 ∧ qn = 〈x2, . . . , xk, e〉(5.23)
5.1.5 Control Program
For the most part we will assume that the robot is controlled by the precondition-extended
variant of program (5.1), presented below:
loop
if¬Empty(queue)
then (pix)
Poss(selectRequest(x))?; selectRequest(x);
Poss(pickupCoffee)?; pickupCoffee;
Poss(bringCoffee(x))?; bringCoffee(x)
else Poss(wait)?; wait
endIf
endLoop
(5.24)
Exogenous Actions
Exogenous actions are those which are not under the control of the agent, but can happen
at any time during the runtime of the robot. In our scenario, there is only one such action,
namely requestCoffee(x), representing a newly arriving coffee request by person x. To distin-
guish exogenous from ordinary actions, we let the definitional part Σdef of our BAT contain the
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axiom
Exo(a) ≡ ∃x. a = requestCoffee(x)(5.25)
Let δ be the control program of the robot. In addition, we have a program
δexo
def
= (pia. Exo(a)?; a)ω(5.26)
that continuously executes exogenous actions at random. The interaction between robot be-
haviour and its environment is then modelled by the program
δ||δexo.
Occurrence of Actions
Sometimes we need to be able to refer to the previously executed action, for example in temporal
properties such as (5.2) and (5.3). We can do this by means of the Occ predicate, which we can
treat as any other normal fluent by including
∀a. ¬Occ(a)(5.27)
into Σ0 and
[a]Occ(a′) ≡ (a = a′)(5.28)
into Σpost.
Preconditions
Moreover, we include a precondition axiom in Σdef as follows:
Poss(a) ≡(5.29)
(a = wait) ∨
∃x (a = requestCoffee(x) ∧ x 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue)) ∨
∃x (a = selectRequest(x) ∧ x 6= e ∧ IsFirst(queue, x)) ∨
(a = pickupCoffee ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee) ∨
∃x (a = bringCoffee(x) ∧HoldingCoffee)
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Successor State Axioms
Finally, we have the following successor state axioms for the queue and HoldingCoffee fluents
in Σpost:
[a]HoldingCoffee ≡(5.30)
a = pickupCoffee ∨HoldingCoffee ∧ ¬∃x. a = bringCoffee(x)
[a]queue = y ≡(5.31)
∃x (a = requestCoffee(x) ∧ Enqueue(queue, x, y)) ∨
∃x (a = selectRequest(x) ∧Dequeue(queue, x, y)) ∨
queue = y ∧ ¬∃x(a = requestCoffee(x) ∨ a = selectRequest(x))
5.2 Characteristic Graphs
Next, we introduce a graph-based representation for program traces and show that any Golog
program admitted by (5.4) can be represented in this manner.
5.2.1 Trace Graphs
Definition 5.13 (Trace Graphs). A trace graph is given by a triple G = 〈V,E, v0〉, where
• V is a finite set of vertices such that each vertex v ∈ V is associated with a situation
formula ϕ(v);
• E is a finite set of edges of the form v ψ1/pi~x:t/ψ2−−−−−−−→ v′, where v, v′ ∈ V , ~x is a possibly empty
list of variables, t is an action term and ψ1, ψ2 are situation formulas;
• v0 ∈ V is a distinguished vertex called the initial node.
As notational convention, we omit the leading pi in edges in case the ~x is empty, and we omit
any ψi that is >.
The intuition behind trace graphs is that nodes represent possible system configurations, whereas
edges encode possible transitions among them. For that matter, each node contains a termina-
tion condition ϕ(v), while edges are labelled with a list of variables ~x to be (newly) instantiated,
the action t to be taken, as well as a first transition condition ψ1 (to be tested prior to (re-)
instantiating the ~x) and a second transition condition ψ2 (to be tested after (re-) instantiating
the ~x). Similar to program traces, there are both finite and infinite traces admitted by trace
graphs. The former correspond to finite paths through the graph that start in the initial node,
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along which all encountered transition conditions are satisfied (wrt a given initial w and z) and
that ends in a node whose termination condition is satisfied as well. An infinite trace further-
more is given by an infinite path starting in v0 such that no visited node’s termination condition
is ever satisfied. To formalize this intuition, we first need the notion of variable maps:
Definition 5.14 (Variable Maps). A variable map θ is an assignment that maps each variable
to a standard name of the appropriate sort. We write θ[x/n] to denote the variable map that is
like θ, except that it maps x to n. When ~x abbreviates x1, . . . , xk and ~n stands for n1, . . . , nk,
we use θ[~x/~n] as an abbreviation for θ[x1/n1] · · · [xk/nk].
For any formula φ, we let φθ stand for the application of θ to φ, which refers to the result
of substituting each free variable x in φ by θ(x), and similarly for terms and programs.
One consequence of the definition we will frequently use is that for any formula φ, variable map
θ, variable y and standard name n of the same sort as y,
φθ[y/n] = φynθ.(5.32)
Again, the same is true for terms and programs. Without loss of generality, we will from now
on also assume that all variables, no matter whether free or quantified by pi, ∃ or ∀, are distinct.
Definition 5.15 (Traces Admitted by Trace Graphs). Given a trace graph G = 〈V,E, v0〉, a
graph configuration is of the form
〈v, θ, w, z〉
where v ∈ V , θ is a variable map, w ∈ W and z ∈ Z. Similar to program execution, we define
transition steps and finality of graph configurations as follows:
• 〈v, θ, w, z〉 G−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉 iff there is an edge v ψ1/pi~x:t/ψ2−−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E and some standard
names ~n such that θ′ = θ[~x/~n], p = |tθ′|zw, and w, z |= ψ1θ ∧ ψ2θ′.
• 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ FG iff w, z |= ϕ(v)θ.
Let w ∈ W, z ∈ Z and θ be a variable map. There are both finite and infinite runs through a
trace graph:
1. A finite run r from z wrt w and θ0 through G is of the form
〈v0, θ0, w, z〉 G−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 G−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 G−→ · · · G−→ 〈vk, θk, w, z · p1 · p2 · · · pk〉
where k ≥ 0, v0 is the initial node of G and 〈vk, θk, w, z · p1 · p2 · · · pk〉 ∈ FG . The trace of
r then is
||r|| = p1 · p2 · · · pk
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2. An infinite run r from z wrt w and θ0 through G is an infinite sequence 4
〈v0, θ0, w, z〉 G−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 G−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 G−→ 〈v3, θ3, w, z · p1 · p2 · p3〉 G−→ · · ·
where v0 is the initial node of G and for all i ≥ 0, 〈vi, θi, w, z · p1 · · · pi〉 6∈ FG . The trace
of r then is
||r|| = p1 · p2 · p3 · · ·
The set of all traces admitted by G, given w, z and θ is
||G||zw(θ) = {||r|| | r is a (finite or infinite) run from z wrt w and θ through G}.
5.2.2 Characteristic Program Graphs
It will now become apparent why we restricted ourselves in Section 5.1.1 to the class Golog
programs admitted by (5.4): All programs within this class are representable by means of a trace
graph. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that given any such program δ, the set of reachable
subprograms (modulo substitution of free variables) is finite.
Definition 5.16 (Characteristic Program Graphs). Let δ be a program. The characteristic
graph of δ is given by a trace graph Gδ = 〈V,E, v0〉, where vertices v ∈ V have the form
〈δ′, φ〉. Intuitively, each such node represents the set of all program configurations 〈z, δ′〉 with
the same remaining subprogram δ′, while the edges encode the transition relation among those
configurations. The second component φ furthermore indicates whether δ′ is final, i.e. φ = ϕ(v)
is the termination condition in the terminology of Definition 5.13. Gδ is defined by induction
on the structure of δ:
• δ is a primitive action t:
In this case, we have two nodes, connected by a single edge labelled with t, where the
initial is not final, but the second one is:
v0 = 〈t,⊥〉;
V = {〈t,⊥〉, 〈nil ,>〉};
E = {〈t,⊥〉 t−→ 〈nil ,>〉}.
The graph is depicted in Figure 5.1(a).
4An infinite run is again formally defined as a mapping from the natural numbers to graph configurations
such that each subsequent configuration is reachable by a transition step from its predecessor.
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〈a,⊥〉 〈nil ,>〉
a
(a) single action a
〈α?, α〉
(b) test α?
〈a; b,⊥〉 〈b,⊥〉 〈nil ,>〉
a b
(c) sequence a; b
〈a||b,⊥〉
〈nil ||b,⊥〉
〈a||nil ,⊥〉
〈nil ||nil ,>〉
a
b a
b
(d) concurrent execution a||b
〈a|b,⊥〉 〈nil ,>〉
a
b
(e) nondeterministic choice a|b
〈piy (α?; a),⊥〉 〈nil ,>〉
piy : a/α
(f) nondet. choice of argument
piy (α?; a)
〈a∗,>〉
a
(g) iteration a∗
〈aω,⊥〉
a
(h) loop aω
Figure 5.1: Example characteristic graphs
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• δ is a test α?:
Here we have a single node with α? as its program and α as termination condition:
v0 = 〈α?, α〉;
V = {〈α?, α〉};
E = ∅.
The corresponding graph is shown in Figure 5.1(b).
• δ is a sequence of programs δ1; δ2:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v10〉 and Gδ2 = 〈V2, E2, v20〉, where vi0 = 〈δi, ϕi0〉. Then
v0 = 〈δ1; δ2, ϕ10 ∧ ϕ20〉;
V = {〈δ′1; δ2, ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ20〉 | 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1} ∪ V2;
E = {〈δ′1; δ2, ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ20〉
φ1/pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 ; δ2, ϕ′′1 ∧ ϕ20〉 | 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉
φ1/pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 , ϕ′′1〉 ∈ E1} ∪
{〈δ′1; δ2, ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ20〉
φ2/pi~x:t/ϕ′1∧φ′2−−−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′2, ϕ′2〉 | 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1, ϕ′1 6= ⊥,
〈δ2, ϕ20〉
φ2/pi~x:t/φ′2−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′2, ϕ′2〉 ∈ E2} ∪
E2.
The idea here is to essentially leave Gδ1 as it is, but where each δ′1 turns into δ′1; δ2 and
each termination condition is augmented by ϕ20, the condition under which δ2 is final. Gδ2
then remains unchanged and we have copies of edges originally going out of v20 also at all
δ′1; δ2 nodes, with the additional constraint that δ′1 is final, i.e. that ϕ′1 holds.
An example graph for a program containing a sequence is given in Figure 5.1(c).
• δ is a nondeterministic choice between two subprograms δ1|δ2:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v1o〉 and Gδ2 = 〈V2, E2, v2o〉, where vi0 = 〈δi, ϕi0〉. Then
v0 = 〈δ1|δ2, ϕ10 ∨ ϕ20〉;
V = {v0} ∪ V1 ∪ V2;
E = {v0 pi~x:t/φ
′
i−−−−→ vi | vi0
pi~x:t/φ′i−−−−→ vi ∈ Ei} ∪ E1 ∪ E2.
Here we have a copy of each Gδi . From the new initial node, there are copies of the
outgoing edges of both vi0. Thus, the first transition corresponds to the commitment to
either δ1 or δ2, and all subsequent transitions have to be in the chosen subprogram.
A small example of a characteristic graph for a program containing a nondeterministic
choice is shown in Figure 5.1(e).
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• δ is a nondeterministic choice of argument piy.δ1:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v1o〉, where v10 = 〈δ1, ϕ10〉. Then
v0 = 〈piy.δ1, ∃y.ϕ10〉;
V = {v0} ∪ V1;
E = {v0 piy,~x:t/φ
′
1−−−−−−→ v′1 | v10
pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−→ v′1 ∈ E1} ∪ E1.
In this case we extend a copy of Gδ1 with a new initial node whose outgoing edges contain
the additional choice for y and whose termination condition also requires the existence of
an appropriate y.
An example of a simple program with a nondeterministic choice of argument is depicted
in Figure 5.1(f).
• δ is the concurrent execution of two subprograms δ1||δ2:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v1o〉 and Gδ2 = 〈V2, E2, v2o〉, where vi0 = 〈δi, ϕi0〉. Then
v0 = 〈δ1||δ2, ϕ10 ∧ ϕ20〉;
V = {〈δ′1||δ′2, ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ′2〉 | 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉∈V1, 〈δ′2, ϕ′2〉∈V2};
E = {〈δ′1||δ′2, ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ′2〉
φ1/pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 ||δ′2, ϕ′′1 ∧ ϕ′2〉 | 〈δ′2, ϕ′2〉 ∈ V2,
〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉
φ1/pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 , ϕ′′1〉 ∈ E1} ∪
{〈δ′1||δ′2, ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ′2〉
φ2/pi~x:t/φ′2−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′1||δ′′2 , ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ′′2〉 | 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1,
〈δ′2, ϕ′2〉
φ2/pi~x:t/φ′2−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′2 , ϕ′′2〉 ∈ E2}.
The set of vertices here is something like the Cartesian product of the nodes of the Gδi .
Edges are such that either a transition in δ1 or one in δ2 is taken, and the other program
remains unchanged.
A simple example of the graph for a concurrent execution is provided in Figure 5.1(d).
• δ is an iteration (δ1)∗:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v1o〉. Then
v0 = 〈(δ1)∗,>〉;
V = {v0} ∪ {〈δ′1; (δ1)∗, ϕ′1〉 | 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1};
E = {v0 pi~x:t/φ
′
1−−−−−→ 〈δ′1; (δ1)∗, ϕ′1〉 | v10
pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−→ 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ E1 } ∪
{〈δ′1; (δ1)∗, ϕ′1〉
φ1/pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 ; (δ1)∗, ϕ′′1〉 | 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉
φ1/pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 , ϕ′′1〉 ∈ E1} ∪
{〈δ′1; (δ1)∗, ϕ′1〉
ϕ′1/pi~x:t/φ
′
1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 ; (δ1)∗, ϕ′′1〉 | 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1, ϕ′1 6= ⊥
v10
pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 , ϕ′′1〉 ∈ E1 }.
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Here we introduce a new initial node, which has > as the termination condition, and
which has copies of the leaving edges of the initial node of Gδ1 . Furthermore, we have
copies of all edges within Gδ1 where each subprogram δ′1 simply becomes δ′1; (δ1)∗. Finally,
there are edges that encode the case where the δ′1 is final and a new iteration of (δ1)
∗ is
started.
A simple example of the graph for an iteration is depicted in Figure 5.1(g).
A consequence from the above definition is:
Lemma 5.17. Gδ is a trace graph.
Proof. This is almost obvious from the definition. One specialty of the definition is that it
is assumed that for all edges v0
φ1/pi~x:t/φ2−−−−−−−→ v′ leaving the initial node v0 of the graph of a
subprogram, the corresponding φ1 is > (and therefore omitted). It is easy to show by induction
on δ that this property then translates to all programs, and hence that Gδ is well defined.5
Note that in the examples depicted in Figure 5.1 we made use of two conventions with respect
to characteristic graphs, which we will keep using throughout the remainder of the thesis: On
the one hand, we make “obvious” simplifications for programs and formulas, e.g. both (nil ; δ)
and (δ; nil) become δ, ⊥∧α becomes ⊥, >∨β becomes > etc. We can thus identify “obviously”
equivalent nodes and edges, which helps keeping the graphs smaller and simpler.
On the other hand, all nodes and edges are omitted that are unreachable (in the graph-
theoretic sense) from the corresponding initial node v0. For example in the graph of Figure
5.1(e) for the program a|b, we dropped the nodes 〈a,⊥〉 and 〈b,⊥〉 (which originated as the
initial nodes of the graphs for the subprograms a and b, respectively) as well as their outgoing
edges 〈a,⊥〉 a−→ 〈nil ,>〉 and 〈b,⊥〉 b−→ 〈nil ,>〉. This is safe in the sense that no admitted traces
are lost since vertices and edges that are unreachable from the initial node can obviously never
be part of a successful run through the graph.
Let δcoffee denote the control program for the coffee robot given in (5.1). Recall that
the exogenous actions of the domain are furthermore represented by the program δexo =
(pia. Exo(a)?; a)ω. Figure 5.2 shows the characteristic graph for the overall program δcoffee ||δexo,
5In fact it will rarely occur that we get any nontrivial φ1 in an edge v
φ1/pi~x:t/φ2−−−−−−−→ v′. One example is the
program (piy.g(y);P (y)?)∗, where when entering the next cycle of the iteration, we have to test for P (y) with the
previously chosen instantiation of y before choosing a new instance.
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v0 v1
v2
pia : a/Exo(a) pia : a/Exo(a)
pia : a/Exo(a)
wait/Empty(queue)
pix : selectRequest(x)/
¬Empty(queue)
pickupCoffee
bringCoffee(x)
Figure 5.2: Characteristic graph for the coffee robot example
where
v0 = 〈δcoffee || δexo,⊥〉(5.33)
v1 = 〈(pickupCoffee; bringCoffee(x); δcoffee) || δexo,⊥〉(5.34)
v2 = 〈(bringCoffee(x); δcoffee) || δexo,⊥〉(5.35)
Intuitively, the graph can be understood as follows: The fact that the program is a nonter-
minating one is reflected in the cyclic structure of the graph and the termination conditions
of all nodes being ⊥. In each cycle of the infinite loop, there is the choice between either do-
ing wait when the queue is empty (the lower reflexive edge at v0) or otherwise executing the
sequence selectRequest(x); pickupCoffee; bringCoffee(x) (the cycle between v0, v1 and v2) after
choosing an instantiation for the x. Because exogenous actions can happen at any time, each
node furthermore possesses a reflexive edge labelled with pia : a/Exo(a).
Before we prove that the characteristic graphs correctly capture all program traces, we first
need the following lemmas. First, we note that the remaining program in the initial node of a
characteristic graph of a program δ is δ itself:
Lemma 5.18. If Gδ = 〈V,E, v0〉, then v0 = 〈δ, φ〉 for some φ.
Proof. Obvious from Definition 5.16.
Next we have a central lemma that establishes the correspondence between transitions in char-
acteristic graphs and transitions in programs, as well as between finality of graph configurations
and finality of programs:
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Lemma 5.19. Let δ be a program (possibly with free variables), w ∈ W, and z ∈ Z. Then for
all δ′, δ′′ appearing in nodes of Gδ (including δ itself) and all variable maps θ′, θ′′:
(1) 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ′′, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉 iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′θ′′〉
(2) 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 ∈ Fw
Proof. The lemma can be proved by an induction on the structure of δ. The details can be
found in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 5.20. Let δ be a program and θ a variable map. If 〈z, δθ〉 w−→∗〈z′, δ′〉, then δ′ = δ′′θ′
for some δ′′ appearing in some node of Gδ and some variable map θ′.
Proof. The proof is by a simple, but tedious outer induction on the structure of δ and an inner
induction on the length of z′.
We can now note that characteristic graphs correctly represent programs in the sense that the
traces admitted by a program are exactly the traces admitted by its characteristic graph:
Theorem 5.21. Let δ be a program (possibly with free variables), θ a variable map, w ∈ W,
and z ∈ Z. Then
||Gδ||zw(θ) = ||δθ||zw
Proof. We prove the two cases of finite and infinite traces separately:
• Finite traces:
z′ ∈ ||Gδ||zw(θ0)
iff there is a finite run
〈〈δ, · 〉, θ0, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ1, · 〉, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ · · · Gδ−→ 〈〈δk, · 〉, θk, w, z · p1 · p2 · · · pk〉
such that z′ = p1 · · · pk, k ≥ 0 and 〈〈δk, · 〉, θk, w, z · p1 · p2 · · · pk〉 ∈ FGδ
(by Definitions 5.15 and 5.16 as well as Lemma 5.18)
iff 〈z, δθ0〉 w−→ 〈z · p1, δ1θ1〉 w−→ · · · w−→ 〈z · p1 · p2 · · · pk, δkθk〉
such that z′ = p1 · · · pk, k ≥ 0 and 〈z · p1 · p2 · · · pk, δkθk〉 ∈ Fw (by Lemma 5.19)
iff 〈z, δθ0〉 w−→∗〈z · z′, δ′〉 and 〈z · z′, δ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Lemma 5.20)
iff z′ ∈ ||δθ0||zw (by Definition 5.7)
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• Infinite traces:
pi ∈ ||Gδ||zw(θ0)
iff there is an infinite run
〈〈δ, · 〉, θ0, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ1, · 〉, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ2, · 〉, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ · · ·
such that pi = p1 · p2 · · · and for all i ≥ 0, 〈〈δi, · 〉, θi, w, z · p1 · · · pi〉 6∈ FGδ
(by Definitions 5.15 and 5.16 as well as Lemma 5.18)
iff 〈z, δθ0〉 w−→ 〈z · p1, δ1θ1〉 w−→ 〈z · p1 · p2, δ2θ2〉 w−→ · · ·
s.t. pi = p1 · p2 · · · and for all i ≥ 0, 〈z · p1 · · · pi, δiθi〉 6∈ Fw (by Lemma 5.19)
iff 〈z, δθ0〉 w−→ 〈z · p1, δ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p1 · p2, δ′′〉 w−→ · · ·
such that pi = p1 · p2 · · · and for all i ≥ 0, 〈z · p1 · · · pi, δ(i)〉 6∈ Fw (by Lemma 5.20)
iff pi ∈ ||δθ0||zw (by Definition 5.7)
5.3 Nonterminating Programs
We are now ready to use the characteristic graphs for verifying program properties. The first
verification method we discuss for nonterminating programs is inspired by the classic CTL
model checking algorithm [CES86]. In a nutshell, the latter operates on a finite transition system
which represents a concurrent, nonterminating system. Using an exhaustive search of the state
space, the method inductively identifies subsets of states that satisfy the different subformulas
of the CTL input formula. Subformulas that include a universal (A) or an existential (E) path
quantifier are evaluated by an iterative fixpoint computation.
The algorithm presented in this section evaluates formulas in a similar manner. Conse-
quently, we will consider a CTL-like subset of ESG, as defined in the following subsection. The
main differences to classic CTL are that we allow for first-order quantification and that instead
of the A and E quantifiers, we use the more general program trace quantifiers [[δ]] and 〈〈δ〉〉 of
ESG. The characteristic graphs then somewhat play the role of the transition system in the
sense that they are used to systematically explore the space of possible program configurations.
5.3.1 The Logic ESGCTL
Definition 5.22 (ESGCTL). The formulas of ESGCTL are the ones admitted by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= (t1 = t2) | F (~t) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | 〈〈δ〉〉Xϕ | 〈〈δ〉〉(ϕ U ϕ) | 〈〈δ〉〉Gϕ(5.36)
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In the latter three cases, the program δ is required to have the form
δ1
ω|| · · · ||δkω.(5.37)
Apart from the fact that we prohibit [ · ] operators here,6 the major restriction is that we require
path operators 〈〈δ〉〉 to be applied directly to subformulas of the form Xϕ, (ϕ1 U ϕ2), or Gϕ. In
particular, Boolean combinations of temporal subformulas are disallowed. Like in CTL, only
using existential path quantifiers is no real restriction, since the following equivalences are valid:
Lemma 5.23. Let δ be a program that does not admit finite traces. Then:
|=  [[δ]]Xϕ ≡ ¬〈〈δ〉〉X¬ϕ(5.38)
|=  [[δ]]Gϕ ≡ ¬〈〈δ〉〉(> U ¬ϕ)(5.39)
|=  [[δ]](ϕ1 U ϕ2) ≡ ¬〈〈δ〉〉(¬ϕ2 U (¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2)) ∧ ¬〈〈δ〉〉G¬ϕ2(5.40)
Proof.
• (5.38) follows directly from our semantics definition:
w, z |= [[δ]]Xϕ
iff for all pi ∈ ||δ||zw, if pi = p · pi′, then w, z · p, pi′ |= ϕ
iff there is no pi ∈ ||δ||zw such that pi = p · pi′ and w, z · p, pi′ 6|= ϕ
iff there is no pi ∈ ||δ||zw such that w, z, pi |= X¬ϕ
iff w, z |= ¬〈〈δ〉〉X¬ϕ
• (5.39) is also an almost immediate consequence of the semantics:
w, z |= [[δ]]Gϕ
iff for all pi ∈ ||δ||zw and all z′ such that pi = z′ · pi′, w, z · z′, pi′ |= ϕ
iff there is no pi ∈ ||δ||zw such that for some z′ with pi = z′ · pi′, w, z · z′, pi′ 6|= ϕ
iff there is no pi ∈ ||δ||zw such that w, z, pi |= (> U ¬ϕ)
iff w, z |= ¬〈〈δ〉〉(> U ¬ϕ)
• We prove the two directions of (5.40) separately:
“⇒”: Let w, z |= [[δ]](ϕ1 U ϕ2) and assume that w, z |= 〈〈δ〉〉(¬ϕ2 U (¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ1)) or
w, z |= 〈〈δ〉〉G¬ϕ2. In the former case, there is some pi ∈ ||δ||zw such that pi = z′ · pi′,
6We deal with such formulas in Section 5.5.
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w, z · z′, pi′ |= ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 and for all z′′ 6= z′ with z′ = z′′ · z′′′, w, z · z′′, z′′′ · pi′ 6|= ϕ2.
Then obviously w, z, pi 6|= (ϕ1 U ϕ2), contradiction. In the latter case, we get that for
some pi ∈ ||δ||zw, for all z′ with pi = z′ · pi′, w, z · z′ 6|= ϕ2. Again, w, z, pi 6|= (ϕ1 U ϕ2),
contradiction.
“⇐”: Conversely, let w, z |= ¬〈〈δ〉〉(¬ϕ2 U (¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2)) ∧ ¬〈〈δ〉〉G¬ϕ2 and suppose that
w, z 6|= [[δ]](ϕ1 U ϕ2). This means there is some pi ∈ ||δ||zw such that for all z′ with pi = z′ ·pi′,
w, z · z′, pi′ 6|= ϕ2 or there exists z′′ 6= z′ with z′ = z′′ · z′′′ so that w, z · z′′, z′′′ ·pi′ 6|= ϕ1. Let
z0 be the smallest action sequence with pi = z0 · pi0 and w, z · z0, pi0 |= ϕ2. Note that there
must be such a sequence as otherwise this would directly contradict w, z |= ¬〈〈δ〉〉Gϕ2.
By assumption, there is some z′0 6= z0 such that z0 = z′0 · z′′0 and w, z · z′0, z′′0 · pi0 6|= ϕ1,
and for all z1 6= z0 with z0 = z1 · z′1, w, z0 · z1, z′1 · pi′0 6|= ϕ2. This however contradicts
w, z |= ¬〈〈δ〉〉(¬ϕ2 U (¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2)).
Using the above, example property (5.3) is thus a formula of ESGCTL, while (5.2) is not,7 as all
traces of programs according to (5.37) are infinite:
Lemma 5.24. Let δ be a program of the form δ1
ω|| · · · ||δkω and θ a variable map. Then δθ does
not admit finite traces. Equivalently, if Gδ = 〈V,E, v0〉, then for all 〈δ′, ϕ′〉 ∈ V , |= ϕ′ ≡ ⊥.
Proof. It suffices to show that for all nodes in the characteristic graph of δ, the termination
condition is equivalent to ⊥. By Definition 5.15 and Lemma 5.19, there then cannot be any
finite trace in ||Gδ||zw(θ), and hence by Theorem 5.21 neither in ||δθ||zw.
Let Gδiω = 〈Vi, Ei, vi0〉 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k. By the concurrency case of Definition 5.16, all nodes
in Gδ are of the form 〈δ′1|| · · · ||δ′k, ϕ′1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ′k〉, where 〈δ′i, ϕ′i〉 ∈ Vi. The claim therefore follows
if all ϕ′i are ⊥. It is easy to see that this is indeed the case, as δiω is shorthand for (δi)∗;⊥?, for
which Definition 5.16 implies that the set of nodes consist of nodes of the form 〈δ′′1 ;⊥?, ϕ′′1 ∧⊥〉
and 〈⊥?,⊥〉.
It can further be argued that (5.37) is not a rigorous restriction because it represents the
typical structure one would expect a robot’s non-terminating control program to have, where
the intuition is that the robot concurrently performs a number of different (open-ended) tasks,
each of which is implemented by some infinitely looping subprogram δi
ω, and where one of the
δi
ω moreover is the δexo program that encodes exogenous actions. Obviously, our coffee robot’s
program δcoffee ||δexo is an example that adheres to this form.
7We deal with such formulas in Section 5.4.
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5.3.2 The Algorithm
We now define our meta-level operator that, similar to regression, transforms a formula of
ESGCTL into an equivalent fluent formula. As all such manipulations will be with respect to
some basic action theory Σ, we first have the following definition:
Definition 5.25 (Verifiable ESGCTL Formulas). Let Σ be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉.
An ESGCTL formula ϕ is verifiable iff it only mentions fluents from 〈D,F〉, every quantifier uses
a distinct variable and every occurrence of a functional fluent is of the form f(~t) = ~t′, where ~t
and ~t′ do not contain any further functional fluents.
Note that the restriction to fluents from 〈D,F〉 also applies to test formulas within programs
mentioned in ϕ.
Definition 5.26 (Verification Transform Operator for ESGCTL Formulas). Let Σ be a basic
action theory over 〈D,F〉 and ϕ a verifiable ESGCTL formula. The verification transformation
of ϕ wrt Σ, denoted as C[ϕ], is inductively defined as follows:
1. C[(t1 = t2)] = R[(t1 = t2)];
2. C[F (~t)] = R[F (~t)];
3. C[ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2] = C[ϕ1] ∧ C[ϕ2];
4. C[¬ϕ] = ¬C[ϕ];
5. C[∃x.ϕ] = ∃x.C[ϕ];
6. C[〈〈δ〉〉Xϕ] = CheckEX[δ, C[ϕ]];
7. C[〈〈δ〉〉Gϕ] = CheckEG[δ, C[ϕ]];
8. C[〈〈δ〉〉(ϕ1 U ϕ2)] = CheckEU[δ, C[ϕ1], C[ϕ2]].
The interesting cases of course are those for 〈〈δ〉〉Xϕ, 〈〈δ〉〉Gϕ and 〈〈δ〉〉(ϕ1 U ϕ2) subformulas.
For each of them, there is a corresponding procedure (CheckEX, CheckEG, and CheckEU
respectively) which we will discuss in the following. First of all, each of these procedures works
on the characteristic graph of the input program, using labels on the graph nodes:
Definition 5.27 (Labels). Let G = 〈V,E, v0〉 be a trace graph. A label on G is of the form
〈v, ψ〉, where v ∈ V and ψ is a fluent formula. Furthermore, a labelling of G or a label set on G
is a set of labels, containing exactly one label for each v ∈ V .8
8A labelling thus is actually a mapping from nodes to formulas, but for convenience, we will resort to a
set-based notation.
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Intuitively, a label represents a set of graph configurations. Formally, let Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost
be a basic action theory. Then we define
||〈v, ψ〉||Σ def= {〈v, θ, w, z〉 | w, z |= ψθ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost}(5.41)
For any label set L let
||L||Σ def=
⋃
{||〈v, ψ〉||Σ | 〈v, ψ〉 ∈ L}(5.42)
Definition 5.28 (Operations on Labels). We define the following operations on labels: Let
G = 〈V,E, v0〉 be a trace graph, α a fluent formula and L1 and L2 label sets. Then
Label[〈V,E, v0〉, α] def= {〈v, α〉 | v ∈ V }(5.43)
L1 And L2
def
= {〈v, ψ1 ∧ ψ2〉 | 〈v, ψ1〉 ∈ L1, 〈v, ψ2〉 ∈ L2}(5.44)
L1 Or L2
def
= {〈v, ψ1 ∨ ψ2〉 | 〈v, ψ1〉 ∈ L1, 〈v, ψ2〉 ∈ L2}(5.45)
InitLabel[〈V,E, v0〉, L] def= ψ such that 〈v0, ψ〉 ∈ L(5.46)
That is we can generate a labelling for some specified formula α using Label[G, α], yielding a
label set where every node in G is labelled with α. Conjunction and disjunction of two label sets
is defined as expected, i.e. by applying these operations individually to the formulas in labels at
the same node. InitLabel[G, L] extracts the formula by which the initial node of G is labelled
(recall that there is exactly one label for each node, hence the returned formulas is unique). We
furthermore need to decide when two label sets are equivalent:
Definition 5.29 (Label Equivalence). Let L1 and L2 be label sets. Then we define
L1 ≡ L2 iff for all v ∈ V such that 〈v, ψ1〉 ∈ L1 and 〈v, ψ2〉 ∈ L2, |= ψ1 ≡ ψ2.(5.47)
We note that the conjunction, disjunction and equivalence of label sets corresponds to the
intersection, union and equality, respectively, of the represented sets of configurations:
Lemma 5.30. Let L1 and L2 be label sets over some trace graph G and Σ a basic action theory.
Then
||L1 And L2||Σ = ||L1||Σ ∩ ||L2||Σ
||L1 Or L2||Σ = ||L1||Σ ∪ ||L2||Σ
L1 ≡ L2 iff ||L1||Σ = ||L2||Σ
198 5 GOLOG VERIFICATION
Proof. The first two cases follow immediately from (5.42) and Definition 5.28. In the third case,
||L1||Σ equals ||L2||Σ for any BAT Σ due to the fact that labels contain only fluent formulas, which
means that their truth (and hence by Definition 5.29 also equivalence between them) does not
depend on Σdef ∪ Σpost.
Finally, a paramount ingredient for all three subprocedures is the computation of the preimage
of a set of labels:
Definition 5.31 (Preimage). Let L be a set of labels on some trace graph G = 〈V,E, v0〉 and
Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory. The preimage of L is defined as:
Pre[〈V,E, v0〉, L] = {〈v,Pre[v, L]〉 | v ∈ V }(5.48)
where
Pre[v, L] =
∨
{R[φ ∧ ∃~x.φ′ ∧ [t]ψ] | v φ/pi~x:t/φ
′
−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E, 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L}.(5.49)
We follow the usual convention that the disjunction over the empty set is identified with ⊥.
Here we consider all incoming edges of any node in the graph, where in each case, we have to
determine the regression of the label formula of the adjacent node through the corresponding
action. Furthermore included are the two transition conditions φ and φ′ as well as an existential
quantification over the pi-quantified variables at the edge. Recall that φ is the condition that
has to hold before instantiating the ~x, hence the scope of ∃~x begins only after φ. Also note that
it is necessary to regress φ and φ′ because they may contain definitional fluents such as Poss.
Semantically, the preimage of L represents the set of possible predecessor configurations of
those represented by L, which is established in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.32. Let G = 〈V,E, v0〉 be a trace graph and Σ be a basic action theory. Then
||Pre[G, L]||Σ = {〈v, θ, w, z〉 | 〈v, θ, w, z〉 G−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉, 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉 ∈ ||L||Σ}.
Proof. 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Pre[G, L]||Σ
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||〈v,Pre[v, L]〉||Σ (by (5.48) and (5.42))
iff w, z |= Pre[v, L]θ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by (5.41))
iff w, z |= R[φ ∧ ∃~x.φ′ ∧ [t]ψ]θ,
where v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E, 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L, and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by (5.49))
iff w, z |= φθ and for some ~n, w, z |= φ′~x~nθ and w, z · p |= ψ~x~nθ,
where v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E, 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L, w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and p = |t~x~nθ|zw (see below)
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iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 G−→ 〈v′, θ[~x/~n], w, z · p〉,
w, z · p |= ψθ[~x/~n], 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L, and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by Definition 5.15)
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 G−→ 〈v′, θ[~x/~n], w, z · p〉 and 〈v′, θ[~x/~n], w, z · p〉 ∈ ||L||Σ (by (5.41))
Above, we used the following property about the regression of formulas and variable substitu-
tions: If w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost, then
w, z |= R[α]θ iff w, z |= αθ,(5.50)
which can be easily proven by an induction on α, similar to Lemma 3.32 item 4. Intuitively,
this is correct since regression leaves the free variables of a formula unchanged. We also used
the fact that since the ~x are bound in ∃~xα,
w, z |= (∃~xα)θ iff for some ~n, w, z |= α~x~nθ,(5.51)
which follows directly from the ESG semantics and our definition of variable substitutions.
The “Next” Operator
We begin with the seemingly easiest case, which is the procedure to evaluate path-quantified
formulas involving the “next” operator X. The algorithm for CheckEX works as follows: If
〈〈δ〉〉Xϕ is the input formula, then we determine the characteristic graph of the program δ and
initially label each of its vertices with ϕ, conjoined with a formula that encodes all necessary and
sufficient conditions under which an infinite trace may start in a configuration that corresponds
to that node. Next, we determine the preimage of that label set, and finally extract the formula
in the label of the initial node. Formally:
Procedure 1 CheckEX[δ, ϕ]
1: L′ := Label[Gδ, ϕ] And Path[Gδ];
2: L := Pre[Gδ, L′];
3: return InitLabel[Gδ, L]
Regarding Path[Gδ], for the time being we simply assume that it returns a label set that encodes
the necessary and sufficient conditions for any node v under which there exists an infinite run
starting in v. Formally let us assume that
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Path[Gδ]||Σ iff w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and there is an infinite run
(5.52)
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . .
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It will be shown later how this label set can actually be computed.
Example 5.33. Let us apply the algorithm to the input formula 〈〈δ〉〉XEmpty(queue), where
δ refers to (δcoffee ||δexo)p, i.e. the precondition-extended variant of δcoffee ||δexo. Recall from
Definition 5.11 that this means that we replace every atomic action t by Poss(t)?; t. The
resulting characteristic graph, which is depicted in Figure 5.3, is nearly identical to the one
shown in Figure 5.2, with the exception that the transition condition of every edge also contains
a test for Poss(t). According to Definition 5.26, we get that
C[〈〈δ〉〉XEmpty(queue)] = CheckEX[δ, C[Empty(queue)]] = CheckEX[δ,Empty(queue)].
To evaluate the latter, presume that
Path[Gδ] = {〈v0,>〉, 〈v1,¬HoldingCoffee〉, 〈v2,HoldingCoffee〉}
and that CheckEX hence begins with the following label set:
L′ = { 〈v0,Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1,Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee〉,
〈v2,Empty(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee〉 }.
Next, the preimage of this set is determined. Below we only show the computation of the
resulting label for v0 in detail, since the other ones are not relevant for the end result. The
preimage for v0, Pre[Gδ, v0] consists of three disjuncts, one for each outgoing edge:
• For the v0 pia:a/Exo(a)∧Poss(a)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ v0 edge, we get (with simplifications):
R[∃a. Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]Empty(queue)]
≡ ∃a∃x. a = requestCoffee(x) ∧ x 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧R[[a]Empty(queue)]
≡ ∃x. x 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧R[[requestCoffee(x)]Empty(queue)]
≡ ∃x. x 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ Enqueue(queue, x, 〈e, . . . , e〉)
≡ ∃x. x 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ⊥
≡ ⊥
• For the v0 wait/···−−−−→ v0 edge we have (with simplifications):
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ]Empty(queue)]
≡ Empty(queue) ∧ > ∧R[[wait ]Empty(queue)]
≡ Empty(queue) ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue)
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v0 v1
v2
pia : a/Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) pia : a/Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a)
pia : a/Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a)
wait/Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait)
pix : selectRequest(x)/
¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(sR(x))
pickupCoffee/Poss(pC )
bringCoffee(x)/Poss(bC (x))
Figure 5.3: Characteristic graph for the coffee robot example, with preconditions
• For the v0 pix:sR(x)/···−−−−−−−→ v1 edge we get (with simplifications):
R[∃x. ¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(sR(x)) ∧ [sR(x)](Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC )]
≡ ∃x. ¬Empty(queue)∧ x 6= e ∧ IsFirst(x, queue)∧R[[sR(x)](Empty(queue)∧¬HC )]
≡ ∃x. ¬Empty(queue)∧x 6= e∧IsFirst(x, queue)∧Dequeue(queue, x, 〈e, . . . , e〉)∧¬HC
≡ ∃x. ¬Empty(queue) ∧ x 6= e ∧ IsFirst(x, queue) ∧ queue = 〈x, e, . . . , e〉 ∧ ¬HC
≡ ∃x. x 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x, e, . . . , e〉 ∧ ¬HC
The resulting label set is hence:
L = { 〈v0,Empty(queue) ∨ ∃x. x 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x, e, . . . , e〉 ∧ ¬HC 〉, 〈v1, . . .〉, 〈v2, . . .〉 }
As a result, the procedure returns the formula in the v0 label, i.e.
Empty(queue) ∨ ∃x. x 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x, e, . . . , e〉 ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee(5.53)
As will be proven formally later, this sentence represents precisely the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which XEmpty(queue) holds for some execution trace of the program δ. In-
tuitively, this is true since the two disjuncts represent exactly the two cases under which the
queue can be empty after the first action and it is still possible to continue the execution of
the program: either the action is wait , which does not have any effect at all, and the queue
was already empty in the beginning, or there initially was one request in the queue and the
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action is to select that request to be served next, which removes it from the queue. In the first
case, program execution may afterwards continue indefinitely with further wait actions that
do not require any more preconditions to hold. In the latter case, we have to ensure that the
robot is not already holding coffee such that we may subsequently proceed with pickupCoffee
and bringCoffee(x), after which the program can again continue indefinitely with wait actions.
Note that it is impossible that the queue is empty after an exogenous action since that would
be a requestCoffee action appending some request to the queue.
Theorem 5.34. Let Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉, δ a program of
the form δ1
ω|| · · · ||δkω that only mentions fluents in 〈D,F〉, and ϕ a fluent formula wrt 〈D,F〉.
If the procedure terminates, CheckEX[δ, ϕ] is fluent and
Σdef ∪ Σpost |=  CheckEX[δ, ϕ] ≡ 〈〈δ〉〉Xϕ
Proof. We prove the equivalent claim that for all w ∈ W with w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost, all z ∈ Z and
all variable maps θ,
w, z |= CheckEX[δ, ϕ]θ iff w, z |= 〈〈δθ〉〉Xϕθ.
To see why we need the variable map θ here, note that δ and ϕ as well as CheckEX[δ, ϕ]
may contain free variables, and recall our convention that we regard free variables in formulas
as being implicitly ∀-quantified from the outside. Now assume that Procedure 1 terminates.9
Semantically, we have that
||L′||Σ = {〈v, θ, w, z〉 | w, z |= ϕθ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost} ∩ ||Path[Gδ]||Σ(5.54)
||L||Σ = ||Pre[Gδ, L′]||Σ(5.55)
We furthermore need that
if 〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉, then ϕθ = ϕθ′.(5.56)
This is true since θ′ is of the form θ[~x/~n], where v
φ1/pi~x:t/φ2−−−−−−−→ v′ is an edge in Gδ. Since the
~x are pi-quantified in δ, due to our distinctiveness assumption they do not appear freely in ϕ,
therefore applying θ or θ′ yields the same result. Now let w be a world with w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost.
Then
w, z |= CheckEX[δ, ϕ]θ
iff w, z |= InitLabel[Gδ, L]θ (by assumption)
iff 〈v0, ψ〉 ∈ Pre[Gδ, L′], w, z |= ψθ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by (5.55) and (5.46))
9As we will see shortly, non-termination may be due to the computation of Path[Gδ] not converging.
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iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Pre[Gδ, L′]||Σ (by (5.41))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 and 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 ∈ ||L′||Σ (by Lemma 5.32)
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉, w, z · p1 |= ϕθ1 and
〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . . (by (5.54) and (5.52))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉, w, z · p1 |= ϕθ and
〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . . (by (5.56))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . . such that
w, z · p1 |= ϕθ and for all i ≥ 0, 〈vi, θi, w, z · p1 · · · pi〉 6∈ FGδ (by Lemma 5.24)
iff pi ∈ ||Gδ||zw(θ) and w, z, pi |= ϕθ (by Definition 5.15 and the semantics)
iff pi ∈ ||δθ||zw and w, z, pi |= ϕθ (by Theorem 5.21)
iff w, z |= 〈〈δθ〉〉ϕθ (by the semantics)
Finally, since labels always contain fluent formulas, the output of the procedure (if any) is also
a fluent formula.
The “Always” Operator
Let us turn to the more interesting case of the “always” operator G. The idea behind the corre-
sponding procedure is as follows. To verify 〈〈δ〉〉ϕ, we first label each vertex in the characteristic
graph of δ with ϕ, which represents all configurations where ϕ holds. Next, we determine the
preimage of this labelling and conjoin it with the initial one, yielding a representation of the
set of all configurations where ϕ holds and will hold in the successor configuration. Iterating
this, we successively obtain representations of configurations from which on ϕ persists to hold
for 2,3,. . . steps of a partial run. Convergence is reached once the newly determined labelling is
equivalent to the previous one. The initial node’s label then contains the necessary and sufficient
condition under which an infinite run exists along which ϕ never ceases to be true. Formally:
Procedure 2 CheckEG[δ, ϕ]
1: L′ := Label[Gδ,⊥];
2: L := Label[Gδ, ϕ];
3: while L 6≡ L′ do
4: L′ := L;
5: L := L′ And Pre[Gδ, L′];
6: end while
7: return InitLabel[Gδ, L]
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Example 5.35. Let us apply the procedure within our coffee robot example to verify one of
the two previously mentioned properties, namely whether it is possible that no request is ever
served. Recall that this is expressed by the formula
〈〈δ〉〉G¬∃xOcc(selectRequest(x))
That is, let δ again be the precondition-extended variant of δcoffee ||δexo and ϕ the formula
¬∃xOcc(selectRequest(x)). Furthermore, in order to keep the example small, assume that the
size of the robot’s queue is k = 2. Then the initial set of labels is
L0 = {〈v0, ϕ〉, 〈v1, ϕ〉, 〈v2, ϕ〉}
which is obviously not equivalent to Label[Gδ,⊥]. We need to determine the preimage of
each node. Note that due to the unique names assumption for actions, R[[a]ϕ] is equivalent
to ⊥ just in case the action a is an instance of selectRequest(x), and otherwise >. That is
R[[requestCoffee(x′)]ϕ] ≡ >, R[[selectRequest(x)]ϕ] ≡ ⊥, and R[[wait ]ϕ] ≡ >. We thus get
(with simplifications):
• Pre[v0, L0]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]ϕ] ∨
R[∃x.¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(selectRequest(x)) ∧ [selectRequest(x)]ϕ] ∨
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ]ϕ]
≡ ∃a∃x′(a = requestCoffee(x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ >) ∨
∃x(¬Empty(queue) ∧ x 6= e ∧ IsFirst(queue, x) ∧ ⊥) ∨
Empty(queue) ∧ > ∧ >
≡ LastFree(queue) ∨ ⊥ ∨ Empty(queue)
≡ ∃x1(queue = 〈x1, e〉) ∨ queue = 〈e, e〉
≡ ∃x1(queue = 〈x1, e〉)
≡ LastFree(queue)
• Pre[v1, L0]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]ϕ] ∨ R[Poss(pickupCoffee) ∧ [pickupCoffee]ϕ]
≡ ∃x′(a = rC (x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ >) ∨ ¬HoldingCoffee ∧ >
≡ LastFree(queue) ∨ ¬HoldingCoffee
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• Pre[v2, L0]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]ϕ] ∨ R[Poss(bringCoffee(x)) ∧ [bringCoffee(x)]ϕ]
≡ ∃a∃x′(a = rC (x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ >) ∨ HoldingCoffee ∧ >
≡ LastFree(queue) ∨ HoldingCoffee
In the simplification steps above, we further used that if a formula starts with
∃a∃x′(a = requestCoffee(x′) ∧ x′ 6= e · · · ,
then that part is trivially satisfied if a and x′ do not appear in the remainder of the formula,
and that Empty(queue) implies LastFree(queue), which follows from the definition of these
abbreviations as stated in (5.19) and (5.21). After one iteration, our (simplified) label set is
hence
L1 = L0 And Pre[Gδ, L0]
= { 〈v0, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue)〉, 〈v1, ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨ ¬HC )〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨HC )〉 }
Obviously, L1 is not equivalent to L0, and we have to continue. Doing four more iterations (the
details can be found in Appendix B.1), we end up with the label set
L5 = {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue)〉, 〈v1, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉, 〈v2, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC )〉}
One last iteration will show us that convergence is reached, i.e. we have L6 ≡ L5. The algorithm
hence terminates and outputs the label at v0, which is the formula
¬∃xOcc(selectRequest(x)) ∧ Empty(queue)
Intuitively, this correctly represents the necessary and sufficient conditions under which there
is an execution of δ where never any selectRequest(x) action occurs: On the one hand, it has
to be the case that there did not occur a selectRequest(x) just before the current situation z in
which we are about to start the program, as then Occ(selectRequest(x)) would hold in z. On
the other hand, the queue of pending coffee requests must be empty, since only then we may
execute wait actions indefinitely, provided that no exogenous requestCoffee(x) ever occurs.
Theorem 5.36. Let Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉, δ a program of
the form δ1
ω|| · · · ||δkω that only mentions fluents in 〈D,F〉, and ϕ a fluent formula wrt 〈D,F〉.
If the procedure terminates, CheckEG[δ, ϕ] is fluent and
Σdef ∪ Σpost |=  CheckEG[δ, ϕ] ≡ 〈〈δ〉〉Gϕ
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Proof. We will prove the equivalent claim that for all w ∈ W such that w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost, all
z ∈ Z and all variable maps θ,
w, z |= CheckEG[δ, ϕ]θ iff w, z |= 〈〈δθ〉〉Gϕθ.
Again note that θ is needed since δ and ϕ, and consequently CheckEG[δ, ϕ], may contain free
variables, which by convention we regard as being implicitly ∀-quantified from the outside.
First consider the simple case where ϕ is unsatisfiable. Then |= ϕ ≡ ⊥, and hence L ≡ L′, so
the procedure does not enter the while loop, but immediately returns ⊥ as output. The claim
then trivially follows since neither w, z |= ⊥ nor can there be any trace τ such that w, z, τ |= G⊥.
Therefore assume now that ϕ is satisfiable and that there is at least one iteration of the
while loop. In this case the algorithm iteratively constructs label sets according to the following
equations:
L0 = Label[Gδ, ϕ](5.57)
Li+1 = Li And Pre[Gδ, Li](5.58)
Semantically, this means that
||L0||Σ = {〈v, θ, w, z〉 | w, z |= ϕθ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost}(5.59)
||Li+1||Σ = ||Li||Σ ∩ ||Pre[Gδ, Li]||Σ(5.60)
By assumption the procedure terminates, therefore there is some smallest index n such that
Ln+1 ≡ Ln. Together with the above this implies that
||Ln||Σ = ||Ln||Σ ∩ ||Pre[Gδ, Ln]||Σ.(5.61)
The output of the procedure is obviously a fluent formula: We start off with all labels containing
ϕ, which is fluent by assumption, and subsequently apply conjunction and regression, which
always leads to label formulas that are fluent as well.
The proof of the main claim of this theorem is based on the following property, which will
be proved below:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ iff w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and there is an infinite run(5.62)
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . .
such that for all i ≥ 0, w, z · p1 · · · pi |= ϕθ
Let w be a world with w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost. Then we get that
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w, z |= CheckEG[δ, ϕ]θ
iff w, z |= InitLabel[Gδ, Ln+1]θ (by assumption)
iff 〈v0, ψ0〉 ∈ Ln+1 and w, z |= ψ0θ (by (5.46))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln+1||Σ (by (5.41))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ (since Ln+1 ≡ Ln)
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . .
such that for all i ≥ 0, 〈vi, θi, w, z · p1 · · · pi〉 6∈ FGδ , and w, z · p1 · · · pi |= ϕθ
(by (5.62) and Lemma 5.24)
iff pi ∈ ||Gδ||zw(θ) with w, z, pi |= Gϕθ (by Definition 5.15 and the semantics)
iff pi ∈ ||δθ||zw with w, z, pi |= Gϕθ (by Theorem 5.21)
iff w, z |= 〈〈δθ〉〉Gϕθ (by the semantics)
To prove (5.62), first note that
if 〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉, then ϕθ = ϕθ′.(5.63)
As in the proof to Theorem 5.34, this is due to the fact that v
φ1/pi~x:t/φ2−−−−−−−→ v′ is an edge in Gδ
such that θ′ = θ[~x/~n]. Since variables that appear pi-quantified in δ are assumed to not appear
freely in ϕ, applying θ or θ′ yields the same result.
“⇒”: For the only-if direction, suppose that 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ. An infinite run with the
desired properties is guaranteed to exist using the following: For any 〈v′, θ′, w′, z′〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ,
(a) w′, z′ |= ϕθ′ and w′ |= Σdef ∪ Σpost;
(b) 〈v′, θ′, w′, z′〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′′, θ′′, w′, z′ · p〉 such that 〈v′′, θ′′, w′, z′ · p〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ.
(a) is obtained by repeated application of (5.60), which implies that any configuration in ||Li+1||Σ
is also in ||Li||Σ, hence any 〈v′, θ′, w′, z′〉 in ||Ln||Σ is also in ||L0||Σ, and therefore by (5.59),
w′, z′ |= ϕθ′ and w′ |= Σdef ∪ Σpost. Furthermore, (b) is a direct consequence of (5.61) and
Lemma 5.32. With the above, we can inductively construct an infinite run whose configurations
remain within ||Ln||Σ: By assumption, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 is in ||Ln||Σ, and for every such configuration,
(b) implies that there is a transition to a successor configuration that is in ||Ln||Σ as well.
Furthermore, in any situation thus reached, ϕθ′ is satisfied according to (a), which is the same
as ϕθ according to (5.63).
“⇐”: Conversely, assume that w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and that there is an infinite run
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ · · ·
such that for all j ≥ 0, w, z · p1 · · · pj |= ϕθ. We use the following two properties:
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(a) For all j ≥ 0, 〈vj , θj , w, z · p1 · · · pj〉 ∈ ||L0||Σ;
(b) If 〈v′, θ′, w′, z′ ·p〉 ∈ ||Li||Σ and 〈v, θ, w′, z′〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′, θ′, w′, z′ ·p〉, then 〈v, θ, w′, z′〉 ∈ ||Li+1||Σ.
(a) is a direct consequence of (5.59) and (5.63), whereas (b) follows from (5.60) and Lemma 5.32.
From the above we obtain that, in particular, the n-th graph configuration 〈vn, θn, w, z ·p1 · · · pn〉
is in ||L0||Σ, hence the n− 1-st configuration 〈vn−1, θn−1, w, z · p1 · · · pn−1〉 is in ||L1||Σ, therefore
〈vn−2, θn−2, w, z · p1 · · · pn−2〉 ∈ ||L2||Σ, and so forth, until we end up with 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ,
which was to be proved.
Before moving on to the “until” case, note that we can now easily define a procedure for the
previously mentioned Path[Gδ] function, which is quite similar to CheckEG:
Procedure 3 Path[Gδ]
1: L′ := Label[Gδ,⊥];
2: L := Label[Gδ,>];
3: while L 6≡ L′ do
4: L′ := L;
5: L := L′ And Pre[Gδ, L′];
6: end while
7: return L
There are only two differences here: On the one hand, we return the entire resulting label
set, instead of only the formula by which v0 is labelled. For another, the ϕ parameter has
been replaced by >. Intuitively, this yields the desired result since CheckEG determines the
necessary and sufficient conditions under which there is an infinite run through Gδ starting
from v0 such that ϕ holds globally along the traversed path, whereas Path[Gδ] is supposed to
compute the necessary and sufficient conditions for each node v in Gδ under which there exists
an arbitrary infinite run starting in v.
Lemma 5.37. The output of Procedure 3 satisfies property (5.52). That is, let Σ be a basic
action theory and δ a program of the form δ1
ω|| · · · ||δkω without free variables. If the procedure
terminates, Path[Gδ] returns a label set L such that
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||L||Σ iff w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and there is an infinite run
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . .
Proof. The proof is identical to the one for property (5.62) in the proof of Theorem 5.36, only
with ϕ replaced by >.
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The “Until” Operator
In the case of a formula (ϕ1 U ϕ2) containing the “until” operator, our algorithm proceeds as
follows. First, label each vertex with ϕ2 together with the path existence condition obtained
from Path[Gδ]. Intuitively, this labelling represents all configurations where ϕ2 holds and from
where we may continue an infinite run through the graph. We then determine the disjunction
of that label set with the conjunction of its preimage and ϕ1, yielding a representation of the
configurations where either ϕ2 holds (and then some infinite run starts), or where ϕ1 holds and
a configuration satisfying ϕ2 is reachable in one step (after which an infinite run starts). When
iterating this a second time, we obtain a set of labels that tell us under which conditions we
can reach such a configuration in at most two steps, and so on. If the procedure eventually
converges, we have found a solution that represents all necessary and sufficient conditions under
which there exists and infinite run where ϕ2 holds after any number of transitions, and ϕ1 is
true until then. Formally:
Procedure 4 CheckEU[δ, ϕ1, ϕ2]
1: L′ := Label[Gδ,>];
2: L := Label[Gδ, ϕ2] And Path[Gδ];
3: while L 6≡ L′ do
4: L′ := L;
5: L := L′ Or (Label[Gδ, ϕ1] And Pre[Gδ, L′]);
6: end while
7: return InitLabel[G, L]
Example 5.38. Again, let us apply the algorithm to an example. Suppose we want to verify
the formula
〈〈δ〉〉(Empty(queue) U HoldingCoffee)
where δ is, as before, the precondition-extended variant of our coffee robot control program,
including exogenous actions, whose characteristic graph is depicted in Figure 5.3. Again we
assume that the maximal size of the queue is k = 2 and that
Path[Gδ] = {〈v0,>〉, 〈v1,¬HoldingCoffee〉, 〈v2,HoldingCoffee〉}
Then the initial set of labels is therefore
L0 = {〈v0,HC ∧ >〉, 〈v1,HC ∧ ¬HC 〉, 〈v2,HC ∧HC 〉}
≡ {〈v0,HC 〉, 〈v1,⊥〉, 〈v2,HC 〉}
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Since this is obviously not equivalent to the set
L′ = {〈v0,>〉, 〈v1,>〉, 〈v2,>〉},
we have to first determine the preimage of this set:
• Pre[v0, L0]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]HoldingCoffee] ∨
R[∃x.¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(selectRequest(x)) ∧ [selectRequest(x)]⊥] ∨
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ]HoldingCoffee]
≡ ∃a∃x′(a = requestCoffee(x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee) ∨
∃x(¬Empty(queue) ∧ x 6= e ∧ IsFirst(queue, x) ∧ ⊥) ∨
Empty(queue) ∧ > ∧HoldingCoffee
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee ∨ ⊥ ∨ Empty(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee
• Pre[v1, L0]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]⊥] ∨
R[Poss(pickupCoffee) ∧ [pickupCoffee]HoldingCoffee]
≡ ⊥ ∨ ¬HoldingCoffee ∧ >
≡ ¬HoldingCoffee
• Pre[v2, L0]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]HoldingCoffee] ∨
R[Poss(bringCoffee(x)) ∧ [bringCoffee(x)]HoldingCoffee]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee ∨HoldingCoffee ∧ ⊥
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee
Using the above, the label set after the first iteration is
L1 = L0 Or (Label[Gδ, ϕ1] And Pre[Gδ, L0])
= {〈v0,HC ∨ Empty(queue) ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧HC 〉,
〈v1,⊥ ∨ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2,HC ∨ Empty(queue) ∧ LastFree(queue)〉}
≡ {〈v0,HC 〉, 〈v1,Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉, 〈v2,HC ∨ Empty(queue)〉}
5.3 Nonterminating Programs 211
Since L1 is not equivalent to L0, we have to do another iteration:
• Pre[v0, L1]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]HC ] ∨
R[∃x.¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(sR(x)) ∧ [sR(x)](Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC )] ∨
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ]HC ]
≡ ∃a∃x′(a = requestCoffee(x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧HC ) ∨
∃x(¬Empty(queue) ∧ x 6= e ∧ IsFirst(queue, x) ∧
(Dequeue(queue, x, 〈e, e〉) ∧ ¬HC )) ∨
Empty(queue) ∧ > ∧HC
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧HC ∨ ∃x(x 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x, e〉 ∧ ¬HC ∨ Empty(queue) ∧HC )
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee ∨ ∃x(x 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x, e〉 ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee)
• Pre[v1, L1]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee)] ∨
R[Poss(pickupCoffee) ∧ [pickupCoffee](HoldingCoffee ∨ Empty(queue))]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ ⊥ ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee ∨ ¬HoldingCoffee ∧ (> ∨ Empty(queue))
≡ ⊥ ∨ ¬HoldingCoffee
≡ ¬HoldingCoffee
• Pre[v2, L1]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](HoldingCoffee ∨ Empty(queue))] ∨
R[Poss(bringCoffee(x)) ∧ [bringCoffee(x)]HoldingCoffee]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ (HoldingCoffee ∨ ⊥) ∨HoldingCoffee ∧ ⊥
≡ LastFree ∧HoldingCoffee
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The label set after the second iteration thus is
L2 = L1 Or (Label[Gδ, ϕ1] And Pre[Gδ, L1])
= {〈v0,HC ∨ Empty(queue) ∧
(LastFree(queue) ∧HC ∨ ∃x(x 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x, e〉 ∧ ¬HC )〉,
〈v1,Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC ∨ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2,HC ∨ Empty(queue) ∨ Empty(queue) ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧HC 〉}
≡ {〈v0,HC ∨ Empty(queue) ∧HC ∨ Empty(queue) ∧ ⊥ ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v1,Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2,HC ∨ Empty(queue) ∨ Empty(queue) ∧HC 〉}
≡ {〈v0,HC 〉, 〈v1,Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉, 〈v2,HC ∨ Empty(queue)〉}
We now have L2 ≡ L1, so we are done. The output of the procedure is the label at v0, i.e. the
formula HoldingCoffee. This is intuitively correct since the only possible way to execute the
coffee robot program and maintain an empty queue of requests until picking up coffee is when
the robot is already holding coffee initially. When then no requests ever occur, the robot can
keep doing wait actions indefinitely. Otherwise, the queue will obviously not be empty once
some requestCoffee(x) occurs.
Theorem 5.39. Let Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉, δ a program
of the form δ1
ω|| · · · ||δkω that only mentions fluents in 〈D,F〉, and ϕ1, ϕ2 fluent formulas wrt
〈D,F〉. If the procedure terminates, CheckEU[δ, ϕ1, ϕ2] is fluent and
Σdef ∪ Σpost |=  CheckEU[δ, ϕ1, ϕ2] ≡ 〈〈δ〉〉(ϕ1 U ϕ2)
Proof. We prove the equivalent claim that for any w ∈ W with w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost, any z ∈ Z,
and any variable map θ,
w, z |= CheckEU[δ, ϕ1, ϕ2]θ iff w, z |= 〈〈δθ〉〉(ϕ1θ U ϕ2θ)
Again note that θ is needed since δ, ϕ1 and ϕ2 as well as CheckEU[δ, ϕ1, ϕ2] may contain free
variables, which by convention we regard as being implicitly ∀-quantified from the outside.
Let us again first consider the simple case where
Label[Gδ,>] ≡ Label[Gδ, ϕ2] And Path[Gδ],(5.64)
i.e. the conjunction of ϕ2 with each node’s path existence condition is valid. The procedure
then does not enter the while loop, but immediately returns > as result, and of course >θ is
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trivially satisfied by w in z for any θ. Similarly, by Lemma 5.37 we have that for every θ, there
is an infinite run
〈v0, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ · · ·
where w, z |= ϕ2θ. By Lemma 5.24, 〈vi, θi, w, z · p1 · · · pi〉 6∈ FGδ for all i ≥ 0, hence pi =
p1 · p2 · p3 · · · ∈ ||Gδ||zw(θ) by Definition 5.15, therefore also pi ∈ ||δθ||zw by Theorem 5.21, and thus
w, z |= 〈〈δθ〉〉(ϕ1θ U ϕ2θ).
Therefore assume now that (5.64) is not the case and that at least one iteration of the while
loop is performed. This means that the procedure iteratively constructs labels sets according
to below equations:
L0 = Label[Gδ, ϕ2] And Path[Gδ](5.65)
Li+1 = Li Or (Label[Gδ, ϕ1] And Pre[Gδ, L])(5.66)
Semantically, this means that
||L0||Σ = {〈v, θ, w, z〉 | w, z |= ϕ2θ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost} ∩ ||Path[Gδ]||Σ(5.67)
||Li+1||Σ = ||Li||Σ ∪ ({〈v, θ, w, z〉 | w, z |= ϕ1θ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost} ∩ ||Pre[Gδ, Li]||Σ)(5.68)
By assumption, the procedure terminates, hence there is some smallest index n such that
Ln+1 ≡ Ln. Again it is obvious that the final output has to be a fluent formula. The proof of
the main claim of this theorem relies on the following property:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ iff w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and there is an infinite run(5.69)
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . .
such that for some j ≥ 0, w, z · p1 · · · pj |= ϕ2θ
and for all 0 ≤ k < j, w, z · p1 · · · pk |= ϕ1θ
Then we get that
w, z |= CheckEU[δ, ϕ1, ϕ2]θ
iff w, z |= InitLabel[Gδ, Ln+1]θ (by assumption)
iff 〈v0, ψ0〉 ∈ Ln+1 and w, z |= ψ0θ (by (5.46))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln+1||Σ (by (5.41))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ (since Ln+1 ≡ Ln)
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iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . .
such that for some j ≥ 0, w, z · p1 · · · pj |= ϕ2θ
and for all 0 ≤ k < j, w, z · p1 · · · pk |= ϕ1θ
and for all i ≥ 0, 〈vi, θi, w, z · p1 · · · pi〉 6∈ FGδ (by (5.69) and Lemma 5.24)
iff pi ∈ ||Gδ||zw(θ) with w, z, pi |= (ϕ1θ U ϕ2θ) (by Definition 5.15 and the semantics)
iff pi ∈ ||δθ||zw with w, z, pi |= (ϕ1θ U ϕ2θ) (by Theorem 5.21)
iff w, z |= 〈〈δθ〉〉(ϕ1θ U ϕ2θ) (by the semantics)
In order to prove (5.69), we introduce a bit of notation for the fact that there exists an infinite
run starting in some 〈v, θ, w, z〉 where ϕ2θ becomes true after exactly j transitions and ϕ1θ holds
until then: Let
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j) def= w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and there is an infinite run(5.70)
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . .
such that w, z · p1 · · · pj |= ϕ2θ
and for all 0 ≤ k < j, w, z · p1 · · · pk |= ϕ1θ.
(5.69) then is equivalent to writing that 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ iff for some j ≥ 0, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j).
We first show that the following weaker property holds for all i ≥ 0:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Li||Σ iff for some j with i ≥ j ≥ 0, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j)(5.71)
To prove the above, note that
If 〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉, then ϕ1θ = ϕ1θ′ and ϕ2θ = ϕ2θ′.(5.72)
This is again due to the fact that v
φ1/pi~x:t/φ2−−−−−−−→ v′ is an edge in Gδ such that θ′ = θ[~x/~n]. Since
variables that appear pi-quantified in δ are assumed to not appear freely in ϕ1 and ϕ2, applying
θ or θ′ yields the same result. We prove (5.71) by induction on i:
• i = 0: immediate by (5.67) and Lemma 5.37.
• i 7→ i+ 1:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Li+1||Σ
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Li||Σ or
w, z |= ϕ1θ, w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Pre[Gδ, Li]||Σ (by (5.68))
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iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Li||Σ or
w, z |= ϕ1θ, w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉 where 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉 ∈ ||Li||Σ (by Lemma 5.32)
iff for some j with i ≥ j ≥ 0, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j) or
w, z |= ϕ1θ, w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉
where for some j with i ≥ j ≥ 0, 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉 ∈ P(j) (by induction)
iff for some j with i ≥ j ≥ 0, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j) or
for some j with i+ 1 ≥ j ≥ 1, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j) (by (5.70) and (5.72))
iff for some j with i+ 1 ≥ j ≥ 0, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j)
Finally, we obtain (5.69) from (5.71) as follows. Assume that n is the smallest index with
Ln+1 ≡ Ln, but that the algorithm applies (5.68) indefinitely. Then 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j) iff
j ≤ n and 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ by (5.71), or j > n and 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Lj ||Σ by (5.71), but where
||Lj ||Σ = ||Ln||Σ due to the fact that ||Lm||Σ = ||Ln||Σ for all m > n, which follows inductively
from Ln+1 ≡ Ln.
5.3.3 Correctness
Soundness
The soundness of the subprocedures CheckEX, CheckEG and CheckEU was already estab-
lished in Theorems 5.34, 5.36 and 5.39, respectively. We are left with showing that the overall
ESGCTL verification transform operator C given in Definition 5.26 is sound as well.
Lemma 5.40. Let Σ = Σ0∪Σdef∪Σpost be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉 and ϕ be a formula
of ESGCTL that only mentions fluents in 〈D,F〉. Then
Σdef ∪ Σpost |=  ϕ ≡ C[ϕ](5.73)
Proof. We prove the equivalent claim that if w is a world with w |= Σdef ∪Σpost, z is a sequence
of action standard names, and θ a variable map,
w, z |= ϕθ iff w, z |= C[ϕ]θ(5.74)
The base cases ϕ = (t1 = t2) and ϕ = F (~t) are due to the correctness of regression (Lemma
3.32 (4)) and the easily provable fact that R[αθ] = R[α]θ for any α. Moreover, the cases ϕ =
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ϕ = ¬ϕ1 and ϕ = ∃xϕ1 are immediately obtained by induction. Cases ϕ = 〈〈δ〉〉Xϕ1,
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ϕ = 〈〈δ〉〉Gϕ1 and ϕ = 〈〈δ〉〉(ϕ1 U ϕ2) finally follow by induction and using Theorems 5.34, 5.36
and 5.39, respectively.
Theorem 5.41. Let Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory over fluents 〈D,F〉 and ϕ
be a sentence of ESGCTL that only mentions fluents in D ∪F . If the computation of C[ϕ] wrt Σ
terminates, it is a fluent sentence and
Σ |= ϕ iff Σ0 |= C[ϕ].
Proof. “⇒”: Suppose Σ |= ϕ. Let w be a world such that w |= Σ0. From Lemma 3.32 (2) it
follows that wΣ |= Σ, and hence wΣ |= ϕ. By Lemma 5.40 we obtain that wΣ |= C[ϕ] and thus
by Lemma 3.32 (6) we get w |= C[ϕ].
“⇐”: Conversely, suppose Σ0 |= C[ϕ] and let w be a world with w |= Σ. Then in particular
w |= Σ0, and so w |= C[ϕ]. By Lemma 5.40 w |= ϕ.
Completeness
We now know that whenever our algorithm returns an output, then that formula correctly
captures precisely the situations in which the input ESGCTL formula is entailed by our basic
action theory. The question now is whether the method produces an output for every input.
The quick answer to this question is that obviously, since the algorithm involves classical
first-order theorem proving, due to the undecidability of first-order logic, the method necessarily
has to be incomplete. Recall from Theorem 3.13 that if α is a sentence of L (which corresponds
to the static, objective subset of ES without actions and numbers), then α is valid in FOL iff it
is valid in ES. We can reduce the problem of validity in FOL to the application of our algorithm
as follows: Let the basic action theory Σ be the empty set, i.e. we do not make any assumptions
about the initial situation and do not have any definitional or normal fluents. Furthermore,
suppose δ is the program anyω, which admits every infinite action sequence as trace. Let α be
an L sentence that without loss of generality mentions at most rigid predicates and functions,
which implies that the truth value of α does not change by the application of actions. Then α
is valid iff Σ |= 〈〈δ〉〉(> U α).
The above is a serious concern, but it is not specific to our algorithm: In fact, any system
that allows for the full expressiveness of first-order logic will necessarily suffer from the logic’s
undecidability. In this respect, our method is thus not “less complete” than the overall system
that it is part of.
In the spirit of our previous assumption of the agent being a logically omniscient first-
order reasoner, let us therefore now assume that we have an oracle that decides all first-order
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entailments. A second potential reason for the algorithm failing to terminate is that the loop
condition “L 6≡ L′” in line 3 of Procedure 2, line 3 of Procedure 3 or line 3 of Procedure 4 may
never seize to hold.
In fact, it is rather simple to come up with an example where the algorithm does not
terminate. The following is adapted from a similar example in [KP10]. Consider a basic action
theory over a single normal relational fluent F with the successor state axiom
[a]F (x) ≡ F (f(x))(5.75)
where f is a non-changing function. Again, let δ be the program anyω. Suppose we want to
verify whether 〈〈δ〉〉GF (n) for some standard name n. Then Procedure 2 iteratively produces
the following label sets:
L0 = {〈v0, F (n)〉}
L1 = {〈v0, F (n) ∧ F (f(n))〉}
L2 = {〈v0, F (n) ∧ F (f(n)) ∧ F (f(f(n)))〉}
. . .
Ln = {〈v0,
n∧
i=0
F (f i(n))〉}
Obviously, the property is true just in case that F holds for all individuals that are the result
of successively applying f to n. The latter property is nothing else than a transitive closure,
and hence cannot be expressed by a fluent first-order formula.
The problem here is however not only a matter of expressive power. If we think of f as the
successor function for natural numbers and n as the number zero, then the transitive closure is
the “greater than” relation. Since we defined the meaning of “>” within our logic’s semantics,
the property in question can in this case be expressed as follows:
F (0) ∧ ∀m. (m > 0) ⊃ F (m)(5.76)
Yet, our algorithm will fail to find this representation as it cannot be obtained by finitely often
conjoining the current label set with its preimage.
For better understanding under what circumstances we can expect our algorithm to termi-
nate, we have to delve a bit into fixpoint theory, for which we first need the following definition:
Definition 5.42 (Complete Lattice). A partially ordered set 〈L,≤〉 is a complete lattice iff
every subset A ⊆ L has a greatest lower bound, called the infimum, or meet, and a least upper
bound, called the supremum, or join in L.
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The most prominent example for a complete lattice is the power set ℘(S) of a given set S, for
example the set of all graph configurations over Gδ wrt Σdef ∪ Σpost. In this case, the ordering
relation ≤ is set inclusion ⊆, and the meet and join of some set A correspond to the union and
intersection of all sets in A, respectively. We can then make use of the well-known Knaster-
Tarski Theorem:
Theorem 5.43 (Knaster and Tarski, [Kna28, Tar55]). Let 〈L,≤〉 be a complete lattice and let
f : L → L be an order-preserving function (i.e. x ≤ y implies f(x) ≤ f(y)). Then the set of
fixpoints of f (i.e. solutions x ∈ L to the equation f(x) = x) in L is a complete lattice as well.
In case of Procedure 2 for CheckEG (and similarly Procedure 3 for Path), the monotone
function is the semantic counterpart of conjoining a set of labels with its preimage (line 5):
||L||Σ = ||L′||Σ ∩ ||Pre[Gδ, L′]||Σ(5.77)
Similarly, the order-preserving operator in case of Procedure 4 for CheckEU is given by
||L||Σ = ||L′||Σ ∪ (||Label[Gδ, ϕ1]||Σ ∩ ||Pre[Gδ, L′]||Σ)(5.78)
The good news is that due to Definition 5.42, complete lattices cannot be empty, and therefore
the theorem in particular implies the existence of a least and a greatest fixpoint. Moreover, the
constructive proof of the theorem [CC79] tells us that these fixpoints can be reached through
transfinite iteration. CheckEG and Path hence correspond to iterative approximations of the
greatest fixpoint of (5.77) “from above”, while CheckEU iteratively approximates the least
fixpoint of (5.78) “from below”.
The bad news on the other hand is that in general, the fixpoint is not necessarily reached
within a finite number of iterations. We may rather have to resort to proper transfinite iteration,
which may also include the necessity to determine limits of iteration sequences, such as formula
(5.76) in the above example. Devising algorithms that are capable of that is however beyond
the scope of this thesis and therefore left for future work.
A more direct approach to ensure termination is to restrict oneself to well-founded lattices.
Since the latter are defined to not contain any infinite descending chains, the fixpoint com-
putation loop will finish within a finite number of iterations. This could be achieved through
appropriately restricting the classes of basic action theories, programs and properties under
consideration. A simple, though not very interesting example would be the set of BATs cor-
responding to the ADL fragment of PDDL (cf. Section 4.2). Since in that case, fluents and
actions are restricted to only take arguments from finite domains, the corresponding state space
is also finite. In a similar vein, termination can be guaranteed if we restrict ourselves to theories
with context-free successor state axioms and a finite number of parameterless actions [LL98b].
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Finding more expressive (and interesting) classes of action theories is another worthwhile
line of future research. There are at least two approaches to follow: First, we could consider
fragments of the Situation Calculus in which the projection problem is known to be decidable
[GS10] and study how this affects our algorithm’s termination behaviour, possibly in combina-
tion with additional restrictions on action theories, programs and properties. A first step in this
direction has been taken by Baader, Liu and ul Mehdi [BLuM10] who use an action formalism
based on the decidable description logic ALC to verify LTL properties, where instead of Golog
execution traces they consider infinite sequences of actions that are accepted by some Bu¨chi
automaton.
Second, it seems promising to build upon results by Liu, Lakemeyer and Levesque [LLL04,
LL05b] who present a classically sound, yet incomplete reasoning mechanism that is decidable
and even tractable for proper+ knowledge bases. The latter allow to retain a major part of first-
order expressiveness, and giving up logical completeness seems a price worth paying in view of
the fact that our original algorithm is incomplete anyway. In particular, the approach could be
combined with recent results on the tractability of progressing proper+ knowledge bases with
respect to local-effect successor state axioms [LL09b], which of course requires redesigning the
algorithm such that progression is used instead of regression.
5.4 Expressive Properties of Nonterminating Programs
We have now a good understanding of the verification of properties of non-terminating Golog
programs, albeit only for a limited class of such properties. Recall the two example questions
about the coffee delivery robot’s control program that were given in the beginning of this
chapter:
1. Will every request eventually be served by the robot?
2. Is it possible that no request is ever served at all?
We could express both of them in terms of ESG formulas:
[[δ]]G(Occ(requestCoffee(x)) ⊃ FOcc(selectRequest(x)))(5.79)
〈〈δ〉〉G¬∃x(Occ(selectRequest(x)))(5.80)
However, only (5.80), the formula for the second property above, was of a form that the presented
algorithm could handle. The ESGCTL fragment that we considered resembled the classic temporal
logic CTL in that it was required that a [[δ]] or 〈〈δ〉〉 path quantifier is directly followed by
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a temporal operator like G or F. In particular, this forbids nesting temporal operators or
combining them through logical connectives, such as done in (5.79).
The latter is a representative for a much broader class of properties that resembles classical
CTL∗, where the usage of temporal operators within a path quantifier is unrestricted and we
may make free use of logical connectives, in our case including first-order quantification. Many of
the typical properties one may want to verify for a non-terminating agent are only expressible in
this manner, most importantly liveness and fairness conditions such as the above “every request
will eventually be served”, or “when the battery is low, it will get recharged in time”, or “the
floor gets cleaned infinitely often” etc.
In this section, we therefore address the verification for this more general class of properties,
which will be called ESGCTL∗ . The corresponding algorithm will again rely on characteristic
program graphs and regression-based reasoning as its main ingredients. As before, there is of
course no free lunch here: Allowing arbitrary first-order quantification within action theories,
programs and properties, and thus resorting to first-order theorem proving, comes at the price
of losing decidability. The algorithm we discuss here is hence sound, but not guaranteed to
terminate.
5.4.1 The Logic ESGCTL∗
First of all we will again formally define the logic under consideration, which is another, more
general fragment of ESG.
Definition 5.44 (ESGCTL∗). The formulas of ESGCTL∗ are the ones admitted by the following
grammar:
α ::= (t1 = t2) | F (~t) | ¬α | α ∧ α | ∃x.α | 〈〈δ〉〉ϕ(5.81)
where temporal subformulas are as follows:
ϕ ::= α | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | Xϕ | ϕ U ϕ(5.82)
Again, we require that all programs δ are of the form:
δ1
ω|| · · · ||δkω.(5.83)
5.4.2 The Algorithm
Our method for verifying ESGCTL∗ formulas is inspired by the classical propositional CTL∗
model checking algorithm, which in turn relies on a verification method for LTL formulas
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[VW86]. There, the rough idea is to construct a finite, nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton that
encodes the infinite traces not admitted by the input formula. Given the finite transition system
that represents the system behaviour, the two models are then merged into a single one. It has
then only to be checked whether the resulting transition systems admits any traces at all, which
is a purely graph-theoretical task.
First, we need a few definitions. Similar to the ESGCTL case, we have:
Definition 5.45 (Verifiable ESGCTL∗ Formulas). Let Σ be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉.
An ESGCTL∗ formula α is verifiable iff it only mentions fluents from 〈D,F〉, every quantifier uses
a distinct variable and every occurrence of a functional fluent is of the form f(~t) = ~t′, where ~t
and ~t′ do not contain any further functional fluents.
Next, we define a transform operator that recursively evaluates ESGCTL∗ formulas as follows:
Definition 5.46 (Verification Transform Operator for ESGCTL∗ Formulas). Let Σ be a basic
action theory over 〈D,F〉 and α a verifiable ESGCTL∗ formula. The verification transformation
of α wrt Σ, denoted as C[α], is inductively defined as follows:
1. C[(t1 = t2)] = R[(t1 = t2)];
2. C[F (~t)] = R[F (~t)];
3. C[¬α] = ¬C[α];
4. C[α1 ∧ α2] = C[α1] ∧ C[α2];
5. C[∃x.α] = ∃x.C[α];
6. C[〈〈δ〉〉ϕ] = CheckLTL[δ, T [ϕ]].
Trace subformulas are handled by means of the T operator:
1. T [α] = C[α], if α is a situation formula;
2. T [¬ϕ] = ¬T [ϕ];
3. T [ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2] = T [ϕ1] ∧ T [ϕ2];
4. T [∃x.ϕ] = ∃x.T [ϕ];
5. T [Xϕ] = XT [ϕ];
6. T [ϕ1 U ϕ2] = T [ϕ1] U T [ϕ2];
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We are left with defining CheckLTL. The name of the operation already suggests that it
involves evaluating LTL-like formulas. More precisely, we let ESGLTL refer to the fragment
of ESG trace formulas that do not contain nested path quantifiers, as given by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= (t1 = t2) | F (~t) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | Xϕ | ϕ U ϕ(5.84)
It is easy to see that any input formula to CheckLTL[δ, · ] during the evaluation of C[α] has
to be of this form, provided that CheckLTL itself only yields fluent formulas as result (which
will be shown later).
In the classical automata-based LTL model checking approach, the states of the automaton
represent the elementary sets of subformulas in the input formula ϕ: Given all subformulas
in the input formula ϕ, together with their negations, a subset is called elementary iff it is
logically consistent, the satisfaction of temporal subformulas is locally consistent, and the set is
maximal. The transitions in the automaton are furthermore defined according to the semantics
of the logic and the expansion laws of temporal operators. The acceptance criterion is chosen
in a way such that it is ensured that any accepted trace satisfies ϕ.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly adopt this approach for the verification of ESGLTL
formulas. The reason is that we allow arbitrary first-order quantification inside the temporal
input formula, and hence the set of its subformulas is in general not finite. We hence have to
again resort to an implicit representation using logical formulas.
Formally, let ϕ ∈ ESGLTL. We need to consider all (and only) temporal subformulas of ϕ,
i.e. all its subformulas of the form (φi U ψi) (with free variables ~xi) as well as all subformulas
of the form Xφj (with free variables ~xj).
Example 5.47. Consider property (5.79) that expresses that every request will eventually be
served. Removing all “syntactic sugar”, the formula reads as follows:
∀x. ¬〈〈δ〉〉(> U (Occ(rC (x)) ∧ ¬(> U Occ(sR(x))))(5.85)
Let ϕ denote the part behind the 〈〈δ〉〉 quantifier. It is an ESGLTL formula and contains the
following two temporal subformulas with free variable x:
> U Occ(sR(x))(5.86)
> U (Occ(rC (x)) ∧ ¬(> U Occ(sR(x)))(5.87)
In a similar vein as LTL model checking with Bu¨chi automata, the idea behind our approach is
now to break down the truth of temporal formulas on infinite traces into three different parts:
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1. Local Consistency:
First, we have to ensure the local consistency of satisfaction of the temporal subformulas:
∀~xi. ψi ⊃ (φi U ψi)(5.88)
∀~xi. (φ1 U ψi) ∧ ¬ψi ⊃ φi(5.89)
(5.88) expresses that any trace starting in the current situation, where ψi is satisfied,
also satisfies (φi U ψi). Moreover, if ψi does no hold, then such a trace can only satisfy
(φi U ψi) if φi is true (5.89).
Note that due to our implicit representation, it is unnecessary to explicitly enforce logical
consistency and maximality, since we get these “for free” from logical entailment: If a
label formula is inconsistent, then the set of satisfying configurations will be empty, and
the set of formulas entailed by some label formula is maximal by definition.
2. Single-Step Consistency:
Next, it is required that the satisfaction of temporal subformulas remains consistent from
one situation of a trace to the next:
∀~xi. (φi U ψi) ≡ ψi ∨ (φi ∧ [a](φi U ψi))(5.90)
∀~xj . Xφj ≡ [a]φj(5.91)
(5.90) is a variant of the well-known expansion law for the temporal “until” operator,
whereas (5.91) is a similar one for “next”.
3. Eventual Compliance:
Finally, for each (φi U ψi) subformula, we have to ensure that the acceptance condition
Accept i
def
= (φi U ψi) ⊃ ψi(5.92)
gets satisfied infinitely often.
Definition 5.48. Given ϕ ∈ ESGLTL, we let LocCons[ϕ] denote the set of all local consistency
constraints of the forms (5.88) and (5.89) for all of ϕ’s temporal “until” subformulas. Similarly,
we will use Trans[ϕ] to denote the set of all transition constraints (5.90) and (5.91) for temporal
subformulas in ϕ.
Moreover, in order to be able to reason with these properties solely based on non-modal
theorem proving, we introduce a new predicate symbol Ui(~xi) for each (φi U ψi) subformula
(whose free variables are ~xi), and a new predicate symbol Xj(~xj) for each Xφj subformula
(whose free variables are ~xj). We will use φ↓ to denote the result of replacing all of ϕ’s temporal
subformulas in φ by their corresponding predicates.
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Example 5.49. For the two temporal subformulas mentioned in Example 5.47 we have to
introduce two new predicate symbols. Let U1(x) correspond to temporal subformula (5.86),
and U2(x) to (5.87). Then LocCons[ϕ]↓ contains
∀x. Occ(sR(x)) ⊃ U1(x)(5.93)
∀x. U1(x) ∧ ¬Occ(sR(x)) ⊃ >(5.94)
∀x. Occ(rC (x)) ∧ ¬U1(x) ⊃ U2(x)(5.95)
∀x. U2(x) ∧ ¬(Occ(rC (x)) ∧ ¬U1(x)) ⊃ >(5.96)
Conveniently, formulas (5.94) and (5.96) are valid, hence we will only have to deal with (5.93)
and (5.95) in the following.
Next, Trans[ϕ]↓ in the example is the set consisting of the following formulas:
∀x. U1(x) ≡Occ(sR(x)) ∨ [a]U1(x)(5.97)
∀x. U2(x) ≡Occ(rC (x)) ∧ ¬U1(x) ∨ [a]U2(x)(5.98)
Finally, the acceptance conditions are
Accept1↓ = U1(x) ⊃ Occ(sR(x))(5.99)
Accept2↓ = U2(x) ⊃ Occ(rC (x)) ∧ ¬U1(x)(5.100)
To ensure eventual compliance, we use a property that is similar to the acceptance criterion
of Bu¨chi automata, but extends it to the first-order case. For this purpose, we introduce yet
another new fluent Ai(~xi) for each (φi U ψi) subformula, having the successor state axiom
[a]Ai(~xi) ≡ (Accept i↓ ∨ (Ai(~xi) ∧ ¬AccAll [ϕ]))(5.101)
where
AccAll [ϕ]
def
=
∧
i
∀~xi. Ai(~xi)(5.102)
The idea is that the Ai “collect” all instances of Accept i, and AccAll [ϕ] becomes true once all
Ai hold for all ~xi, after which they are “reset” to false. The algorithm then basically tries to
prove the existence of an execution trace on which AccAll [ϕ] is satisfied infinitely often. The
algorithm is depicted below:
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Procedure 5 CheckLTL[δ, ϕ]
1: L′ := Label[Gδ,⊥];
2: L := Label[Gδ,AccAll [ϕ]] And PathLTL[Gδ, ϕ];
3: while L 6≡ L′ do
4: L′ := L;
5: L := L′ Or PreLTL[Gδ, ϕ, L′];
6: end while
7: L′ := Label[Gδ,⊥];
8: while L 6≡ L′ do
9: L′ := L;
10: L := L′ And PreLTL[Gδ, ϕ, L′];
11: end while
12: return InitLabelLTL[Gδ, ϕ, L]
Intuitively, we can understand its structure as follows: In line 2, we initialize the label set to
represent all configurations on situations where AccAll [ϕ] holds and that may start infinite runs.
The fixpoint computation loop in lines 3 to 6 then determines the configurations from which
eventually such configurations are reachable (note the similarity to Procedure 4 for CheckEU).
Furthermore, the loop in lines 8 to 11 computes labels representing configurations where this
is always the case (again note the resemblance to Procedure 2 for CheckEG). The formula
extracted in line 12 hence represents the necessary and sufficient conditions under which there
is a path where AccAll [ϕ] is always eventually true, i.e. holds infinitely often.
A few details are left to explain. Foremost, we have to revise the definition of a preimage,
as it is now required that we ensure that local and single-step consistency is maintained:
Definition 5.50 (Preimage Under Local And Single-Step Constraints). Let L be a set of labels
on some trace graph G = 〈V,E, v0〉 and Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory. The
preimage under local and single-step constraints of L is defined as:
PreLTL[〈V,E, v0〉, ϕ, L] = {〈v,PreLTL[v, ϕ, L]〉 | v ∈ V }(5.103)
where the preimage of a single node is
PreLTL[v, ϕ, L] =
∨
{PreLTL[φ, ~x, t, φ′, ψ, ϕ] | v φ/pi~x:t/φ
′
−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E, 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L}(5.104)
with
PreLTL[φ, ~x, t, φ
′, ψ, ϕ] = Elim[〈 ~X , ~U〉,R[LocCons[ϕ]↓ ∧ φ ∧ ∃~x.φ′ ∧ [t]ψ ∧ Trans[ϕ]↓at ]].
(5.105)
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The formula to be regressed may now contain occurrences of the newly introduced special
fluents. We therefore extend the set of successor state axioms Σpost by axioms of the form
(5.101) for all Ai(~xi) (in the following denoted by Σ
~A
post as well as the following ones for Ui(~xi)
and Xj(~xj) (in the following denoted by Σ
~X , ~U
post ):
[a]Ui(~xi) ≡ Ui(~xi)(5.106)
[a]Xj(~xj) ≡ Xj(~xj)(5.107)
and regress wrt Σpost ∪ Σ~Apost ∪ Σ
~X , ~U
post . The Ui and Xj are yet another set of new predicates.
Intuitively, they are placeholders for the truth values of the Ui and Xj in the successor situation.
After regression, we eliminate them using the Elim operator:
Elim[〈P1, . . . , Pk〉, α] def= ∃P1 . . . ∃Pk α(5.108)
We thus get a representation of those configurations for which a truth assignment of the temporal
subformulas exists such that local and single-step consistency are maintained into the successor
configuration.
The definition of Elim given in (5.108) obviously amounts to second-order reasoning, which
violates our assumption of a logically omniscient first-order reasoner that we took so far. In
Section 5.4.4 below, we briefly discuss how an alternative definition of the operator allows to
stay consistent with the assumption. Second-order quantification is necessary because of the
nondeterministic nature of the single-step consistency law for the “until” case: as opposed to
successor state axioms for normal fluents, (5.90) cannot determine a unique value for (φi U ψi)
(and thus Ui) in the successor situation solely based on the truth values of formulas in the
current situation. We use Ui therefore rather to express the possibility of that (φi U ψi) holds
on some execution trace, and additionally have to ensure eventual compliance otherwise.
Furthermore, for the above to be well-defined, we require that label formulas are now always
fluent formulas wrt 〈D,F ∪ {~X , ~U , ~A}〉. This implies that the ~X and ~U that occur in any
label formula are always bound by a second-order quantifier. It can easily be verified that the
initial assignment of label sets in Procedure 5 conforms to this requirement, and that it will be
maintained by the application of PreLTL as well as conjunction and disjunction of labels.
Let us first understand this new notion of a preimage semantically. For this purpose, we
introduce the following relation among worlds:
Definition 5.51. If w,w′ ∈ W, z ∈ Z and ~P (fluent or rigid) predicate symbols, then w z≈~P w′
iff w
z∼~P w′ and for all z′ 6= z · z′′, all primitive terms t and all primitive sentences β:
w[t, z′] = w′[t, z′](5.109)
w[β, z′] = w′[β, z′](5.110)
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Intuitively, w
z≈~P w′ means that w and w′ are almost identical, except for their interpretation
of the ~P from z on. Recall that this is different from w
z∼~P w′ which allows the two worlds to
differ arbitrarily in situations not reachable from z. We note the following consequences of this
definition:
Proposition 5.52.
z≈~P is an equivalence relation.
Proposition 5.53. If w′
z·z′≈ ~P w, then w′
z≈~P w.
Proposition 5.54. If w′ z∼~P w and w′, z |= α, then there exists w′′
z≈~P w with w′′, z |= α.
Additionally, we need:
Definition 5.55 (Instantiation of Successor State Axioms). Let Σpost be any set of SSAs
[a]F (~x) ≡ γF .
Then Σpost(p) denotes the instantiation of Σpost wrt p, consisting of corresponding formulas
([a]F (~x) ≡ γF )ap.
With the above, we can now define:
Definition 5.56 (Runs Consistent wrt an ESGLTL Formula). Given a trace graph G = 〈V,E, v0〉
and a formula ϕ ∈ ESGLTL, we extend the definition of transition steps and finality for graph
configurations to include consistency wrt ϕ as follows:
• 〈v, θ, w, z〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈v′, θ′, w′, z · p〉 iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 G−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉, w′ z·p≈ ~X , ~U ,~A w
and w′, z |= LocCons[ϕ]↓ ∧ Trans[ϕ]↓ap ∧ Σ~Apost(p).
• 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ FG,ϕ iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ FG,ϕ and w, z |= LocCons[ϕ]↓.
Furthermore, the notion of (finite and infinite) runs from Definition 5.15 is extended accordingly.
Note that this new definition of a transition among graph configurations now allows to switch to
a different world, albeit one that at most differs in the interpretation of the auxiliary predicates
starting at the current situation. Also notice that the formulas LocCons[ϕ]↓, Trans[ϕ]↓ap and
Σ
~A
post(p) are actually sentences, hence their satisfaction does not depend on the application of a
variable map. We now have, in analogy to Lemma 5.32:
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Lemma 5.57. Let G = 〈V,E, v0〉 be a trace graph, Σ a basic action theory and ϕ ∈ ESGLTL.
||PreLTL[G, ϕ, L]||Σ = {〈v, θ, w, z〉 | 〈v, θ, w, z〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈v′, θ′, w′, z · p〉, 〈v′, θ′, w′, z · p〉 ∈ ||L||Σ}.
Proof.
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||PreLTL[G, ϕ, L]||Σ
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||PreLTL[v, ϕ, L]||Σ (by (5.103) and (5.42))
iff w, z |= PreLTL[v, ϕ, L]θ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by (5.41))
iff w, z |= ∃ ~X , ~U . R[LocCons[ϕ]↓ ∧ φ ∧ ∃~x.φ′ ∧ [t]ψ ∧ Trans[ϕ]↓at ]θ,
where v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E, 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L
and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by (5.104) and (5.108))
iff exists w′ z∼ ~X , ~U w such that w′, z |= R[LocCons[ϕ]↓ ∧ φ ∧ ∃~x.φ′ ∧ [t]ψ ∧ Trans[ϕ]↓at ]θ,
where v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E, 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L
and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by the semantics)
iff exists w′ z∼ ~X , ~U w and standard names ~n such that w′, z |= R[LocCons[ϕ]↓ ∧ φ]θ
and w′, z |= R[φ′ ∧ [t]ψ ∧ Trans[ϕ]↓at ]θ[~x/~n],
where v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E, 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L
and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by the definition of regression)
iff exists w′
z·p≈ ~X , ~U ,~A w and standard names ~n such that w′, z |= φθ ∧ φ′θ[~x/~n],
w′, z |= LocCons[ϕ]↓ ∧ Trans[ϕ]↓ap ∧ Σ~Apost(p) and w′, z · p |= ψθ[~x/~n],
where v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E, p = |tθ[~x/~n]|zw′ , 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L,
and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by (5.112) below)
iff exists w′
z·p≈ ~X , ~U ,~A w and standard names ~n such that w, z |= φθ ∧ φ′θ[~x/~n],
w′, z |= LocCons[ϕ]↓ ∧ Trans[ϕ]↓ap ∧ Σ~Apost(p) and w′, z · p |= ψθ[~x/~n],
where v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E, p = |tθ[~x/~n]|zw, 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L,
and w′ |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by (5.111) below)
iff exists w′
z·p≈ ~X , ~U ,~A w and standard names ~n such that 〈v, θ, w, z〉
G−→ 〈v′, θ[~x/~n], w, z · p〉,
w′, z |= LocCons[ϕ]↓ ∧ Trans[ϕ]↓ap ∧ Σ~Apost(p) and w′, z · p |= ψθ[~x/~n],
where 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L and w′ |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by Definition 5.15)
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈v′, θ[~x/~n], w′, z · p〉,
w′, z · p |= ψθ[~x/~n], 〈v′, ψ〉 ∈ L, and w′ |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by Definition 5.56)
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈v′, θ[~x/~n], w′, z · p〉 and 〈v′, θ[~x/~n], w′, z · p〉 ∈ ||L||Σ (by (5.41))
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In the seventh step above, we used the following property:
If w′
z·p≈ ~X , ~U ,~A w, then w′ and w agree on φ, φ′, t and Σdef ∪ Σpost.(5.111)
This is because by assumption, neither of φ, φ′, t and Σdef∪Σpost mentions any of the 〈~X , ~U , ~A〉.
It remains to be proven that the sixth rewriting step is correct as well. For this purpose, assume
w |= Σdef∪Σpost, that α is regressable wrt Σdef∪Σpost∪Σ~X , ~Upost ∪Σ~Apost, that the only action within
[ · ] operators in α is tθ and that α does not contain any free occurrences of the ~X , ~U . Then we
use that:
There is w′ z∼ ~X , ~U w with w′, z |= R[α]θ(5.112)
iff there is w′′
z·p≈ ~X , ~U ,~A w with w′′, z |= αθ ∧ Σ
~A
post(p), where p = |tθ|zw.
We prove the two directions separately:
“⇒”: Let p = |tθ|zw and w′′ be a world such that for all ~n,
w′′[Xj(~n), z · p] = w′[Xj(~n), z](5.113)
w′′[Ui(~n), z · p] = w′[Ui(~n), z](5.114)
w′′[Ai(~n), z · p] = 1 iff w′′, z |= γAi~xi a~n p(5.115)
and that is otherwise like w. Obviously, w′′
z·p≈ ~X , ~U ,~A w and w′′, z |= Σ
~A
post(p). That w
′′, z |= αθ
iff w′ |= R[α]θ can then be shown by induction on α, similar to Lemma 3.32 item 4.
“⇐”: Conversely, given w′′, we define w′ to the world that satisfies (5.113) and (5.114), and
that is otherwise like w. Then obviously w′ z∼ ~X , ~U w. Again, w′′, z |= αθ iff w′ |= R[α]θ follows
by induction on the structure of α.
Next, Procedure 5 uses a variant of the Path algorithm (Procedure 3):
Procedure 6 PathLTL[Gδ, ϕ]
1: L′ := Label[Gδ,⊥];
2: L := Label[Gδ,>];
3: while L 6≡ L′ do
4: L′ := L;
5: L := L′ And PreLTL[Gδ, ϕ, L′];
6: end while
7: return L
We note that it behaves completely analogous to Path:
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Lemma 5.58. Let Σ be a basic action theory and δ a program of the form δ1
ω|| · · · ||δkω without
free variables. If Procedure 6 terminates, it returns a label set L such that
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||L||Σ iff w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and there is an infinite run
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v1, θ1, w1, z · p1〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v2, θ2, w2, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ . . .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.37, only using Lemma 5.57 instead of Lemma 5.32.
The last definition for the algorithm is the extraction of the result formula out of the initial
node’s label, which once more requires eliminating auxiliary predicates:
InitLabelLTL[G, ϕ, L] def= Elim[〈~X , ~U , ~A〉, ϕ↓ ∧ ψ] such that 〈v0, ψ〉 ∈ L.(5.116)
5.4.3 Correctness
Before we come to the main theorem of this section, we first establish the following relation
between runs with respect to some ϕ ∈ ESGLTL and runs satisfying ϕ:
Lemma 5.59. Let w ∈ W and Σ = Σ0 ∪Σdef ∪Σpost a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉 such that
w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost. Furthermore let ϕ ∈ ESGLTL and G = 〈V,E, v0〉 a trace graph. The following
are equivalent:
1. There is some w0
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w with w0, z |= ϕ↓θ and a run
〈v0, θ, w0, z〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈v1, θ1, w1, z · p1〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈v2, θ2, w2, z · p1 · p2〉 G,ϕ−−→ . . .
such that for all k ≥ 0 exists l ≥ k with wl, z · p1 · · · pl |= AccAll [ϕ].
2. w, z, p1 · p2 · · · |= ϕθ and there is a run
〈v0, θ, w, z〉 G−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 G−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 G−→ . . .
Proof. We only sketch the structure of the proof here. The details are in Appendix A.3.
“1 ⇒ 2”: We establish the existence of a corresponding run by an induction over the steps of
the given run. The satisfaction of ϕθ is shown by induction over the structure of ϕ.
“2 ⇒ 1”: We construct a world w0 that is like w, except that for all k ≥ 0, all i, all j, and all ~n
w0[Xj(~n), z · zk] = 1 iff w, z · zk, pik |= Xφj~xj~n
w0[Ui(~n), z · zk] = 1 iff w, z · zk, pik |= (φi U ψi)~xi~n
w0[Ai(~n), z] = 0
w0[Ai(~n), z · zk+1] = 1 iff w0, z · zk |= γAi~xi a~n pk+1
To obtain a sequence of worlds w0, w1, w2, . . . with the desired properties, we set wk = w0 for
all k > 0.
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With the above lemma, it is now possible to show that Procedure 5 works correctly:
Theorem 5.60. Let Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉, δ a program
of the form δ1
ω|| · · · ||δkω that only mentions fluents in 〈D,F〉, and ϕ a formula of ESGLTL that
only mentions fluents in 〈D,F〉. If the procedure terminates, CheckLTL[δ, ϕ] is fluent and
Σdef ∪ Σpost |=  CheckLTL[δ, ϕ] ≡ 〈〈δ〉〉ϕ
Proof. We will prove the equivalent claim that for all w ∈ W such that w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost, all
z ∈ Z and all variable maps θ,
w, z |= CheckLTL[δ, ϕ]θ iff w, z |= 〈〈δθ〉〉ϕθ.
So assume that the procedure terminates. Let L0 denote the label set L after the initial
assignment in line 2, L1 be L after completing the first while loop in line 6, and L2 after
finishing the second while loop in line 11. Then the following properties hold:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||L0||Σ iff w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and there is an infinite run
(5.117)
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v1, θ1, w1, z · p1〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v2, θ2, w2, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ . . .
such that w, z |= AccAll [ϕ]
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||L1||Σ iff w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and there is an infinite run
(5.118)
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v1, θ1, w1, z · p1〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v2, θ2, w2, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ . . .
such that for some l ≥ 0, wl, z · p1 · · · pl |= AccAll [ϕ]
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||L2||Σ iff w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and there is an infinite run
(5.119)
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v1, θ1, w1, z · p1〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v2, θ2, w2, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ . . .
such that for all k ≥ 0 exists l ≥ k with wl, z · p1 · · · pl |= AccAll [ϕ]
The above properties can be proven as follows:
• (5.117): by Lemma 5.58 and our interpretation of label formulas.
• (5.118): Similar to property (5.69) in the proof for Theorem 5.39: Before entering the first
while loop in line 3, the set of labels is equivalent to L0. After one iteration, L represents
those configurations such that a configuration in ||L0||Σ can be reached in one step. After
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two iterations, L stands for those configurations such that a configuration in ||L0||Σ can be
reached in at most two steps, and so on. If the loop converges after n iterations, it means
that the resulting L stands not only for all configurations where a configuration in ||L0||Σ
is reachable within at most n steps, but also those where this is the case for any number
of steps l > n.
• (5.119): Similar to property (5.62) in the proof for Theorem 5.36: Again, before the
procedure enters the second while loop in line 8, the set of labels is L1. After doing one
iteration, L represents those configurations where it is ensured that there starts a run
such that all visited configurations until after the first step are in ||L1||Σ. After the second
iteration, L stands for those configurations that start some run where all configurations
until the completing the first two transitions are from ||L1||Σ, and so on. If the loop
converges after n iterations, it means that L represents those configurations where there
is a path such that not only the configurations visited within the first n transitions remain
in ||L1||Σ, but all of them do.
Now let w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost. Then
w, z |= CheckLTL[δ, ϕ]θ
iff w, z |= InitLabelLTL[Gδ, ϕ, L2]θ (by assumption)
iff w, z |= ∃~X , ~U , ~A. (ϕ↓ ∧ ψ)θ and 〈v0, ψ〉 ∈ L2 (by (5.116))
iff there is some w′ z∼~X , ~U ,~A w with w′, z |= ϕ↓θ,
w′, z |= ψθ and 〈v0, ψ〉 ∈ L2 (by the semantics)
iff there is some w0
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w with w0, z |= ϕ↓θ,
w0, z |= ψθ and 〈v0, ψ〉 ∈ L2 (by Proposition 5.54)
iff there is some w0
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w with w0, z |= ϕ↓θ
and 〈v0, θ, w0, z〉 ∈ ||L2||Σ (by (5.41))
iff there is some w0
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w with w0, z |= ϕ↓θ
and 〈v0, θ, w0, z〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v1, θ1, w1, z · p1〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ 〈v2, θ2, w2, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ,ϕ−−−→ . . .
such that for all k ≥ 0 exists l ≥ k with wl, z · p1 · · · pl |= AccAll [ϕ] (by (5.119))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . .
such that w, z, p1 · p2 · · · |= ϕθ (by Lemma 5.59)
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 Gδ−→ . . .
such that for all k ≥ 0, 〈vk, θk, w, z · p1 · · · pk〉 6∈ FGδ
and w, z, p1 · p2 · · · |= ϕθ (by Lemma 5.24)
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iff pi ∈ ||Gδ||zw(θ) with w, z, pi |= ϕθ (by Definition 5.15 and the semantics)
iff pi ∈ ||δθ||zw with w, z, pi |= ϕθ (by Theorem 5.21)
iff w, z |= 〈〈δθ〉〉ϕθ (by the semantics)
Finally, since labels always contain fluent formulas wrt 〈D,F ∪ {~X , ~U , ~A}〉, the output of the
procedure (if any) will be a fluent formula wrt 〈D,F〉 due to the fact that the ~X , ~U , ~A get
bound by a second-order quantifier in (5.116).
We are left with showing the soundness of the overall ESGCTL∗ verification transform operator
of Definition 5.46.
Lemma 5.61. Let Σ = Σ0∪Σdef∪Σpost be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉 and ϕ be a formula
of ESGCTL∗ that only mentions fluents in 〈D,F〉. Then
Σdef ∪ Σpost |=  ϕ ≡ C[ϕ](5.120)
Proof. We prove the equivalent claim that if w is a world with w |= Σdef ∪Σpost, z is a sequence
of action standard names, and θ a variable map,
w, z |= ϕθ iff w, z |= C[ϕ]θ(5.121)
The base cases ϕ = (t1 = t2) and ϕ = F (~t) are due to the correctness of regression (Lemma 3.32
(4)) and the easily provable fact that R[αθ] = R[α]θ for any α. Moreover, the cases ϕ = ϕ1∧ϕ2,
ϕ = ¬ϕ1 and ϕ = ∃xϕ1 are immediately obtained by induction. The case ϕ = 〈〈δ〉〉φ finally
follows by an easy induction on the structure of φ and Theorem 5.60.
Theorem 5.62. Let Σ = Σ0∪Σdef∪Σpost be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉 and ϕ a sentence
of ESGCTL∗ that only mentions fluents in D ∪ F . If the computation of C[ϕ] wrt Σ terminates,
it is a fluent sentence and
Σ |= ϕ iff Σ0 |= C[ϕ].
Proof. “⇒”: Suppose Σ |= ϕ. Let w be a world such that w |= Σ0. From Lemma 3.32 (2) it
follows that wΣ |= Σ, and hence wΣ |= ϕ. By Lemma 5.61 we obtain that wΣ |= C[ϕ] and thus
by Lemma 3.32 (6) we get w |= C[ϕ].
“⇐”: Conversely, suppose Σ0 |= C[ϕ] and let w be a world with w |= Σ. Then in particular
w |= Σ0, and so w |= C[ϕ]. By Lemma 5.61, w |= ϕ.
We thus established the soundness of our verification algorithm for ESGCTL∗ . Regarding its
completeness, it is easy to see that everything that we discussed in Section 5.3.3 for ESGCTL
equally holds for the ESGCTL∗ case in light of the fact that the latter subsumes the former.
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5.4.4 Eliminating Second-Order Quantifiers
As mentioned above, the definition of the Elim operation contradicts our assumption that the
agent is a pure first-order reasoner. It is however possible to implement Elim in a way such that
the assumption is reestablished, and yet our algorithm remains sound. Recall that we defined
Elim[〈P1, . . . , Pk〉, α] to be
∃P1 . . . ∃Pn. α.
If α itself is purely first-order, then replacing a formula of the above form by an equivalent
one without any second-order quantifiers is called predicate quantifier elimination. The general
problem is known to be undecidable [Ack35], yet there a number of techniques as surveyed by
Nonnengart et al. [NOS99]. Any method that allows the α to take arbitrary form, such as the
well-known Scan algorithm [GO92], can only be sound, but necessarily has to be incomplete.
One approach we can take is to simply plug in any such method as implementation of Elim.
As our overall algorithm is already incomplete, this would “only” introduce a third source of
non-termination, in addition to the undecidability of our underlying logic and the possibility
for the fixpoint computation loops to not converge.
There are however notable exceptions. Note that in our case, the predicates to be eliminated
are the Xj(~xj) and Ui(~xi) for the temporal subformulas Xφj and φi U ψi in the input formula,
where the arguments ~xj and ~xi represent the corresponding subformulas’ free variables. In
many practical cases, the auxiliary predicates will be of arity zero, i.e. propositional. This
happens whenever quantifiers in the formula do not range into a nested temporal subformula.
For example,
〈〈δ〉〉(∀F (x) U (G∃yF (y)))(5.122)
contains first-order quantification, but the temporal subformulas have no free variables, hence
all Ui will be propositional. Eliminating a propositional auxiliary predicate P from α then is
nothing more than forgetting [LR94a] the fact P in α. If αP> and α
P
⊥ denote α with all free
occurrences of P replaced by > and ⊥, respectively, we have that
|= ∃Pα ≡ αP> ∨ αP⊥.(5.123)
The elimination of P thus reduces to a simple syntactical manipulation of formulas, and can
easily be iterated for multiple predicates.
There is an even larger set of formulas that we can handle in this manner that even allows for
temporal subformulas with free variables. The only constraint we need is that the free variables
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in question are quantified outside of the path quantifier, as in:
∀x〈〈δ〉〉GFF (x)
The idea is then to use the principle of Universal Generalization that we discussed in Section
3.2.3. Let n1, . . . , nk be all standard names of the same sort as x that appear in the basic action
theory Σ, the program δ and the temporal formula ϕ, and let n′ be some standard name that
does not occur. Then we can show that
|= Σ ⊃ ∀x[δ]ϕ,
if and only if
|= Σ ⊃ [δ]ϕxn
for every n ∈ {n1, . . . , nk, n′}, similar to Theorem 3.15. If ϕ contains no more quantifiers (or
only “safe” ones as in (5.122) above), no temporal subformula in ϕxn will contain free variables,
and we can again use (5.123) to eliminate them. Furthermore, we can treat multiple variables
recursively, similar to the RES operator of Definition 3.51.
5.5 Terminating Programs
Finally, we have so far only studied the verification of Golog programs that are nonterminating.
As argued before, this is justified by the fact that the control program of a robot with an open-
ended task necessarily has to be of this form. Nonetheless, there are certain scenarios where we
have to deal with terminating programs. For example, we may want to analyze the behaviour of
a subroutine of the robot’s overall control program. In this case it is particularly interesting to
verify that the procedure ensures that a certain postcondition comes to hold after its execution.
In this section, we will therefore briefly address the problem of verifying postconditions for
terminating Golog programs.
5.5.1 The Algorithm
Here is the algorithm to compute the necessary and sufficient conditions that an execution
of program δ exists such that the postcondition α comes to hold after successful termination.
Below, let
Final[〈V,E, v0〉, α] def= {〈v, α ∧ ϕ〉 | v = 〈 · , ϕ〉 ∈ V }(5.124)
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and everything else as in Section 5.3.
Procedure 7 CheckPost[δ, α]
1: L′ := Label[Gδ,>];
2: L := Final[Gδ, α];
3: while L 6≡ L′ do
4: L′ := L;
5: L := L Or Pre[Gδ, L];
6: end while
7: return InitLabel[Gδ, L]
Intuitively, the procedure starts with labelling each node with the postcondition α, conjoined
with the termination condition of that node. We then determine the disjunction of that label
set with its preimage, yielding a representation of the configurations where either now or within
one step, α holds and program execution may terminate. When iterating this a second time, we
obtain a set of labels that tell us under which conditions we can reach such a configuration in at
most two steps, and so on. If the procedure eventually converges, we have found a solution that
represents all necessary and sufficient conditions under which there exists a finite run where α
comes to hold after any number of transitions.
Note the close resemblance of the above algorithm with Procedure 4: Again we do an
iterative approximation of a least fixpoint, disjoining the current label set with its predecessor
in each step. This similarity does not come as a surprise since a successful finite run consists of
valid transitions until a final configuration is reached that satisfies the desired postcondition.
Example 5.63. As an example, let Σ be as before and δ the program
(pix. Poss(requestCoffee(x))?; requestCoffee(x))∗,
which is basically a simplified, terminating version of our previous δexo. The simple corre-
sponding characteristic graph is depicted in Figure 5.4. Suppose we want to verify whether
it is possible to reach a situation where the queue of coffee requests is full after successfully
executing this program, i.e. whether
Σ |= 〈δ〉Full(queue),
where we again assume a queue of size k = 2. We begin with the initial set of labels
L0 = {〈v0,Full(queue)〉}
= {〈v0,∃x1∃x2. x1 6= e ∧ x2 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x1, x2〉〉}
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v0
〈δ,>〉
pix : rC (x)/Poss(rC (x))
Figure 5.4: Characteristic graph for the program δ = (pix. Poss(rC (x))?; rC (x))∗
and, since it is not equivalent to >, determine its preimage:
Pre[v0, L0]
≡ R[∃x. Poss(requestCoffee(x)) ∧ [requestCoffee(x)]Full(queue)]
≡ ∃x. x 6= e ∧ ∃x′. queue = 〈x′, e〉 ∧
∃x1∃x2. x1 6= e ∧ x2 6= e ∧ Enqueue(queue, x, 〈x1, x2〉)
≡ ∃x1. x1 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x1, e〉
Because our queue has only two slots, the above formula expresses that the queue is half filled.
Let therefore HalfFilled(queue) denote ∃x1. x1 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x1, e〉. After one iteration, we
thus obtain the label set
L1 = L0 Or Pre[Gδ, L0]
= {〈v0,Full(queue) ∨HalfFilled(queue)〉}
≡ {〈v0, ∃x1∃x2. x1 6= e ∧ queue = 〈x1, x2〉〉}
Obviously, L1 is not equivalent to L0, therefore another iteration is necessary:
Pre[v0, L0]
≡ R[∃x. Poss(requestCoffee(x)) ∧ [requestCoffee(x)](Full(queue) ∨HalfFilled(queue))]
≡ ∃x. x 6= e ∧ ∃x′. queue = 〈x′, e〉 ∧ ∃x1∃x2. x1 6= e ∧ Enqueue(queue, x, 〈x1, x2〉)
≡ ∃x1. queue = 〈x1, e〉
≡ HalfFilled(queue) ∨ Empty(queue)
The label set after the second iteration hence is
L2 = L1 Or Pre[Gδ, L1]
= {〈v0,Full(queue) ∨HalfFilled(queue) ∨ Empty(queue)〉}
≡ {〈v0,∃x1∃x2. queue = 〈x1, x2〉 ∧ (x1 = e ⊃ x2 = e)〉}
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which is again not equivalent to the previous one, so we continue:
Pre[v0, L1]
≡ R[∃x. Poss(requestCoffee(x)) ∧
[requestCoffee(x)](Full(queue) ∨HalfFilled(queue) ∨ Empty(queue))]
≡ ∃x. x 6= e ∧ ∃x′. queue = 〈x′, e〉 ∧
∃x1∃x2. Enqueue(queue, x, 〈x1, x2〉) ∧ (x1 = e ⊃ x2 = e)
≡ queue = 〈e, e〉
≡ Empty(queue)
Finally, the resulting set of labels is thus
L3 = L2 Or Pre[Gδ, L2]
= {〈v0,Full(queue) ∨HalfFilled(queue) ∨ Empty(queue)〉}
≡ {〈v0, ∃x1∃x2. queue = 〈x1, x2〉 ∧ (x1 = e ⊃ x2 = e)〉}
which is equivalent to L2, hence we are done. The resulting formula
Full(queue) ∨HalfFilled(queue) ∨ Empty(queue)
intuitively describes correctly all and only situations under which we can reach a full queue of
requests by means of a sequence of requestCoffee(x) actions: If it is full, we are immediately
done. When only one of the slots is occupied, we need one requestCoffee(x), and in case the
queue is empty, two of them are necessary. The equivalent expression
∃x1∃x2. queue = 〈x1, x2〉 ∧ (x1 = e ⊃ x2 = e)
demonstrates that this means that we only have to require that queue is indeed a list of length
two and is in some admissible state: Although syntactically nothing can keep us from putting
formulas like (queue = bob) or (queue = 〈e, bob〉) in Σ0, the algorithm correctly tells us that we
will thus never be able to reach a situation with a full queue.
5.5.2 Correctness
Once more we have a theorem that guarantees us the soundness of the procedure:
Theorem 5.64. Let Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉, δ a program
that only mentions fluents in 〈D,F〉 and α a fluent formula wrt 〈D,F〉. Then
Σdef ∪ Σpost |=  CheckPost[δ, α] ≡ 〈δ〉α
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Proof. Let Gδ = 〈V,E, v0〉. We prove the equivalent claim that for any world w with w |=
Σdef ∪ Σpost, any z ∈ Z and any variable map θ,
w, z |= CheckPost[δ, α]θ iff w, z |= 〈δθ〉αθ
First consider the simple case where Final[Gδ, α] ≡ Label[Gδ,>]. The procedure then does
not enter the while loop, but immediately returns α∧ϕ0 as output, where ϕ0 is the termination
condition of the initial node, i.e. v0 = 〈δ, ϕ0〉. By assumption, α ∧ ϕ0 is equivalent to >, which
implies that both α and ϕ0 are valid. Then clearly w, z |= CheckPost[δ, α]θ. Moreover, since
w, z |= ϕ0θ, we get that 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ by Definition 5.15, therefore 〈z, δθ〉 ∈ Fw by Lemma
5.19, hence 〈〉 ∈ ||δθ||zw. Together with w, z |= αθ it follows then that w, z |= 〈δθ〉αθ.
Now assume that there is at least one iteration of the loop. The procedure iteratively
computes label sets L0, L1, L2, . . . such that
L0 = Final[Gδ, α](5.125)
Li+1 = Li Or Pre[Gδ, Li](5.126)
Semantically, this means that
||L0||Σ = ||Final[Gδ, α]||Σ(5.127)
||Li+1||Σ = ||Li||Σ ∪ ||Pre[Gδ, Li]||Σ(5.128)
By assumption, the procedure terminates, hence there is some smallest index n such that
Ln+1 ≡ Ln. Obviously, the output will be a fluent formula. The proof of the main claim of this
theorem relies on the following property:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ iff w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and 〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→∗〈v′, θ′, w, z · z′〉(5.129)
such that 〈v′, θ′, w, z · z′〉 ∈ FGδ and w, z · z′ |= αθ
Then we have:
w, z |= CheckPost[δ, α]θ
iff w, z |= InitLabel[Gδ, Ln+1]θ (by assumption)
iff 〈v0, ψ0〉 ∈ Ln+1 and w, z |= ψ0θ (by (5.46))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln+1||Σ (by (5.41))
iff 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ (since Ln+1 ≡ Ln)
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→∗〈v′, θ′, w, z · z′〉
such that 〈v′, θ′, w, z · z′〉 ∈ FGδ and w, z · z′ |= αθ (by (5.129))
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iff z′ ∈ ||Gδ||zw(θ) and w, z · z′ |= αθ (by Definition 5.15)
iff z′ ∈ ||δθ||zw and w, z · z′ |= αθ (by Theorem 5.21)
iff w, z |= 〈δθ〉αθ (by the semantics)
To prove (5.129), we introduce the following notation for the fact that there is some finite run
starting in 〈v, θ, w, z〉 where αθ holds after exactly j transitions:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j) def= w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost and,
(5.130)
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 Gδ−→ . . . Gδ−→ 〈vj , θj , w, z · p1 · · · pj〉
such that 〈vj , θj , w, z · p1 · · · pj〉 ∈ FGδ and w, z · p1 · · · pj |= αθ
(5.129) is then equivalent to writing that 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ iff for some j ≥ 0, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈
P(j). First we prove the following weaker property for all i ≥ 0:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Li||Σ iff for some j with 0 ≤ j ≤ i, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j)(5.131)
We will also use that
if 〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′, θ[~x/~n], w, z · p〉, then αθ[~x/~n] = αθ,(5.132)
which follows from our distinctiveness assumption for variables: Since the ~x are pi-quantified in
δ, they cannot appear freely in α.
The proof of (5.131) is by induction on i:
• i = 0:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||L0||Σ
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Final[Gδ, α]||Σ (by (5.127))
iff v = 〈 · , ϕ′〉 ∈ V, w, z |= (ϕ′ ∧ α)θ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by (5.124))
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ , w, z |= αθ and w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost (by Definition 5.15)
• i 7→ i+ 1:
〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Li+1||Σ
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Li||Σ or 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Pre[Gδ, Li]||Σ (by (5.128))
iff 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Li||Σ or
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉 and 〈v′, θ, w, z · p〉 ∈ ||Li||Σ (by Lemma 5.32)
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iff for some j with 0 ≤ j ≤ i, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j) or
〈v, θ, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉
and for some j with 0 ≤ j ≤ i, 〈v′, θ′, w, z · p〉 ∈ P(j) (by induction)
iff for some j with 0 ≤ j ≤ i, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j) or
for some j with 1 ≤ j ≤ i+ 1, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j) (by (5.130) and (5.132))
iff for some j with 0 ≤ j ≤ i+ 1, 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j)
Finally, we obtain (5.129) from (5.131) as follows. Assume that n is the smallest index such that
Ln+1 ≡ Ln, but that the algorithm would apply (5.126) indefinitely. Then 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ P(j)
iff j ≤ n and 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Ln||Σ by (5.131), or j > n and 〈v, θ, w, z〉 ∈ ||Lj ||Σ by (5.131), but
where ||Lj ||Σ = ||Ln||Σ due to the fact that ||Lm||Σ = ||Ln||Σ for m ≥ n, which follows inductively
from Ln+1 ≡ Ln.
As a final remark, note that this new procedure could be used to extend the regression operator
such that it can handle formulas that not only contain [t] operators with primitive actions, but
also [δ] containing entire programs. We would then simply add the rule
12. R[σ, 〈δ〉α] = R[σ,CheckPost[δ,R[α]]].
Although again we then cannot guarantee termination anymore, this would even allow us to
handle the most interesting case of programs containing iteration. Moreover, for any program
that does not contain iteration, it is easy to see that the procedure will terminate due to the
fact that the corresponding characteristic graph does not contain any cycles.
5.6 BDD Representation
Before concluding this chapter, we want to discuss some suggestions for the possible implemen-
tation of the verification procedures that were presented in this thesis. As we have seen, the
algorithms heavily rely on regression. The latter tends to quickly “blow up” formulas: Typically,
the size of the regression result is roughly exponential in the number of nested action operators
in the original formula, or in our case roughly exponential in the number of iterations of the
fixpoint computation loop. Moreover, when the definitional and successor state axioms of the
basic action theory contain quantification, each regression step introduces new quantifiers.
As is to be expected, theorem-proving systems perform worse the larger the input formula
and the more quantifiers it contains. A naive implementation of our algorithm that does syn-
tactical manipulations of formulas strictly according to the theorems presented in this chapter
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1
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0
Figure 5.5: OBDD for the formula A ∨ B ∧ ¬A and variable ordering A < B. Solid edges
represent the value “true”, dashed ones stand for “false”.
and that then calls a theorem prover to decide the equivalence of label formulas will show a very
bad performance, even for small problems. This is even true in spite of the fact that theorem
provers often do a certain preprocessing to simplify input formulas and bring them into their
internal representational form. The reason is that the effort for this preprocessing has to be
spent anew in each single iteration, and that it has to deal with formulas of increasing size.
In a more sophisticated implementation of the algorithms we would therefore rather want to
keep formulas as compact as possible and maintain this form throughout the algorithm’s entire
operation. Standard clausal-form representations such as CNF and DNF have the disadvantage
that the former tends to be compact only for formulas with many conjunctions and few disjunc-
tions, and vice versa for the latter. Unfortunately, the formulas produced by our algorithms
make heavy use of both connectives.
When it comes to propositional formulas, ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) [Bry86]
have become an increasingly popular and efficient means of representation, in particular as the
basis for symbolic model checking [BCM+92]. They are somewhat similar to binary decision
trees, except that they are actually directed acyclic graphs and that an order over the propo-
sitional variables is assumed. Figure 5.5 shows an example. An OBDD is often much more
compact than representations in other forms. They also support an efficient manipulation
through Boolean operations. What is particularly interesting about them is that if the variable
ordering is fixed, the fully reduced form of an OBDD is unique. Typically, implementations
materialize the OBDD of each subformula only once in memory and represent each formula
by a pointer to the node that is the root of the corresponding OBDD. It is thus possible to
check the equivalence of two formulas in constant time, as they are equivalent just in case their
pointers refer to the same root node!
A variety of approaches have been proposed for lifting OBDDs to the first-order case. While
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many of them require the formula to be in prenex form or quantifier-free [GT03, WJK07], a
variant of the first-order algebraic decision diagrams (FOADDs) introduced by Sanner [San08]
seems best suited for our purposes. The idea is to “expose the propositional structure of a first-
order formula” by pushing quantifiers inside as deeply as possible. For this purpose, Sanner
suggests to repeatedly apply the following rewrite rules:
∃x. φ(x, · ) ∨ ψ(x, · )  (∃xφ(x, · )) ∨ (∃xψ(x, · ))(5.133)
∀x. φ(x, · ) ∧ ψ(x, · )  (∀xφ(x, · )) ∧ (∀xψ(x, · ))(5.134)
∃x. φ(x, · ) ∧ ψ( · )  (∃xφ(x, · )) ∧ ψ( · )(5.135)
∀x. φ(x, · ) ∨ ψ( · )  (∀xφ(x, · )) ∨ ψ( · )(5.136)
Furthermore, quantifiers can be eliminated from the input formula using:
∃x. x = y ∧ φ(x, · )  φ(y, · )(5.137)
∀x. x 6= y ∨ φ(x, · )  φ(y, · )(5.138)
For example, the formula
∃x. (P (x) ∨ ∀y. P (x) ∧Q(x) ∧ ¬P (y))
is rewritten to
∃xP (x) ∨
(
∃x(P (x) ∧Q(x)) ∧ ∀y¬P (y)
)
.
The boxes illustrate the propositional structure of the formula. In its OBDD representation,
each box is treated as a propositional atom. If A stands for ∃xP (x) and B for ∃xP (x) ∧Q(x),
then we obtain exactly the OBDD depicted in Figure 5.5.
Obviously, the property that equivalent formulas have the same OBDD seizes to hold when
we move to the first-order case. Otherwise, we could thus decide first-order validity by simply
checking whether the OBDD of a given sentence is identical to the OBDD only consisting of
the leaf node 1. The reason for this lies in the fact that the construction procedure for OBDDs
sketched above may fail to detect that quantified subformulas that it regards as distinct are
indeed equivalent. Consequently, checking equivalence of first-order formulas by comparing
their OBDDs is only sound, but incomplete.
We may be willing to accept that in light of the fact our algorithms are incomplete anyhow.
More importantly, observe that this procedure is sufficient in many practical cases. For instance,
take the labels of Example 5.63. When we simplified formulas, it turned out that they were
always Boolean combinations of a finite set of quantified subformulas for which we introduced the
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abbreviations Empty(queue), HalfFilled(queue) and Full(queue). This is not surprising given
that a queue with only two slots will necessarily always satisfy exactly one of these three cases,
which can also be viewed as abstract states. What makes the usage of OBDDs as described
above especially appealing is that their construction would automatically expose this matter of
fact, yielding a very compact representation in which each of the three subformulas corresponds
to one propositional atom.
We did some preliminary experimentation with a prototypical implementation, which showed
encouraging first results. An in-depth evaluation and formal analysis is a subject for future work.
5.7 Discussion
5.7.1 Summary
This chapter presented the verification of non-terminating (and also terminating) Golog pro-
grams. We started with motivating that it is equally essential to verify that a Golog agent
meets its specification and requirements before deployment as it is for any other hardware and
software product. It was argued that while either proving properties manually or resorting
to existing model checking methods would constitute viable alternatives, a holistic approach
would be more desirable where an automated verification is done in the very same expressive
formalism and with the very same reasoning mechanisms that are used for the formalization
and actual control of the agent. Therefore, we proposed an extension of the logic ES by two
new modal operators that allow to express properties of execution paths of Golog programs,
drawing inspirations from temporal logics [Eme90], process logic [HKP82], and dynamic logic
[HKT00]. Next, we introduced characteristic graphs as a means of representing the possible
execution traces of a Golog program. We then presented automatic verification algorithms for
properties of non-terminating programs expressed in a CTL-like subset of the logic, after which
we considered a more expressive CTL∗-like subclass, before we addressed verifying postcondi-
tions of terminating programs. Finally, we discussed the implementation of these algorithms by
means of a first-order variant of binary decision diagrams.
5.7.2 Comparison to Related Work
As remarked earlier, the verification of non-terminating Golog programs has received surpris-
ingly little attention so far, one notable exception being the work by De Giacomo, Ternovska
and Reiter [GTR97] who however only do manual, meta-theoretic proofs within second-order
logic. Liu [Liu02] presents a Hoare-style proof system for the partial correctness of terminating
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Golog programs. She proves its soundness and, for a subset of programs, also its “relative
completeness” [Coo78]. The latter refers to completeness under the assumption that we are
given an oracle that decides the truth of first-order formulas, a notion that is closely related to
our assumption of the agent being a logically omniscient first-order reasoner.
Kelly and Pearce [KP10] study property persistence in the classical Situation Calculus using
a technique very similar to ours that is based on an iterative fixpoint approximation. However,
they do not restrict the space of reachable situations by Golog programs. In fact, property
persistence can be viewed as a special case of what our algorithm for ESGCTL can handle,
considering that the formula α (i.e. α persists to hold) is equivalent to [[anyω]]Gα in ESG.
The earlier mentioned work of Baader, Liu and ul Mehdi [BLuM10] is one option to obtain a
decidable verification procedure for properties of action logic programs. First, instead of using
the full first-order expressiveness of the Situation Calculus or ES, they resort to a dynamic
extension [BLM+05] of the decidable description logic ALC [BCM+03] to represent pre- and
postconditions of actions, where properties are expressed by a variant of LTL over ALC propo-
sitions [BGL08]. Second, they encode programs by finite Bu¨chi automata. Thus they indeed
handle a proper subset of possible inputs for our algorithm since their ALC-based formalism
can be viewed as a fragment of the Situation Calculus, and since we can simulate the state
transitions of a finite Bu¨chi automaton through a BAT and express its acceptance criterion by
means of a temporal formula.
Finally, the idea to verify Golog programs by means of iterative fixpoint computations
using characteristic program graphs has recently been taken on by De Giacomo, Lespe´rance
and Pearce [GLP10] in the context of games and multi-agent systems, where properties are
expressed in Alternating-Time Temporal Logic [AHK02].
5.7.3 Future Work
There still remain many possible directions for future work:
Decidability: It is not hard to see that the problem of verifying ESG formulas is highly
undecidable. As a consequence, any algorithm that attempts to solve it, such as the ones
presented in this chapter, can at most guarantee soundness, but not termination. It should be
emphasized again that was presented here were merely idealized reasoning methods, similar in
spirit to Reiter’s regression or Lakemeyer and Levesque’s Representation Theorem in the sense
that they show how a query can be reduced to classical FOL theorem proving by iteratively
“factoring out” its non-classical aspects.
One could take the stance that this is completely sufficient, and that it lies in the domain
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designer’s responsibility to devise a basic action theory and a program for the agent that ensure
that reasoning remains feasible. Our algorithms could then serve as a first sanity check in the
sense that if we get “stuck” in deciding first-order entailments during the offline verification of
a program, then this is an indication of a bad design as it is very likely that this also happens
at runtime after deploying the program.
Nevertheless it is probably more desirable to have guaranteed termination. As discussed
before, this is under the premises that we are able to use the same formalism both for the
specification and the control of the agent, and that we retain as much expressiveness of first-
order logic as possible to cope with possibly unknown individuals. Baader, Liu and ul Mehdi’s
aforesaid method based on description logics and Bu¨chi automata is certainly one first step
in this direction deserving further attention. The same goes for applying Liu, Lakemeyer and
Levesque’s incomplete, yet tractable reasoning method [LLL04, LL05b] in combination with
tractable progression of proper+ knowledge bases for local-effect action theories [LL09b], as
mentioned in Section 5.3.3. Finally, it would be interesting to expand upon results of a recent
diploma thesis [Lie13] that explores how using an ES variant of Gu and Soutchanski’s decidable
two-variable Situation Calculus [GS10] together with a restriction to well-known classes of SSAs
such as the context-free ones [LR97] or those with only local effects [LL05b] influences the
termination behaviour of our verification algorithms.
Witnesses and Counterexamples: When verifying systems using model checking, it is
often useful if the system can provide information beyond a simple “yes” or “no” answer. If we
have a query that asks whether a path with a certain property exists, then a witness is given
in the positive case. Similarly, if a formula is supposed to hold for all execution paths and it
turns out that it does not, then a counterexample can give valuable insight into the potential
error source.
In a sense, our algorithms already do provide witnesses and counterexamples, namely in
the form of the fluent formulas that are returned by the corresponding procedures. If for
instance a call to CheckEG[δ, ϕ] yields φ as output, then it means that an execution trace of
δ satisfying Gϕ exists just in case φ holds initially, and that the path in question must be some
trace admitted by φ?; δ. There are nonetheless scenarios where the latter is not sufficient to
uniquely identify a troublesome execution of a program. A possible direction for future work
therefore is to extend the verification algorithms by a mechanism that constructs witnesses and
counterexamples, for instance in the form of deterministic Golog programs.
5.7 Discussion 247
Semantics: Although ESG is sufficiently expressive for representing and verifying program
properties in many application scenarios, it nonetheless suffers from a few weaknesses. First,
the semantics of programs as given by Definitions 5.5 to 5.7 was devised to resemble the seman-
tics of ω-regular expressions. In particular, one intention behind it was that the · ω operator
only admits infinite traces, while the · ∗ only admits finite ones. However, the rather unusual
requirement that an infinite trace is one that never visits a final configuration sometimes leads
to unintuitive results. For example, it is not possible to express a “mixed” program admitting
both finite and infinite traces. The reader may verify that the program a∗|bω does not yield
any infinite runs because all reachable configurations are final. Moreover, in a program such
as a∗; bω, the supposedly finite iteration a∗ may indeed be executed infinitely since executing
a once leads back to a configuration with a∗; bω as remaining program, which is obviously not
final. It would be desirable to come up with an alternative program semantics that does not
suffer from these shortcomings.
Another intention behind ESG was to generalize the branching time temporal logics CTL
and CTL∗. In particular, the existential and universal path quantifiers E and Amay be viewed
as special cases of the ESG program quantifiers 〈〈δ〉〉 and [[δ]], respectively. The correspondence
is, however, not quite exact, namely when it comes to the nesting of such quantifiers. In
classical branching time temporal logics, one can use a formula such as AGEFOcc(recharge)
to express that on all paths it is always possible to eventually reach a certain desired state.
With the current semantics, we cannot state the same in ESG. The reason is that the nested
〈〈 · 〉〉 quantifier in the formula [[δ]]G〈〈anyω〉〉FOcc(recharge) is completely independent from the
outer [[δ]]. Instead, we may rather want the inner 〈〈anyω〉〉 to be restricted to (continuations of)
the paths admitted by the encapsulating quantifier. While the former reading was incorporated
in the definition of ESG because it yields a much simpler semantics, a suitable adoption of the
latter would increase the expressiveness of the language.
Epistemic Operators: In this chapter we only verified objective formulas. It would be
interesting to see whether we can lift our verification methods to the case of an agent with
incomplete information that is controlled by a knowledge-based program as described in Section
3.7. At first glance, it seems enough to simply apply the methods presented in Section 3.5
to reduce reasoning about action and knowledge to first-order theorem proving. However, the
elimination of epistemic modalities in the Representation Theorem happens always with respect
to a given static knowledge base, which in our current formulation is only available for the initial
situation. We would therefore have to revise our algorithms such that instead of iteratively
determining preimages by regressing label formulas, they perform a forward exploration of the
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state space by means of repeatedly progressing the agent’s initial theory. Alternatively, it might
be interesting to see whether the elimination of knowledge operators can be avoided altogether,
for example by resorting to incomplete inference methods for subjective formulas similar to the
ones employed in Petrick and Bacchus’ knowledge-based planner PKS [PB02, PB04].
Larger Subsets of Golog: The restricted subset of Golog that was used in this chapter
misses some of the language’s interesting constructs, in particular procedures. The problem is
that when we do transitions in a program containing (recursive) procedure calls, the reachable
subprograms of intermediate configurations include the current procedure call stack. Since those
stacks may become arbitrarily large, the space of reachable subprograms is not finite anymore,
and we cannot encode the program through a characteristic graph. The difficulty in extending
our verification algorithms to a more general subclass of Golog programs therefore lies in
appropriately representing the corresponding infinite configuration space.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The knowledge-based approach to agent design is particularly suited in our envisioned scenario
of an autonomous, domestic robot performing an open-ended task. The Situation Calculus,
an expressive dialect of classical first-order logic, is probably the best known and most widely
studied action logic for modelling such dynamic domains. It also forms the basis for Golog,
which is used to define complex behaviours for agents and allows to freely combine programming
with planning. Among other things, Golog has been successfully applied to the control of
mobile robots.
This thesis identified and tackled three issues with agents defined by means of the classical
Situation Calculus and Golog. The first one occurs in the realistic case of an agent with
incomplete world knowledge that needs to use sensing to gather information at runtime, where
epistemic modalities are included in the language to express statements about what the agent
knows and does not know. The corresponding Situation Calculus background axiomatization
of a possible-world semantics is quite involved and sometimes leads to counter-intuitive results.
Lakemeyer and Levesque’s logic ES is a modal variant of the epistemic Situation Calculus where
belief and action is encoded through modalities that are defined within the (non-classical)
semantics of the logic, rather than axiomatically. This yields a better readable syntax and
much easier proofs, while all the benefits of the Situation Calculus are retained, including
Reiter’s solution to the frame problem, regression- and progression-based reasoning, first-order
expressiveness, and Golog. In this thesis, a formal account of knowledge-based agents on the
basis of ES was developed. This includes the integration of various reasoning procedures to
handle actions, sensing and knowledge, an ES-based transition semantics for a rich variant of
Golog, as well as a formal interface definition for the meta-level control that implements the
sense-plan-act cycle of the agent.
Second, in many scenarios agents often encounter subproblems that are rather combinatorial
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in nature, such as scheduling pending requests, planning a route, or a combination of the two.
Although Golog supports planning in principle, existing implementations typically perform
very bad on such pure planning tasks, especially in comparison to state-of-the-art planners such
as those participating at the biennial International Planning Competition. We therefore ad-
dressed the integration of such planners into Golog, with the aim of obtaining a system that
combines the expressiveness of Golog with the efficiency of planning. As theoretical founda-
tion, we developed a mapping from an important fragment of the planning domain definition
language PDDL, the de-facto standard for the formulation of planning problems, to ES, thus ob-
taining an alternative, declarative semantics for PDDL that is in our view easier to grasp than
the standard meta-theoretic definition. An empirical evaluation was conducted that showed
that embedding state-of-the-art planners is indeed highly advantageous in terms of an increase
of the overall runtime performance of the system, while none of Golog’s expressiveness has to
be given up.
Third, before deploying a Golog program to the robot and executing it physically, it is often
desirable if not crucial to verify that it indeed fulfills its intended purpose and meets certain
requirements. In the case of an autonomous agent with an open-ended task, the control program
is usually a non-terminating one. Surprisingly, the verification of non-terminating Golog
programs had previously received little attention, except for work that discusses manual, meta-
theoretic proofs of properties expressed in terms of inductive fixpoint definitions. As this is prone
to errors and difficult to grasp even for the mathematically inclined, an automated verification
is much more desirable. For this purpose, we proposed an extension to ES that includes new
modal operators to express temporal properties of Golog programs, and provided algorithms
for their automated verification. They rely on a newly introduced graph representation for
Golog programs called characteristic graphs which are used to systematically explore the state
space. Similar to other forms of reasoning in the Situation Calculus, our verification methods
ultimately reduce to classical first-order theorem proving, and therefore only their soundness
can be guaranteed.
In addition to the possible directions for future work that were discussed in the individual
chapters, one interesting possibility for further research lies in combining the issues addressed
in this thesis. After all, planning and verification are related forms of reasoning: Planning is the
process of finding an action sequence (or more generally, a policy or program) that ensures that
a goal property will come to hold. Similarly, verification aims at either establishing or disproving
a given property, preferably producing a corresponding witness or counterexample in the form
of a path (or policy or program). Planning could therefore be viewed as a special form of
verification, and vice versa. In the context of a Golog system, this could mean that we refrain
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from having separate reasoning procedures for the interpreter’s lookahead on the one hand and
verification on the other hand, but devise a single algorithm that is suited and practicable for
both purposes by synthesizing a controller or program out of a formal specification.
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Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.39
Theorem 3.39 Let Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σdef ∪ Σpost be a basic action theory over fluents 〈D,F〉. For
every relational Fi ∈ F , we introduce a new predicate symbol Pi with the same arity. Similary,
for every functional fi ∈ F , let hi be a new function symbol of the same arity and sort. For
any formula φ, let φ
~F ~f
~P ~h
denote the result of replacing every occurrence of Fi by Pi and every
occurrence of fi by hi. Then the following is a progression of Σ0 trough t wrt Σpost:
(A.1) ∃P1 . . . ∃Pl ∃h1 . . . ∃hm. Ψ,
where Ψ refers to the conjunction of the following:
(Σ0)
~F ~f
~P ~h
(A.2)
l∧
i=1
∀~xi(Fi(~xi) ≡ (γFiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
)(A.3)
m∧
i=1
∀~xi∀yi((fi(~xi) = yi) ≡ (γfiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
)(A.4)
Proof. Let w′ be a world and let Σ′0 denote (A.1).
“⇒”: Let w′ |= Σ′0. We have to show that there is some world w such that w |= Σ and
w′Σ = wp, where p = |t|〈〉w . By Definition 3.22, there is a world w′′ such that w′′ ∼~P ,~h w′ and
w′′ |= Ψ. We define w′′′ to be a world such that for all the Fi, all the fi and all standard names
~n,
w′′′[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = w′′[Pi(~n), 〈〉]
w′′′[fi(~n), 〈〉] = w′′[hi(~n), 〈〉]
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and for all G, g 6∈ D ∪ F ∪ {P1, . . . , Pl} ∪ {h1, . . . , hm}, all ~n, and all z ∈ Z,
w′′′[G(~n), p · z′] = w′′[G(~n), z′]
w′′′[g(~n), p · z′] = w′′[g(~n), z′]
and further that for all Pi, all hi, all ~n, and all z
′ ∈ Z,
w′′′[Pi(~n), p · z′] = w′[Pi(~n), z′]
w′′′[hi(~n), p · z′] = w′[hi(~n), z′]
Now let w = w′′′Σ . We will need the property that for any fluent sentence φ,
w′′ |= φ~F ~f~P ~h iff w
′′′ |= φ,(A.5)
First we show that for any fluent ground term t′′,
|t′′ ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ = |t′′|〈〉w′′′ ,(A.6)
where t′′
~f
~h
denotes the result of replacing every occurrence of fi by the corresponding hi within
the term t′′. The proof is by an induction on the structure of t′′:
• t′′ = n ∈ N : |t′′ ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ = n = |t′′|〈〉w′′′ .
• t′′ = fi(t1, . . . , tk), fi ∈ F :
|fi(t1, . . . , tk)~f~h|
〈〉
w′′
= |hi(t1 ~f~h, . . . , tk
~f
~h
)|〈〉w′′ (by definition of
~f
~h
)
= w′′[hi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by the semantics)
= w′′′[fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by assumption)
= w′′′[fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj |〈〉w′′′ (by induction)
= |fi(t1, . . . , tk)|〈〉w′′′ (by the semantics)
• t′′ = g(t1, . . . , tk), g rigid:
|g(t1, . . . , tk)~f~h|
〈〉
w′′
= |g(t1 ~f~h, . . . , tk
~f
~h
)|〈〉w′′ (by definition of
~f
~h
)
= w′′[g(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by the semantics)
= w′′′[g(n1, . . . , nk), p], where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by assumption)
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= w′′′[g(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by the rigidity constraint)
= w′′′[g(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj |〈〉w′′′ (by induction)
= |g(t1, . . . , tk)|〈〉w′′′ (by the semantics)
Now we can prove (A.5) by an induction on φ:
• φ = (t1 = t2):
w′′ |= (t1 = t2)~F ~f~P ~h
iff w′′ |= (t1 ~f~h = t2
~f
~h
) (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
iff |t1 ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ = |t2
~f
~h
|〈〉w′′ (by the semantics)
iff |t1|〈〉w′′′ = |t2|〈〉w′′′ (by (A.6))
iff w′′′ |= (t1 = t2) (by the semantics)
• φ = Fi(t1, . . . , tk), Fi ∈ F :
w′′ |= Fi(t1, . . . , tk)~F ~f~P ~h
iff w′′ |= Pi(t1 ~f~h, . . . , tk
~f
~h
) (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
iff w′′[Pi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by the semantics)
iff w′′′[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by assumption)
iff w′′′[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′′′ (by (A.6))
iff w′′′ |= Fi(t1, . . . , tk) (by the semantics)
• φ = G(t1, . . . , tk), G rigid:
w′′ |= G(t1, . . . , tk)~F ~f~P ~h
iff w′′ |= G(t1 ~f~h, . . . , tk
~f
~h
) (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
iff w′′[G(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by the semantics)
iff w′′′[G(n1, . . . , nk), p] = 1, where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by assumption)
iff w′′′[G(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by the rigiditiy constraint)
iff w′′′[G(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′′′ (by (A.6))
iff w′′′ |= G(t1, . . . , tk) (by the semantics)
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• φ = φ1 ∧ φ2:
w′′ |= (φ1 ∧ φ2)~F ~f~P ~h
iff w′′ |= φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h ∧ φ2
~F ~f
~P ~h
(by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
iff w′′ |= φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h and w
′′ |= φ2 ~F ~f~P ~h (by the semantics)
iff w′′′ |= φ1 and w′′′ |= φ2 (by induction)
iff w′′′ |= φ1 ∧ φ2 (by the semantics)
• φ = ¬φ1:
w′′ |= (¬φ1)~F ~f~P ~h
iff w′′ |= ¬(φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h) (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
iff w′′ 6|= φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h (by the semantics)
iff w′′′ 6|= φ1 (by induction)
iff w′′′ |= ¬φ1 (by the semantics)
• φ = ∀xφ1:
w′′ |= (∀xφ1)~F ~f~P ~h
iff w′′ |= ∀x(φ1)~F ~f~P ~h (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
iff w′′ |= (φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h)
x
n for all n ∈ Nx (by the semantics)
iff w′′ |= (φ1xn)
~F ~f
~P ~h
for all n ∈ Nx (see below)
iff w′′′ |= φ1xn for all n ∈ Nx (by induction)
iff w′′′ |= ∀xφ1 (by the semantics)
Above we made use of the fact that the order of the xn and
~F ~f
~P ~h
substitutions is in fact
irrelevant as the former is concerned with the variable x, while the latter only touches
the predicate and function symbols ~F and ~f , i.e. they do not interfere with each other. In
general, if φ is a formula and ~x~t is a substitution of variables by terms, then
(φ~x~t )
~F ~f
~P ~h
= (φ
~F ~f
~P ~h
)~x~t .(A.7)
Since w′′ |= (Σ0)~F ~f~P ~h by assumption, it now follows from (A.5) that w
′′′ |= Σ0. By Lemma 3.32
(2) we get w′′′Σ |= Σ.
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As for showing that w′Σ = wp, according to Definition 3.35, this means that for all z
′ ∈ Z,
all primitive formulas β and all primitive terms t′:
w′Σ[t
′, z′] = w[t′, p · z′](A.8)
w′Σ[β, z
′] = w[β, p · z′](A.9)
To prove this, we show a more general property, namely that for all ground terms t′′ and all
static, objective sentences φ:
|t′′|z′w′Σ = |t
′′|p·z′w(A.10)
w′Σ, z
′ |= φ iff w′′′Σ , p · z′ |= φ(A.11)
Properties (A.8) and (A.9) follow then as special cases from (A.10) and (A.11), respectively,
since any primitive term is also a ground term, and any primitive formula is also a static,
objective sentence. The proof is on both theses properties together, with an outer induction
on the length of the action sequence z′ and a sub-induction on the size of t′′ and φ, where any
occurrence of d(~t) is counted as the size of the corresponding ϕd
~x
~t
+ 1 and any occurrence of
D(~t) as the size of ϕD
~x
~t
+ 1. The induction is well-behaved since the formulas ϕd, ϕD, γfi and
γFi are fluent formulas wrt 〈D,F〉 and therefore do not mention any further d ∈ D or D ∈ D.
Note that below the distinction between z′ = 〈〉 and z′ = z′′ · p′ for the outer induction is only
necessary in case of t′′ = fi(t1, . . . , tk) and φ = Fi(t1, . . . , tk), since for all the other symbols and
constructs, the two cases can be proven in an identical manner.
• t′′ = n ∈ N : |t′′|p·z′w = n = |t′′|z′w′Σ
• t′′ = fi(t1, . . . , tk), fi ∈ F :
– z′ = 〈〉:
|fi(t1, . . . , tk)|pw = n
iff w[fi(n1, . . . , nk), p] = n, where nj = |tj |pw (by the semantics)
iff w[fi(n1, . . . , nk), p] = n, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by induction)
iff w |= γfix1···xk yi an1···nk n p, where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(since w |= Σpost)
iff w |= γfix1···xk yi an1···nk n t , where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(since p = |t|〈〉w by assumption)
iff w′′′ |= R[γfix1···xk yi an1···nk n t ], where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(by Lemma 3.32 (4))
iff w′′′ |= γfix1···xk yi an1···nk n t , where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(by Lemma 3.32 (5))
iff w′′ |= (γfix1···xk yi an1···nk n t )
~F ~f
~P ~h
, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by (A.5))
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iff w′′ |= fi(n1, . . . , nk) = n, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (since w
′′ |= (A.4))
iff w′[fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = n, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (since w
′′ ∼~P ,~h w′)
iff w′Σ[fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = n, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff |fi(t1, . . . , tk)|〈〉w′Σ (by the semantics)
– z′ = z′′ · p′:
|fi(t1, . . . , tk)|p·z
′′·p′
w = n
iff w[fi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′′ · p′] = n, where nj = |tj |p·z
′′·p′
w (by the semantics)
iff w[fi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′′ · p′] = n, where nj = |tj |z
′′·p′
w′Σ
(by induction)
iff w, p · z′′ |= γfix1···xk yi an1···nk n p′ , where nj = |tj |
z′′·p′
w′Σ
(since w |= Σpost)
iff w′Σ, z
′′ |= γfix1···xk yi an1···nk n p′ , where nj = |tj |
z′′·p′
w′Σ
(by induction)
iff w′Σ[fi(n1, . . . , nk), z
′′ · p′] = n, where nj = |tj |z
′′·p′
w′Σ
(since w′Σ |= Σpost)
iff |fi(t1, . . . , tk)|z
′′·p′
w′Σ
= n (by the semantics)
• t′′ = d(t1, . . . , tk), d ∈ D:
|d(t1, . . . , tk)|p·z
′
w = n
iff w[d(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = n, where nj = |tj |p·z
′
w (by the semantics)
iff w[d(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by induction)
iff w, p · z′ |= ϕdx1···xk yn1···nk n, where nj = |tj |z
′
w′Σ
(since w |= Σdef)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= ϕdx1···xk yn1···nk n, where nj = |tj |z
′
w′Σ
(by induction)
iff w′Σ[d(n1, . . . , nk), z
′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (since w
′
Σ |= Σdef)
iff |d(t1, . . . , tk)|z′w′Σ = n (by the semantics)
• t′′ = hi(t1, . . . , tk) for fi ∈ F :
|hi(t1, . . . , tk)|p·z
′
w = n
iff w[hi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = n, where nj = |tj |p·z
′
w (by the semantics)
iff w[hi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by induction)
iff w′′′[hi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff w′[hi(n1, . . . , nk), z′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by assumption)
iff w′Σ[hi(n1, . . . , nk), z
′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff |hi(t1, . . . , tk)|z′w′Σ = n (by the semantics)
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• t′′ = g(t1, . . . , tk), g 6∈ F ∪ D ∪ {h1, . . . , hm}:
|g(t1, . . . , tk)|p·z
′
w = n
iff w[g(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = n, where nj = |tj |p·z
′
w (by the semantics)
iff w[g(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by induction)
iff w′′′[g(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff w′′[g(n1, . . . , nk), z′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by assumption)
iff w′[g(n1, . . . , nk), z′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (since w
′′ ∼~P ,~h w′)
iff w′Σ[g(n1, . . . , nk), z
′] = n, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff |g(t1, . . . , tk)|z′w′Σ = n (by the semantics)
• φ = Fi(t1, . . . , tk), Fi ∈ F :
– z′ = 〈〉:
w, p |= Fi(t1, . . . , tk)
iff w[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), p] = 1, where nj = |tj |pw (by the semantics)
iff w[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), p] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by induction)
iff w |= γFix1···xk an1···nk p, where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(since w |= Σpost)
iff w |= γFix1···xk an1···nk t , where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(since p = |t|〈〉w by assumption)
iff w′′′ |= R[γFix1···xk an1···nk t ], where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(by Lemma 3.32 (4))
iff w′′′ |= γFix1···xk an1···nk t , where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(by Lemma 3.32 (5))
iff w′′ |= (γFix1···xk an1···nk t)
~F ~f
~P ~h
, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by (A.5))
iff w′′ |= Fi(n1, . . . , nk), where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (since w
′′ |= (A.3))
iff w′[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (since w
′′ ∼~P ,~h w′)
iff w′Σ[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff w′Σ |= Fi(t1, . . . , tk) (by the semantics)
– z′ = z′′ · p′:
w, p · z′′ · p′ |= F (t1, . . . , tk)
iff w[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′′ · p′] = 1, where nj = |tj |p·z
′′·p′
w (by the semantics)
iff w[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′′ · p′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z
′′·p′
w′Σ
(by induction)
iff w, p · z′′ |= γFix1···xk an1···nk p′ , where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(since w |= Σpost)
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iff w′Σ, z
′′ |= γFix1···xk an1···nk p′ , where nj = |tj |
〈〉
w′Σ
(by induction)
iff w′Σ[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), z
′′ · p′] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w′Σ (since w
′
Σ |= Σpost)
iff w′Σ, z
′′ · p′ |= F (t1, . . . , tk) (by the semantics)
• φ = D(t1, . . . , tk), D ∈ D:
w, p · z′ |= D(t1, . . . , tk)
iff w[D(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |p·z
′
w (by the semantics)
iff w[D(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by induction)
iff w, p · z′ |= ϕDx1···xkn1···nk , where nj = |tj |z
′
w′Σ
(since w |= Σdef)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= ϕDx1···xkn1···nk , where nj = |tj |z
′
w′Σ
(by induction)
iff w′Σ[D(n1, . . . , nk), z
′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (since w
′
Σ |= Σdef)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= D(t1, . . . , tk) (by the semantics)
• φ = Pi(t1, . . . , tk) for Fi ∈ F :
w, p · z′ |= Pi(t1, . . . , tk)
iff w[Pi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |p·z
′
w (by the semantics)
iff w[Pi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by induction)
iff w′′′[Pi(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff w′[Pi(n1, . . . , nk), z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by assumption)
iff w′Σ[Pi(n1, . . . , nk), z
′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= Pi(t1, . . . , tk) (by the semantics)
• φ = G(t1, . . . , tk), G 6∈ F ∪ D ∪ {P1, . . . , Pl}:
w, p · z′ |= G(t1, . . . , tk)
iff w[G(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |p·z
′
w (by the semantics)
iff w[G(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by induction)
iff w′′′[G(n1, . . . , nk), p · z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff w′′[G(n1, . . . , nk), z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by assumption)
iff w′[G(n1, . . . , nk), z′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (since w
′′ ∼~P ,~h w′)
iff w′Σ[G(n1, . . . , nk), z
′] = 1, where nj = |tj |z′w′Σ (by Definition 3.31)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= G(t1, . . . , tk) (by the semantics)
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• φ = (t1 = t2):
w, p · z′ |= (t1 = t2)
iff |t1|p·z
′
w = |t2|p·z
′
w (by the semantics)
iff |t1|z′w′Σ = |t2|
z′
w′Σ
(by induction)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= (t1 = t2) (by the semantics)
• φ = φ1 ∧ φ2:
w, p · z′ |= φ1 ∧ φ2
iff w, p · z′ |= φ1 and w, p · z′ |= φ2 (by the semantics)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= φ1 and w′Σ, z′ |= φ2 (by induction)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= φ1 ∧ φ2 (by the semantics)
• φ = ¬φ1:
w, p · z′ |= ¬φ1
iff w, p · z′ 6|= φ1 (by the semantics)
iff w′Σ, z
′ 6|= φ1 (by induction)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= ¬φ1 (by the semantics)
• φ = ∀xφ1:
w, p · z′ |= ∀xφ1
iff w, p · z′ |= φ1xn for all n ∈ Nx (by the semantics)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= φ1xn for all n ∈ Nx (by induction)
iff w′Σ, z
′ |= ∀xφ1 (by the semantics)
“⇐”: Let w be a world such that w |= Σ and wp = w′Σ, where p = |t|〈〉w . We have to show
that w′ |= Σ′0, or equivalently that there exists some w′′ with w′′ ∼~P ,~h w′ such that w′′ |= Ψ.
Let w′′ be a world that is like w′, except that for every Pi, every fi, and all names ~n,
w′′[Pi(~n), 〈〉] = w[Fi(~n), 〈〉],
w′′[hi(~n), 〈〉] = w[fi(~n), 〈〉].
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Obviously w′′ ∼~P ,~h w′. In order to show that w′′ |= Ψ, we first need the property that for every
fluent formula φ,
w |= φ iff w′′ |= φ~F ~f~P ~h.(A.12)
We begin by proving the according property for fluent terms t′′:
|t′′|〈〉w = |t′′
~f
~h
|〈〉w′′(A.13)
This is done again by an induction over the structure of t′′:
• t′′ = n ∈ N : |t′′|〈〉w = n = |t′′ ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′
• t′′ = fi(t1, . . . , tk), fi ∈ F :
|fi(t1, . . . , tk)|〈〉w
= w[fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by the semantics)
= w′′[hi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by assumption)
= w′′[hi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by induction)
= |hi(t1 ~f~h, . . . , tk
~f
~h
)|〈〉w′′ (by the semantics)
= |fi(t1, . . . , tk)~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by definition of
~f
~h
)
• t′′ = g(t1, . . . , tk), g rigid:
|g(t1, . . . , tk)|〈〉w
= w[g(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by the semantics)
= w[g(n1, . . . , nk), p], where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by the rigidity constraint)
= w′Σ[g(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by Definition 3.35, and since wp = w′Σ)
= w′[g(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by Definition 3.31)
= w′′[g(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj |〈〉w (since w′′ ∼~P ,~h w′)
= w′′[g(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉], where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by induction)
= |g(t1 ~f~h, . . . , tk
~f
~h
)|〈〉w′′ (by the semantics)
= |g(t1, . . . , tk)~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by definition of
~f
~h
)
Now we can show (A.12) by induction on φ:
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• φ = (t1 = t2):
w |= (t1 = t2)
iff |t1|〈〉w = |t2|〈〉w (by the semantics)
iff |t1 ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ = |t2
~f
~h
|〈〉w′′ (by (A.13))
iff w′′ |= (t1 ~f~h = t2
~f
~h
) (by the semantics)
iff w′′ |= (t1 = t2)~F ~f~P ~h (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
• φ = Fi(t1, . . . , tk), Fi ∈ F :
w |= Fi(t1, . . . , tk)
iff w[Fi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by the semantics)
iff w′′[Pi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by assumption)
iff w′′[Pi(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w′′ (by (A.13))
iff w′′ |= Pi(t1 ~f~h, . . . , tk
~f
~h
) (by the semantics)
iff w′′ |= Fi(t1, . . . , tk)~F ~f~P ~h (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
• φ = G(t1, . . . , tk), G rigid:
w |= G(t1, . . . , tk)
iff w[G(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by the semantics)
iff w[G(n1, . . . , nk), p] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by the rigidity constraint)
iff w′Σ[G(n1, . . . , nk), p] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w
(by Definition 3.35, and since wp = w
′
Σ)
iff w′[G(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w (by Definition 3.31)
iff w′′[G(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj |〈〉w (since w′′ ∼~P ,~h w′)
iff w′′[G(n1, . . . , nk), 〈〉] = 1, where nj = |tj ~f~h|
〈〉
w (by (A.13))
iff w′′ |= G(t1 ~f~h, . . . , tk
~f
~h
) (by the semantics)
iff w′′ |= G(t1, . . . , tk)~F ~f~P ~h (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
• φ = φ1 ∧ φ2:
w |= φ1 ∧ φ2
iff w |= φ1 and w |= φ2 (by the semantics)
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iff w′′ |= φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h and w |= φ2
~F ~f
~P ~h
(by induction)
iff w′′ |= φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h ∧ φ2
~F ~f
~P ~h
(by the semantics)
iff w′′ |= (φ1 ∧ φ2)~F ~f~P ~h (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
• φ = ¬φ1:
w |= ¬φ1
iff w 6|= φ1 (by the semantics)
iff w′′ 6|= φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h (by induction)
iff w′′ |= ¬(φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h) (by the semantics)
iff w′′ |= (¬φ1)~F ~f~P ~h (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
• φ = ∀xφ1:
w |= ∀xφ1
iff w |= φ1xn for all n ∈ Nx (by the semantics)
iff w′′ |= (φ1xn)
~F ~f
~P ~h
for all n ∈ Nx (by induction)
iff w′′ |= (φ1 ~F ~f~P ~h)
x
n for all n ∈ Nx (by (A.7))
iff w′′ |= ∀x(φ1)~F ~f~P ~h (by the semantics)
iff w′′ |= (∀xφ1)~F ~f~P ~h (by definition of
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
We are now ready to prove that w |= Ψ:
• w′′ |= (Σ0)~F ~f~P ~h:
This follows directly from the fact that w |= Σ0 and (A.12).
• w′′ |= ∀~xi(Fi(~x) ≡ (γFiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
):
Let ~n be arbitrary standard name instances for the ~xi. We have that
w′′ |= Fi(~n)
iff w′′[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = 1 (by the semantics)
iff w′[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = 1 (by assumption)
iff w′Σ[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = 1 (by Definition 3.31)
iff wp[Fi(~n), 〈〉] = 1 (since wp = w′Σ by assumption)
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iff w[Fi(~n), p] = 1 (by Definition 3.35)
iff w, p |= Fi(~n) (by the semantics)
iff w |= γFi~xi a~n p (since w |= Σpost by assumption)
iff w |= γFi~xi a~n t (since p = |t|〈〉w by assumption)
iff w′′ |= (γFi~xi a~n t)
~F ~f
~P ~h
(by (A.12))
iff w′′ |= ((γFiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
)~xi~n (by (A.7))
• w′′ |= ∀~xj∀yi(fi(~xj) = yi ≡ (γfiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
):
Let ~n and n be arbitrary standard name instances for the ~xj and yi, respectively. We have
that
w′′ |= fi(~n) = n
iff w′′[fi(~n), 〈〉] = n (by the semantics)
iff w′[fi(~n), 〈〉] = n (by assumption)
iff w′Σ[fi(~n), 〈〉] = n (by Definition 3.31)
iff wp[fi(~n), 〈〉] = n (since wp = w′Σ by assumption)
iff w[fi(~n), p] = n (by Definition 3.35)
iff w, p |= fi(~n) = n (by the semantics)
iff w |= γfi~xj yi a~n n p (since w |= Σpost by assumption)
iff w |= γfi~xj yi a~n n t (since p = |t|〈〉w by assumption)
iff w′′ |= (γfi~xj yi a~n n t )
~F ~f
~P ~h
(by (A.12))
iff w′′ |= ((γfiat )
~F ~f
~P ~h
)
~xj yi
~n n (by (A.7))
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 5.19
Lemma 5.19 Let δ be a program (possibly with free variables), w ∈ W, and z ∈ Z. Then for
all δ′, δ′′ appearing in nodes of Gδ (including δ itself) and all variable maps θ′, θ′′:
(1) 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ′′, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉 iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′θ′′〉
(2) 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 ∈ Fw
Proof. We prove the lemma by an induction on the structure of δ. Let Gδ = 〈V,E, v0〉.
• δ = t:
(1): Since by Definition 5.16, there is only that single edge in Gt, by Definition 5.15
〈〈t,⊥〉, θ′, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈nil ,>〉, θ′, w, z · p〉 is the only transition step in Gt, where
p = |tθ′|zw. Similarly, 〈z, tθ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p,nil〉 is the only transition for t according
to Definition 5.5. Note that obviously nil = nilθ′.
(2): 〈〈t,⊥〉, θ′, w, z〉 6∈ FGδ since w, z 6|= ⊥ according to Definition 5.16, and also 〈z, tθ′〉 6∈
Fw according to Definition 5.5. Furthermore, 〈〈nil ,>〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ since w, z |=
>, and also 〈z,nil〉 ∈ Fw.
• δ = α?:
(1): According to Definition 5.16, Gα? does not contain any edges, hence there is no tran-
sition possible in the graph, and neither is there for 〈z, α?θ′〉 according to Definition
5.5.
(2): We have 〈〈α?, α〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ iff w, z |= αθ′ (by Definition 5.16) iff 〈z, α?θ′〉 ∈ Fw
(by Definition 5.5).
• δ = δ1; δ2:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v10〉 and Gδ2 = 〈V2, E2, v20〉. For this item, we will need the following
consequences of our assumption that all variables are distinct, where for any program δ′,
let ~x 6∈ δ′ mean that none of the ~x appears freely in δ′ (similar for formulas):
If v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E1, then ~x 6∈ δ2.(A.14)
If v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E2, then ~x 6∈ δ1.(A.15)
If ~x 6∈ δ1 and 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1, then ~x 6∈ ϕ′1.(A.16)
It is easy to check that the variables that are pi-quantified in the edges of a program’s
characteristic graph are exactly those variables that are pi-quantified in the program. By
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our assumption, the pi-quantified variables in one subprogram are distinct from the pi-
quantified variables in the other subprogram as well as from any free variables.1 Clearly,
if ~x 6∈ δ′, then δ′θ′[~x/~n] = δ′ (similar for formulas).
(1): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ′′, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉
iff 〈δ′, · 〉 φ/pi~x:t/φ
′
−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′, · 〉 ∈ E,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φθ′ ∧ φθ′′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ′1; δ2, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; δ2, 〈δ′1, · 〉
φ1/pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 , · 〉 ∈ E1,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], δ2θ′′ = δ2θ′, p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φ1θ′ ∧ φ′1θ′′ or
δ′ = δ′1; δ2, δ′′ = δ′2, 〈δ2, · 〉
pi~x:t/φ′2−−−−−→ 〈δ′2, · 〉 ∈ E2, 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1, ϕ′1 6= ⊥,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= (ϕ′1 ∧ φ′2)θ′′, ϕ′1θ′′ = ϕ′1θ′ or
δ′ = δ′2, δ′′ = δ′′2 , 〈δ′2, · 〉
φ2/pi~x:t/φ′′2−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′2 , · 〉 ∈ E2,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φ2θ′ ∧ φ′2θ′′
(by Def. 5.16 and (A.14) – (A.16))
iff δ′ = δ′1; δ2, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; δ2, 〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδ1−−→ 〈〈δ′′1 , · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉,
δ2θ
′′ = δ2θ′ or
δ′ = δ′1; δ2, δ′′ = δ′2, 〈〈δ2, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδ2−−→ 〈〈δ′2, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉,
〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ1 or
δ′ = δ′2, δ′′ = δ′′2 , 〈〈δ′2, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδ2−−→ 〈〈δ′′2 , · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉 (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ′1; δ2, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; δ2, 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′1θ′′〉, δ2θ′′ = δ2θ′ or
δ′ = δ′1; δ2, δ′′ = δ′2, 〈z, δ2θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′2θ′′〉, 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 ∈ Fw or
δ′ = δ′2, δ′′ = δ′′2 , 〈z, δ′2θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′2θ′′〉 (by induction)
iff δ′ = δ′1; δ2, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; δ2, 〈z, (δ′1; δ2)θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, (δ′′1 ; δ2)θ′′〉, or
δ′ = δ′1; δ2, δ′′ = δ′2, 〈z, (δ′1; δ2)θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′2θ′′〉 or
δ′ = δ′2, δ′′ = δ′′2 , 〈z, δ′2θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′2θ′′〉 (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′θ′′〉
(2): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ
iff w, z |= ϕ(〈δ′, · 〉)θ′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ′1; δ2, 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1, v20 = 〈δ2, ϕ20〉, w, z |= (ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ20)θ′ or
δ′ = δ′2, 〈δ′2, ϕ′2〉 ∈ V2, w, z |= ϕ′2θ′ (by Def. 5.16)
1The subprograms may share free variables, though.
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iff δ′ = δ′1; δ2, 〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ1 , 〈〈δ2, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ2 or
δ′ = δ′2, 〈〈δ′2, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ2 (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ′1; δ2, 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 ∈ Fw, 〈z, δ2θ′〉 ∈ Fw or
δ′ = δ′2, 〈z, δ′2θ′〉 ∈ Fw (by induction)
iff δ′ = δ′1; δ2, 〈z, (δ′1; δ2)θ′〉 ∈ Fw or
δ′ = δ′2, 〈z, δ′2θ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 ∈ Fw
• δ = δ1|δ2:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v10〉 and Gδ2 = 〈V2, E2, v20〉.
(1): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ′′, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉
iff 〈δ′, · 〉 φ/pi~x:t/φ
′
−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′, · 〉 ∈ E,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φθ′ ∧ φθ′′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ1|δ2, δ′′ = δ′i, 〈δi, · 〉
pi~x:t/φ′i−−−−→ 〈δ′i, · 〉 ∈ Ei,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φiθ′′ or
δ′ = δ′i, δ
′′ = δ′′i , 〈δ′i, · 〉
φi/pi~x:t/φ
′
i−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′i , · 〉 ∈ Ei,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φiθ′ ∧ φiθ′′ (by Def. 5.16)
iff δ′ = δ1|δ2, δ′′ = δ′i, 〈〈δi, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδi−−→ 〈〈δ′i, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉 or
δ′ = δ′i, δ
′′ = δ′′i , 〈〈δ′i, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδi−−→ 〈〈δ′′i , · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉 (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ1|δ2, δ′′ = δ′i, 〈z, δiθ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′iθ′′〉 or
δ′ = δ′i, δ
′′ = δ′′i , 〈z, δ′iθ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′i θ′′〉 (by induction)
iff δ′ = δ1|δ2, δ′′ = δ′i, 〈z, (δ1|δ2)θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′iθ′′〉 or
δ′ = δ′i, δ
′′ = δ′′i , 〈z, δ′iθ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′i θ′′〉 (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′θ′′〉
(2): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ
iff w, z |= ϕ(〈δ′, · 〉)θ′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ1|δ2, vi0 = 〈δi, ϕi0〉, w, z |= ϕi0θ′ or
δ′ = δ′i, 〈δ′i, ϕ′i〉 ∈ Vi, w, z |= ϕ′iθ′ (by Def. 5.16)
iff δ′ = δ1|δ2, 〈〈δi, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδi or
δ′ = δ′i, 〈〈δ′i, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδi (by Def. 5.15)
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iff δ′ = δ1|δ2, 〈z, δiθ′〉 ∈ Fw or
δ′ = δ′i, 〈z, δ′iθ′〉 ∈ Fw (by induction)
iff δ′ = δ1|δ2, 〈z, (δ1|δ2)θ′〉 ∈ Fw or
δ′ = δ′i, 〈z, δ′iθ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 ∈ Fw
• δ = piy.δ1:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v10〉.
(1): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ′′, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉
iff 〈δ′, · 〉 φ/pi~x:t/φ
′
−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′, · 〉 ∈ E,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φθ′ ∧ φθ′′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = piy.δ1, δ′′ = δ′1, 〈δ1, · 〉
pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−→ 〈δ′1, · 〉 ∈ E1,
θ′′ = θ′[y/n][~x/~n] = θ′[~x/~n][y/n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φ′1θ′′ or
δ′ = δ′1, δ′′ = δ′′1 , 〈δ′1, · 〉
φ1/pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 , · 〉 ∈ E1,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φ1θ′ ∧ φ′1θ′′ (by Def. 5.16)
iff δ′ = piy.δ1, δ′′ = δ′1, 〈〈δ1, · 〉, θ′[y/n], w, z〉
Gδ1−−→ 〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉 or
δ′ = δ′1, δ′′ = δ′′1 , 〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδ1−−→ 〈〈δ′′1 , · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉 (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = piy.δ1, δ′′ = δ′1, 〈z, δ1ynθ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′1θ′′〉 or
δ′ = δ′1, δ′′ = δ′′1 , 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′1θ′′〉 (by induction)
iff δ′ = piy.δ1, δ′′ = δ′1, 〈z, (piy.δ1)θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′1θ′′〉 or
δ′ = δ′1, δ′′ = δ′′1 , 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′1θ′′〉 (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′θ′′〉
(2): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ
iff w, z |= ϕ(〈δ′, · 〉)θ′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = piy.δ1, v10 = 〈δ1, ϕ10〉, w, z |= (∃yϕ10)θ′ or
δ′ = δ′1, 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1, w, z |= ϕ′1θ′ (by Def. 5.16)
iff δ′ = piy.δ1, v10 = 〈δ1, ϕ10〉, w, z |= ϕ10ynθ′ or
δ′ = δ′1, 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1, w, z |= ϕ′1θ′ (by the semantics)
iff δ′ = piy.δ1, 〈〈δ1, ϕ10〉, θ′[y/n], w, z〉 ∈ FGδ1 or
δ′ = δ′1, 〈〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ1 (by Def. 5.15)
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iff δ′ = piy.δ1, 〈z, δ1ynθ′〉 ∈ Fw or
δ′ = δ′1, 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 ∈ Fw (by induction)
iff δ′ = piy.δ1, 〈z, (piy.δ1)θ′〉 ∈ Fw or
δ′ = δ′1, 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 ∈ Fw
• δ = δ1||δ2:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v10〉 and Gδ2 = 〈V2, E2, v20〉. Here, we make use of the following conse-
quences of our distinctiveness assumption for pi-quantified variables:
If v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E1 and 〈δ′2, · 〉 ∈ V2, then ~x 6∈ δ′2.(A.17)
If v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E2 and 〈δ′1, · 〉 ∈ V1, then ~x 6∈ δ′1.(A.18)
Again, if ~x 6∈ δ′i, then δ′i~x~n = δ′i.
(1): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ′′, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉
iff 〈δ′, · 〉 φ/pi~x:t/φ
′
−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′, · 〉 ∈ E,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φθ′ ∧ φθ′′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, δ′′ = δ′′1 ||δ′2, 〈δ′1, · 〉
φ1/pi~x:t/φ′1−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 , · 〉 ∈ E1,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], δ′2θ′′ = δ′2θ′, p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φ1θ′ ∧ φ′1θ′′ or
δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, δ′′ = δ′1||δ′′2 , 〈δ′2, · 〉
φ2/pi~x:t/φ′2−−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′2 , · 〉 ∈ E2,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], δ′1θ′′ = δ′1θ′, p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φ2θ′ ∧ φ′2θ′′
(by Def. 5.16 and (A.17), (A.18))
iff δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, δ′′ = δ′′1 ||δ′2, 〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδ1−−→ 〈〈δ′′1 , · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉,
δ′2θ′′ = δ′2θ′ or
δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, δ′′ = δ′1||δ′′2 , 〈〈δ′2, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδ2−−→ 〈〈δ′′2 , · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉,
δ′1θ′′ = δ′1θ′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, δ′′ = δ′′1 ||δ′2, 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′1θ′′〉, δ′2θ′′ = δ′2θ′ or
δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, δ′′ = δ′1||δ′′2 , 〈z, δ′2θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′2θ′′〉, δ′1θ′′ = δ′1θ′ (by induction)
iff δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, δ′′ = δ′′1 ||δ′2, 〈z, (δ′1||δ′2)θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, (δ′′1 ||δ′2)θ′′〉 or
δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, δ′′ = δ′1||δ′′2 , 〈z, (δ′1||δ′2)θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, (δ′1||δ′′2)θ′′〉 (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′θ′′〉
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(2): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ
iff w, z |= ϕ(〈δ′, · 〉)θ′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1, 〈δ′2, ϕ′2〉 ∈ V2, w, z |= (ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ′2)θ′ (by Def. 5.16)
iff δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, 〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ1 , 〈〈δ′2, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ2 (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 ∈ Fw, 〈z, δ′2θ′〉 ∈ Fw (by induction)
iff δ′ = δ′1||δ′2, 〈z, δ′1||δ′2〉 ∈ Fw (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 ∈ Fw
• δ = (δ1)∗:
Let Gδ1 = 〈V1, E1, v10〉. Again we need two properties for variable substitution, following
from the assumption that the pi-quantified variables are distinct from the free variables of
a program:
If v
φ/pi~x:t/φ′−−−−−−→ v′ ∈ E1, then ~x 6∈ δ1.(A.19)
If ~x 6∈ δ1, then ~x 6∈ (δ1)∗.(A.20)
(1): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 Gδ−→ 〈〈δ′′, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉
iff 〈δ′, · 〉 φ/pi~x:t/φ
′
−−−−−−→ 〈δ′′, · 〉 ∈ E,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φθ′ ∧ φθ′′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = (δ1)∗, δ′′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, 〈δ1, · 〉 pi~x:tφ
′
1−−−−→ 〈δ′1, · 〉 ∈ E1,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], (δ1)∗θ′′ = (δ1)∗θ′, p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φ′1θ′′ or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; (δ1)
∗, 〈δ′1, · 〉
φ1pi~x:tφ′1−−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 , · 〉 ∈ E1,
θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], (δ1)∗θ′′ = (δ1)∗θ′, p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= φ1θ′ ∧ φ′1θ′′ or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; (δ1)
∗, 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ E1, 〈δ1, · 〉
pi~x:tφ′1−−−−→ 〈δ′′1 , · 〉 ∈ E1,
ϕ′1 6= ⊥, θ′′ = θ′[~x/~n], (δ1)∗θ′′ = (δ1)∗θ′, p = |tθ′′|zw, w, z |= ϕ′1θ′ ∧ φ′1θ′′
(by Def. 5.16 and (A.19), (A.19))
iff δ′ = (δ1)∗, δ′′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, 〈〈δ1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδ1−−→ 〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉,
(δ1)
∗θ′′ = (δ1)∗θ′, or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; (δ1)
∗, 〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδ1−−→ 〈〈δ′′1 , · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉,
(δ1)
∗θ′′ = (δ1)∗θ′, or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; (δ1)
∗, 〈〈δ1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉
Gδ1−−→ 〈〈δ′′1 , · 〉, θ′′, w, z · p〉,
〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ1 , (δ1)∗θ′′ = (δ1)∗θ′, (by Def. 5.15)
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iff δ′ = (δ1)∗, δ′′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, 〈z, δ1θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′1θ′′〉,
(δ1)
∗θ′′ = (δ1)∗θ′, or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; (δ1)
∗, 〈z, δ′1θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′1θ′′〉,
(δ1)
∗θ′′ = (δ1)∗θ′, or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; (δ1)
∗, 〈z, δ1θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′1θ′′〉,
〈z, δ′1θ′〉 ∈ Fw, (δ1)∗θ′′ = (δ1)∗θ′, (by induction)
iff δ′ = (δ1)∗, δ′′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, 〈z, (δ1)∗θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, (δ′1; (δ1)∗)θ′′〉 or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; (δ1)
∗, 〈z, (δ′1; (δ1)∗)θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, (δ′′1 ; (δ1)∗)θ′′〉 or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, δ′′ = δ′′1 ; (δ1)
∗, 〈z, (δ′1; (δ1)∗)θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, (δ′′1 ; (δ1)∗)θ′′〉,
〈z, (δ′1; (δ1)∗)θ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 w−→ 〈z · p, δ′′θ′′〉
(2): 〈〈δ′, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ
iff w, z |= ϕ(〈δ′, · 〉)θ′ (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = (δ1)∗, w, z |= > or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, 〈δ′1, ϕ′1〉 ∈ V1, w, z |= ϕ′1θ′ (by Def. 5.16)
iff δ′ = (δ1)∗, w, z |= > or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, 〈〈δ′1, · 〉, θ′, w, z〉 ∈ FGδ1 (by Def. 5.15)
iff δ′ = (δ1)∗, w, z |= > or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, 〈z, δ′1θ′; (δ1)∗θ′〉 ∈ Fw (by induction)
iff δ′ = (δ1)∗, 〈z, (δ1)∗〉 ∈ Fw or
δ′ = δ′1; (δ1)
∗, 〈z, (δ′1; (δ1)∗)θ′〉 ∈ Fw (by Def. 5.5)
iff 〈z, δ′θ′〉 ∈ Fw
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Lemma 5.59 Let w ∈ W and Σ = Σ0∪Σdef∪Σpost a basic action theory over 〈D,F〉 such that
w |= Σdef ∪ Σpost. Furthermore let ϕ ∈ ESGLTL and G = 〈V,E, v0〉 a trace graph. The following
are equivalent:
1. There is some w0
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w with w0, z |= ϕ↓θ and a run
〈v0, θ, w0, z〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈v1, θ1, w1, z · p1〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈v2, θ2, w2, z · p1 · p2〉 G,ϕ−−→ . . .
such that for all k ≥ 0 exists l ≥ k with wl, z · p1 · · · pl |= AccAll [ϕ].
2. w, z, p1 · p2 · · · |= ϕθ and there is a run
〈v0, θ, w, z〉 G−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · p1〉 G−→ 〈v2, θ2, w, z · p1 · p2〉 G−→ . . .
Proof. We prove the two directions separately. In the following, let pi = p1 · p2 · · · . We will
abbreviate the sequence p1 · · · pk as zk and use pik to denote pk+1 · pk+2 · · · for any k ≥ 0.
“1 ⇒ 2”: First we establish the existence of the run. For this purpose, we show by induction
on k:
If 〈v0, θ, w0, z〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈v1, θ1, w1, z · z1〉 G,ϕ−−→ . . . G,ϕ−−→ 〈vk, θk, wk, z · zk〉,(A.21)
then wk
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w and 〈v0, θ, w, z〉
G−→ 〈v1, θ1, w, z · z1〉 G−→ . . . G−→ 〈vk, θk, w, z · zk〉.
• k = 0:
w0
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w by assumption.
• k 7→ k + 1:
Now assume that 〈v, θ, w0, z〉 G,ϕ−−→ . . . G,ϕ−−→ 〈vk, θk, wk, z ·zk〉 and that 〈vk, θk, wk, z ·zk〉 G,ϕ−−→
〈vk+1, θk+1, wk+1, z · zk+1〉. By induction, 〈v0, θ, w, z〉 G−→ . . . G−→ 〈vk, θk, w, z · zk〉 and
wk
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w. By Definition 5.56, we get 〈vk, θk, wk, z · zk〉
G−→ 〈vk+1, θk+1, wk, z · zk+1〉
and wk+1
z·zk+1≈ ~X , ~U ,~A wk. Therefore wk+1
z≈~X , ~U ,~A wk by Proposition 5.53, and thus also
wk+1
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w by Proposition 5.52. 〈vk, θk, w, z · zk〉
G−→ 〈vk+1, θk+1, w, z · zk+1〉 then
follows from Definition 5.15 and the fact that wk and w must agree on all edge conditions
as they do not contain any of the auxiliary predicates.
Next, we need the following property of runs according to item 1:
For all k ≥ 0 and all θ′, there exists l ≥ k such that wl, z · zl |= Accept i↓θ′.(A.22)
To see why, suppose not. Then there is some k ≥ 0, some i and some θ′ such that for all
l′ ≥ k, wl′ , z · zl′ 6|= Accept i↓θ′. Since by assumption wl′+1, z · zl′ |= Σ~Apost(pl′+1), we get with
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wl′+1
z·zl′+1≈ ~X , ~U ,~A wl′ and (5.101) that
For all l′ ≥ k, wl′+1, z · zl′ |= [pl′+1]Ai(~xi)θ′ ≡ (Ai(~xi)θ′ ∧ ¬AccAll [ϕ])(A.23)
Moreover, by assumption we have that there must be one l1 ≥ k with wl1 , z ·zl1 |= AccAll [ϕ], and
that there is some l2 > l1 such that also wl2 , z ·zl2 |= AccAll [ϕ]. Let both l1 and l2 be the smallest
indexes with these properties. Since AccAll [ϕ] entails Ai(~xi)θ
′, and because by assumption
wl3 , z·zl3 6|= AccAll [ϕ] for all l3 with k ≤ l3 < l2 and l3 6= l1, we get that wl2−1, z·zl2−1 |= Ai(~xi)θ′
from (A.23) and wl2
z·zl2≈ ~X , ~U ,~A wl2−1. By repeatedly applying the same argument, we obtain
that this holds for all indexes l4 with l2 > l4 > l1. Due to wl1 , z · zl1 |= AccAll [ϕ], (A.23) and
wl1+1
z·zl1≈ ~X , ~U ,~A wl1 implies that wl1+1, z · zl1+1 6|= Ai(~xi)θ′, contradiction.
We can now turn to the satisfaction of ϕ. For that matter, we prove the following more
general property by an induction on its structure: For all subformulas φ of ϕ, all variable maps
θ′ and all k ≥ 0,
wk, z · zk |= φ↓θ′ iff w, z · zk, pik |= φθ′(A.24)
• The base cases φ = (t1 = t2) and φ = F (~t) follow immediately since φ↓ = φ, wk
z·zk≈ ~X , ~U ,~A w
and φ does not contain any of the ~X , ~U , ~A.
• Furthermore, the cases φ = ¬φ′, φ = φ1 ∧ φ2 and ∃x.φ′ follow directly by induction.
• φ = Xφj :
wk, z · zk |= Xφj↓θ′
iff wk, z · zk |= Xj(~xj)θ′ (by Definition 5.48)
iff wk+1, z · zk |= Xj(~xj)θ′ (since wk+1
z·zk+1≈ ~X , ~U ,~A wk)
iff wk+1, z · zk |= [pk+1]φj↓θ′ (by (5.91) and since wk+1, z · zk |= Trans[ϕ]↓apk+1)
iff wk+1, z · zk · pk+1 |= φj↓θ′ (by the semantics)
iff w, z · zk · pk+1, pik+1 |= φjθ′ (by induction)
iff w, z · zk, pik |= Xφjθ′ (by the semantics)
• φ = (φi U ψi): Then φ↓θ′ = Ui(~xi)θ′. We prove the two directions separately.
“⇒:” Let wk, z · zk |= Ui(~xi)θ′ and l0 ≥ k be the smallest index such that wl0 , z · zl0 |=
Accept i↓θ′, which must exist according to (A.22). Then for all l′ with k ≤ l′ < l0, wl′ , z ·
zl′ 6|= Accept i↓θ′. By (A.22), this means that for all such l′, wl′ , z · zl′ |= U (~xi)θ′ ∧¬ψi↓θ′.
As wl′ , z · zl′ |= LocCons[ϕ]↓, we then furthermore get wl′ , z · zl′ |= φi↓θ′ by (5.89). This
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together with the facts that wl0 , z · zl0−1 |= Trans[ϕ]↓apl0 and wl0
z·zl0≈ ~X , ~U ,~A wl0−1 implies
that wl0 , z · zl0 |= Ui(~xi)θ′ using (5.90), and that hence wl0 , z · zl0 |= ψi↓θ′ by (5.92). By
induction then w, z · zl′ , pil′ |= φiθ′ for all l with k ≤ l < l0, and w, z · zl0 , pil0 |= ψiθ′. By
the semantics, this means that w, z · zk, pik |= (φi U ψi)θ′.
“⇐”: Let w, z · zk, pik |= (φi U ψi)θ′. By the semantics, there then is some l ≥ k such
that w, z · zl, pil |= ψiθ′ and for all l′ with k ≤ l′ < l, w, z · zl′ , pil′ |= φiθ′. Let l further be
the smallest such index. By induction, we obtain wl, z · zl |= ψi↓θ′ and that for all l′ with
k ≤ l′ < l, w, z · zl′ |= φi↓θ′. Since wl+1
z·zl+1≈ ~X , ~U ,~A wl and wl+1, z · zl |= LocCons[ϕ]↓, also
wl, z · zl |= LocCons[ϕ]↓. Hence by (5.88) we get wl, z · zl |= Ui(~xi)θ′. Repeated applying
(5.90), and using the facts that wl′+1
z·zl′+1≈ ~X , ~U ,~A wl′ and that wl′+1, z ·zl′ |= Trans[ϕ]↓apl′+1 ,
yields wl′ , z · zl′ |= Ui(~xi)θ′ for all l′ with k ≤ l′ < l, including the case l′ = k.
By (A.24) we now get in particular that if w0, z |= ϕθ, then w, z, pi |= ϕθ.
“2⇒ 1”: First we construct a sequence of w0, w1, w2, . . . , given the original w. Let w0 be world
that is like w, except that for all k ≥ 0, all i, all j, and all ~n
w0[Xj(~n), z · zk] = 1 iff w, z · zk, pik |= Xφj~xj~n
w0[Ui(~n), z · zk] = 1 iff w, z · zk, pik |= (φi U ψi)~xi~n
w0[Ai(~n), z] = 0
w0[Ai(~n), z · zk+1] = 1 iff w0, z · zk |= γAi~xi a~n pk+1
Obviously w0
z≈~X , ~U ,~A w. Moreover, we simply set wk = w0 for all k > 0. Then trivially, for all
k ≥ 0, wk+1
z·zk+1≈ ~X , ~U ,~A wk, and wk+1, z · zk |= Σ
~A
post(pk+1). We furthermore note that for all
subformulas φ of ϕ, all variable maps θ′ and all k ≥ 0,
wk, z · zk |= φ↓θ′ iff w, z · zk, pik |= φθ′(A.25)
which follows by a simple induction over the structue of φ and our construction of the wk.
Hence in particular, w0, z |= ϕ↓θ.
Next, we need to establish that for all k ≥ 0, 〈vk, θk, wk, z ·zk〉 G,ϕ−−→ 〈vk+1, θk+1, wk+1, z ·zk+1〉.
According to Definition 5.56, this requires the following:
• 〈vk, θk, wk, z · zk〉 G−→ 〈vk+1, θk+1, wk, z · zk+1〉:
By assumption, 〈vk, θk, w, z · zk〉 G−→ 〈vk+1, θk+1, w, z · zk+1〉, and since wk = w0 z∼~X , ~U ,~A w,
they in particular agree on all edge conditions as they do not contain any of the ~X , ~U , ~A.
Therefore 〈vk, θk, wk, z · zk〉 G−→ 〈vk+1, θk+1, wk, z · zk+1〉.
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• wk+1, z · zk |= LocCons[ϕ]↓:
– (5.88):
Let w0, z · zk |= ψi↓θ′. By (A.25), w, z · zk, pik |= ψiθ′, therefore by the semantics
w, z · zk, pik |= (φi U ψi)θ′, hence again by (A.25) w0, z · zk |= U (~xi)θ′.
– (5.89):
Let w0, z · zk |= Ui(~xi)θ′ ∧ ¬ψi↓θ′. By (A.25), w, z · zk, pik |= (φi U ψi)θ′ ∧ ¬ψiθ′,
therefore by the semantics w, z ·zk, pik |= φiθ′, hence again by (A.25) w0, z ·zk |= φi↓θ′.
• wk+1, z · zk |= Trans[ϕ]↓apk+1 :
– (5.90):
w0, z · zk |= Xj(~xj)θ′
iff w, z · zk |= Xφjθ′ (by construction)
iff w, z · zk+1 |= φjθ′ (by the semantics)
iff w0, z · zk+1 |= φj↓θ′ (by (A.25))
iff w0, z · zk |= [pk+1]φj↓θ′ (by the semantics)
– (5.91):
w0, z · zk |= Ui(~xi)θ′
iff w, z · zk, pik |= (φi U ψi)θ′ (by (A.25))
iff w, z · zk, pik |= ψiθ′ or w, z · zk, pik |= φiθ′
and w, z · zk+1, pik+1 |= (φi U ψi)θ′ (by the semantics)
iff w0, z · zk |= ψi↓θ′ or w0, z · zk |= φi↓θ′ and w0, z · zk+1 |= U (~xi)θ′ (by (A.25))
iff w0, z · zk |= ψi↓θ′ ∨ φi↓θ′ ∧ [pk+1]U (~xi)θ′ (by the semantics)
Finally, the property remains to be shown that for all k ≥ 0 there is some l ≥ k such that
w0, z · zl |= AccAll [ϕ]. Suppose not, then there is some smallest k ≥ 0 such that for all l ≥ k,
w0, z · zl 6|= AccAll [ϕ]. Using that w0, z · zl |= Σ~Apost(pl+1), this implies that for all such l ≥ k and
all i,
w0, z · zl |= [pl+1]Ai(~xi) ≡ (Accept i↓ ∨Ai(~xi))(A.26)
according to (5.101). Furthermore, suppose that k > 0, then w0, z · zk−1 |= AccAll [ϕ], and by
(A.26) also w0, z · zk |= AccAll [ϕ], contradicting our assumption. Therefore it must be that
k = 0. Note that by (A.26), the extensions of the Ai are monotonically non-decreasing: Once
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Ai(~n) gets true in w0, zl+1 due to w0, z · zl |= Accept i↓~xi~n , it will be that Ai(~n) will hold in all
w0, zl′ with l
′ ≥ l. There is thus at least some i and some ~n such that Accept i↓~xi~n never holds in
any w0, zl′ . By (A.25), this means that for all l
′ ≥ 0, w, z · zl′ |= (φi U ψi)~xi~n ∧ ¬ψi~xi~n , which is
impossible in our semantics. Contradiction.
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Appendix B
Examples
B.1 Complete Example 5.35
L0 = {〈v0, ϕ〉, 〈v1, ϕ〉, 〈v2, ϕ〉}
First Iteration
• Pre[v0, L0]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]ϕ] ∨
R[∃x.¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(selectRequest(x)) ∧ [selectRequest(x)]ϕ] ∨
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ]ϕ]
≡ ∃a∃x′(a = requestCoffee(x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ >) ∨
∃x(¬Empty(queue) ∧ x 6= e ∧ IsFirst(queue, x) ∧ ⊥) ∨
Empty(queue) ∧ > ∧ >
≡ LastFree(queue) ∨ ⊥ ∨ Empty(queue)
≡ ∃x1(queue = 〈x1, e〉) ∨ queue = 〈e, e〉
≡ ∃x1(queue = 〈x1, e〉)
≡ LastFree(queue)
• Pre[v1, L0]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]ϕ] ∨ R[Poss(pickupCoffee) ∧ [pickupCoffee]ϕ]
≡ ∃x′(a = rC (x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ >) ∨ ¬HoldingCoffee ∧ >
≡ LastFree(queue) ∨ ¬HoldingCoffee
280 B EXAMPLES
• Pre[v2, L0]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a]ϕ] ∨ R[Poss(bringCoffee(x)) ∧ [bringCoffee(x)]ϕ]
≡ ∃a∃x′(a = rC (x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ >) ∨ HoldingCoffee ∧ >
≡ LastFree(queue) ∨ HoldingCoffee
L1 = L0 And Pre[Gδ, L0]
= {〈v0, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue)〉, 〈v1, ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨ ¬HC )〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨HC )〉 }
Second Iteration
• Pre[v0, L1]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue))] ∨
R[∃x.¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(sR(x)) ∧ [sR(x)](ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨ ¬HC ))] ∨
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue))]
≡ ∃a∃x′(a = rC (x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧
> ∧ ∃x1Enqueue(queue, x′, 〈x1, e〉) ∨
∃x(¬Empty(queue) ∧ x 6= e ∧ IsFirst(queue, x) ∧ ⊥ ∧ (· · · )) ∨
Empty(queue) ∧ > ∧ > ∧ LastFree(queue)
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ ∃x′∃x1(queue = 〈e, e〉 ∧ x′ = x1) ∨ ⊥ ∨ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue) ∨ ⊥ ∨ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue)
• Pre[v1, L1]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨ ¬HC ))] ∨
R[Poss(pickupCoffee) ∧ [pickupCoffee](ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨HC ))]
≡ ∃a∃x′(a = rC (x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧
> ∧ (∃x1Enqueue(queue, x′, 〈x1, e〉) ∨ ¬HC ) ∨
¬HC ∧ > ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨ >)
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨ ¬HC ) ∨ ¬HC
≡ Empty(queue) ∨ ¬HoldingCoffee
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• Pre[v2, L1]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨HC ))] ∨
R[Poss(bringCoffee(x)) ∧ [bringCoffee(x)](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue))]
≡ ∃a∃x′(a = rC (x′) ∧ x′ 6= e ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧
> ∧ (∃x1Enqueue(queue, x′, 〈x1, e〉) ∨HC ) ∨
HC ∧ > ∧ LastFree(queue)
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨HC ) ∨ HC ∧ LastFree(queue)
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨HoldingCoffee)
L2 = L1 And Pre[Gδ, L1]
= {〈v0, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨ ¬HC ) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨ ¬HC)〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ (LastFree(queue) ∨HC ) ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨HC )〉 }
≡ {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨ ¬HC )〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨HC )〉 }
Third Iteration
• Pre[v0, L2]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))] ∨
R[∃x.¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(sR(x)) ∧ [sR(x)](ϕ ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨ ¬HC ))] ∨
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))]
≡ ⊥ ∨ ⊥ ∨ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue)
• Pre[v1, L2]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨ ¬HC ))] ∨
R[Poss(pC ) ∧ [pC ](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨HC ))]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ > ∧ (⊥ ∨ ¬HC ) ∨
¬HC ∧ > ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨ >)
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC ∨ ¬HC ∧ LastFree(queue)
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee
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• Pre[v2, L2]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨HC ))] ∨
R[Poss(bringCoffee(x)) ∧ [bringCoffee(x)](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue))]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ (⊥ ∨HC ) ∨
HC ∧ > ∧ LastFree(queue)
≡ Empty(queue) ∧HC ∨ HC ∧ LastFree(queue)
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee
L3 = L2 And Pre[Gδ, L2]
= {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨ ¬HC ) ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ (Empty(queue) ∨HC ) ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧HC 〉 }
≡ {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧HC )〉 }
Fourth Iteration
• Pre[v0, L3]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))] ∨
R[∃x.¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(sR(x)) ∧ [sR(x)](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC )] ∨
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))]
≡ ⊥ ∨ ⊥ ∨ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue)
• Pre[v1, L3]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC )] ∨
R[Poss(pC ) ∧ [pC ](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧HC )]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC ∨
¬HC ∧ > ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ >
≡ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC ∨ ¬HC ∧ LastFree(queue)
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee
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• Pre[v2, L3]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧HC )] ∨
R[Poss(bringCoffee(x)) ∧ [bringCoffee(x)](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC ∨
HC ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue) ∧HC ∨ HC ∧ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee
L4 = L3 And Pre[Gδ, L3]
= {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧HC ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC 〉 }
≡ {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC )〉 }
Fifth Iteration
• Pre[v0, L4]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))] ∨
R[∃x.¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(sR(x)) ∧ [sR(x)](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC )] ∨
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))]
≡ ⊥ ∨ ⊥ ∨ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue)
• Pre[v1, L4]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC )] ∨
R[Poss(pC ) ∧ [pC ](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC )]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC ∨
¬HC ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ >
≡ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC ∨ ¬HC ∧ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee
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• Pre[v2, L4]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC )] ∨
R[Poss(bringCoffee(x)) ∧ [bringCoffee(x)](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ > ∧ ⊥ ∧HC ∨
HC ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue)
≡ ⊥ ∨ HC ∧ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee
L5 = L4 And Pre[Gδ, L4]
= {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ LastFree(queue) ∧ ¬HC ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC 〉 }
≡ {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC )〉 }
Sixth Iteration
• Pre[v0, L5]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))] ∨
R[∃x.¬Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(sR(x)) ∧ [sR(x)](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC )] ∨
R[Empty(queue) ∧ Poss(wait) ∧ [wait ](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))]
≡ ⊥ ∨ ⊥ ∨ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue)
• Pre[v1, L5]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC )] ∨
R[Poss(pC ) ∧ [pC ](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC )]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ > ∧ ⊥ ∧ ¬HC ∨
¬HC ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ >
≡ ⊥ ∨ ¬HC ∧ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HoldingCoffee
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• Pre[v2, L5]
≡ R[∃a.Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a) ∧ [a](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC )] ∨
R[Poss(bringCoffee(x)) ∧ [bringCoffee(x)](ϕ ∧ Empty(queue))]
≡ LastFree(queue) ∧ > ∧ ⊥ ∧HC ∨
HC ∧ > ∧ Empty(queue)
≡ ⊥ ∨ HC ∧ Empty(queue)
≡ Empty(queue) ∧HoldingCoffee
L6 = L5 And Pre[Gδ, L5]
= {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC 〉 }
≡ {〈v0, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue)〉,
〈v1, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧ ¬HC 〉,
〈v2, ϕ ∧ Empty(queue) ∧HC )〉 }
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co-referring, 34
Stanford Research Institute, see SRI
state constraint, 21
state update axiom, 14
static, 33
STRIPS, 4, 12, 15, 114
strongest post-condition, 71
successor state axiom, 12, 54, 56
instantiation, 227
strongly context free, 114
wrt an ADL problem, 131
supremum, 217
symbol grounding, 107
synchronization, 180
syntactical preference, 32
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